Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Duncan fell behind on her car payments, ARS repossessed the vehicle on behalf of the lender, Wells Fargo. Duncan had left some personal items in the car, and when she sought to retrieve them, ARS allegedly demanded $100. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of her suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692f. The $100 charge was not a demand for loan repayment by Duncan, but rather an administrative property-retrieval fee that Wells Fargo had agreed to pay, Duncan was not able to back her allegation that ARS demanded the $100 fee of her with anything beyond her own testimony. ARS backed its contrary testimony with the Receipt for Redeeming Personal Property, which expressly established that Wells Fargo—not Duncan—would make the $100 payment. The same documentary evidence shows that the $100 handling fee was just an administrative expense, not a masked demand for a principal payment to Wells Fargo. View "Duncan v. Asset Recovery Specialists, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2011, Abrego began work as a dental assistant at a VA clinic, with Dr. Strampe. According to Abrego, Strampe “harassed” him, was “short-tempered,” and did not allow him to schedule patients, use computer resources, or make ward visits. In 2012, Abrego was assigned to a new dentist. Abrego claims that Strampe treated his new female assistant more favorably. Abrego received a letter of counseling that referenced three instances of inappropriate conduct; he filed an EEO complaint, alleging race and sex discrimination amounting to a hostile work environment. Although Abrego received “fully successful” ratings on his 2011-2013 performance evaluations, the reviews discussed Abrego’s combative workplace behavior. In 2014, the VA suspended Abrego for illegally recording his supervisor. Abrego filed another EEO complaint, alleging retaliation. In 2014, Abrego had several incidents with his new supervisor, primarily concerning Abrego’s absences and disruptive behavior. Abrego filed another EEO complaint and was terminated. In 2015, the Office of Employment Discrimination Complaint Adjudication rejected the three EEO complaints. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Abrego’s suit. Abrego failed to exhaust administrative remedies on some claims. The evidence “as a whole” does not “permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that [Abrego’s] race [and] sex … caused … [his] adverse employment action. Abrego was terminated for legitimate reasons. The workplace conditions described by Abrego are not objectively offensive, severe, or pervasive. View "Abrego v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

Lake County, Indiana, Sheriff's Department (LCSD) Deputy Orlich, in uniform, and carrying a gun, responded to Zander’s husband’s call, reporting a domestic disturbance. Arriving at the scene, Orlich ordered Zander to leave the home and go to her other house on White Oak Avenue. Zander stated that she could not go there because the electric panel had been dismantled. Orlich's supervisor gave Orlich permission to take Zander to White Oak Avenue, where Orlich turned on the electricity. Orlich told Zander that she could not return to the other house for several hours. About 10-15 minutes after Orlich left, Zander found Orlich standing naked in the house. He attacked Zander sexually and said that he could make Zander’s life difficult if she reported him. Zander filed negligence claims against the Sheriff and intentional tort and civil rights claims against Orlich. The district court granted the Sheriff summary judgment on Zander’s respondeat superior claim and on Zander’s negligent hiring, training, and retention claim because Zander presented no evidence that Buncich knew of the necessity of exerting control to prevent Orlich's sexual misconduct. On Zander’s claims against Orlich, a jury awarded $100,000 in compensatory damages, $275,000 in punitive damages, and attorneys fees and costs totaling $97,267.80. The Seventh Circuit reversed as to Zander’s respondeat superior claim and affirmed as to the negligent hiring claim. Orlich exploited “unique institutional prerogatives of his police employment.” Whether Orlich’s employment gave rise to the abuse of that power is a question of fact for the jury. View "Zander v. Orlich" on Justia Law

In 2007, OFTI sold a mill to TAK. During the financial crunch, Goldman Sachs cut $19 million from the financing. OFTI had promised clean title, but with the reduced financing, was unable to pay off all security interests. TAK agreed to issue negotiable notes, aggregating about $16 million, to OFTI, which would offer them as substitute security. The creditors accepted the notes. The transaction closed. OFTI promised to pay the notes. The lenders who released their security had the credit of both companies behind the notes. TAK was to hire an OFTI construction firm to build new mills; if TAK did not arrange for this construction and did not pay the notes, OFTI could cancel the notes and acquire a 27% interest in TAK. Neither paid the notes. The new mills did not materialize. OFTI demanded a 27% equity interest in TAK. Some formerly secured creditors have not been paid and retain promissory notes; OFTI does not possess any of the notes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. A hold-harmless agreement effectively prevents OFTI from enforcing the notes against TAK; whatever TAK gave to OFTI would be returned in indemnification. The notes were designed as security for third parties, not as compensation for OFTI. Additionally, under Wisconsin’s UCC applicable to negotiable instruments, OFTI is not entitled to enforce the notes because it is not their holder, is not in possession of them, and is not entitled to enforce them under specified sections. If OFTI could use nonpayment as a reason to cancel the notes, they would be worthless to the creditors. View "Tissue Technology LLC v. TAK Investments LLC" on Justia Law

Austin was charged, based on an eight‐year mortgage‐fraud scheme, with bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344; wire fraud, section 1343; aggravated identity theft, section 1028A(a)(l); and obstruction of justice, section 1512(c)(2). Austin allegedly participated in 52 fraudulent mortgage loans, with losses of over $8 million. Nine co-defendants pleaded guilty. On the sixth day of his jury trial, Austin changed his plea. The court confirmed that it was “an oral blind plea” to three counts, confirmed Austin's understanding of the maximum penalties and fines, asked questions to determine Austin’s competence, and explained trial rights that Austin would be waiving. Austin admitted the factual basis for his plea and confirmed that he had spoken to his attorney about the Sentencing Guidelines. The court did not discuss forfeiture. The PSR indicated a Guidelines range of 188–235 months, with enhancements for the number of victims, role in the offense, obstruction of justice, and loss amount of over $8.6 million per the 2014 version of U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(1)(K) although the 2015 manual that was then in effect. There was no adjustment for acceptance of responsibility. Austin did not object to the loss chart. The court imposed a sentence of 144 months, entered an order of forfeiture ($4,374,070), and ordered restitution. The Seventh Circuit affirmed acceptance of the plea but vacated the sentence. While Austin did not provide any evidence he would not have pleaded guilty had the court advised him concerning forfeiture, restitution was improperly calculated. View "United States v. Austin" on Justia Law

After being arrested for DUI, Martin was booked by Clay County Officers Herbert and Overton and was placed in a cell with bunk beds, rather than the padded cell or the “drunk tank,” which did not contain bunk beds. The other inmate in the cell had recently had surgery and required the bottom bunk. Martin stated that he could not get to the upper bunk. Officer Herbert says he told Martin to remove the mattress and put it on the floor. Martin climbed onto the upper bunk and fell while attempting to climb down, hitting his head on a table on the opposite wall, damaging his spinal cord and paralyzing him permanently. He died months later. Martin’s Estate sued Officers Herbert and Overton. The district court denied their motion for qualified immunity, The Seventh Circuit reversed. Drawing all factual inferences in its favor, the Estate failed to show that the officers’ conduct violated clearly established law. There were several intervening events: Martin decided to climb into the bunk rather than sitting or sleeping on the floor; Martin attempted to climb down before he was sufficiently sober; Martin fell and hit his head. None of these events was so obviously foreseeable that the Fourth Amendment’s requirement of reasonable conduct would have given notice that the officers' actions violated that standard. View "Lovett v. Herbert" on Justia Law

The Moorish Temple is a religious organization that believes Moors are the rightful owners of North America. As a “Grand Sheik,” Walton preached that the government occupies Moorish land and owes its members payment, which they could acquire by filing specialized tax returns. Many people filed fraudulent tax returns at Walton’s urging. Walton pled guilty to mail fraud. An attachment to the PSR showed that other defendants received sentences ranging from probation to 28 months’ imprisonment for similar schemes but the probation officer calculated a range of 70-87 months for Walton, based on an agreed‐upon intended‐loss amount of $16,391,161. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a 68-month sentence, noting Walton’s leadership role and the vulnerable nature of his followers. View "United States v. Walton" on Justia Law

In 1991, Molina-Avila, born in Guatemala and then 11 years old, came to the U.S. with his sister and brother. He became a legal permanent resident the same year. As a young adult, he was convicted of three drug offenses under Illinois law. DHS initiated removal proceedings. Molina-Avila requested deferral of removal because he feared torture by Guatemalan gangs. His brother had been deported to Guatemala in 1998 and experienced violent harassment by a Guatemalan gang, the Mara 18. Molina-Avila believes the harassment occurred because his brother was perceived as a wealthy former-American. The IJ and BIA denied relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the decision as supported by substantial evidence. Molina-Avila relied on generalized evidence in arguing his tattoos and perceived wealth would inevitably result in torture and the record did not compel the conclusion that the police force is unwilling or unable to investigate gang violence nor did it compel the conclusion that safe relocation within Guatemala would be impossible. View "Avila v. Sessions" on Justia Law

Law enforcement intercepted cellular telephone communications pursuant to a Maryland state court order, revealing that Moreno and Salinas planned to transport illegal drugs to Illinois. Lopez arranged for Linares to get the drugs from Salinas and bring them to him. Law enforcement intercepted the drugs at an Illinois bus stop, arresting Salinas and Linares and seizing 10 ounces of methamphetamine. A government source engaged in three controlled purchases of illegal drugs from Lopez. Lopez knowingly with knowingly attempting to possess 50 grams or more of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(viii). Lopez unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence of two cellular telephone calls, arguing that the Maryland order violated 18 U.S.C. 2518(4)(b) by failing to specify “the nature and location of the communications facilities,” and that intercepted communications fell outside of the state’s territorial jurisdiction. The government notified Lopez that it intended to rely on two prior drug convictions to enhance his sentence to life in prison. One conviction stemmed from a 1999 Texas felony marijuana possession charge for which Lopez completed a deferred adjudication. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Lopez’s conviction and life sentence, upholding the denial of the motion to suppress. The district court expressly found that the listening post was in Maryland. The court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence and that the government failed to prove that Lopez took a substantial step toward committing the underlying offense. The court did not err in counting Lopez’s 1999 conviction as a predicate conviction. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

The appellees sought permission to file a brief containing more words than the 14,000 permitted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7) and Circuit Rule 32(c). Vermillion, the appellant, represented that his brief contains fewer than 14,000 words, after excluding the portions not counted by Rule 32(f). Seventh Circuit staff found 16,522 countable words in Vermillion’s brief. The judge struck Vermillion’s brief, ordered him to file a new brief with fewer than 14,000 words, and directed him to explain why he should not be penalized for falsely representing that his original brief complied with the word limits. The court subsequently discharged the rule to show cause, upheld the order striking Vermillion’s brief, and reset the briefing dates, noting that Vermillion is litigating pro se. The court explained that Vermillion erred in his use of Microsoft Word because footnotes count toward the word limit. The fact that Rule 32 does not “specifically include” any category of words does not imply that it does not count toward the limit. Once Vermillion files a complying brief, the appellees will be subject to the 14,000-word limit; 14,000 suffices for all but the rare cases with lengthy trials, complex administrative records, or multiple complex issues. View "Vermillion v. Corizon Health, Inc." on Justia Law