Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After Illinois State Senate Minority (Republican) Leader Brady decided to remove McCann from the Illinois Senate Republican Caucus and to deny McCann certain resources, McCann and his constituent sued Brady under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal; legislative immunity blocks all of McCann’s theories. Minority Leader Brady’s decisions about who is included within the Caucus, and how to allocate resources to those people, are protected as decisions that fit within the ambit of the “things generally done in a session of the [legislative body] by one of its members in relation to the business before it.” Extra help in the form of staff resources is part of the leader’s toolkit for managing his troops. Brady did not “oust” McCann from the legislature and there is no objective standard for second-guessing the leadership’s judgment about the distribution of resources. McCann would have the federal courts micro-manage exactly which resources, and in what amount, the legislative leaders of the two major political parties dole out to their members. The separation of powers principle reflected in Article II, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution, and inherent in the federal Constitution, requires the courts to accept the final output of the legislature without sitting in judgment about how it was produced. View "McCann v. Brady" on Justia Law

Jackson was convicted, based on a scheme to defraud mortgage lenders, of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1343, and mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and was sentenced to 112 months’ imprisonment on each of three counts, to be served concurrently, plus concurrent three‐year terms of supervised release, a $300 special assessment, and restitution of $8,515,570. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, finding that the court erroneously applied the obstruction‐of‐justice enhancement. At resentencing, the court removed that enhancement and imposed a sentence of 100 months’ imprisonment. It did not change the remaining elements of the sentence. Jackson appealed the terms of her supervised release. The parties agreed that certain conditions were impermissibly vague in light of recent Seventh Circuit decisions. At her third sentencing, Jackson received a sentence of 76 months’ imprisonment, with the same special assessment and restitution, and terms of supervised release that complied with precedent. The district court orally announced the conditions of supervised release and explained why each condition was imposed but did not orally announce any condition requiring that Jackson notify a probation officer within 72 hours of being arrested or questioned by a law enforcement officer. The district court’s written judgment included that discretionary condition. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence with a corrective instruction. When “an inconsistency exists between an oral and the later written sentence, the sentence pronounced from the bench controls.” View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Taylor, a former Lawrenceburg, Indiana police officer, also held positions with the civil-city, parks, and electric departments. Taylor ran for a City Council position and improperly appeared in police uniform at a campaign event and represented on his time sheet that he was on duty during that event. The State Police investigated, resulting in criminal charges for Official Misconduct and Ghost Employment. Taylor won election to the Council. Taylor signed a deferred prosecution agreement admitting to the criminal charges and agreeing to resign from the Council. The next day, he distributed a letter accusing the Board and city officials of corruption and criminal wrongdoing. The Board notified Taylor of its intent to terminate his employment. The Board terminated Taylor’s employment, crediting a prosecutor’s testimony that he would not accept case-related information from a police officer, like Taylor, who had admitted a crime of dishonesty, and rejected Taylor’s contention that Board members were biased and that the termination proceedings were a response to his letter accusing Board members of wrongdoing. Taylor dismissed his state court appeal and filed a First Amendment retaliation claim, 42 U.S.C. 1983, with state law defamation and whistleblower claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in the city’s favor. Federal courts must give state administrative fact-finding the same preclusive effect to which it would be entitled in state courts, if the agency acted in a judicial capacity and resolved issues that the parties had an adequate opportunity to litigate. The Board acted in a judicial capacity and Taylor had a fair opportunity to litigate the issues. View "Taylor v. City of Lawrenceburg" on Justia Law

Riley worked for the Kokomo Housing Authority (KHA) for eight years before she was terminated in 2014. During her employment, Riley suffered from seizures, anxiety disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, and depression, which required her to take leaves of absence. She claims that KHA improperly denied her requests for medical leave and retaliated against her for these requests by disciplining and terminating her, in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2601; that KHA failed to make reasonable accommodations and discriminated and retaliated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101; and that she was subjected to retaliation for engaging in protected activity in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e and the Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. 3617. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in KHA's favor. Five months elapsed between the end of Riley’s FMLA leave and a written warning; although Riley had requested leave for medical appointments and was told that her leave had been exhausted, she was allowed time off for her appointments nonetheless. Riley alleged that she had been terminated because of her disability, but, in her EEOC complaint, she omitted any allegation that KHA had denied her a reasonable accommodation. Rejecting Riley’s retaliation and FHA claims, the court noted that there is no evidence that she called HUD to report a discriminatory housing practice. View "Riley v. City of Kokomo, Indiana, Housing Authority" on Justia Law

An FBI investigation into Indianapolis drug‐trafficking included judicial authorization to intercept calls from 10 cell phones. During its authorized surveillance, the government intercepted calls between the apparent head of the drug‐trafficking conspiracy and his brother, Zamudio. The government obtained a search warrant to search 34 locations, including Zamudio’s residence. Agent Bates prepared the application and 84‐page affidavit, including three specific instances of Zamudio’s participation in the drug‐trafficking conspiracy. The affidavit identified Zamudio’s address, that he paid utilities at this address, and that his vehicle was routinely parked there overnight, but did not include information that drug‐trafficking activity actually took place at Zamudio’s residence. Bates stated that based on his experience and training, drug traffickers generally store their drug‐related paraphernalia and maintain records relating to drug-trafficking in the residences or the curtilage of their residences, and typically possess dangerous weapons at their residence to protect their profits, supply of drugs, and themselves. The search yielded approximately 11 kilograms of methamphetamine, a loaded gun, and a cell phone used to make intercepted calls. Zamudio was charged with participating in a drug‐trafficking conspiracy. The district court granted Zamudio’s motion to suppress the seized items. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The issuing judge reasonably drew the inference that indicia of drug‐trafficking would be found at Zamudio’s home; the evidence was enough to create a fair probability that Zamudio’s home contained evidence of a crime. View "United States v. Zamudio" on Justia Law

Frances and her husband John filed a joint return for 2004. The IRS subsequently found the return deficient and informed them that they owed an additional $488,177 in income taxes and underreporting penalties of $138,732. The couple filed suit. John, a Harvard-educated tax lawyer, represented them at trial. Frances, a former teacher with an MBA, doctorate, and a law degree, attended the trial. The Tax Court ruled against the couple, finding them jointly and severally liable, 26 U.S.C. 6013(d), Three years later, Frances sought innocent spouse relief, 26 U.S.C. 6015. The Tax Court rejected the claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding that her meaningful participation in the trial precluded Frances from after-the-fact seeking to avoid responsibility for those liabilities. Such relief is available only if the petitioner has not “participated meaningfully in [the] prior proceeding”—in this case, the 2012 trial. Mrs. Rogers’s contention that she lacked knowledge of business and financial matters, including complex tax matters, and otherwise did not understand what transpired during the 2012 trial lacked credibility and she had every opportunity to raise her claim during the 2012 trial. Her testimony was self-serving and at odds with her education and experience. View "Rogers v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Waushara County wanted to improve a rural highway. A dispute erupted about who owned land on which DeCoster had erected a fence. State court litigation settled for a $7,900 payment to DeCoster, who then sought more than $110,000 in attorneys’ fees and other expenses. The court of appeals affirmed an award of about $31,000, ruling that any outlay after the $7,900 offer was unreasonable. DeCoster then sued in federal court, seeking an award under 42 U.S.C. 4651–55, the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Act, which conditions federal grants for highway projects on states’ providing assurance that they will compensate affected landowners for reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees. The district court ruled that the Act does not provide a private right of action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, without deciding the merits. DeCoster had to present his claim in the state suit. Wisconsin employs the doctrine of claim preclusion under which all legal theories, pertaining to a single transaction, that could have been presented in the initial suit, are barred if not so presented. It does not matter whether the “transaction” is identified as the (arguable) taking of DeCoster’s land or his litigation expenses; the federal suit rests on a transaction that was before the state court. In addition, both Wis. Stat. 32.28 and the Act call for reimbursement of “reasonable” litigation expenses. Wisconsin’s judiciary determined that an award exceeding $31,561 would be unreasonable. View "DeCoster v. Waushara County Highway Department" on Justia Law

Thomas, an Illinois prisoner formerly confined at Hill Correctional Center, alleged that prison guards attacked him with excessive force and that the beating and subsequent disciplinary proceedings were in retaliation for lawsuits and grievances he filed. He sued the guards and other prison officials seeking damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In the course of pretrial proceedings, the district judge required the parties to stipulate to the events preceding the attack and ruled that certain inmate witnesses must appear, if at all, by video conference. The judge also declined Thomas’s request for recruited counsel, determining that he was competent to litigate the suit pro se. At trial, the judge entered judgment as a matter of law for the defendants on all claims except those asserting excessive force by two officers. The jury decided those claims against Thomas. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Because Thomas’s trial testimony allowed for a permissible inference of retaliation, the judge should not have taken the retaliation claims from the jury. The court rejected other challenges to evidentiary rulings and to the refusal to recruit counsel. View "Thomas v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Hudson pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm by a convicted felon. The Seventh Circuit corrected two conditions of supervised release, holding that resentencing was not required. Hudson's presentence investigation report included several potential conditions of supervised release, with radio buttons recommending conditions: “you shall refrain from any or excessive use of alcohol (defined as having a blood alcohol concentration greater than 0.08%).” Hudson’s attorney did not object. The corresponding condition in the subsequent written judgment differed from the PSR, failing to check the definitional box. A condition prohibiting “excessive” alcohol use, without definition, is impermissibly vague. The Seventh Circuit described the situation as “an obvious scrivener’s error” because nothing indicated the judge intended to deviate from that definition. The district court also stated, “Once Mr. Hudson is released from custody, he will be directed to remain within the jurisdiction in which he is being supervised, unless he is granted permission to leave.” Hudson’s attorney requested the condition include Indiana, where Hudson’s wife lives. The court agreed, but the written judgment simply states, “you shall remain within the jurisdiction where you are being supervised unless granted permission to leave.” The Seventh Circuit stated that the better term to use in this condition is “judicial district,” rather than “jurisdiction” and that the failure to include the district in which Hudson’s wife resides was another obvious technical oversight. An oral sentence controls over a written one whenever the two conflict. View "United States v. Hudson" on Justia Law

Bell sued Vacuforce for copyright infringement, accusing it of publishing his photograph of the Indianapolis skyline on its website without a license. Vacuforce hired attorney Overhauser. The parties quickly settled; the federal lawsuit was dismissed with prejudice. Overhauser then moved to recover attorney fees from Bell, arguing that because the settlement produced a dismissal with prejudice, Vacuforce was the “prevailing party” for purposes of fees under the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. 505. The district court denied Overhauser’s as motion frivolous and misleading and ordered monetary sanctions against Overhauser: one under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and another under 28 U.S.C. 1927. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sanctions, rejecting an argument that a party can “prevail” for purposes of a fee-shifting statute by paying a settlement and obtaining a dismissal with prejudice. The district court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the section 1927 sanction. “Objective bad faith” will support such a sanction. A lawyer demonstrates objective bad faith when she “pursues a path that a reasonably careful attorney would have known, after appropriate inquiry, to be unsound.” The district court found that Overhauser’s legal contentions were baseless and that he failed to disclose the proper factual foundation necessary to evaluate his legal argument. View "Overhauser v. Bell" on Justia Law