Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mitchell enrolled in an Elgin Community College online criminal-justice course. The instructor, an Elgin police officer, eventually advised her that she was failing the course. Soon after, the police department received anonymous threats and a harassing email targeting the officer. Another officer swore out a complaint accusing Mitchell of electronic communication harassment. She was arrested, immediately bonded out, and two years later was acquitted. Mitchell sued the city and several officers seeking damages for wrongful prosecution. A district judge dismissed the case, concluding that the federal claims were either untimely or not cognizable. Mitchell appealed. The Supreme Court’s 2017 decision, Manuel v. Joliet, overturned circuit precedent that defeated Mitchell’s Fourth Amendment claim below, clarifying that pretrial detention without probable cause is actionable under the Fourth Amendment, via 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Court did not decide when the claim accrues. A Seventh Circuit panel then held that a Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention accrues when the detention ends. The court did not determine the timeliness of Mitchell’s claim because the parties did not adequately address whether and under what circumstances a person who is arrested but released on bond remains “seized” for Fourth Amendment purposes or what conditions of release, if any, were imposed on Mitchell when she bonded out. View "Mitchell v. City of Elgin" on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit previously concluded that people whose property is taken into custody by Illinois under its Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, 765 ILCS 1026/15-607, are entitled to receive the time value of their property (interest or other earnings), less reasonable custodial fees. On remand the district court declined to certify a proposed class, ruling that owners are entitled to compensation for the time value of money only if the property was earning interest when the state took it into custody, which meant that the class had internal divisions that made certification inappropriate. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The Supreme Court has held that the Takings Clause protects the time value of money as much as it does money itself. What the property earns in the state’s hands does not depend on what it had been earning in the owner’s hands; cash has time value even if not invested. The Takings Clause does not set up a situation in which someone who wanted to be “in cash” bears the risk of loss as market conditions change without any prospect of offsetting gain. On remand, Illinois can argue that it does not owe interest on small amounts, such as the $100 at issue, because of administrative costs. View "Goldberg v. Frerichs" on Justia Law

Hagen was convicted twice under Illinois law for failing to get her children to school (Guardian Allows Child Truancy). She later pleaded guilty in federal court for conspiring to distribute methamphetamine. The district court counted her two convictions for allowing child truancy toward her criminal history score. The Seventh Circuit reversed, applying a five‐factor test to confirm that Guardian Allows Child Truancy is similar to, but less serious than, the offense of non‐support (failing to provide for a child’s basic needs); Sentencing Guidelines section 4A1.2(c)(1) therefore required its exclusion from the criminal history score. Non‐support bears so many obvious similarities to Guardian Allows Child Truancy that the court plainly ought to have considered it; the court committed plain error, affecting a substantial right. View "United States v. Hagen" on Justia Law

The inmate sued Pendleton Correctional Industrial Facility (CIF) and Indiana Department of Corrections officials, alleging that they prevented him from participating fully in Moorish Science Temple of America services held at the CIF, in violation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses. The district court screened the complaint under 28 U.S.C. 1915A; dismissed claims against two defendants on Eleventh Amendment grounds and against an officer who had not participated personally in any of the cited actions; and allowed damages claims against the remaining defendants to proceed. Following discovery, the court granted the remaining defendants summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, concluding that the defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on First Amendment claims for damages. The court remanded in part; the district court misread the complaint, which clearly seeks injunctive relief as well as damages. The court should have read the inmate’s pro se free exercise claim as seeking injunctive relief under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. On remand, the court first must determine whether the free exercise claim and RLUIPA claims are moot, then consider whether injunctive relief is warranted. There is no basis for injunctive relief on the establishment clause claims. View "Neely-Beytarik-El v. Conley" on Justia Law

An April 2016 Chicago Police Accountability Task Force report indicated that the Chicago Police Department’s “response to violence is not sufficiently imbued with Constitutional policing tactics.” In January 2017, the U.S. Department of Justice released a report concluding that the Chicago Police Department exhibits a pattern or practice of the unconstitutional use of force. In August 2017, the state sued the city, alleging that the Chicago Police Department’s use-of-force policies and practices violate the federal constitution and Illinois law. Two days later, the parties moved to stay the proceedings while they negotiated a consent decree. Almost immediately, the Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 7, publicly opposed any consent decree, citing fears that the decree might impair its collective bargaining rights. For months, the Lodge monitored the ongoing negotiations and met informally with the state’s representatives. The Lodge nonetheless waited until June 2018, to file a motion to intervene in the suit. The district court denied the motion to intervene as untimely. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Lodge knew from the beginning that a consent decree might impact its interests but delayed its motion for nearly a year; its allegations of prejudice are speculative. View "Illinois v. Chicago" on Justia Law

Beltran-Aguilar, a citizen of Mexico, applied for cancellation of removal. The BIA affirmed the denial of his application. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Beltran-Aguilar’s conviction for Wisconsin battery involving domestic abuse was a crime of domestic violence, rendering him ineligible for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(1)(C). A “crime of violence” is “an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another,” 18 U.S.C. 16(a). The elements of the crime for which a defendant was convicted, not his underlying conduct, are determinative. Beltran-Aguilar was convicted under Wisconsin Statute 940.19(1), which prohibits “caus[ing] bodily harm to another by an act done with intent to cause bodily harm to that person or another without the consent of the person so harmed.” “Bodily harm” means “physical pain or injury, illness, or any impairment of physical condition.” Rejecting an argument that certain types of non-qualifying conduct theoretically might be prosecuted under the statute, the court stated that there must be “a realistic probability, not a theoretical possibility," that the state would prosecute conduct that falls outside the generic definition of a crime. Beltran-Aguilar has not identified any case in which Wisconsin’s definition of “bodily harm” has been applied in a way that does not accord with precedent defining crimes of violence. View "Beltran-Aguilar v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Ronkowski own 120 acres of undeveloped land in Bayfield County, Wisconsin. Since acquiring the property in 1972, Ronkowski has accessed it via an unpaved road that crosses over neighboring land, including land owned by the U.S. Forest Service. Ronkowski brought suit under the Quiet Title Act seeking recognition of an easement to access their property by way of the unpaved road. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Ronkowski had not established entitlement to an easement. Ronkowski did not make the required showing for an easement by necessity or an easement by implication because the existing forest service road provided them an alternate route by which to reach their property. Ronkowski could not demonstrate that the easement was necessary to access the property; even if traveling by way of forest road would be “inconvenient, difficult or require a high clearance vehicle,” there was no evidence that it is impossible. View "Ronkowski v. United States" on Justia Law

Fare Foods hired Swyear as an outside sales representative in 2015. Swyear claims Porter (an owner) indicated that she would be the first female outside sales representative and expressed concern regarding her ability to perform effectively in a male-dominated field. Porter later testified that he liked hiring a woman because they could get men to do things like unload delivery trucks or make sales and that Fare employed several female outside sales representatives before Swyear. Swyear noticed the work environment was sometimes unprofessional; male employees used offensive nicknames, discussed the sexual activities of other employees, and talked about how one female employee dressed inappropriately. Porter testified that he was aware of and may have used the offensive nicknames. Swyear did not tell anyone she was offended nor did she make any formal or informal complaints. At one point, Swyear reported that a fellow representative had made overtures to her during a business trip. The company investigated but decided that discipline was not required. After two reviews, during which Swyear was given instructions about improving her job performance with respect to punctuality and use of company vehicles, Swyear’s employment was terminated. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection, on summary judgment, of her claims of sexual discrimination, sexual harassment, and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and breach of contract. View "Swyear v. Fare Foods Corp." on Justia Law

During a traffic stop, Kentucky officers found marijuana and a gun in Sheperd’s car. He pleaded guilty to possession of marijuana with intent to distribute, being a felon in possession of a firearm, and two counts for criminal forfeiture. The judge applied an Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) enhancement based on his prior Kentucky burglary convictions and sentenced Shepherd to the mandatory minimum 15 years in prison, 18 U.S.C. 924(e). The Sixth Circuit affirmed. Though his case originated in Kentucky, Shepherd is in an Indiana federal prison. After his challenges to his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 were rejected by the Kentucky district court and the Sixth Circuit, Shepherd filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 motion in Indiana. A section 2241 habeas petition may be allowed if the prisoner can show “that the remedy by motion [under section 2255] is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” The Seventh Circuit did not address whether Shepherd’s plea agreement waived his right to bring the collateral challenge or whether section 2241 should be available to him and if so, which precedent should apply. The court resolved the case on the merits: the Sixth Circuit held recently that Kentucky second-degree burglary qualifies as a predicate offense for an ACCA enhancement. View "Shepherd v. Julian" on Justia Law

McHenry, a 49-year-old former hair stylist who suffers from several physical and mental disabilities, challenged the denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits. The ALJ had concluded that, although McHenry suffers from degenerative disc disease and fibromyalgia, she lacked sufficient medical evidence that the conditions were disabling, and that she was not credible about her limitations. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The ALJ erred by failing to have a medical expert review a consequential MRI report. The court rejected arguments that the ALJ improperly determined McHenry’s residual functional capacity by not accounting for McHenry’s anxiety-related limits on social functioning and limits in her ability to sustain concentration because of her medications’ side effects and by discounting McHenry’s credibility. View "McHenry v. Berryhill" on Justia Law