Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Telecommunications providers Peerless and Verizon entered into an Agreement, providing for lowered rates for certain switching services. If a contractual rate did not apply, Peerless billed Verizon its tariff rates, as filed with the FCC and state public utility commissions. The relationship failed. Verizon withheld payments. Peerless sued Verizon, alleging 12 counts, including breach of the Agreement and breach of tariffs. Verizon alleged that Peerless was an access stimulator and failed to reduce its rates as required by the FCC and that Peerless was billing certain services at inappropriate rates. The district court dismissed four counts and granted Verizon summary judgment on Count X. The district court referred the access stimulation and other counterclaim issues to the FCC under the primary-jurisdiction doctrine and stayed Verizon’s counterclaims. It nonetheless granted Peerless summary judgment on its breach-of-tariff claims, reasoning that Verizon’s defense could be adjudicated separately from the collection action; entered a partial final judgment on the breach-of-tariff claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b), finding that it would be “unjust” to make Peerless wait to collect the unpaid bills; and granted Rule 54(b) partial final judgment on claims regarding the breach of the Agreement, reasoning that Verizon had not disputed the breach, only the amount owed. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part. Rule 54(b) partial final judgment was improper, given the significant factual overlap with pending claims. A genuine issue of fact persists with respec breach-of-contract claims. View "Peerless Network, Inc. v. MCI Communications Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Ruark was working for Union Pacific, using a hydraulic rail drill. Ruark was involved connecting the drill to the hydraulic lines and used the machine to drill several holes without noticing any leaking fluid or other malfunction. As he drilled the last hole, Ruark reached down to turn the drill off. Hot fluid sprayed over him, including in his eyes. Ruark declined medical attention. The supervisor sent him home to clean up. Ruark returned the following day, but did not do much work, because, he claims, “it hurt too bad.” Ruark saw his regular nurse practitioner the next day, for “sinus and stomach problems.” Ruark did not return to work because he was convicted of a felony unrelated to the accident. Ruark sued under the Federal Employers Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. 51-60. Ruark’s prison sentence interrupted his trial preparation. The judge denied a motion for a continuance because the case had been pending for almost three years, Ruark had been well represented by his initial counsel, and Ruark's incarceration did not justify reopening exhausted deadlines and allowing Ruark to begin discovery anew. The judge allowed Ruark’s trial testimony by video deposition and deposition of Ruark’s treating physician. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of Ruark’s theory of negligence based on res ipsa loquitur. That doctrine requires that the defendant was in control of the instrumentality that caused the injury and that the plaintiff was not also negligent; those conditions were not met. A jury could not assume that “the matter spoke for itself.” The court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to grant a continuance. View "Ruark v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Walker had worked at Ingersoll since 2008 and had a history of conflict with coworkers. On October 21, 2014, Walker was listening to music while working. Rafferty told Walker to mute the radio. Walker alleges that he was “bumped” and threatened with additional violence. Ingersoll questions whether physical contact or threats occurred. The men engaged in a shouting match. The unit supervisor, Thompson, calmed them down. Walker returned to work; Rafferty went home. They worked without incident on October 22. On October 23, Walker met with Thompson and another supervisor. Walker told Thompson that he no longer trusted or respected him because he had not disciplined Rafferty and suggested that the conflict with Rafferty was affecting his physical wellbeing. The supervisors suspended Walker with pay while determining how to proceed. On October 26, Thompson and his supervisor decided to terminate Walker’s employment. The human resources manager began the termination process. On October 29, Walker’s attorney informed Ingersoll that he intended to sue for discrimination and retaliation unless Ingersoll brought him back to work. Walker reported the alleged physical assault to local police. The prosecutor declined to bring charges. Ingersoll formally terminated Walker’s employment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Ingersoll. Walker had abandoned his Title VII racial discrimination claims and did not identify a causal connection between his termination and conduct protected by Illinois law. View "Walker v. Ingersoll Cutting Tool Co." on Justia Law

Jones observes Islamic dietary restrictions, which forbid the consumption of certain foods and require that others be prepared in accordance with Islamic law (halal). There is overlap in halal and Jewish kosher requirements. Some Muslims—including Jones—find kosher food acceptable. The Indiana Department of Correction (DOC) formerly provided kosher meal trays, with kosher meat, to inmates who requested them. The cost increased. DOC stopped offering the kosher trays and put those inmates on a vegan diet. Inmates seeking kosher food successfully sued the DOC under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. DOC built kosher kitchens at some facilities and moved as many kosher inmates into those facilities as possible. Inmates who could not be moved continued to receive kosher trays. Inmates (including Jones) in a facility with a kosher kitchen had to eat the food prepared there, which is vegetarian. While many Jewish and Muslim inmates find that diet acceptable, Jones does not. Jones's sect believes that the Qur’an commands him to eat meat regularly. DOC refused his request for kosher trays with meat. The Seventh Circuit held that Indiana’s refusal to provide Jones with meat substantially burdens his exercise of religion under RLUIPA, rejecting the DOC’s argument that he could purchase halal meat at the prison commissary. The state cannot demand that Jones, uniquely among inmates, empty his account and forgo purchasing hygiene products to avoid a diet that violates his religious beliefs. View "Jones v. Carter" on Justia Law

Henderson was indicted for possession of crack cocaine with intent to distribute and two related firearms offenses. In accordance with the Marshals Service’s policy in the Springfield Division, Henderson appeared in court for arraignment encircled by four security officers and shackled with leg irons and handcuffs connected to a waist chain. His attorney moved to have him unshackled except for the leg irons for the remainder of the arraignment and at all future pretrial hearings. Counsel argued that routine shackling in court violates the accused’s right to due process and asked the judge to hold a hearing to determine whether Henderson posed an individualized risk to justify the use of full restraints. The judge denied the request, deferring to the Marshals Service’s policy of using full restraints on prisoners at every nonjury court appearance. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the collateral-order doctrine does not apply; due process shackling claims may be effectively reviewed on appeal from a final judgment. The court declined to reframe the appeal as a petition for a writ of mandamus. View "United States v. Henderson" on Justia Law

DEA agents, with an arrest warrant for Terry, waited for him to return from taking his son to school, arrested him when he got out of his car, and took him in for questioning. Other agents knocked on Terry’s apartment door. A woman answered, wearing a bathrobe. The agents identified themselves, explained that they had arrested Terry, and asked to enter. They did not ask the woman who she was or whether she lived at the apartment. She let them in, signed a consent form, and the search began. The woman then identified herself as the mother of Terry’s son, explaining that her son lived at Terry’s apartment, but she did not. Agents continued the search. At the field office, Terry refused to sign an advice‐of‐rights form, citing his previous experience with law enforcement but stated “he was willing to talk” and made incriminating statements about his role in a conspiracy to distribute heroin. The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of his motion to suppress. It is not reasonable for officers to assume that a woman who answers the door in a bathrobe has authority to consent to a search of a male suspect’s residence. Terry’s education, sophistication, and familiarity with the criminal justice system provide sufficient evidence that he understood his rights when the agents read them to him and his willingness to speak was a “course of conduct indicating waiver,” notwithstanding his refusal to sign the form. View "United States v. Terry" on Justia Law

Spiegel has lived in a Wilmette condominium building for 22 years. In 2015, the McClintics bought a unit in the building. The McClintics, apparently in violation of association rules, do not live in the building but use the building pool almost daily. To document the violations, Spiegel photographed and filmed them. Corrine McClintic filed police reports. Spiegel was not arrested but officers threatened him with arrest for disorderly conduct if his conduct persists. Spiegel sued Corrine and the Village, arguing that they conspired to violate his constitutional rights and that Corrine intruded upon his seclusion, in violation of Illinois law, by photographing the interior of his condominium. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his complaint. Spiegel has not identified a constitutional violation or shown that he suffered damages from the alleged intrusion upon his seclusion. The mere act of filing false police reports is not actionable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and it is unclear whether McClintic’s reports contained falsehoods. Spiegel’s claim that the officers refused to listen to his explanations for why his conduct was lawful is not enough to establish a conspiracy. Spiegel has not plausibly alleged an express Wilmette policy to enforce the disorderly conduct ordinance unconstitutionally. He merely alleges that officers received reports of a disturbance and advised an apparent provocateur to stop his surveillance. View "Spiegel v. McClintic" on Justia Law

Adkinson and others robbed an Indiana T-Mobile phone store and a Kentucky Verizon store at gunpoint. They later robbed nine additional stores. During its investigation, T-Mobile pulled data from cell sites near two victim stores and determined that only one T-Mobile phone was near both robberies; Adkinson was an authorized user on that account. T-Mobile determined where Adkinson’s phone traveled and voluntarily gave the data to the FBI, which used the information to obtain a court order under the Stored Communications Act, 18 U.S.C. 2703, granting the FBI access to additional cell-site data. Adkinson unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence obtained without a warrant. The court ruled that T-Mobile was not the government’s agent and, in his user agreement, Adkinson consented to T-Mobile’s cooperation with the government. Adkinson did not timely file a change of venue motion. On the morning of trial, seeing only one African-American prospective juror, Adkinson moved to transfer the case to a venue with “a better pool of African Americans.” Convicted of robbery, brandishing a firearm to further a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit those crimes, Adkinson was sentenced to 346 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Constitution does not entitle a defendant to a venire of any particular racial makeup and federal law authorized the government to prosecute Adkinson in any district where he offended. The government’s mere receipt of T-Mobile’s data is not a ratification of T-Mobile’s conduct. View "United States v. Adkinson" on Justia Law

ARC, a distributor of compressed gases, sold its assets to American. Because ARC leased asset cylinders to customers, it was not immediately able to identify the number of cylinders included in the purchase; the Agreement estimated 6,500 cylinders and provided that American would hold back $150,000 for 180 days to protect against a shortage of up to 1,200 cylinders, at $125 per cylinder. When American began billing the customers it acquired, it learned that many of them paid only to have cylinders refilled but did not pay rent on the cylinders they used. An audit revealed that ARC owned and transferred 4,663 asset cylinders--1,837 cylinders short of the 6,500 promised. In an ensuing breach of contract suit, ARC argued that American breached the contract because it did not complete its audit within the specified 180-day period. The district court disagreed, concluding that ARC extended that deadline and that, because only 4,663 cylinders were delivered, ARC was never entitled to receive any portion of the Cylinder Deferred Payment. The court granted American’s counterclaim for breach of contract, holding that American was entitled to the entire $150,000 and to recover $125 for each cylinder it failed to receive under the threshold of 5,300. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Because ARC was not entitled to any of the Cylinder Deferred Payment in that it provided less than the 5,300 cylinders, it could not have been damaged by the delay in completing the audit. View "ARC Welding Supply, Co. Inc. v. American Welding & Gas, Inc." on Justia Law

Scabby the Rat is a giant, inflatable balloon that is associated with labor disputes. After the Union learned that a masonry company working at Kolosso Toyota in Grand Chute, was not paying area standard wages, it engaged in informational picketing and to set up a 12-foot Scabby in the median across from the dealer, along the frontage road for a major local thoroughfare. The Code Enforcement Officer required that the Union remove Scabby as violating the Sign Ordinance. The Union filed suit, arguing that the ordinance distinguished among signs based on content. The district court rejected the suit on summary judgment. The Town amended its Code. On remand, the district court held that the case was not moot because the Union was seeking damages for having to use greater resources to maintain the protest. The court noted that the likelihood of recurrence theory was not available because of the Code amendment and rejected the claims on the merits. The Seventh Circuit agreed that claims based on the former ordinance were not moot, despite the fact that construction was complete and that ordinance did not discriminate on the basis of content. It was narrowly tailored to meet its stated purpose—banning anything on the public right-of-way that might obstruct vision or distract passing drivers. Whatever dispute may exist over the new law is not ripe. View "Construction and General Laborers' Union Number 330 v. Town of Grand Chute" on Justia Law