Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Seventh Circuit denied a “Request for Judicial Notice,” publishing an “explanation in the hope of forestalling other, similar applications, which recently have increased in frequency.” Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) permits a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute” because it is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The “Request” asked the court to take judicial notice of four documents. Two are orders entered by a Wisconsin state court, which are public records and appropriate subjects of judicial notice. The third is a power of attorney filed in state court. The fact that a document is in a court’s record does not make it an appropriate subject of notice; its provenance may be disputed. The fourth document is a motion filed in the same state case, which is not evidence of an adjudicative fact. The court further noted that the right place to propose judicial notice, in a court of appeals, is in a brief. When evidence is “not subject to reasonable dispute” there is no need to multiply the paperwork by filing “Requests.” If a brief proposes judicial notice, any objection can be presented in a responsive brief. View "In re: Lisse" on Justia Law

Lincolnshire's Ordinance 15-3389-116 Section 4 bans union-security agreements within the village by forbidding any requirement that workers join a union, compensate a union financially or make payments to third parties in lieu of such contributions and bars any requirement that employees “be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared for employment by or through a labor organization.” Section 5 prohibits employers from making payments to unions on a worker’s behalf except under a “signed written authorization” that may be revoked by the employee at any time by written notice. The Ordinance provides civil remedies and criminal penalties for its violation. Unions sued, asserting preemption by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The district court entered summary judgment, finding that all of the unions had standing to challenge the membership and fee provisions and the checkoff regulation (section 5), but that only one union could challenge the section 4 prohibition of hiring halls. The Seventh Circuit agreed. The district court also held that all three provisions were preempted and that the unions failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Localities may not address the subjects of hiring halls or dues checkoffs. The authority conferred in 29 U.S.C. 14(b)), allowing states to bar compulsory union membership as a condition of employment, does not extend to political subdivisions. View "International Union of Operating Engineers v. Village of Lincolnshire" on Justia Law

Mohsin and Khan pleaded guilty to conspiring to sell drugs (commonly known as synthetic marijuana) misbranded as incense or potpourri (18 U.S.C. 371) during approximately eight months in 2011 from a store Mohsin owned in the Fox Valley Mall in Aurora, Illinois. A customer died in an auto accident after smoking the product. In their plea agreements, Mohsin and Khan admitted that the synthetic marijuana products they sold contained inadequate consumer warnings, failed to identify the products’ active ingredients, and were mislabeled in an effort to mislead regulators regarding the products’ status as drugs—all in violation of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act. The district court found that the defendants consciously or recklessly disregarded the risk that the mislabeled products could cause death or serious injury, significantly increasing their advisory ranges under U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(15)(A). The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for resentencing. The record before the district court, while supporting a conclusion that Mohsin and Khan knew customers (and perhaps teenagers) were smoking the products to obtain marijuana‐like highs, did not support a determination that either Mohsin or Khan knew the products presented lethal risks to users. View "United States v. Khan" on Justia Law

The Affordable Care Act’s three premium‐stabilization programs were designed to redistribute money among insurance companies and mitigate each company’s exposure to market risks, 42 U.S.C. 18061–18063. The Department of Health and Human Service (HHS) intended to implement these programs in a budget‐neutral way paying out only the funds that each program had taken in from other insurance companies. Land of Lincoln participated in these premium‐stabilization programs and incurred a debt of roughly $32 million but HHS owed Land of Lincoln over $70 million. HHS was not able to pay what it owed because it was taking in far less money than expected, and it refused to dip into its discretionary funds. Like other insurance companies, Land of Lincoln sought the overdue payments in an unsuccessful suit. Land of Lincoln became insolvent and began liquidation. Despite an Illinois court order, HHS began to offset its overdue payments against Land of Lincoln’s debt, as its own regulations permitted. The Director of the Illinois Department of Insurance, Land of Lincoln’s appointed liquidator, asked the state court for a declaration that HHS violated the order, but HHS removed the motion to federal district court arguing that the federal government was not subject to state court jurisdiction. The district court remanded the case back to state court relying on a narrow reading of 28 U.S.C. 1442, and principles of abstention. The Seventh Circuit reversed on both grounds and remanded to the district court. View "Hammer v. United States Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law

Union Pacific Railroad hired Griff in the mid-1980s. Griff was promoted from locomotive engineer to management but was fired in 2013 when the railroad discovered that he had falsified safety and training documentation. Griff argued that he was entitled to a hearing under a collective-bargaining agreement (CBA) between Union Pacific and his union. The railroad responded that the agreement did not provide a hearing for supervisory employees. The National Railroad Adjustment Board (45 U.S.C. 153) denied the claim, reasoning that it had already resolved similar disputes between the parties and that nothing in the specific CBA required a different outcome: Griff was not entitled to a pretermination hearing because he was a supervisory employee. The Seventh Circuit affirmed and awarded sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. The union’s arguments are facially untenable and fly in the face of clear precedent. The Board had authority to decide this dispute and properly did so. View "Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers and Trainmen v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Barrett applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income based on limitations from bipolar disorder and alcohol addiction. If an administrative law judge (ALJ) had found him disabled, then Barrett would shoulder the burden of showing that his alcoholism was not material to his disability. An ALJ found that he was not disabled, however, even considering his alcohol addiction, and denied him benefits. The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that the ALJ determined that Barrett’s impairments, including his alcoholism, taken together were at most moderately limiting, and that he could have sustained full-time employment. That conclusion is supported by substantial evidence: Barrett performed in workplace-like settings tasks such as summarizing depositions and medical records and maintaining attendance records of 100 people. He also sat for the LSAT—though the ALJ emphasized his “above-average” score when it was in fact below average, the fact that he sat for the test and achieved the score he did was consistent with someone capable of working. View "Barrett v. Berryhill" on Justia Law

Krier operates a Wisconsin trail-riding facility. Dilley reserved a ride, informing Krier that she had no horseback-riding experience. Dilley was matched with Blue, Krier’s most docile horse. Dilley received no instruction from Krier or his employee, Kremsreiter; neither adjusted the stirrups nor provided a helmet. Kremsreiter rode in front of Dilley. During the ride, Dilley stated that she did not have the reins. Kremsreiter responded, “Don’t worry; this horse knows where it wants [to] go,” and never looked back. Blue attempted to pass Kremsreiter’s horse, which kicked, prompting Blue to rear up. Dilley fell, sustaining a head injury, fractured ribs and vertebra, and a punctured lung. The judge granted the defendants summary judgment. Wisconsin law confers immunity on the sponsors and participants in equine activities for injuries that result from “an inherent risk of equine activities,” including any participant’s negligence. Brown took a riding lesson at a Wisconsin indoor facility, using her own horse. The instructor allowed a second horse and rider to enter the arena, knowing that the second horse was “high spirited” and required a very experienced rider. The instructor directed the rider of the second horse to jump a fence. The horse sped off, leaping out of control, and collided with Brown’s horse. Brown was thrown and sustained leg fractures. Her case was dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed both defense judgments. Dilley’s claims fail because a trail operator’s negligence is an “inherent risk of equine activities” under the statute; no exception applies. The operators reasonably assessed Dilley’s abilities; they did not act in willful or wanton disregard for her safety; the tack they provided was not faulty. Because Brown rode her own horse, an exception that applies when the defendant provides a horse is unavailable. View "Dilley v. Holiday Acres Properties, Inc." on Justia Law

An Illinois jury convicted Czech of first-degree murder and aggravated discharge of a firearm for his role in a gang-related drive-by shooting that resulted in the death of a 14-year-old bystander. Czech argued on direct appeal that his counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the felony murder instruction that was submitted to the jury in conjunction with a general verdict. The Illinois Appellate Court determined that the felony murder instruction violated Illinois law, but concluded the error was harmless. The Supreme Court of Illinois declined further review. The federal district court denied 28 U.S.C. 2254 relief, reasoning that, although the conviction violated clearly established federal law, the error did not have a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In 2004, when the Illinois court affirmed the conviction, no Supreme Court precedent clearly established that a conviction entered on a general verdict was unconstitutional merely because the jury instructions included a legal theory that was invalid under state law Even subsequent law did not expressly hold that instructing a jury on multiple theories of guilt, one of which is legally improper, is a constitutional error. In addition, Czech is not entitled to relief because, even if constitutional error were shown, the error was harmless: a properly instructed jury would have delivered the same verdict. View "Czech v. Melvin" on Justia Law

Bradford was convicted of conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846; transfer of a firearm to a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(d)(1); two counts of distribution of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C); possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, section 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(D); and possession of a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The jury acquitted him of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his challenge to the denial of his motion to suppress evidence recovered in a search of his home pursuant to a warrant. Bradford claimed that the warrant application relied on statements from a confidential informant but omitted information damaging to the informant’s credibility. The informant’s information was quite detailed and robustly corroborated with ample additional evidence from the ATF’s investigation. Considering the warrant application as a whole, the omission of facts bearing negatively on the informant’s credibility was not fatal to the probable-cause finding. The court also upheld the denial of his pretrial motion to exclude evidence that he used the firearms seized in the search or directed others to use them; Rule 403 is a balancing test and there was no plain error. View "United States v. Bradford" on Justia Law

Hrobowski was convicted of federal firearms offenses in 2006 and sentenced to 264 months’ imprisonment under the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. 924(e) based on prior Illinois state‐law convictions: aggravated battery, second‐degree murder, aggravated discharge of a firearm, and aggravated fleeing from a police officer. Hrobowski first unsuccessfully moved to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel; he then unsuccessfully sought authorization to file a successive petition alleging a "Brady" violation. He then filed an unsuccessful petition under Descamps and Alleyne. Hrobowski then sought authorization to file a successive section 2255 petition following the U.S. Supreme Court’s Johnson decision, invalidating ACCA’s residual clause. Petitions based on Johnson errors generally satisfy the requirement for filing a successive section 2255 petition: the Johnson decision was a new rule of constitutional law, and the Supreme Court made the rule retroactive. Hrobowski claimed that he was discharged from the second‐degree murder conviction in 1998 and from the aggravated discharge of a firearm conviction in 2002 and that his civil rights were fully restored. The Seventh Circuit affirmed denial of the petition. One prior conviction was based on the residual clause but the Johnson violation was harmless as Hrobowski had three other prior violent felonies. His claim that two of his other convictions should not be considered prior violent felonies because his rights were restored is procedurally barred. View "Hrobowski v. United States" on Justia Law