Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hotel Coleman owned a Holiday Inn Express franchise. Vaughn ran daily operations, including hiring, supervising, and discharging employees, and determining compensation. Frey and other Hotel workers were on Hotel Coleman’s payroll; the management agreement stated that all personnel “are in the employ of” the Hotel. Vaughn hired Frey in 2008. Frey alleged that Vaughn subjected her to unwelcome sexual comments and advances. Frey objected and complained to the housekeeping manager, but the behavior went unchecked. After Frey informed Vaughn that she was pregnant, Vaughn reduced her hours and took other steps in retaliation. During Frey’s maternity leave, she filed a charge with the EEOC. One week after she returned from leave, Vaughn fired her for allegedly stealing another employee’s phone. Frey sued under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The court accepted Vaughn’s argument that it was not an employer; granted Vaughn summary judgment on Frey’s sexual harassment, pregnancy discrimination, and Title VII retaliation claims; and entered summary judgment against Hotel Coleman. A jury awarded Frey $45,000 in compensatory damages; the court awarded her $13,520 in back pay. The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding that Vaughn was a joint employer. The existence of a joint employment relationship is analyzed under an “economic realities” test which considers the extent of the employer’s control over the worker; the kind of occupation and skill required; responsibility for the costs of operation; method of payment and benefits; and length of job commitment or expectations. View "Frey v. Hotel Coleman" on Justia Law

On March 18, 2011, Manuel was arrested charged with possessing unlawful drugs. He was held in jail pending trial; on May 4, 2011 the prosecutor dismissed all charges after concluding that the pills Manuel had been carrying were legal. On April 22, 2013, Manuel filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The next day he was released. In 2017, the Supreme Court held that Manuel is entitled to seek damages on the ground that detention without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment and remanded the question whether Manuel sued in time. Illinois law gave Manuel two years from the claim’s accrual but federal law defines when a claim accrues. The Seventh Circuit determined that the claim was timely. Manuel’s claim accrued on May 5, when he was released from custody. While many Fourth Amendment cases concern pre-custody events that can be litigated without awaiting vindication on the criminal charges, Manuel contests the propriety of his detention. When a wrong is ongoing rather than discrete, the limitations period does not commence until the wrong ends. Fourth Amendment malicious prosecution is the wrong characterization of Manuel’s case; the problem is wrongful custody. A claim cannot accrue until the would-be plaintiff is entitled to sue, yet the existence of detention forbids a suit for damages contesting that detention’s validity. View "Manuel v. City of Joliet" on Justia Law

Rhodes was convicted of first‐degree intentional homicide and first‐degree recklessly endangering safety for shooting two victims, killing Davis. The prosecution’s theory was that Rhodes and his brother shot Davis, who was an ex‐boyfriend of their sister, Nari, and that the other victim was at the wrong place at the wrong time. Nari had suffered a severe beating the day before Davis was murdered. Nari’s direct testimony focused on her injuries from the beating the day before. When Rhodes tried to cross‐examine Nari to rebut the motive theory, the judge limited the questioning and did not allow evidence of prior beatings. In 2010, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed Rhodes’s conviction, finding that his Confrontation Clause rights were violated and that the violation was not harmless. The Wisconsin Supreme Court reversed and reinstated the conviction in 2011. Rhodes then sought federal habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The district court agreed that Rhodes had shown a clear Confrontation Clause violation but found that the violation was harmless. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The state courts violated clearly established federal law in violating Rhodes’s Confrontation Clause rights. Given the importance of the motive issue and the overall balance of evidence in the trial, the constitutional error was not harmless. View "Rhodes v. Dittmann" on Justia Law

Packgen's customer, CRI, required a new type of intermediate bulk container (IBC) for a chemical catalyst used in refining crude oil into other petroleum products. The new IBC's outer surface consisted primarily of polypropylene fabric rather than metal; it could be collapsed for storage. CRI's catalyst is self-heating and can ignite when exposed to oxygen. Packgen engaged Berry to manufacture a laminate of woven polypropylene chemically bonded to aluminum foil, to strengthen the IBC’s exterior and serve as a barrier to oxygen, ultraviolet light, and infrared radiation. By April 2008, Packgen was selling an average of 1,261 IBCs per month to CRI and was making overtures to other petroleum refiners. While CRI personnel were lifting an IBC full of catalyst, the foil layer separated from the polypropylene, exposing the interior lining. Other failures followed, some resulting in fires. Packgen determined that foil laminate obtained from Berry was defective. CRI canceled pending orders and destroyed and refused to pay for IBCs that Packgen had provided. Word reached other potential Packgen customers. Packgen sued Berry. The First Circuit affirmed an award of $7.2 million in damages. Berry unsuccessfully demanded that Illinois National indemnify it for all but the first $1 million, which Berry’s primary liability insurer agreed to cover. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Illinois National. The policy covers damages that Berry is required to pay “because of … Property Damage.” While some portion of the lost profits award might be attributable to property damage, Berry did not attempt to make that showing. View "Berry Plastics Corp. v. Illinois National Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Suppo, a Costco employee, was stalked by Thompson, a Costco customer, and secured a plenary no-contact order from an Illinois state court. Traumatized by the experience, she also took an unpaid medical leave. When she did not return to work, Costco terminated her employment. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) sued Costco on Suppo’s behalf, alleging that Costco had subjected her to a hostile work environment by tolerating Thompson’s harassment. After the jury rendered a verdict in the EEOC’s favor. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. A reasonable jury could conclude that Thompson’s conduct was severe or pervasive enough to render Suppo’s work environment hostile. Suppo cannot recover backpay for the period of time after Costco fired her, but the court should have considered whether Suppo was entitled to backpay for some or all of her time on unpaid medical leave. View "Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

Cleven worked as a City of Madison stagehand, classified as an independent contractor and not enrolled in the Wisconsin Retirement System. In 2006, a union sought to represent the stagehands. The Employment Relations Commission found that they were not independent contractors and ordered an election. The city agreed to review the stagehands’ hours to determine whether they qualified for enrollment in the System, determined that Cleven qualified as of December 2009, and agreed to pay the stagehands’ share of the required contribution starting in 2010. There was no agreement concerning the period before the labor agreement. The state Employee Trust Funds Board concluded that Cleven was eligible to enroll in 1983, but declined to decide who was responsible for paying the past‐due employee contribution. State courts declined his efforts to seek judicial review. In the meantime, the city did not report his hours and earnings. Cleven sought mandamus relief. In 2016, the state court ordered the city to “immediately” report his enrollment as a participating employee as of 1983. The city complied; the System invoiced the city for the employer and employee contributions. After the city paid, it joined parallel litigation about whether the stagehands owed the past‐due employee contribution; its appeal is pending. Cleven sued the city and city employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated his due process rights because he wanted to retire in 2011, but the delay in reporting his hours forced him to wait until 2016, holding his benefits "hostage” without a pre-deprivation hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the city. If there was a deprivation of property, Cleven’s ability to seek a writ of mandamus was adequate post-deprivation process. View "Cleven v. Soglin" on Justia Law

In 2008, Standard sued, on behalf of itself and “all others similarly situated," alleging that was injured when it “purchased several items of steel tubing [at an inflated price] indirectly … for end use," claiming that eight U.S. steel producers colluded to slash output to drive up the price of steel so that plaintiffs overpaid for steel sheets, rods, and tubing. Eight years later, the plaintiffs amended their complaint, asserting that they overpaid for end-use consumer goods, including vehicles, washing machines, and refrigerators, that were manufactured by third parties using steel. The district court dismissed the suit as time-barred because it redefines “steel products” to give rise to an entirely different, and exponentially larger, universe of plaintiffs, and, in the alternative, for not plausibly pleading a causal connection between the alleged antitrust conspiracy and plaintiffs’ own injuries. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable defendant, reading the original complaint, would have imagined that plaintiffs were actually suing over the thousands of end-use household and commercial goods manufactured by third parties—a reading so broad that it would make nearly every person in the country a potential class member. The court further noted that it was unclear how to trace the effect of an alleged overcharge on steel through the complex supply and production chains that gave rise to consumer products. View "Supreme Auto Transport, LLC v. Arcelor Mittal USA, Inc." on Justia Law

A cocaine courier arrested by Indianapolis police stated that a major customer of his distributor, Colon, lived in a certain apartment complex; he had seen Colon deliver drugs to the customer there and at Colon’s store and provided a general physical description. Officers saw Stewart visit Colon's store, making no purchase. Stewart lived in the apartment complex and had felony drug convictions. Officers followed Stewart to a gas station. Another man exited a parked car and got into Stewart’s car. Minutes later, the man left. Officers, believing that they had witnessed a drug sale, called Detective Ball, who traveled with Josie, a dog trained to detect illegal drugs. Three detectives saw Stewart fail to stop at a red light. Ball pulled Stewart over. Stewart declined to allow a search. Stewart identified a bulge in his pocket as $700 in cash. Five minutes into the stop, Ball requested backup, continuing to work on the traffic violation. Approximately eight minutes later, backup arrived. Ball then walked Josie around Stewart’s car. Josie alerted after 105 seconds. An officer was still working on the ticket. Ball inspected the car's interior, immediately finding a handgun close to the driver’s seat. Stewart was a convicted felon, so Ball arrested Stewart and gave him Miranda warnings, then continued his search. The trunk contained crack cocaine, powder cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, a digital scale, and $7,420 in cash, plus $1,904 in Stewart’s pocket. Given his Miranda warnings again at the station, Stewart signed a waiver and made incriminating statements that were recorded. A warranted search of Stewart’s home yielded additional cocaine, methamphetamine, heroin, four handguns, and $487,542 in cash. Convicted under 21 U.S.C. 841 and 851; 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 18 U.S.C. 924(c); 18 U.S.C. 1957; and 18 U.S.C. 1956(a)(1), Stewart’s sentence was life imprisonment without parole. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of motions to suppress the evidence obtained during and as a result of the traffic stop and the confession and to limit the use of evidence of Stewart's visits to Colon’s store. There was reasonable suspicion to support any delay in obtaining a dog sniff. The money laundering convictions were supported by substantial evidence. View "United States v. Stewart" on Justia Law

In 2008 Indiana University hired Haynes, who is black, as an assistant professor, funding most of his salary through the Strategic Recruitment Fund, which facilitates "recruitment of underrepresented minorities and women into the professoriate.” Haynes had a six-year probationary contract. Tenure candidates are evaluated on research, teaching, and service and must be “excellent” in one area and “satisfactory” in the others. In 2013, Haynes submitted his tenure dossier, selecting research as his "excellence" performance area. The committee voted 6–3 against tenure. The dean wrote that “the committee questioned the extent of Dr. Haynes’[s] impact based on low citation numbers and low numbers of publications in high-quality journals” and that Haynes’s “evaluations ha[d] been mixed[] and particularly low in the online courses” and failed to show “significant improvement.” The university-wide Tenure Advisory Committee voted unanimously against tenure; 18 of 27 faculty members found his teaching unsatisfactory and 19 found his research not excellent. Haynes sued under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the University, upholding the exclusion of Haynes’s proffered expert reports for lack of “specialized knowledge.” A plaintiff needs compelling evidence that “clear discrimination” pervasively infected the tenure decision; this case was “not a close one.” Regardless of the finer points of academic tenure and its intersection with anti-discrimination law. Haynes lacks any evidence that the University denied tenure because he is black. View "Haynes v. Indiana University" on Justia Law

Foster planned, with Hill and Anderson, to rob a credit union. Foster supplied the guns, drove the others to the location, and waited nearby while they entered. Hill directed a teller to empty the cash drawers and threatened to shoot her if she pressed any alarms. Anderson held another employee at gunpoint and ordered him to empty the vault. Anderson stated: “Nobody move for ten minutes. I got a bomb and I’ll blow this place up.” They took approximately $250,000 and met Foster to split the proceeds. Foster pocketed around $100,000. Foster was convicted of armed robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), (d); using a firearm during a crime of violence, section 924(c)(1)(A)(i); and possessing a firearm as a felon, section 922(g) and was sentenced to 284 months’ imprisonment. Foster later successfully moved to vacate his sentence, in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson (2015) decision. His prior conviction for burglary no longer qualified as a predicate offense under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Applying a two‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(2)(F) based on Hill’s threat to shoot and Anderson’s threat to detonate a bomb, his guidelines range was 97-121 months. Without that enhancement, the range was 78-97 months. The court imposed concurrent sentences of 121 months for the robbery and felon‐in‐possession convictions plus a 60‐month mandatory consecutive term for the 924(c) conviction. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Application Note 4 to U.S.S.G. 2K2.4 prohibits any death‐threat enhancement where a defendant also received a sentence for a firearms offense under 18 U.S.C. 924(c). View "United States v. Foster" on Justia Law