Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009, U.S. Army Specialist Schaefer was killed by a roadside bomb while serving a tour of duty in Iraq. Those directly responsible for such attacks are often unidentifiable or beyond the reach of a court’s personal jurisdiction. Secondary actors, such as the organizations that fund the terrorists, are often amorphous. Despite Congress’s effort to make state sponsors of terrorism accountable in U.S. courts (28 U.S.C. 1605A) any resulting judgment may be uncollectible. Spc. Schaefer’s mother claimed that the bomb that killed her son was a signature Iranian weapon that traveled from the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps to Hezbollah to Iraqi militias, who then placed it in the ground and that Deutsche Bank, a German entity with U.S. affiliates, is responsible for her son’s death under the Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA), 18 U.S.C. 2333. She argued that the Bank joined an Iranian conspiracy to commit acts of terror when it instituted procedures to evade U.S. sanctions and facilitate Iranian banking transactions. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of her suit, which “failed to plead facts that plausibly indicated that Deutsche Bank’s actions caused her son’s death.” The Bank’s conduct was not “violent” or “dangerous to human life” as the ATA requires, nor did it display the terroristic intent. To the extent Deutsche Bank joined any conspiracy, it joined only a conspiracy to avoid sanctions, distinct from any of Iran’s terrorism-related goals. View "Kemper v. Deutsche Bank AG" on Justia Law

Crutchfield, charged with drug crimes, faced enhanced penalties based on his criminal record. The prosecutor offered a plea deal that would have capped his sentence at 25 years, explaining that Crutchfield would have to serve 85 percent of that term under state law. Crutchfield’s attorney advised him of the offer but did not correct the prosecutor’s mistake: under Illinois law, Crutchfield could have been eligible for release after serving 50 percent of his sentence. Crutchfield rejected the deal, was convicted, and received a 40-year sentence. After a direct appeal and two rounds of post-conviction proceedings, Crutchfield sought federal habeas review under 28 U.S.C. 2254 claiming ineffective assistance under the Strickland rule because he would have taken the deal if his attorney had correctly advised him. He had not raised this claim on direct appeal or in his initial state post-conviction proceeding but presented it in a successive petition. Illinois courts refused to hear the claim. The district judge denied relief based on the unexcused procedural default. Crutchfield argued that Illinois prisoners may use the Martinez–Trevino gateway to obtain review of defaulted claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The Seventh Circuit rejected the argument. Illinois does not impose the kind of restrictive procedural rules on Strickland claims to warrant application of the Martinez–Trevino exception. Crutchfield procedurally defaulted his Strickland claim and has not shown cause to excuse the default. View "Crutchfield v. Dennison" on Justia Law

Current and former flight attendants challenged a SkyWest Airlines compensation policy of paying for their work in the air but not on the ground, alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 201 (FLSA), and various state and local wage laws. The sought to certify a class of similarly situated SkyWest employees. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the federal claim. The flight attendants plausibly allege they were not paid for certain hours of work but under the FLSA the relevant unit for determining a pay violation is the average hourly wage across a workweek. The flight attendants failed to allege even a single workweek in which one of them received less than the federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour. The dormant Commerce Clause, however, does not bar the other claims.. States possess authority to regulate the labor of their own citizens and companies; the dormant Commerce Clause does not preclude state regulation of flight attendant wages in this case, particularly when the FLSA itself reserves that authority to states and localities. View "Hirst v. Skywest, Inc." on Justia Law

Kohl was convicted of three federal controlled substance offenses, 21 U.S.C. 841 and 846. The court assigned Kohl criminal history category IV, including one criminal history point for a 2016 Wisconsin conviction for operating a vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted controlled substance in his blood. Kohl argued that a first violation of the Wisconsin statute does not carry a criminal penalty and should not have been counted. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 36-month sentence. The Sentencing Guidelines provide that certain listed misdemeanors and petty offenses, including local ordinance violations that are not also violations of state criminal law, are not to be counted, U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(c)(2), but an Application Note qualifies that exclusion by requiring that convictions for driving under the influence and similar offenses are always counted. Although the Wisconsin statute does not require proof that the offender was impaired or under the influence, Kohl’s offense was sufficiently similar to driving while intoxicated or under the influence to qualify for inclusion. The court noted that the sentence was well below the Guideline range for category IV (77-96 months) and was also below the Guideline range for category III (63-78 months), the category to which Kohl would have been assigned if the disputed conviction was not included. View "United States v. Kohl" on Justia Law

Hamdan was arrested after a 2014 traffic stop revealed he was driving on a suspended license. Hamdan consented to a search of his car. Officers found a shoebox containing $67,000 in cash. Police found a card for a Public Storage business inscribed with unit and access code information. Hamdan denied knowledge of the storage unit. Police obtained a search warrant. A key Hamdan was carrying opened the unit. Hamdan's passenger, Yahia, told police that he was employed by Hamdan and alerted officers to a second storage unit, rented in Yahia’s name, but controlled by Hamdan. Another of Hamdan’s keys opened that unit. With Yahia’s consent, police searched that unit and discovered boxes marked with Hamdan’s name and address. In the storage units, officers discovered 20,000 packages of the street drug, “spice,” plus tools and ingredients to make spice, including the synthetic cannabinoid XLR-11. Hamdan was convicted of controlled substance offenses, 21 U.S.C. 841 & 846. Hamdan had planned to argue that he did not know spice was illegal by introducing evidence that he was previously arrested, but not prosecuted for activities related to spice. Hamdan sought to subpoena two Wisconsin state troopers who arrested and interviewed him in 2012. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hamdan’s proposed evidence was largely irrelevant to the issues. The synthetic cannabinoid involved in the 2012 arrest was not at issue here. The two incidents were remote in time and Hamdan’s knowledge of XLR-11’s illegality could have changed. The testimony could have caused confusion and prejudice. View "United States v. Hamdan" on Justia Law

The District operates Naperville Central High School (NCHS), where H.P. attended three years of high school. In 2006, during her junior year, H.P.’s mother committed suicide. H.P. moved from her mother’s Naperville home to her father’s home, which is not in the District. H.P. completed her junior year at NCHS. Before the 2017‐18 school year, the District learned that H.P. no longer lived in the District. H.P.’s father asked the District to allow H.P. to attend her senior year at NCHS, instead of Downers Grove North High School. Under the District’s policy, “[a] student must establish residency within the School District boundaries.” Her father asked the District to waive that requirement to allow H.P. to attend NCHS as an accommodation for certain claimed disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, including anxiety, depression, sleep disturbances, and seizures. The District again denied the request. H.P. enrolled in DGNHS, where she ultimately graduated. H.P. and her father filed suit, asserting disparate impact and disparate treatment under ADA Title II and Rehabilitation Act Section 504. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary rejection of both claims. H.P. could not show causation, i.e., that but‐for her alleged disability, she would have been able to obtain her requested accommodation--attending NCHS. View "H. P. v. Naperville Community Unit School District 203" on Justia Law

Bostock pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine and was sentenced to 125 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The statute distinguishes by purity in setting minimum and maximum sentences, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The Sentencing Guidelines drug quantity table, U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(c), similarly distinguishes among “Methamphetamine”, “Methamphetamine (actual)”, and “Ice”. Bostock conceded distributing 63.8 grams of ice. Given his criminal history, the Guidelines recommended a sentencing range of 130-162 months’ imprisonment. Bostock argued that the judge should have proceeded as if he had sold 64 grams of “methamphetamine” rather than 64 grams of “ice,” for a recommended range of 77-96 months. The court rejected arguments that the distinction between “methamphetamine” and “ice” or “methamphetamine (actual),” is outmoded because most sellers have higher-purity products and that the distinction never had a sound empirical footing. A judge is not required even to articulate a reason for sticking with the Guidelines. The 10-to-1 ratio between “ice” and “methamphetamine” does not denigrate from marginal punishment for more serious criminals. There is no problem with holding Bostock, who did not receive a supervisory enhancement, responsible for the amount or purity of the drug he distributed. In addition, the judge found Bostock undeterrable; Bostock was fortunate, given the judge’s observations, that his sentence is below the USSG range. View "United States v. Bostock" on Justia Law

In 2000 Balsiger took the helm of IOS, a large coupon processing companies. IOS contracted with large retail chains and small, independently owned stores to collect and sort coupons redeemed at their stores and to submit invoices for reimbursement either directly to the manufacturer or indirectly to the manufacturer’s agent. For his role in designing and implementing a scheme to defraud those manufacturers, Balsiger was charged with 25 counts of wire fraud and conspiracy both to commit wire fraud and obstruct justice. After a decade of litigation, Balsiger represented himself at a bench trial with the assistance of stand-by counsel. The district court convicted Balsiger on 12 counts and sentenced him to 120 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Balsiger’s argument that the court deprived him of his Sixth Amendment right to retain the counsel of his choice by failing to grant an 18-month continuance and by refusing to order the government to remove a lis pendens on his home—a notice to potential buyers that title to the property might be impaired by the outcome of his criminal prosecution. The court upheld the district court’s conclusion, following the death of Balsiger’s attorney, that Balsiger waived his right to counsel and its decision to require him, over his objection, to proceed pro se. View "United States v. Balsiger" on Justia Law

O’Boyle claimed a debt-collection letter sent by RTR violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by “overshadowing” the consumer’s rights under 15 U.S.C. 1692g(b) and failing to communicate the FDCPA rights effectively. The letter consisted of two sheets the validation notice is not on either side of the first sheet. The front of this sheet directs the reader to “the back of this page for additional important information” but that “additional important information” does not include the notice. Instead, the notice is at the second sheet’s front top. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of O’Boyle’s claim. The FDCPA does not say a debt collector must put the validation notice on the first page of a letter. Nor does the FDCPA say the first page of a debt-collection letter must point to the validation notice if it is not on the first page. Nor does the FDCPA say a debt collector must tell a consumer the validation notice is important. Nor does the FDCPA say a debt collector may not tell a consumer that other information is important. View "O' Boyle v. Real Time Resolutions, Inc." on Justia Law

During a drug deal, Bishop was pepper sprayed by his customer and shot her. He was convicted of discharging a firearm during a drug transaction, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). He argued that the warrant authorizing a search of his cell phone violated the Fourth Amendment’s requirement that every warrant “particularly describ[e] the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized” by describing the “place to be searched” as the cell phone Bishop carried during the attempted sale, and describing the things to be seized as: any evidence (including all photos, videos, and/or any other digital files, including removable memory cards) of suspect identity, motive, scheme/plan along with DNA evidence of the crime of Criminal Recklessness with a deadly weapon which is hidden or secreted [in the cellphone or] related to the offense of Dealing illegal drugs. The Seventh Circuit upheld the denial of Bishop’s motion to suppress. While the warrant permitted the police to look at every file on the phone and decide which files satisfied the description, the warrant was not too general. It is enough if the warrant confines the things being looked for by stating what crime is under investigation. A warrant need not be more specific than knowledge allows. View "United States v. Bishop" on Justia Law