Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Seventh Circuit affirmed Fernandez’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), and his 27-month sentence. Voecks, the driver of the car in which Fernandez was found with a firearm, gave the arresting officer, Frusti, contradictory (recorded) accounts about the gun’s ownership and who had placed it in the center console of the car. When the defense attempted to ask Voecks about what Frusti had said to him and vice-versa, the district court sustained the government’s hearsay objections, essentially confining the cross-examination of each witness to his own statements. The Seventh Circuit upheld that ruling. Fernandez has not shown that any of the omitted details of the interrogations mattered enough to demonstrate reversible error; Fernandez’s failure to invoke his Confrontation Clause rights below and his ability to raise the essential points as to Voecks’ change of story defeated any claim of plain error. The court also upheld the district court’s ruling precluding Fernandez from questioning defense witness Stramowski, another passenger in the car, about the content of the texts she had purportedly received from Voecks before the trial and upheld a ruling permitting the government to establish that Fernandez was arrested during the traffic stop on an outstanding warrant for a probation violation. View "United States v. Fernandez" on Justia Law

An FBI task force identified Brewer as being present at banks just before robberies, determined that Brewer lived with Pawlak, in Gary, Indiana, and observed a Toyota matching the one from the robberies parked outside their residence. An officer obtained a state court warrant, which permitted the use of a “tracking device … in any public or private area ... within the State of Indiana.” An officer monitored Brewer's car until it arrived in Los Angeles, unaware of the limitation, saw it circling a Los Angeles bank, and notified local officers, who observed Brewer and Pawlak near the bank. When they returned, Pawlak got out of the car, approached the tellers, held up a robbery note, and ran out of the bank with about $1,000. Officers stopped their car, arrested Brewer and Pawlak, and found a bag of cash. Brewer was charged in Indiana with three counts of bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a) and lost a motion to suppress regarding the tracking device. The government presented evidence of the Ohio and California robberies, eyewitness testimony identifying Brewer as present before the robberies, and surveillance footage. Convicted, Brewer was sentenced to 137 months in prison. He had been convicted in California; the Indiana sentence added 12 months in custody. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The in-state limitation did not reflect a probable-cause finding or a particularity requirement; the Fourth Amendment is unconcerned with state borders. The evidence of the unindicted robberies was directly probative of Brewer’s identity, modus operandi, and intent, and fell within the bounds of Federal Rule 404(b)(2). View "United States v. Brewer" on Justia Law

Kopplin, a former train conductor, brought claims of negligence and negligence per se against the Wisconsin Central railroad under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51, alleging that Kopplin injured his elbow in trying to operate a broken railroad switch on January 24, 2014. The district court granted the railroad summary judgment because Kopplin could not prove that the broken switch caused his injury. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. A video of the incident shows no immediate signs of injury and Kopplin never mentioned any pain to his coworkers until two hours later. He had continued to perform other physical tasks. Kopplin’s sole causation expert conceded, in a deposition, that he knew so little about Kopplin’s job that it would be mere speculation to say throwing a switch even could cause the elbow injury and that he did not investigate whether Kopplin’s other physical activities could have caused his renewed elbow problems. That expert later provided an affidavit in which he definitively stated that the January 24 incident caused the elbow injury, explaining that the nature of the injury was so clear that there was no need to even consider other potential causes. The judge refused to consider the affidavit because it contradicted sworn deposition testimony. View "Kopplin v. Wisconsin Central Limited" on Justia Law

In 1993, Carey was a security guard at a night school. Carey arrived for his shift, traversed the premises, then returned to his car to read. The parking lot was not well lit. Around 7:00 p.m., Carey saw three black men walking toward his vehicle. About two feet from Carey’s car one man grabbed a gun from his coat and fired it through the window. Carey, shot in the face, made his way into the school. Help was summoned; 15-20 minutes after the shooting, the Elkhart police found Sims near about 20 feet from Carey's car. Carey’s identification of Sims in the photographic lineup was not unequivocal but Carey identified him at trial as the shooter. The police never found the gun. Sims was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to 35 years’ imprisonment. In 2012, during a post-conviction evidentiary hearing, Sims learned the prosecution withheld evidence that Carey, the only identification witness, was hypnotized before trial to enhance his recollection. After the Indiana courts denied habeas relief, Sims filed a federal petition. The district court held that the Indiana court did not unreasonably apply established federal law. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The Supreme Court recognizes that suppression of strong, non-cumulative evidence related to the credibility of a witness who is critical to the prosecution's case, is material under Brady. The fact that Carey had been hypnotized would have undermined his credibility and changed his cross-examination dramatically. View "Sims v. Hyatte" on Justia Law

Until recently, Sexing Tech held a monopoly on the market for sexed cattle semen in the United States. Sperm‐sorting technology separates bull semen into X‐chromosome bearing and Y‐chromosome bearing sperm cells; the resulting “sexed semen” is used to inseminate cows artificially so that dairy farmers can breed only milk‐producing cows. ABS, a bull‐stud operation, sued, alleging that Sexing Tech had unlawfully monopolized the domestic sexed‐semen market in violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act by using its market power to impose coercive contract terms. ABS sought a declaratory judgment proclaiming those contracts invalid, to permit its own entry into that market. Sexing Tech counterclaimed that ABS infringed its patents and breached the contract by misappropriating trade secrets in developing ABS’s competing technology. Three claims went to trial: ABS’s antitrust claim and Sexing Tech’s patent infringement and breach of contract counterclaims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that ABS violated a confidentiality agreement it had with Sexing Tech and that Sexing Tech’s patent was not invalid on obviousness grounds. The jury’s assessments of two of the three patent claims still at issue cannot be reconciled under the rules governing dependent claims and enablement, and so a new trial is necessary on them. View "ABS Global, Inc. v. Inguran, LLC" on Justia Law

On trial for bank robbery, Books chose not to testify in his own defense. He was found guilty and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment. He challenged the district court’s decision to allow eyewitness testimony from two bank tellers; Books alleged they based their identification of him as the robber not on personal knowledge, but rather on information improperly supplied by a police detective. He also challenged a ruling that would have allowed the government, had Books chosen to testify, to impeach him with physical evidence directly tying him to the robbery—evidence the police learned of (and recovered) only as a result of a confession the district court separately had determined was unlawfully coerced. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. The district court did not err in finding the eyewitness identifications reflected the tellers’ firsthand knowledge of Books; allowing their testimony at trial was entirely proper. Nor does the district court’s conditional impeachment ruling, even if wrong on the law, mandate reversal in light of the overwhelming weight of evidence against Books. View "United States v. Books" on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Giles suffers from schizoaffective disorder. Giles filed a pro se suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging the defendants violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment by being deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs, subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement, and failing to protect him from other inmates. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, holding that Giles could not establish the subjective elements of his claims because the defendants, who are all non-medical officials, appropriately relied on the judgment of medical professionals. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Giles cannot establish the defendants possessed a sufficiently culpable state of mind. Giles received regular medical attention from psychologists, psychiatrists, and mental health professionals; several of his grievances were subjected to emergency review. Giles has not presented evidence that his grievances were ignored or mishandled not was there an indication from his medical records that he was not receiving adequate care. The non-medical officials relied on the medical professionals to provide proper treatment, and there was nothing to give notice to the officials of a need to intervene. View "Giles v. Godinez" on Justia Law

In Belarus, Ruderman experience discrimination and violence because of his Jewish heritage. His father, a documentary filmmaker, died while filming a piece on government corruption and had previously been detained and battered by the KGB. Ruderman fled to the U.S. at age 19, in 2001, under the Lautenberg Amendment, which lowers barriers to immigration for certain former Soviet nationals, 8 U.S.C. 1157. Shortly after arriving he was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol and sentenced to court supervision. He found work and got married. In 2008, Ruderman struck and killed a pedestrian while driving drunk. He pleaded guilty to homicide by negligent operation of a vehicle and was sentenced to five years in prison. Following his release, he worked until the government denied his adjustment‐of‐status application, causing his work permit to expire. The government then began removal proceedings. The IJ concluded that Ruderman was statutorily inadmissible because of his two convictions and denied Ruderman’s applications for a waiver of inadmissibility, adjustment of status under the Lautenberg Amendment, cancellation of removal, asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. The BIA dismissed Ruderman’s appeal. The Seventh Circuit remanded the question of whether Ruderman is statutorily inadmissible. It is unclear why the BIA concluded that Ruderman waived his argument that the inadmissibility statute applies only when two or more convictions each result in a sentence to confinement. View "Ruderman v. Whitaker" on Justia Law

Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, T&W regularly contributed on behalf of its employees to the Suburban Teamsters of Northern Illinois Pension Fund. In 2014 T&W ceased operations and cut off its pension contributions, prompting the Fund to assess withdrawal liability of $640,900 under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1396. The Fund sought to collect payment by mailing a notice of the withdrawal liability to T&W and affiliated entities. Those efforts were ignored. The district court ordered T&W and several other individuals and entities under common control to pay the withdrawal liability. The defendants argued that their due process rights were violated when the Fund initiated collection by mailing notice to some but not all of them. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Certain defendants forfeited all defenses to liability, including the defense that they were not members of a controlled group, by failing to arbitrate after receiving the Fund’s notice of withdrawal liability. Other defendants had no credible claim of surprise (at being a member of a controlled group) to sidestep ERISA’s arbitration requirement. Each defendant was a trade or business under common control with another party who received the notice and was liable under ERISA’s controlled group provision; each became jointly and severally liable for payment View "Trustees of the Suburban Teamsters of Northern Illinois Pension Fund v. E Co." on Justia Law

Cervantes began working as an Ardagh pallet loader in 1991. He was promoted to forklift driver, then to electro‐mechanic in 2000. On June 20, 2015, after completing his shift, he remained at the Ardagh facility to assist his father, an Ardagh employee, with fixing a machine. Supervisor Stewart unsuccessfully attempted to call Cervantes on his radio. When Stewart located Cervantes, he explained that he had not responded because he was not working a second shift. Stewart stated that if he was not accepting second shift assignments, he must leave. He eventually complied. Cervantes was written up for insubordination and temporarily suspended. Following an investigation, Ardagh demoted Cervantes to forklift driver. Cervantes filed a charge with the Illinois Department of Human Rights, claiming only “Retaliation.” He did not check boxes for race, national origin, or any other basis of discrimination. The IDHR dismissed the charge. Cervantes sued under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 20003 and the Illinois Human Rights Act, claiming Ardagh failed to promote him, issued him performance warnings, and demoted him based on his race and national origin and in retaliation for his previous complaints about harassment and discrimination. The district court granted Ardagh summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Cervantes did not exhaust his administrative remedies for his discrimination claims. His retaliation claim fails because there is no evidence of a causal connection between any protected activity by Cervantes and an adverse employment action by Ardagh. View "Cervantes v. Group" on Justia Law