Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a chase and takedown, a Milwaukee Police Department (MPD officer remained on top of Williams after he was handcuffed. Williams stated, repeatedly that he could not breathe, even after the officer shifted his weight. The officer’s radio transmission was recorded, and Williams can be heard complaining that he could not breathe. Williams, a 22-year-old African American man in good physical shape, went limp when the officers lifted him up. Williams subsequently began sweating and breathing heavily and, when he regained consciousness, would complain of being unable to breathe. Officers did not call for help until several minutes after he was discovered to have no pulse and to have stopped breathing. Williams apparently died in the squad car, leaving three children. The cause of death is disputed. The estate sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court denied a defense motion for summary judgment of qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit remanded for an individual analysis of each officer’s claim of qualified immunity. The court noted material issues of fact concerning whether the officers were on notice of Williams’s serious medical condition; each officer had a different degree of contact with Williams and had different assigned responsibilities with respect to the apprehension of Williams and investigation of the alleged armed robbery. View "Estate of Williams, v. Cline" on Justia Law

Cotton was visiting his sister, Kimberly when he scuffled with three men. Cotton was beaten and shot; he died from the gunshot wounds. Milton and another were tried separately as parties to first‐degree reckless homicide. Four eye‐witnesses testified: Kimberly, her son James (age 18), Howard, and Jones. James initially stated that he saw the scene after the shooting. At trial, James testified to having seen both the beating and the shooting. He identified Milton first in a photo array, in a post‐indictment lineup, and at trial. Howard testified that he saw the fight through a window. He identified Milton in a lineup but could not identify anyone from a photo array. Jones testified that he could hear the argument from his home, but changed his story about identifying the perpetrators. The prosecution also presented a bullet casing found outside Milton’s home that matched a casing found at the shooting and a bandana found in Milton’s bedroom that matched a bandana described by Jones and Howard. One expert testified that the bullet casings came from the same gun; a detective opined that the comparison would be inconclusive without the actual gun, which was never recovered. Milton had participated, without counsel, in a live lineup viewed by the witnesses, despite having invoked his right to counsel. Wisconsin courts rejected his claims on appeal, stating that Milton did not meet the “burden to show that he did not waive his right to counsel at the lineup.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. The jury was aware of variations in witness testimony and still voted to convict. Under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), it lay within the bounds of reason to conclude that the evidence was so compelling that the probability of an acquittal if the lineup were suppressed, was negligible. View "Milton v. Boughton" on Justia Law

JTE, distributed products for Bimbo around Chicago under an agreement with no fixed duration that could be terminated in the event of a non-curable or untimely-cured breach. New York law governed all disputes. According to JTE, Bimbo began fabricating curable breaches in 2008 in a scheme to force JTE out as its distributor and install a less-costly distributor. Bimbo employees filed false reports of poor service and out-of-stock products in JTE’s distribution area and would sometimes remove products from store shelves, photograph the empty shelves as “proof” of a breach, and then return the products to their shelves. Once, a distributor caught a Bimbo manager in the act of fabricating a photograph. Bimbo assured JTE that this would never happen again. In 2011, Bimbo unilaterally terminated JTE’s agreement, citing the fabricated breaches, and forced JTE to sell its rights to new distributors. JTE claims that it did not learn about the scheme until 2013-2014. The district court dismissed JTE’s suit for breach of contract and tortious interference. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Under the primary-purpose test, the agreement qualifies as a contract for the sale of goods, governed by the UCC’s four-year statute of limitations, not by the 10-year period for other written contracts. With respect to tortious interference, the court reasoned that JTE knew about the shelving incidents and should not have “slumber[ed] on [its] rights” until it determined the exact way in which it was harmed. View "Heiman v. Bimbo Foods Bakeries Distribution Co." on Justia Law

In 2002, a Wisconsin jury convicted Reynolds in a fatal carjacking. He unsuccessfully sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254, based on alleged violations of his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel. He claims the state stopped paying his state‐appointed lawyer during his direct appeal and that he received ineffective assistance during his direct appeal and trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Even if his denial‐of‐counsel claim were not procedurally barred, his attorney did not abandon Reynolds. After being told by the State Public Defender that he would not be paid any more for working on Reynolds’s case, the attorney continued to represent Reynolds for free in the state court of appeals, completing the briefing there and seeking review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. The court rejected an alternative argument that Reynolds was denied the effective assistance of counsel when the Public Defender’s Office created a conflict of interest by ceasing to pay his lawyer while also informing him that he would no longer receive new case assignments. The state court did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent in holding that a missed opportunity to raise an equal protection challenge to the state carjacking statute in an already-untimely fashion was not an “adverse effect”; Reynolds’s claim cannot meet the stringent standard of section 2254(d)(1). View "Reynolds v. Hepp" on Justia Law

Oshkosh inmate Lanaghan reported to Health Services on November 21 and was treated only for a rash. He received four further treatments but increasingly experienced problems with activities of daily living, and was rushed to the hospital on December 6. Diagnosed with a rare muscle disease, he returned a week later with medication. His conditions worsened. He was no longer eating or sleeping; he could not sit up, lay down, or move. On December 20, he attempted to prepare an inmate complaint form regarding inadequate treatment. In a wheelchair, he was transported to Oshkosh’s dayroom, for assistance, unable to write. All of the recreational tables were occupied. Denied permission to use a study table, Lanaghan was returned to his cell where no visitors were allowed. On December 28, he was hospitalized, for approximately two months. Lanaghan returned to Oshkosh in March 2012 but did not file any grievance. He later decided to file suit and learned that he had to first file an inmate complaint. His July 2 complaint was rejected as untimely. The institutional examiner testified that his condition would have been good cause to extend the filing period but not until July.His civil rights suit was rejected under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies within 14 days, as required by Wisconsin law. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Whether a grievance procedure is unavailable does not depend whether the defendants engaged in affirmative misconduct, but whether Lanaghan was not able to timely file the grievance through no fault of his own. Concluding that nothing prevented him from filing the grievance immediately after he returned to Oshkosh holds Lanaghan responsible for failing to follow a procedure of which he was not aware and which was not in the handbook. View "Lanaghan v. Koch" on Justia Law

Allied offered Robertson a job, but ran a background check before she reported to work. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA) 15 U.S.C. 1681a(d)(1), Robertson claims that Allied violated a requirement to notify her “clear[ly] and conspicuous[ly],” in writing, unadorned by additional information, of its intent to obtain the report and to secure her consent (notice claim). Non‐conviction information appeared in Robertson’s background check. Allied revoked its offer. An employer that relies on a background check for an adverse employment decision must provide the applicant with a copy of the report and a written description of her rights under FCRA before acting. Allied provided neither (adverse action claim). After mediation, the parties reached a tentative settlement. Months later, the Supreme Court held that federal jurisdiction exists only if the plaintiff has alleged an injury that is concrete and particular. Months later, Robertson moved under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) for preliminary approval of the settlement and for certification of two settlement classes. The court rejected, as “simply wrong,” Robertson’s assertion that it could approve the settlement without jurisdiction over the underlying case and dismissed the case for lack of standing. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to the adverse action claim. Allied’s alleged violations of the Act caused Robertson concrete injury. Dismissal of the notice claim was proper because authority to adjudicate must exist before a court can resolve the case, even if that resolution is only a Rule 23(e) fairness hearing, followed by approval of a settlement. View "Robertson v. Allied Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

Alvarenga-Flores, apprehended crossing the U.S. border, gave a “credible fear” interview while he was detained, stating that he was afraid to return to El Salvador, where he is a citizen, because after witnessing a friend's murder, he received threats from the gang members responsible. Alvarenga applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ denied all of relief based on an adverse credibility finding; he also found that Alvarenga’s asylum application was time-barred. The IJ cited inconsistencies in Alvarenga’s testimony about his escapes from gang members who attacked him in a taxi and from gang members who approached him on a bus. Alvarenga had submitted affidavits from his parents; both were written in English, although neither parent speaks English. Alvarenga’s parents lacked firsthand knowledge of the events and “restate[d] things that they can only have heard from [Alvarenga].” The IJ further noted that Alvarenga’s parents could have testified telephonically but did not. The BIA found the discrepancies sufficient to sustain an adverse credibility finding, 8 U.S.C. 1229a(c)(4)(C). The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Substantial evidence supports the decisions of the immigration judge and the Board, and the record does not compel a contrary conclusion. View "Alvarenga-Flores v. Sessions" on Justia Law

During child-custody proceedings, Nixon accused her ex-husband G.G. of physically and sexually assaulting their daughter, S. An Illinois judge limited G.G.’s parental rights to visitation in the presence of another adult while the allegations were being investigated. Nixon concluded that the judge would terminate her parental rights and give G.G. full custody of S. so she left for Canada with S. and remained there even after learning that the judge had given G.G. sole custody. Nixon was convicted of international parental kidnapping, 18 U.S.C.1204, and sentenced to 26 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. It is an affirmative defense that “the defendant was fleeing an incidence or pattern of domestic violence.” Nixon presented evidence that G.G. physically and sexually abused S but S professed love for her father and fear of being alone with her mother. She expressed regret at allowing her mother to persuade her to accuse her father falsely. Nixon did not carry her burden on this defense. The court rejected claims of emotional abuse; the statute speaks of “domestic violence” and requires the defendant to show real domestic violence, not just a belief that violence occurred. Selling a beloved house, demeaning language, failing to provide adequate financial support do not constitute “violence.” View "United States v. Nixon" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Rivera of aiding and abetting a pair of Hobbs Act robberies, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a) and his friend’s use of a firearm during them, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The same jury acquitted him of, or deadlocked on, counts related to three other robberies. Rivera moved for a judgment of acquittal on the four counts of conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to show that he knew in advance that his friend, Thomas, would commit the armed robberies or to show that he assisted Thomas during them. Alternatively, he asked for a new trial on the ground that the jury should have disregarded Thomas’s testimony—the key evidence at trial—because Thomas was an unbelievable witness and the remaining evidence was too weak to support the convictions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient and that the district judge reasonably concluded that concerns about Thomas’s credibility did not warrant a new trial. The court noted testimony by Rivera’s girlfriend, with whom the two lived, and surveillance videos. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

An Indiana judge appointed Stochel as receiver for Tip Top Supermarkets, while its proprietors were embroiled in protracted litigation. Over several years Stochel stole more than $330,000 from the receivership. Stochel evaded detection by diverting funds from other sources to pay bills. As the litigation and receivership were winding down, the principals had suspicions and asked the court to appoint an independent auditor. The judge ordered Stochel to turn over the receivership’s files. To delay discovery, Stochel moved to vacate the order, falsely stating that the receivership had sufficient funds to pay the auditor and claiming that he needed more time to assemble the records. The judge removed Stochel as the receiver; the auditor uncovered the fraud. Stochel was charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, based on Stochel’s motion, which he had mailed to the court; the indictment alleged that the motion perpetuated the fraudulent scheme by delaying the detection of Stochel’s embezzlement. The district judge imposed a sentence of 24 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence’ the denial of credit for acceptance of responsibility, U.S.S.G. 3E1.1(a); the loss-amount calculation, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(G); and the application of a two-level enhancement for violating a judicial order, U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(9)(C). View "United States v. Stochel" on Justia Law