Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Iowa closed the Iowa Girls State Training School. Palmer, Director of the Iowa Department of Human Services, subsequently contracted to use the Wisconsin Girls State Training School (Copper Lake). Plaintiffs claim that, since its 2011 opening, Cooper Lake “has had a very high turnover rate of employees,” leading to “over-worked and untrained staff” and has received criticism from Wisconsin judges regarding its “sordid” and “inhumane” treatment of juveniles. Iowa juvenile courts ordered Plaintiffs to be placed at Copper Lake in 2015. Both were 16 years old. Plaintiffs claim that Copper Lake subjected them to prolonged “isolation,” and that they received little or no educational instruction. Both attempted suicide. Plaintiffs also claim they were subjected to excessive force and that staff sprayed them with mace on multiple occasions. Plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for cruel and unusual punishment, excessive force, and deprivation of due process. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of their claims. The district court acted prematurely in deciding Palmer’s entitlement to qualified immunity at the motion to dismiss stage. At the time plaintiffs were allegedly in Palmer’s custody, isolation of pre-trial juvenile detainees not “reasonably related to a legitimate governmental objective”could rise to the level of a constitutional violation. On the record, it is impossible to determine whether such a constitutional violation occurred in plaintiffs’ cases. View "Reed v. Palmer" on Justia Law

Secret Service agents used a peer‐to‐peer sharing network to download eight images of child pornography from a computer using an internet protocol address assigned to Burrows’s home, then executed a search warrant. A forensic search of a computer at the residence revealed files received through the peer‐to‐peer sharing program, including videos depicting sexually explicit content of females as young as six years old. Burrows waived his Miranda rights and stated that before deleting his collection 10 days earlier, he had 20-30 movies and several thousand images of child pornography on his computer. Burrows unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A) is unconstitutionally vague. Burrows entered a conditional guilty plea. The court concluded that Burrows’s Guidelines range was 121–155 months’ imprisonment. The court examined the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors, stating that it believed Burrows, age 33, posed a “greater risk to recidivate than other similarly situated individuals” based on his “juvenile history” and “pattern of violent outbursts” but also addressed mitigating factors, including abuse Burrows suffered as a child, and imposed a 121‐month sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that section 2252A “is unconstitutionally vague because it does not distinguish receiving child pornography from possessing it, which does not impose a mandatory minimum sentence.” The court noted that one cannot receive child pornography without possessing it but one can possess child pornography without receiving it View "United States v. Burrows" on Justia Law

In 1999, after deregulation of the energy industry in Illinois, Exelon sold its fossil-fuel power plants to use the proceeds on its nuclear plants and infrastructure. The sales yielded $4.8 billion, $2 billion more than expected. Exelon attempted to defer tax liability on the gains by executing “like-kind exchanges,” 26 U.S.C. 1031(a)(1). Exelon identified its Collins Plant, to be sold for $930 million, with $823 of taxable gain, and its Powerton Plant, to be sold for $870 million ($683 million in taxable gain) for exchanges. Exelon identified as investment candidates a Texas coal-fired plant to replace Collins and Georgia coal-fired plants to replace Powerton. In “sale-and-leaseback” transactions, Exelon leased an out-of-state power plant from a tax-exempt entity for a period longer than the plant’s estimated useful life, then immediately leased the plant back to that entity for a shorter sublease term. and provided to the tax-exempt entity a multi-million-dollar accommodation fee with a fully-funded purchase option to terminate Exelon’s residual interest after the sublease. Exelon asserted that it had acquired a genuine ownership interest in the plants, qualifying them as like-kind exchanges.The Commissioner disallowed the benefits claimed by Exelon, characterizing the transactions as a variant of the traditional sale-in-lease-out (SILO) tax shelters, widely invalidated as abusive tax shelters. The tax court and Seventh Circuit affirmed, applying the substance over form doctrine to conclude that the Exelon transactions failed to transfer to Exelon a genuine ownership interest in the out-of-state plants. In substance Exelon’s transactions resemble loans to the tax-exempt entities. View "Exelon Corp. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Minerva, an Ohio‐based, family‐owned dairy company, produces Amish‐style butters in small, slow‐churned batches using fresh milk supplied by pasture‐raised cows. Minerva challenged Wisconsin’s butter‐grading requirement under the Due Process Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and the dormant Commerce Clause. Wisconsin’s law applies to butter manufactured in‐state and out‐of‐state and provides that butter may be graded by either a Wisconsin‐licensed butter grader or by the USDA. Wisconsin’s standards are materially identical to the USDA’s standards. The district court rejected the challenges on summary judgment, holding that the statute is rationally related to Wisconsin’s legitimate interest in consumer protection and does not discriminate against out‐of‐state businesses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Consumer protection is a legitimate state interest; the butter‐grading requirement is rationally related to the state’s legitimate interest in “protect[ing] the integrity of interstate products so as not to depress the demand for goods that must travel across state lines.” The state presented some evidence that the statute effectively conveys consumer preferences. The statute does not violate the Equal Protection Clause simply because Wisconsin failed to implement mandatory grading for other commodities. Wisconsin’s butter‐grading law confers a competitive advantage on prospective butter-graders who live closer to testing locations but this geographical fact of life does not constitute discrimination against out‐of‐state applicants. View "Minerva Dairy, Inc. v. Harsdorf" on Justia Law

Eight men stole 104 new Ruger firearms, in original packaging, from a cargo train parked in a Chicago rail yard. The men divided the stolen firearms among themselves and sold them on the black market. Most of the guns have not been recovered, but at least 17 have been recovered from crime scenes. The men were charged with possession of a firearm after being convicted of a felony, 18 U.S.C. 922(g); possession of a stolen firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(j); and cargo theft, 18 U.S.C. 659. Shelton pleaded guilty to Counts One and Two. Lewis pleaded guilty to Counts One and Three. Edwards pleaded guilty to Counts One and Two. Walker pleaded guilty to Counts One and Three. All four challenged their sentences, arguing that the court improperly imposed multiple offense-level enhancements under U.S.S.G. 2K2.1 (stolen firearm, trafficking, and other felony offense enhancements) in violation of double counting principles. Shelton challenged the application of three criminal history points for a prior burglary conviction. The Seventh Circuit rejected the arguments and affirmed their below-Guidelines terms of 132 months, 180 months, 120 months, and 150 months, each with three years of supervised release. Any error in calculating Shelton’s criminal history score was harmless, given the below-Guidelines sentence. View "United States v. Shelton" on Justia Law

Gray worked in maintenance for the Vigo County Parks and Recreation Department, cleaning restrooms and directing volunteers. Some volunteers were completing court‐mandated community service; Gray was responsible for signing off on their time‐logs. Gray performed his job with a high degree of autonomy and worked independently of another maintenance specialist assigned to his park. Doe volunteered at that park to complete her court‐ordered community service. She alleges that Gray took her to the park’s restroom and told her that it required cleaning. After locking the door, Gray allegedly forced Doe to perform oral sex and digitally penetrated her vagina. Gray pleaded guilty to criminal confinement and official misconduct. There were a few prior incidents of misconduct by county employees over the past two decades. Some involved sexual misconduct but, apparently, none resulted in coerced sexual activity. One incident involved a vague comment about Gray made by a park visitor; Vigo County could not substantiate the allegation. Another involved inappropriate comments that Gray made to a coworker; Gray received a written reprimand, which caused him to correct his behavior. Doe sued Gray and Vigo County for damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court entered a default against Gray and granted the county summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that the county was neither vicariously liable for Gray’s wrongs nor directly liable for permitting them to occur. View "Doe v. Vigo County" on Justia Law

Santiago was charged with conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 1000 grams or more of heroin and five or more kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846; distribution of heroin, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); and money laundering, 18 U.S.C. 1956. Before trial, Santiago unsuccessfully moved to suppress phone recordings secured through a wiretap under the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. 2510–2520. A jury convicted Santiago on all charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling on the motion to suppress, rejecting arguments that the application incorrectly stated that the investigators did not know his identity, that the application failed to establish that the wiretap was necessary to obtain relevant evidence and that he made a substantial preliminary showing that the application contained a deliberate or reckless misstatement of material fact that required a hearing under Franks v. Delaware. The warrant application’s failure to identify Santiago by his name rather than simply by his nickname did not affect the issuing court’s probable‐cause analysis. The application also established that traditional investigative techniques had been employed, but were unlikely to uncover critical evidence about the targets. Santiago did not make the necessary showing to obtain a Franks hearing. View "United States v. Santiago" on Justia Law

Bolson develops products and processes for use in 3D printing. Soarus is a distributor of specialty polymers, including G-Polymer. In 2009, Bolson and Soarus began discussing Bolson’s acquisition and use of GPolymer in connection with developing a new 3D printing process. Soarus sought to protect its rights in G-Polymer while also allowing for its potential entry into the lucrative 3D printing market. The parties executed a nondisclosure agreement (NDA). Soarus then provided Bolson with confidential information regarding G-Polymer and samples. Shortly after executing the NDA, Bolson filed a provisional patent for the 3D printing process it developed using G-Polymer; the 171 Patent issued in 2013. Soarus claimed that Bolson’s patent application revealed confidential information about G-Polymer, in violation of the NDA. The district court granted Bolson summary judgment, concluding that the plain meaning of the NDA, while conferring generally broad confidentiality protection on Bolson’s use of information about G-Polymer, authorized Bolson to use such confidential information in pursuing a patent in the specific area of the fused deposition method of 3D printing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The NDA clearly authorise Bolson to freely patent and protect new applications of GPolymer in the specified 3D printing process, not confined by the NDA’s confidentiality restrictions. View "Soarus L.L.C. v. Bolson Materials International Corp." on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit denied a “Request for Judicial Notice,” publishing an “explanation in the hope of forestalling other, similar applications, which recently have increased in frequency.” Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b) permits a court to take judicial notice of an adjudicative fact that is “not subject to reasonable dispute” because it is generally known within the trial court’s territorial jurisdiction or can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. The “Request” asked the court to take judicial notice of four documents. Two are orders entered by a Wisconsin state court, which are public records and appropriate subjects of judicial notice. The third is a power of attorney filed in state court. The fact that a document is in a court’s record does not make it an appropriate subject of notice; its provenance may be disputed. The fourth document is a motion filed in the same state case, which is not evidence of an adjudicative fact. The court further noted that the right place to propose judicial notice, in a court of appeals, is in a brief. When evidence is “not subject to reasonable dispute” there is no need to multiply the paperwork by filing “Requests.” If a brief proposes judicial notice, any objection can be presented in a responsive brief. View "In re: Lisse" on Justia Law

Lincolnshire's Ordinance 15-3389-116 Section 4 bans union-security agreements within the village by forbidding any requirement that workers join a union, compensate a union financially or make payments to third parties in lieu of such contributions and bars any requirement that employees “be recommended, approved, referred, or cleared for employment by or through a labor organization.” Section 5 prohibits employers from making payments to unions on a worker’s behalf except under a “signed written authorization” that may be revoked by the employee at any time by written notice. The Ordinance provides civil remedies and criminal penalties for its violation. Unions sued, asserting preemption by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA). The district court entered summary judgment, finding that all of the unions had standing to challenge the membership and fee provisions and the checkoff regulation (section 5), but that only one union could challenge the section 4 prohibition of hiring halls. The Seventh Circuit agreed. The district court also held that all three provisions were preempted and that the unions failed to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Localities may not address the subjects of hiring halls or dues checkoffs. The authority conferred in 29 U.S.C. 14(b)), allowing states to bar compulsory union membership as a condition of employment, does not extend to political subdivisions. View "International Union of Operating Engineers v. Village of Lincolnshire" on Justia Law