Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

McCann was severely burned while attempting to commit arson at his mother’s house and spent three weeks in the hospital before being released to police custody. McCann died from a doctor’s over-prescription of methadone while detained and awaiting trial at the Ogle County Correctional Center. His estate brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to McCann’s severe burn wounds and related medical needs. The treating physician and his private employer settled the claims. The district court entered summary judgment for the remaining defendants, concluding that the evidence did not show that any individual defendant acted with deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit subsequently replaced deliberate indifference with a standard requiring a showing of objective reasonableness for a claim challenging the medical care provided to a pretrial detainee like McCann. Measuring the record evidence under this new standard, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the award of summary judgment to the individual defendants and a determination that the record evidence did not support a claim for municipal liability against Ogle County under Monell. View "McCann v. Ogle County" on Justia Law

Shaf, a New Jersey company, sells apparel. Seventh Avenue, a Wisconsin-based catalog merchandiser, sells clothing protected by a trademark. After a dispute over Shaf’s alleged infringement of Seventh Avenue’s trademark, the parties entered into a consent agreement. Months later, Seventh Avenue discovered what it saw as continuing infringement by Shaf and moved to hold Shaf in contempt. Shaf was represented in the district court by Milwaukee counsel. The attorney received an email notification (from the court’s electronic docketing system) of the motion upon its January 17 filing, indicating that response was due January 24. Shaf failed to respond. The court scheduled a hearing for February 14. Nobody for Shaf appeared. The court held Shaf in contempt and required that it pay Seventh Avenue’s fees and costs. The contempt order prompted Shaf's local counsel to move for reconsideration, explaining that counsel was traveling internationally when the motion was filed. Counsel returned to work five days before Shaf’s written response was due and 26 days before the hearing, but took several weeks to catch up on his email. Shaf’s request also explained that local counsel believed national counsel would attend to any ongoing needs in the case. The court denied the motion to reconsider. Seventh Avenue supplemented its fee petition to reflect additional expenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed an award of $34,905 in fees and costs. While the delayed response was better than no response, the court acted within its discretion to find that Shaf’s initial unresponsiveness warranted a sanction. View "Seventh Avenue, Inc. v. Shaf International, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendants conduct online fantasy‐sports games. Participants pay an entry fee and select a roster, subject to a budget cap that prevents every entrant from picking only the best players. Results from real sports contests determine how each squad earns points to win cash. Former college football players whose names, pictures, and statistics have been used without their permission sued, claiming that Indiana’s right-of-publicity statute, Code 32‐36‐1‐8, gives them control over the commercial use of their names and data. The district court dismissed the complaint, relying on exemptions for the use of a personality’s name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance, gestures, or mannerisms "in" material “that has political or newsworthy value” or “in connection with the broadcast or reporting of an event or a topic of general or public interest." The Seventh Circuit affirmed after the Supreme Court of Indiana responded to a certified question that: Indiana’ right of publicity statute contains an exception for material with newsworthy value that includes online fantasy sports operators’ use of college players’ names, pictures, and statistics for online fantasy contests. View "Daniels v. Fanduel, Inc." on Justia Law

Hatch illegally brought handguns into Chicago three times. Over the next year, Chicago police recovered five of these guns—some from felons and one from a minor. Hatch told his friend Driver, who had used her identification to purchase some of the guns in Indiana, not to divulge any information, but she admitted that she purchased guns for him. Hatch told a probation officer that he was a straw buyer for Kemp: he bought the guns for Kemp and did not know why Kemp wanted them. Hatch pleaded guilty to unlawfully transporting firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(a)(3), 924(a)(1)(D). The judge calculated a Guidelines range of 30-37 months, then applied the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and imposed a 55-month sentence. The judge said that Hatch’s family, job, and lack of prior felonies “appear to be in his favor,” but the nature of the offense was “troubling,” and Hatch failed to accept responsibility fully because he denied knowing what the guns were for. The judge gave statistics, attributing the spike in Chicago’s homicides to guns from Indiana, and discussed the effect of gun violence in the city, concluding that the Guidelines did not adequately reflect the seriousness of Hatch’s offense or sufficiently deter firearm trafficking. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A judge may depart from the Guidelines based on locality-specific factors. View "United States v. Hatch" on Justia Law

Lewis, an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs, worked as a cook in the Nutrition and Food Service Department in 2008-2009 and again from December 2013 until April 2015. The four‐year gap in employment occurred because Lewis was terminated and then, after a successful Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint, was reinstated to his former position. Lewis alleges that upon reinstatement he faced retaliation from the VA and two supervisors for his EEO activity. The district court granted the Va summary judgment, holding that none of the alleged retaliatory actions constituted a materially adverse action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Some of the actions constituted isolated administrative errors that were subsequently corrected; they represent the kind of minor workplace grievances against which Title VII does not protect against. Other incidents may have resulted in annoyance and frustration, but they did not cause the kind of harm that would dissuade a reasonable employee from engaging in protected activity. Unfulfilled threats that do not produce harm do not qualify as adverse actions. Lewis also failed to demonstrate a causal link between his protected activity and nearly all of the alleged retaliatory actions; failed to identify any similarly‐situated employee; and failed to demonstrate the VA’s legitimate, non‐discriminatory explanations were pretextual. View "Lewis v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

The Twenty-first Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, section 2, forbids the “transportation or importation” of liquor into a state in violation of that state’s law. The Supreme Court has decreed that states may not infringe upon other provisions of the Constitution under the guise of exercising that power and now is considering whether the Twenty-first Amendment permits states to regulate liquor sales by limiting retail and wholesale licenses to persons or entities that have resided within the state for a specified time (Tennessee Wine). Illinois allows retailers with an in-state physical presence to ship alcoholic beverages to consumers anywhere within Illinois but will not allow out-of-state businesses to apply for a similar shipping license. Plaintiffs claimed violations of the Commerce Clause and Privileges and Immunities Clause. Illinois argued that because all retailers are barred from shipping from out-of-state, the provision does not discriminate against out-of-state retailers, and that that the differential treatment is necessitated by permissible Twenty-first Amendment interests. The district court dismissed the challenge. The Seventh Circuit reversed, noting material contested issues about the necessity for and justifications behind the Illinois statute, and the possible impact of the Tennessee Wine decision. The court characterized some of the state’s justification as possible protectionism. View "Lebamoff Enterprises, Inc. v. Rauner" on Justia Law

Bogart, a Democrat, worked as the Financial Resources Director of Vermilion County, Illinois. Marron, a Republican, assumed control of the County Board and fired her. She brought claims under the First Amendment and Equal Protection Clause, alleging that Vermilion County and Marron violated her right of political affiliation and engaged in political retaliation. The district court dismissed the equal protection claim as duplicative of the First Amendment claim, and, after finding that the substantial fiscal and budgetary responsibilities of Bogart’s position fit within the exception to political patronage dismissals, granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court has held (the Elrod-Branti exception) that, while public employers cannot condition employment on an individual’s political affiliation, an employee’s First Amendment right of political association leaves room for employers to dismiss employees in positions where political loyalty is a valid job qualification. Determining whether a particular job fits within the exception requires “focus on the inherent powers of the office as presented in the official job description,” while also looking at “how the description was created and when, and how often, it was updated.” Bogart held a senior position requiring the trust and confidence of the elected Board members, including the County Chairman, and entailing substantial policymaking authority. View "Bogart v. Vermilion County" on Justia Law

In 1988, Huber pleaded guilty to making fraudulent credit card charges of $800. He spent the next 25 years either on probation or in prison for violating his probation, although Wisconsin had no lawful basis for extending his sentence beyond November 1995. It took the state until 2014 to recognize this problem and to vacate his ongoing sentence. Huber filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, ruling that Huber had failed to bring most claims within six years of their accrual, as required under Wisconsin’s statute of limitations. Some of Huber’s claims were timely, but the court granted the defendants summary judgment on the merits. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Huber’s claims were timely and summary judgment was premature on those claims that the district court reached. Huber’s claim did not accrue until the court invalidated his sentence. Huber filed this action in 2016, within Wisconsin’s six-year statute of limitations. He did not sit on his rights under the Heck doctrine, which ensures that civil litigation does not undermine the basis of criminal convictions and sentences. A reasonable jury could find deliberate indifference here. Construing facts and inferences in Huber’s favor, Huber’s Eighth Amendment claims are not suitable for summary judgment. View "Huber v. Anderson" on Justia Law

Dr. Griffin provided medical care to T.R., a participant in a Central States health plan. Before receiving treatment, T.R. assigned to Griffin the rights to “pursue claims for benefits, statutory penalties, [and] breach of fiduciary duty ….” Griffin confirmed through a Central representative that the plan would pay for the treatment at the usual, reasonable, and customary rate, then treated T.R. and submitted a claim for $7,963. Griffin later challenged the benefits determination, requesting a copy of the summary plan description and documents used to determine her payment. Six months later, Central responded that iSight, a third party, used “pricing methodology” to determine the fee and telling her to negotiate with iSight before engaging in the appeals process that the plan required before a civil suit. Griffin missed a call from iSight, returned the call, and left a message that she “would not take any reductions.” iSight never called back. Central provided a copy of the summary plan description, but no fee schedules or tables. Griffin sued under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), (a)(3), alleging that Central did not pay her the proper rate under the plan; breached its fiduciary duty by not adhering to plan terms; and failed to produce, within 30 days, the summary plan description she requested, nor iSight’s fee schedules. The court dismissed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part. Griffin adequately alleged that she is eligible for additional benefits and statutory damages. View "Griffin v. Teamcare" on Justia Law

After Illinois State Senate Minority (Republican) Leader Brady decided to remove McCann from the Illinois Senate Republican Caucus and to deny McCann certain resources, McCann and his constituent sued Brady under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal; legislative immunity blocks all of McCann’s theories. Minority Leader Brady’s decisions about who is included within the Caucus, and how to allocate resources to those people, are protected as decisions that fit within the ambit of the “things generally done in a session of the [legislative body] by one of its members in relation to the business before it.” Extra help in the form of staff resources is part of the leader’s toolkit for managing his troops. Brady did not “oust” McCann from the legislature and there is no objective standard for second-guessing the leadership’s judgment about the distribution of resources. McCann would have the federal courts micro-manage exactly which resources, and in what amount, the legislative leaders of the two major political parties dole out to their members. The separation of powers principle reflected in Article II, section 1 of the Illinois Constitution, and inherent in the federal Constitution, requires the courts to accept the final output of the legislature without sitting in judgment about how it was produced. View "McCann v. Brady" on Justia Law