Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Rodriquez D’Aundre Pam was shot and killed by Evansville police officers responding to a 911 call reporting that a man matching Pam’s description was in a backyard with a handgun, allegedly pointing it at a dog and at the caller. Officers arrived, encountered Pam on the property, and repeatedly ordered him to show his hands and get on the ground. Pam did not comply, appeared to reach for the doorknob, then moved along the house, put his hands in his pockets, and removed them when ordered. As officers continued to issue commands, Pam raised his left hand and kept his right hand at his side. Officers then fired multiple shots, killing him. A handgun was found near Pam’s body. Body camera footage captured the incident, but the video was unclear as to whether Pam was holding a gun at the moment he was shot.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, finding it undisputed that Pam pointed a gun at them before they fired. Pam’s estate appealed, challenging the grant of summary judgment for Officers Offerman and McQuay.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo, considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the estate. The court found that, while the video did not conclusively show Pam pointing a gun, the officers’ belief that Pam was threatening them with a firearm was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including the 911 report, Pam’s actions, and the recovery of a gun. The Seventh Circuit held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because their perception and response did not violate clearly established law. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Pam v. City of Evansville" on Justia Law

Devin Seats was convicted in Illinois state court in 2012 of three felonies related to a shooting, including aggravated battery with a firearm, armed habitual criminal, and aggravated discharge of a firearm. His pre-sentence investigation report listed six prior felonies, three of which were for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon. The sentencing judge referenced Seats’s “considerable criminal background” but did not specifically mention the vacated convictions. Seats was sentenced to concurrent prison terms.After his conviction was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court and the Illinois Supreme Court denied review, Illinois law changed. The Illinois Supreme Court held that certain subsections of the aggravated unlawful use of a weapon statute were unconstitutional, which affected two of Seats’s prior convictions. Seats sought post-conviction relief, arguing that his sentence was based on inaccurate information due to the inclusion of these now-invalid convictions. The Illinois Appellate Court vacated his armed habitual criminal conviction but declined to order resentencing, finding that the vacated convictions did not result in a greater sentence. The Illinois Supreme Court denied further review.Seats then filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, arguing that his sentence was based on inaccurate information and that the statute of limitations should run from the date his prior convictions were vacated. The district court dismissed the petition as untimely, calculating the limitations period from the date his conviction became final. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that Seats forfeited his argument for a later limitations period by not raising it in the district court and that the circumstances did not warrant plain error review. The court also found that the Illinois Appellate Court reasonably determined the sentencing judge did not rely on the vacated convictions. View "Seats v Nurse" on Justia Law

Otis Elion pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine in federal court in 2017. His sentence was enhanced under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines as a “career offender” based on three prior convictions, including two Illinois state convictions for delivery of a look-alike substance. The enhancement depended on whether those state convictions qualified as “controlled substance offenses” under the Guidelines, which required a categorical approach comparing the elements of the state statutes to the federal definition.After sentencing, Elion filed a federal habeas petition in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, arguing that his attorney was ineffective for failing to object to the career offender enhancement. The district court initially denied relief. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit (in Elion I) found Elion was prejudiced by counsel’s failure to object and remanded for the district court to determine whether counsel’s performance was deficient under Strickland v. Washington.On remand, the district court held an evidentiary hearing and found that Elion’s attorney had identified the correct legal issues, researched the relevant law, and reasonably applied the categorical approach, even though she ultimately reached an incorrect legal conclusion. The district court concluded her performance was not deficient.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Seventh Circuit held that an attorney’s reasonable but mistaken legal conclusion does not automatically constitute deficient performance under Strickland. The court found that, at the time of sentencing, existing caselaw did not sufficiently foreshadow the argument that ultimately succeeded, and that counsel’s overall performance met prevailing professional norms. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Elion v USA" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man who, in 2005, forcibly entered his estranged wife’s home, threatened her with a knife, and sexually assaulted her. He was convicted by a jury in Allen County, Indiana, of rape, burglary, and related offenses, and sentenced to 70 years in prison. The evidence at trial included testimony from the victim, their daughter, and other witnesses, as well as the defendant’s own statements to police. The defendant had a history of domestic abuse and was subject to a protective order at the time of the offenses.After his conviction, the defendant appealed, but the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Indiana Supreme Court denied review. He then filed a state postconviction petition alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, specifically that his trial attorney failed to pursue plea negotiations and made poor decisions regarding witness strategy. For over a decade, his postconviction attorneys took no substantive action to develop the record. When he proceeded pro se, the state court required him to submit affidavits, but he was unable to obtain one from his trial counsel. The state trial court denied relief, finding insufficient evidence that plea negotiations would have changed the outcome, and the Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed, focusing on the lack of corroborating evidence for his claims. The Indiana Supreme Court again denied review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case after the district court denied federal habeas relief and an evidentiary hearing. The Seventh Circuit held that, under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, the failure of postconviction counsel to develop the record is attributed to the petitioner, and the statutory exceptions for evidentiary hearings did not apply. The court also found that the state appellate court’s decision was not unreasonable under federal law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Ford v Reagle" on Justia Law

John Seiwert, who had a long history of daily heroin and crack cocaine use, was found in possession of firearms at his home in Illinois shortly after his father’s death. Law enforcement, investigating Seiwert’s drug dealer, observed frequent contact between the two and recovered firearms and drug paraphernalia from Seiwert’s residence. Seiwert admitted to using crack cocaine just hours before police arrived and to being a daily user for twenty years. He was charged with two counts of possessing a firearm as an unlawful user of, or addict to, a controlled substance under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(3).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied Seiwert’s pretrial motions to dismiss the indictment, which argued that § 922(g)(3) was unconstitutionally vague and violated the Second Amendment, both before and after the Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. Bruen. At trial, the government presented evidence of Seiwert’s drug use and firearm possession, and the jury convicted him on both counts. The district court denied Seiwert’s post-trial motions and sentenced him to concurrent terms of imprisonment and supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Seiwert’s arguments that § 922(g)(3) violated the Second Amendment, was unconstitutionally vague, and that the evidence was insufficient. The court held that, under the Bruen framework, § 922(g)(3) does not violate the Second Amendment as applied to Seiwert, finding it analogous to historical laws disarming the intoxicated and mentally ill. The court also found that its prior decision in United States v. Cook foreclosed Seiwert’s vagueness challenge, and that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the conviction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA v Seiwert" on Justia Law

A pharmaceutical company participated in a federal program that required it to report the average price it received for drugs sold to wholesalers, which in turn affected the rebates it owed the government under Medicaid. From 2005 to 2017, the company sold drugs to wholesalers at an initial price, but if it raised the price before the wholesaler resold the drugs to pharmacies, it required the wholesaler to pay the difference. The company reported only the initial price as the average manufacturer price (AMP), excluding the subsequent price increases, which resulted in lower reported AMPs and thus lower rebate payments to the government. The company justified this exclusion by categorizing the price increases as part of a bona fide service fee to wholesalers, even though the increased value was ultimately paid by pharmacies.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reviewed the case after a qui tam action was filed by a relator, who alleged that the company’s AMP calculations were false and violated the False Claims Act (FCA). The district court granted summary judgment to the relator on the issue of falsity, finding the AMP calculations and related certifications were factually and legally false. The issues of scienter (knowledge) and materiality were tried before a jury, which found in favor of the relator and awarded substantial damages. The company appealed, challenging the findings on falsity, scienter, and materiality, while the relator cross-appealed on the calculation of the number of FCA violations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the company’s exclusion of price increase values from AMP was unreasonable and contradicted the plain language and purpose of the relevant statutes, regulations, and agreements. The court also held that the jury reasonably found the company acted knowingly and that the false AMPs were material to the government’s payment decisions. The court rejected the cross-appeal on damages, finding the issue was not properly preserved for appeal. View "Streck v Eli Lilly and Company" on Justia Law

Elmer Miller, a general contractor and owner of a construction company, was cited by the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) for failing to provide fall protection for workers. OSHA sent the citation by certified mail to an address (433 E. County Road, 100 North, Arcola, Illinois) that it had used for Miller in the past. The certified mail was twice refused at that address and returned. OSHA then resent the citation to the same address using UPS, which was marked as received by “Miller.” Miller later argued that the citation was not properly served because it was sent to the wrong address and that there was no proof he received it, claiming his correct address was 435 E. County Road, not 433.After Miller did not contest the citation within the statutory period, the citation became a final order. The Secretary of Labor petitioned the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit for summary enforcement of the order. In response, Miller raised the issue of improper service, asserting that the Commission failed to prove adequate service because the citation was not sent to his correct address. The Secretary countered with public records and prior court documents showing Miller and his business had repeatedly used the 433 address for official purposes, including previous OSHA citations and court filings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that OSHA’s service of the citation to the 433 address was reasonably calculated to provide Miller with notice, satisfying due process requirements. The court found that Miller’s history of using the 433 address and his prior acceptance of service there undermined his claim. The court granted the Secretary of Labor’s petition for summary enforcement and issued the enforcement decree pursuant to 29 U.S.C. §660(b). View "Chavez-DeRemer v. Miller" on Justia Law

Tyree M. Neal, Jr. was indicted for conspiracy to distribute cocaine under federal law. After evading arrest in a high-speed chase and carjacking, he was eventually apprehended. The government sought a sentencing enhancement based on Neal’s prior Illinois conviction for unlawful delivery of cocaine, which, if applied, increased his statutory maximum sentence from 20 to 30 years. Neal pleaded guilty, represented by several attorneys during plea negotiations and sentencing. At sentencing, the district court found the enhancement applicable and imposed the 30-year maximum. Neal appealed, arguing his guilty plea was involuntary and lacked a factual basis, but did not challenge the enhancement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction.Subsequently, Neal filed a motion under 28 U.S.C. §2255 in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel. He argued that his appellate, sentencing, and plea counsel were deficient for failing to raise the argument that his Illinois cocaine conviction could not support the federal enhancement, an argument that later succeeded in United States v. Ruth. The district court denied relief, finding that counsel were not deficient for failing to anticipate a change in law, and held an evidentiary hearing regarding appellate counsel’s performance. The court concluded appellate counsel was not ineffective, as the unraised argument was not “obvious nor clearly stronger” than those presented.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that, although later precedent established the categorical approach to such enhancements, counsel’s failure to raise the argument did not constitute ineffective assistance under Strickland v. Washington. The court found that none of Neal’s attorneys performed below an objective standard of reasonableness given the law at the time, and thus denied collateral relief. View "Neal v USA" on Justia Law

A former sales representative for a pharmaceutical company alleged that the company engaged in an aggressive campaign to market one of its drugs, Vraylar, for uses not approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), specifically for substance abuse and major depressive disorder (MDD). The representative, who was responsible for promoting the drug to medical providers, claimed that the company trained its sales force to encourage off-label prescriptions and incentivized providers to prescribe Vraylar for these unapproved uses. He further asserted that he faced adverse employment actions, such as loss of promotion and increased workload, after raising concerns internally about the legality and compliance of these marketing practices.After the representative filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana, the government declined to intervene. The plaintiff then amended his complaint, dropping his direct fraud claim and proceeding solely on a theory of retaliation under 31 U.S.C. §3730(h). The district court dismissed the complaint with prejudice, finding that the plaintiff’s internal complaints to the company focused on regulatory noncompliance rather than fraud against the government, and thus did not put the employer on notice of protected activity under the FCA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that, to state a claim for FCA retaliation, an employee must plausibly allege that the employer was on notice that the employee was attempting to prevent fraud against the government, not merely regulatory violations. Because the plaintiff’s communications only referenced regulatory and policy concerns, and did not suggest government fraud, the court found the notice requirement unmet. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal and found no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend. View "Lewis v AbbVie Inc." on Justia Law

The case concerns a defendant who was arrested at a gas station mini-mart after officers, investigating an earlier robbery, observed him enter a single-occupancy restroom marked “Out of Order.” The defendant did not lock the door. Officers entered the restroom shortly after and found him standing on the handicap bars, reaching into the ceiling. A firearm was recovered from the ceiling area, and a subsequent search of the defendant revealed cash and various controlled substances. The government conceded that the officers lacked probable cause or reasonable suspicion to believe the defendant had committed a crime at the time they entered the restroom.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the evidence, finding he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy in the out-of-order restroom. The court also found sufficient evidence to convict him of unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon and possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance following a bench trial. The defendant appealed, challenging the denial of the suppression motion, the sufficiency of the evidence for the firearm conviction, and sought to preserve a constitutional challenge to 18 U.S.C. § 922(g).The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the defendant did not have a subjective or objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the unlocked, out-of-order restroom, so the officers’ entry did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court also found that sufficient evidence supported the conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon, based on constructive possession. Finally, the court held that the defendant waived his constitutional challenge to § 922(g) by failing to present any legal argument on appeal. View "United States v. Scott" on Justia Law