Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2010 Phillips began serving an eight-year term of supervised release stemming from a 2003 conviction for possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute. In October 2017, Quincy police officers stopped him as he drove out of the parking lot of the Amtrak station. A dog alerted that drugs might be present in the car. The officer conducted a search, discovered approximately 196 grams of heroin, and arrested Phillips for possession with intent to distribute. Phillips moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that there was no violation of any traffic law, so the police lacked probable cause for the stop. The district court concluded that the exclusionary rule does not apply to supervised-release-revocation hearings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Two of the Supreme Court’s rationales for declining to extend the exclusionary rule to the parole context equally apply to hearings for the revocation of supervised release. The exclusionary rule would “alter the traditionally flexible, administrative nature of parole revocation proceedings.” View "United States v. Phillips" on Justia Law

Police conducted a traffic stop of Cook's car, approached the car and noticed a strong odor of marijuana. Cook was driving on a suspended license and without a license plate on the front of his vehicle, so the officers ordered him to step out of the vehicle and removed a loaded, .40-caliber pistol from a holster under Cook’s shoulder. The gun had an extended 22-round capacity magazine with 19 bullets remaining. In purchasing the firearm, Cook completed an ATF form, answering “no” to the question, “Are you an unlawful user of, or addicted to, marijuana or any depressant, stimulant, narcotic drug, or any other controlled substance?” During a recorded interview, Cook acknowledged that he had used marijuana almost daily for nearly 10 years and had smoked two “blunts” that day. Cook ultimately produced a small packet containing a half ounce of marijuana. Cook was convicted of being an unlawful user of a controlled substance in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A defendant whose conduct is clearly prohibited by a statute cannot make a facial vagueness challenge. There is a substantial relationship between the government’s legitimate interest in preventing violent crime and the statute’s ban on gun possession by unlawful drug users. The court also rejected a challenge to the jury instructions. View "United States v. Cook" on Justia Law

Scheidler, employed by the Indiana Department of Insurance (IDOI), sought accommodations for disabilities related to her mental health. She asked, among other things, that her coworkers not startle her. She received these accommodations for several years. In May 2013, a frustrated supervisor reached toward Scheidler and said, “I could just strangle you.” An investigation into the incident discovered that several months earlier Scheidler commented in an elevator about a coworker’s apparent promotion prospects: “It’s who you know and who you blow.” IDOI terminated Scheidler. She sued for disability discrimination, retaliation, and other claims. She lost some claims at summary judgment and the rest at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The closest Scheidler comes to advancing a failure-to-accommodate claim is under the theory that she asked her coworkers not to startle her, but the supervisor threatened to strangle her in an episode that was an isolated, “one-off” event. Scheidler claimed that her elevator comment was statutorily protected activity but the court held she failed both the subjective and objective factors because she did not have a sincere, good-faith belief she opposed an unlawful practice and because her comment did not involve discrimination prohibited by Title VII. View "Scheidler v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Nielen-Thomas, on behalf of herself and others similarly situated, filed a complaint in Wisconsin state court alleging she and other class members were defrauded by their investment advisor. Defendants removed the case to federal court and argued the action should be dismissed because it was a “covered class action” precluded by the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), 15 U.S.C. 78bb(f)(1), (f)(5)(B), According to Nielen-Thomas, her lawsuit did not meet SLUSA’s “covered class action” definition because she alleged a proposed class with fewer than 50 members. The district court held that Nielen-Thomas’s suit was a “covered class action” because she brought her claims in a representative capacity, section 78bb(f)(5)(B)(i)(II), and dismissed her claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plain language of SLUSA’s “covered class action” definition includes any class action brought by a named plaintiff on a representative basis, regardless of the proposed class size, which includes Nielen-Thomas’s class action lawsuit and her complaint meets all other statutory requirements, her lawsuit is precluded by SLUSA. View "Nielen-Thomas v. Concorde Investment Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Coleman, a former Chicago police officer, was friends with cousins Davis and Conway. In 2014, Coleman served on the Operation Five Leaf Clover drug investigation task force, which began to focus on people whom Coleman knew, including Davis. The Operation was preparing to execute search and arrest warrants but, before the bust, the targets learned about it. Conway testified that on June 9, 2014, he received a call from an unknown woman who told him to call Coleman, who warned him about the impending searches and told him to pass the message along to Davis. Conway did so. The Operation had wiretapped numerous phones and heard two men say that someone “on the task force” had given them a warning call. The contraband was moved to a house that the Operation had not known about but officers were monitoring the person Davis called. The Operation then obtained a search warrant for the new house and recovered the contraband. Coleman was convicted of obstruction of justice, 18 U.S.C. 1512(c)(2), and sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting claims of evidentiary errors, that the prosecution used perjured testimony, and that the court committed errors in selecting his sentence. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law

In March 2014, Kleber, an attorney, applied for a senior inhouse position in CareFusion’s law department. The job description required applicants to have “3 to 7 years (no more than 7 years) of relevant legal experience.” Kleber was 58 and had more than seven years of pertinent experience. CareFusion hired a 29-year-old applicant who met but did not exceed the experience requirement. Kleber filed suit, alleging disparate treatment and disparate impact under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623(a)(2). The district court dismissed Kleber’s disparate impact claim, reasoning that the text of section 4(a)(2) did not extend to outside job applicants. Kleber then voluntarily dismissed his separate claim for disparate treatment liability to appeal. Following en banc review, the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The plain language of section 4(a)(2) makes clear that Congress, while protecting employees from disparate impact age discrimination, did not extend that same protection to outside job applicants; that reading is reinforced by the ADEA’s broader structure and history. View "Kleber v. CareFusion Corp." on Justia Law

In September 2013, Chicago police officers searched an apartment where they encountered Lewis and two others and discovered a handgun. Lewis alleges that the officers had no basis to believe the gun was his; that he didn’t live at the apartment and never told the officers otherwise; and that the officers never found anything in the apartment indicating that he lived there. Lewis spent more than two years in pretrial detention on charges of unlawfully possessing a firearm. After the charges were dropped, Lewis sued the city and police officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages. The district court dismissed the suit, ruling that both claims were time-barred. Days later the Supreme Court decided Manuel v. City of Joliet, clarifying that detention without probable cause violates the Fourth Amendment “when it precedes, but also when it follows, the start of legal process in a criminal case.” The Court declined to decide when such claims accrue, remanding the case to the Seventh Circuit, which held that a Fourth Amendment claim for wrongful pretrial detention accrues on the date the detention ends. The Seventh Circuit then held that Lewis had filed a viable, timely Fourth Amendment claim for unlawful pretrial detention. Lewis filed it within two years of his release from detention. The court affirmed the dismissal of the due-process claim. View "Lewis v. Chicago" on Justia Law

Fuller entered the U.S. on a fiancé visa in 1999 and married an American citizen in 2000. In 2004, he pleaded guilty to attempted criminal sexual assault. An Illinois court ultimately imposed a sentence of four years' imprisonment. Following Fuller’s 2014 release, DHS initiated removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(D)(i) . In 2004, Fuller and his wife, whom he divorced in 2005, had failed to appear for a mandatory immigration interview, triggering the revocation of his conditional residency status. Because Fuller’s conviction constituted a “particularly serious crime,” he was disqualified from seeking withholding of removal. Fuller sought deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture, alleging that he was likely to be tortured as a bisexual if returned to Jamaica. In 2015, the BIA affirmed the denial of relief based on the IJ’s adverse credibility findings. Fuller asked the BIA to reopen his removal proceeding so that he could present new evidence, Fuller submitted new letters of support from acquaintances attesting to prior incidents in which he was the victim of violence in Jamaica owing to his sexual orientation. In denying this request, the BIA explained that “[Fuller’s] motion does not challenge our conclusions regarding his credibility or his eligibility for deferral of removal, and we do not find that his letters of support would materially alter these findings.” The Seventh Circuit again remanded. The BIA’s stated rationale reflects a misapprehension of the basis for his request. View "Fuller v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Calvert was the sole owner of E.L.C., an electrical contracting company. After a labor organization unsuccessfully campaigned to unionize his workforce, Calvert laid off most of E.L.C.’s electricians, effectively preventing future unionization attempts. The NLRB determined that E.L.C. violated the National Labor Relations Act prohibition on discrimination against workers for exercising their statutory rights, 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(3) and ordered E.L.C. to compensate the electricians with backpay. Calvert shifted E.L.C.’s operations to new corporate entities. The NLRB discovered Calvert’s plan and held him personally responsible for the backpay award. Facing more than $400,000 in liability, Calvert filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Board argued that the debt was not dischargeable because it arose from a willful and malicious injury, 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(6). Calvert denied that he acted maliciously. The bankruptcy judge declined to apply collateral estoppel and found that Calvert had not acted maliciously, so the debt was not exempt from discharge. In the district court, the Board again raised collateral estoppel but failed to analyze the elements of the doctrine or provide citations to the agency record. The district judge and Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Board did not challenge the evidence or the factual findings but based its entire case on collateral estoppel while providing only a generalized discussion of preclusion doctrine that is untethered to specific findings. View "National Labor Relations Board v. Calvert" on Justia Law

Under Wisconsin’s open-enrollment program, a public-school student can apply to transfer from his resident school district to a nonresident district that has available space. The program distinguishes between regular education and special education spaces. If a student with a disability requires special services, a nonresident district may deny the student’s transfer application if it lacks the services or space necessary to meet those special needs. Disabled school children, whose transfer applications were denied because nonresident districts determined that they could not meet the students’ special needs, sued the school districts and state actors under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12132; section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 794(a); and the Equal Protection Clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Differential treatment of special-needs students does not make the program unlawful. Federal law forbids discrimination based on stereotypes about a handicap but does not forbid decisions based on the actual attributes of the handicap. The program makes decisions based on the actual needs of disabled students, so it complies with federal law. Even analyzing the case as a request for an accommodation, the requested change would fundamentally alter the program; neither the ADA nor the Rehabilitation Act requires fundamental alterations. View "P.F., a minor, by A.F., v. Taylor" on Justia Law