Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In this case, federal agents used a confidential informant to conduct two controlled purchases of crack cocaine from a person known as “Black.” The informant, Luis Villegas, met “Black” in a courthouse and later identified him as Antwan Eiland through a driver’s license photograph provided by an ATF agent. Subsequent drug deals were arranged and recorded, but the video evidence did not clearly capture Eiland’s face. Additional testimony came from the informant, the ATF agent, and a woman who drove Eiland to one transaction; all identified Eiland as the dealer. Eiland did not testify and argued at trial that he was not “Black.”A grand jury indicted Eiland on two counts of distributing a controlled substance in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). After a jury trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, Eiland was found guilty on both counts. Post-verdict, Eiland moved for acquittal based on insufficient evidence and for a new trial arguing juror bias, citing a juror’s remarks about his silence and mask-wearing. The district court denied both motions, finding the evidence sufficient and the juror’s comment inadmissible under Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that the evidence was sufficient for a rational jury to find Eiland guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and declined to reassess witness credibility. It found no plain error in the prosecutor’s rebuttal argument, determining that the comments did not improperly reference Eiland’s silence. The court also ruled that the juror’s post-trial comment was inadmissible and did not justify a new trial or evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Eiland" on Justia Law

After being convicted in 2012 of drug and firearm offenses, a man was sentenced to 180 months in prison and six years of supervised release. He completed his prison term and began supervised release in 2022, but soon violated several conditions, including failing to notify his probation officer of changes in residence and employment, misrepresenting his place of residence, leaving his job without notice, and failing multiple drug tests. These violations led his probation officer to petition for revocation of his supervised release.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana held a revocation hearing in February 2025, where the defendant admitted to the violations. The court determined that the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range was 18 to 24 months. The government sought 30 months’ imprisonment with additional supervised release, while the defendant requested 18 months without further supervision, arguing that supervision would be futile. The court ultimately revoked supervised release and imposed a 36-month prison sentence, citing the seriousness and number of violations, the defendant’s criminal and personal history, and his stated refusal to comply with supervision, while also noting the need for correctional treatment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether the district court improperly lengthened the sentence for rehabilitative purposes, which is prohibited under Tapia v. United States, 564 U.S. 319 (2011). The appellate court found that, although the district court mentioned correctional treatment, it had considered multiple proper grounds for the sentence, including accountability and the defendant’s refusal to comply with supervision. The Seventh Circuit held that there was no Tapia error and affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Richards" on Justia Law

Jerome and Shaun Cohen operated a Ponzi scheme through their companies, EquityBuild, Inc. and EquityBuild Finance, LLC, from 2010 to 2018. They solicited funds from individual investors and institutional lenders, promising high returns secured by real estate, primarily in Chicago. In reality, the Cohens used new investors’ funds to pay earlier investors and overvalued properties to retain excess capital. By 2018, the scheme collapsed, leaving over $75 million in unpaid obligations. The Securities and Exchange Commission intervened, obtaining a temporary restraining order and having a receiver appointed to liquidate assets and distribute proceeds to victims.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois oversaw the receivership and determined how proceeds from the sale of two properties—7749 South Yates and 5450 South Indiana—should be distributed. Both a group of individual investors and Shatar Capital Partners claimed priority to the proceeds, with Shatar arguing its mortgages were recorded before those of the individual investors. The district court found that Shatar was on inquiry notice of the individual investors’ preexisting interests and thus not entitled to priority, limiting all claimants’ recoveries to their contributed principal, minus any amounts previously received.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s distribution order. The appellate court affirmed, holding that under Illinois law, Shatar was on inquiry notice of the individual investors’ interests in both properties at the time it invested, given multiple red flags about the properties’ financing and EquityBuild’s business model. As a result, the individual investors were entitled to priority in the distribution of proceeds. The court also found Shatar’s challenge to the distribution plan moot, as there were insufficient funds to benefit Shatar after satisfying the investors’ claims. View "Securities and Exchange Commission v. Duff" on Justia Law

A Palestinian American tenant displayed a Palestinian flag in her apartment window to express solidarity with her heritage. In response to a complaint from another resident, the property manager, following a building-wide “neutrality” policy regarding the Israel-Palestine conflict, instructed her to remove the flag. The tenant informed management that her actions reflected pride in her heritage, but was told this was “unacceptable” and warned of eviction if she did not comply. After refusing to remove the flag, she received a notice terminating her tenancy, which cited a lease violation for hanging the flag outside the window. The tenant alleged this justification was pretextual, as management had indicated the flag would not be allowed anywhere, even inside the window. She also claimed other tenants displayed flags or decorations in their windows without consequence, but did not specify that any involved the Israel-Palestine conflict.She filed suit in the Circuit Court of Cook County, alleging violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and state laws. The defendants removed the case to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, and moved to dismiss most claims. The district court granted the motion, holding that her complaint did not plausibly allege national origin discrimination, as it did not show the policy was motivated by her national origin or that it had a disparate impact on Palestinians.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Seventh Circuit held that the tenant failed to allege facts showing intentional national origin discrimination or disparate impact under the FHA. The court also found her interference claim under § 3617 of the FHA insufficient, and determined that the district court properly dismissed the state law claims without prejudice after dismissing the federal claims. View "Farhan v. 2715 NMA LLC" on Justia Law

Four property-specific limited liability companies owned real estate in Wisconsin, which was leased to skilled nursing facilities operated by Kevin Breslin through his company, KBWB Operations, LLC. Breslin and his co-guarantors executed personal guaranties ensuring payment and performance under the leases. The nursing facility tenants defaulted on their rent obligations starting in 2018 and subsequently lost their operating licenses after a court-appointed receiver moved residents out. The tenants also failed to complete a purchase option for the properties, triggering a liquidated damages clause. Plaintiffs later sold the properties at a loss.The plaintiffs sued Breslin, his company, and co-guarantors in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to enforce the guaranties and recover damages. During the litigation, plaintiffs discovered that one co-guarantor was a California citizen, which destroyed complete diversity and thus federal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs moved to dismiss this non-diverse defendant, arguing he was not indispensable because the guaranties provided for joint and several liability. The district court agreed and dismissed him. Breslin did not oppose the dismissal. Plaintiffs then moved for summary judgment; Breslin, facing criminal charges, invoked the Fifth Amendment and presented no evidence on liability or damages. The district court granted summary judgment to plaintiffs and awarded nearly $22 million in damages across several categories.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that jurisdiction was proper because the dismissed co-guarantor was not an indispensable party under Rule 19, given joint and several liability. The court affirmed the district court’s findings on most damages but vacated the awards for accelerated rent under one lease (pending further consideration of its enforceability as a liquidated damages clause) and for liquidated damages related to the purchase option (finding it unenforceable as a penalty). The case was remanded for recalculation of damages consistent with these holdings. In all other respects, the judgment was affirmed. View "CCP Golden/7470 LLC v. Breslin" on Justia Law

Juan Mendez was approached by two Chicago police officers investigating a gunshot detected near his home early one morning. As the officers arrived and questioned Mendez and a juvenile on the porch, Mendez suddenly fled, jumping a fence and running down an alley. The officers pursued him, with one warning that Mendez had something in his waistband and then in his hand. During the chase, Mendez fell, got up, and turned toward the officers with an object in his hand. One officer, perceiving a threat, shot Mendez three times, resulting in paralysis from the waist down.Mendez filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, against the City of Chicago and the two officers, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, battery under Illinois law, and seeking indemnification from the City. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding that, based on body-camera footage and the circumstances, a reasonable officer would have had probable cause to believe Mendez posed a threat to the officers’ safety. The court also found that, without a Fourth Amendment violation, Mendez could not prevail on his state law claims. Mendez appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the record independently and affirmed the district court. The Seventh Circuit held that Officer Szczur had probable cause to believe that Mendez posed a threat of serious physical harm under the totality of the circumstances, making the use of deadly force reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that the state law battery and indemnification claims failed for the same reasons. The judgment for the defendants was affirmed. View "Mendez v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The case involves a defendant who pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm after a police chase in which he discarded a loaded firearm in a residential area. Prior to this incident, law enforcement had evidence linking the same firearm to a gang-related murder occurring about two weeks earlier. Cell phone records, surveillance footage, and the defendant’s online activity connected him to other gang members and to the murder scene. The firearm discarded during the police chase was later found to have been used in that murder.In the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the defendant’s presentence investigation report initially recommended a base offense level based solely on the firearm possession charge. However, after the government presented evidence tying him to the earlier murder, it sought to apply the United States Sentencing Guidelines’ cross-reference for homicide, leading to a much higher base offense level. The district court found by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant was culpable in the murder and applied both the murder cross-reference and a sentencing enhancement for reckless endangerment resulting from his act of tossing the loaded gun during his flight. The court imposed the statutory maximum sentence of 15 years.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo the district court’s interpretation and application of the Sentencing Guidelines, and for clear error its factual findings. The appellate court held that the district court properly applied the homicide cross-reference and the reckless endangerment enhancement, and found the sentence not substantively unreasonable. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "USA v Taylor" on Justia Law

Several current and former employees of the City of Chicago, including police officers and an emergency management officer, challenged the City’s COVID-19 vaccination policy. The policy, issued in October 2021, required city employees to either be vaccinated against COVID-19 or undergo regular testing and report their status through an employee portal. Religious exemptions from vaccination were available and granted to these plaintiffs, but the plaintiffs objected to having to submit their vaccination status and test results in the portal, arguing that this reporting requirement violated their constitutional and statutory rights.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, raising claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the First and Fourteenth Amendments via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act (IRFRA). The district court dismissed the Third Amended Complaint for failure to state a claim. It found the Title VII claims factually implausible and concluded that the plaintiffs did not allege a religious practice conflicting with the reporting requirements. The court also held that, since the plaintiffs were granted their requested exemptions from vaccination, they could not succeed on claims based on their refusal to comply with reporting requirements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The Seventh Circuit held that the policy’s reporting requirements were neutral and generally applicable, subject only to rational-basis review, which the policy satisfied. The court determined that the reporting and disciplinary provisions were rationally related to the City’s legitimate interest in public health and workplace safety. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all constitutional, statutory, and state-law claims, finding the plaintiffs’ arguments insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. View "Kondilis v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

In 1989, Shannon Agofsky robbed a bank in southwest Missouri and kidnapped the bank president at gunpoint, ultimately drowning him in Oklahoma. A federal jury in the Western District of Missouri convicted Agofsky of bank robbery and using a firearm during a crime of violence, resulting in a life sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed his conviction, and subsequent motions for collateral relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 were denied. In 2001, while serving his sentence in a Texas federal prison, Agofsky murdered a fellow inmate and received a death sentence in the Eastern District of Texas, partly based on his prior firearm conviction.Agofsky later sought to challenge his Missouri firearm conviction by filing a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the Southern District of Indiana, arguing—based on the Supreme Court’s decision in Borden v. United States, 593 U.S. 420 (2021)—that bank robbery does not qualify as a “crime of violence” under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). His claim did not meet the conditions for a successive § 2255 motion. Previously, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in In re Davenport allowed such statutory claims to proceed via § 2241, but the Supreme Court overruled that approach in Jones v. Hendrix, 599 U.S. 465 (2023). Accordingly, the district court dismissed Agofsky’s petition for lack of jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit addressed whether § 2255(e) is a jurisdictional bar or merely a venue provision. After reviewing precedent and circuit splits, the court held that § 2255(e) constitutes a jurisdictional limit on the court’s power to entertain habeas petitions outside the strict confines of § 2255. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Agofsky’s § 2241 petition for lack of jurisdiction. View "Agofsky v. Baysore" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, a microbrewery and its owner, operated a seasonal business in a tourist town and became known for engaging in political advocacy. The business applied for various permits to operate both an indoor retail outlet and, later, an outdoor beer garden. Despite being granted permits that included specific conditions—such as restrictions on outdoor operations—the plaintiffs repeatedly violated these conditions, operated without proper permits, and explicitly stated their intention to continue doing so regardless of regulatory decisions. Throughout this period, the owner was vocal in criticizing local officials on social media.After several rounds of permit applications, denials, suspensions, and revocations, the plaintiffs’ most recent permit application for an outdoor beer garden was denied by the county committee, which cited the plaintiffs’ ongoing and willful violations of permit conditions and their declared intent to continue such violations. The plaintiffs appealed administrative actions to the Oneida County Board of Adjustment, which upheld the revocations. Subsequently, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin, asserting that the permit denials and revocations constituted retaliation for protected political speech, in violation of the First Amendment. They sought a preliminary injunction to reinstate their permit and prevent further alleged retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction and affirmed it. The Seventh Circuit held that, while the plaintiffs engaged in protected speech and suffered adverse permit actions, they failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim. The court concluded that the permit denials and revocations were based on the plaintiffs’ repeated and admitted violations of permit conditions, not on retaliatory motives, and that the plaintiffs offered no evidence of disparate treatment or pretext. View "Minocqua Brewing Company LLC v Hess" on Justia Law