Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
Estate of Gifford v Operating Engineers 139 Health Benefit Fund
Michael Gifford, a beneficiary of the Operating Engineers 139 Health Benefit Fund, sought reimbursement for out-of-network medical expenses incurred during his treatment for a stroke and subsequent brain aneurysm surgery. The Fund denied the claim, stating the services were not provided in an emergency and were not medically necessary. Gifford's wife, Suzanne, appealed the decision, but the Fund upheld the denial after consulting two independent medical reviewers who concluded the surgery was not an emergency and not medically necessary.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted the Fund's motion for summary judgment, agreeing that the Fund's decision was not arbitrary and capricious. The court also granted the Fund's motion for a protective order, limiting discovery to the administrative record. The Estate of Michael Gifford, represented by Suzanne, appealed the decision, arguing that the Fund failed to conduct a full and fair review by not considering a surgical note from Dr. Ahuja, which was not included in the administrative record.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the Fund's denial of benefits was not arbitrary and capricious, as the Fund reasonably relied on the independent medical reviewers' reports and the administrative record. The court also found that the Fund was not required to seek out additional information not provided by the claimant. Additionally, the court upheld the district court's grant of the protective order, finding no abuse of discretion in limiting discovery to the administrative record. The court concluded that the Fund provided a full and fair review of the claim, and the denial of benefits was reasonable. View "Estate of Gifford v Operating Engineers 139 Health Benefit Fund" on Justia Law
United States v Harris
Taibian Harris and his cousin Treveon Smith robbed a cell phone store in South Bend during a blizzard. Harris acted as the getaway driver while Smith stole items from the store. Unbeknownst to them, one of the stolen phones was a bait phone that sent GPS signals to the police. The police tracked them to a gas station, and after a brief encounter, Harris led the police on a high-speed chase through snowy, icy streets, running stop signs and red lights. The chase ended when Harris collided with a police car. Both were apprehended after attempting to flee on foot.Harris and Smith were indicted for robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 1951 and both pled guilty. The Presentence Investigation Report recommended a two-level enhancement for Harris for recklessly creating a substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury while fleeing law enforcement. Harris objected, arguing there was no reliable evidence of reckless driving and that no police officer was in actual pursuit. The government called Smith as a witness, who described the high-speed chase in detail. The district court credited Smith’s testimony and overruled Harris’s objection, applying the two-level enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that Harris drove recklessly, as his actions met the recklessness standard under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.2. The court also found that Harris was knowingly fleeing from law enforcement, as evidenced by his erratic driving and attempts to evade police. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s application of the two-level enhancement to Harris’s sentence. View "United States v Harris" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
Thompson v Army and Air Force Exchange Service
Linda Thompson filed a putative class action against the Army and Air Force Exchange Service (the "Exchange") in Illinois state court, alleging that the Exchange printed her credit card’s expiration date on purchase receipts, violating the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA). The Exchange removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1), which allows federal agencies to remove cases to federal court. Thompson moved to remand the case to state court, arguing lack of Article III standing, while the Exchange moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois denied Thompson’s motion to remand and granted the Exchange’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the Exchange, as a federal entity, could remove the case without asserting a colorable federal defense and had an absolute right to litigate in federal court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court agreed that the Exchange did not need to present a federal defense to remove the case. However, it found that the district court erred in dismissing the suit. The Seventh Circuit held that under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), when a federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over a removed case, it must remand the case to state court. The court noted that Thompson’s lack of Article III standing did not preclude state court jurisdiction, as state courts are not bound by Article III constraints. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded the case with instructions to remand it to state court. View "Thompson v Army and Air Force Exchange Service" on Justia Law
USA v Sheffler
Correctional officers at an Illinois state prison brutally beat inmate Larry Earvin, who later died from his injuries. Todd Sheffler and two others were charged with various federal crimes related to the killing and its cover-up. After a mistrial, Sheffler was retried and found guilty by a jury.In the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Sheffler was convicted on five counts, including conspiracy to deprive civil rights, deprivation of civil rights, conspiracy to engage in misleading conduct, obstruction-falsification of documents, and obstruction-misleading conduct. Sheffler argued that there was no reasonable likelihood that his incident report and interview with state police would reach federal officials, challenging his convictions under 18 U.S.C. § 1512 and § 1519. He also contended that the district court erred in ruling he breached a proffer agreement and allowed a biased juror to sit on his trial. Additionally, he claimed prosecutorial misconduct during the rebuttal closing argument.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that sufficient evidence supported Sheffler’s convictions, as it was reasonably likely that his false statements would reach federal officials, given the severity of the crime and the cooperation between state and federal authorities. The court also found no clear error in the district court’s conclusion that Sheffler breached the proffer agreement by making false statements during FBI interviews. Furthermore, the court determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in handling the juror bias issue or in denying Sheffler’s motion for a new trial based on alleged prosecutorial misconduct.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Sheffler’s motion for a new trial and upheld his convictions. View "USA v Sheffler" on Justia Law
Manery v Lee
William Manery filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in Indiana state court against Lieutenant Jason Lee and other defendants, alleging that Lee used excessive deadly force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana. Lee moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity, but the district court denied the motion, citing genuine issues of material fact.The district court acknowledged that Lee knew Manery was wanted for serious crimes and believed he was armed and had threatened "suicide by cop." However, the court found that factual disputes about the threat level at the time Lee fired his weapon precluded summary judgment. The court assumed, without deciding, that Lee might have violated Manery's constitutional rights but concluded that the issue of whether the law was clearly established was intertwined with these factual disputes, necessitating a jury's resolution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court noted that Lee accepted Manery's version of the facts for the appeal. The court emphasized that qualified immunity protects officers unless they violate clearly established rights that a reasonable officer would know. The court found that the cases cited by Manery did not clearly establish that Lee's use of deadly force was unreasonable under the specific circumstances. Given the rapidly evolving situation and the information Lee had, the court concluded that a reasonable officer in Lee's position would not have known that using deadly force was a violation of Manery's rights.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Manery v Lee" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Rights
Bachner v CIR
Edward Bachner filed fraudulent tax returns for three years, inflating his income and tax withholdings to claim unwarranted refunds. The IRS detected the fraud and imposed civil penalties. Bachner petitioned the United States Tax Court for a redetermination but did not attend the trial, which resulted in the Tax Court sustaining the penalties. Bachner and his wife, Rebecca, who filed joint tax returns, appealed the Tax Court’s judgment.The Tax Court rejected the Bachners' arguments that the IRS’s notice of deficiency was invalid, that the limitations period had expired, and that the IRS had ignored certain procedures. The court also dismissed their claim that they had not underpaid taxes, as well as their assertion of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Tax Court accepted the IRS’s evidence and sustained the fraud penalties against Edward.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Edward had standing to appeal but dismissed Rebecca from the appeal due to her innocent-spouse status. The court held that the Tax Court had jurisdiction to review the IRS’s determinations based on the penalties listed in the notice. The court also upheld the Tax Court’s imposition of fraud penalties, explaining that Edward’s fraudulent overstatement of withholdings constituted an underpayment of taxes under the relevant Treasury Regulations. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the Tax Court’s decision to sustain the penalties against Edward and dismissed Rebecca from the appeal. View "Bachner v CIR" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Tax Law
Zarzecki v. Garland
Beata Zarzecki, a Polish national, entered the United States on a six-month tourist visa in 1989 and remained in the country illegally. In 1998, she married a U.S. citizen, and they have a daughter who is also a U.S. citizen. In 2013, removal proceedings were initiated against her, and she applied for adjustment of status based on her marriage. Her application was complicated by a 2005 conviction for felony aggravated driving under the influence, resulting in a fatal accident. She was sentenced to nine years in prison and served over eight years. Additional incidents included a 2003 arrest for aggravated assault and a 2004 charge for driving without insurance.The immigration judge denied her application for adjustment of status, citing the severity of her criminal record and insufficient evidence of addressing her mental health issues. The Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) reviewed the case de novo and upheld the immigration judge's decision, emphasizing the egregious nature of her offense and finding that her mitigating factors did not outweigh the adverse factors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Zarzecki's petition, focusing on whether the Board committed legal or constitutional errors. Zarzecki argued that the Board failed to properly consider her mental health evidence and did not apply the correct standard of review. The court found that the Board did consider her mental health evidence and applied the appropriate standard of review. The court concluded that the Board did not commit any legal or constitutional errors and dismissed Zarzecki's petition for lack of jurisdiction, as discretionary decisions regarding adjustment of status are not subject to judicial review. View "Zarzecki v. Garland" on Justia Law
Cunningham v. Austin
Gwendolyn Cunningham, a Black woman, alleged that the Department of Defense discriminated against her by not promoting her to a newly created GS-13 supervisor position. Cunningham, who had been with the Department since 1988 and held a GS-12 supervisor position, applied for the GS-13 role along with Emmanuel Griffin and two other employees. Griffin, a Black man with extensive experience and higher education credentials, was ultimately selected for the position by Andrew Hartz, the newly hired GS-14 Benefits Division Chief. Hartz cited Griffin's strategic vision and leadership skills as reasons for his selection, despite Cunningham's strong subject matter expertise.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the Department of Defense. The court found that the Department had provided legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for promoting Griffin over Cunningham and that Cunningham failed to offer evidence that these reasons were pretextual. Cunningham's belief that she was discriminated against based on her sex and race was deemed insufficient to establish a genuine issue of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that the Department's rationale for promoting Griffin was legitimate and nondiscriminatory, as it was based on Hartz's genuine belief in Griffin's superior qualifications and strategic vision. The court also found that Cunningham did not provide sufficient evidence to show that the Department's reasons were pretextual. Consequently, the appellate court concluded that Cunningham's heartfelt belief in discrimination was not enough to defeat the motion for summary judgment. View "Cunningham v. Austin" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law
FTC v. Day Pacer LLC
Day Pacer LLC and EduTrek L.L.C., along with their managing members, were responsible for millions of telemarketing calls to consumers on the National Do Not Call Registry. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brought a civil enforcement action against them, resulting in the district court finding the defendants liable on summary judgment and awarding over $28 million in civil penalties. The defendants appealed the court’s liability findings and damages award.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois found the companies liable for violating the Telemarketing Sales Rule (TSR) by making calls to consumers on the registry without proper consent. The court also held the individual defendants liable, as they had control over the companies and knew or should have known about the illegal activities. The court substituted the estate of a deceased defendant, David Cumming, into the litigation, finding the penalties sought were remedial. The court awarded a $28.6 million penalty and issued a permanent injunction against the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding of liability but reversed and remanded the decision to substitute Cumming’s estate and the damages award. The appellate court held that the penalties sought were penal, not remedial, and thus did not survive Cumming’s death. The court also found that the district court did not consider all mandatory statutory factors in calculating the damages award, constituting an abuse of discretion. The court affirmed the broad injunction against the defendants, prohibiting them from engaging in any telemarketing activities. View "FTC v. Day Pacer LLC" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Consumer Law, Government & Administrative Law
Montgomery v. C.H. Robinson Company
Shawn Montgomery was severely injured when his truck was hit by a tractor-trailer driven by Yosniel Varela-Mojena, who was employed by motor carrier Caribe Transport II, LLC. The shipment was coordinated by C.H. Robinson Worldwide, Inc., a freight broker. Montgomery sued Varela-Mojena, Caribe, and Robinson, alleging that Robinson negligently hired Varela-Mojena and Caribe and was vicariously liable for their actions.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois granted partial summary judgment in favor of Robinson on the vicarious liability claim, finding that Varela-Mojena and Caribe were independent contractors, not agents of Robinson. Following the Seventh Circuit's decision in Ye v. GlobalTranz Enterprises, Inc., which held that the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAAA) preempts state law claims against freight brokers for negligent hiring, the district court also granted judgment for Robinson on the negligent hiring claims. Final judgment was entered in favor of Robinson to facilitate Montgomery's appeal, while his claims against Varela-Mojena and Caribe were stayed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that Robinson did not exercise the necessary control over Caribe and Varela-Mojena to establish an agency relationship, thus negating vicarious liability. The court also declined to overrule its precedent in Ye, maintaining that the FAAAA preempts state law negligent hiring claims against freight brokers. Consequently, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of Robinson. View "Montgomery v. C.H. Robinson Company" on Justia Law