Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Briggins pleaded guilty in 2017 to committing multiple bank robberies. In 1999, he had been convicted of 10 bank robberies and sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment. The number of criminal history points to be added for the 1999 robberies depended on whether that term reflected one sentence or multiple concurrent sentences. The PSR concluded that Briggins received 10 concurrent sentences but recognized that Briggins’s criminal history points needed to account for the reality that he was charged with all 10 robberies in the same indictment, pleaded guilty in the same proceeding, and faced sentencing on the same day and recommended that Briggins receive six criminal history points: three from USSG 4A1.1(a), which requires sentencing courts to “[a]dd 3 points for each prior sentence of imprisonment exceeding one year and one month” and three points from 4A1.1(e), which applies where a defendant is convicted of multiple offenses charged in the same indictment or receives multiple sentences on the same day and limits the maximum number of additional points to three. Applying 4A1.1(e) meant that only three additional points were allowed for Briggins’s nine robberies not encompassed by 4A1.1(a). The resulting advisory guidelines range was 77-96 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence of 96 months. View "United States v. Briggins" on Justia Law

Sansone, a Postal Service employee since 1981, was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis in 1991. By 1999, he used a wheelchair. He parked in a reserved space near the loading docks, where there was room to deploy his wheelchair ramp. In 2011, the manager, Branch, asked Sansone to stop parking there, citing safety concerns and offering Sansone a handicapped spot in front of the building or a reserved space in the back. Neither provided space to deploy his ramp; spots in the back would require him to travel along a busy truck route in the dark. With permission from his supervisor, Sansone continued to park in his usual place, while seeking help from Grieser, chair of the Reasonable Accommodation Committee. Branch threatened to have his van towed. Sansone panicked, experienced chest pain, and left work. His doctor recommended that he stay home until the situation was rectified and prescribed medication. Grieser asked Sansone to provide medical information about his “condition and the specific limitations.” The letter exacerbated Sansone’s frustration because the Service knew that he was confined to a wheelchair. Sansone did not provide the information but claimed that the stress had rendered him unable to return to work. He was granted disability retirement, then sued under the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. 791 for constructive discharge and failure to accommodate. The court granted the Service summary judgment on constructive discharge. Sansone won $300,000 in compensatory damages for failure to accommodate. On Sansone’s equitable claim for back and front pay, the court awarded $828,774. The Seventh Circuit vacated in part, upholding a jury instruction about an employee’s obligation to cooperate with his employer in identifying a reasonable accommodation but finding an instruction about how the jury should evaluate the Service’s expert witness (on the issue of compensatory damages) “wrong and prejudicial.” View "Sansone v. Brennan" on Justia Law

Salgado conspired with Lorenzo (his father) and others to distribute heroin, using a Bensenville, Illinois stash house. Lorenzo, who lived in Mexico, was the leader. Salgado was arrested in 2016, indicted under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 846, and pleaded guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute heroin. The PSR recommended an aggravating role enhancement under USSG 3B1.1(b), reasoning that Salgado directed and controlled” the others and was the Chicago‐based leader of the conspiracy. Salgado objected, claiming he had “no decision making authority, acted solely at the direction of [his father] … did not arrange the importation ... did not set any of the price or quantity terms” and that the government had not proven otherwise by a preponderance of the evidence. The court applied the enhancement, stating that Salgado’s “role as the supervisor is clear from the materials that are not disputed.” The court calculated the Guidelines range as 210-262 months, discussed the section 3553 factors in detail, and stated that “the sentence ... would be the same even if the guidelines were a little bit different … even if I made a mistake in the calculation with respect to the aggravating role, the guideline sentence is going to not control the sentence here. What’s going to control is the 3553 factors. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 192-month sentence; “whether or not the enhancement should have applied, the district court’s detailed explanation makes a remand pointless." View "United States v. Salgado" on Justia Law

The Liebharts own three houses on a block in Watertown, Wisconsin. Part of the block was previously occupied by a factory, built in 1920 and last owned by SPX. The factory manufactured power transformers containing polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), a carcinogenic chemical banned by the EPA in 1979. Studies revealed that the factory's concrete floor was generally contaminated. In 2014, SPX demolished the building with the assistance of the defendants. The Liebharts sued, alleging that dust and debris containing toxic chemicals migrated onto their properties, contaminating their yards and jeopardizing their health and the health of their tenants. Following discovery and the submission of expert witness reports, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment with costs. The Seventh Circuit vacated. Although the district court adequately evaluated the expert witnesses and did not abuse its discretion in its procedural decisions, the court set the bar unnecessarily high for the plaintiffs to show a violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. 6901, and the Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA), 15 U.S.C. 2601. RCRA requires only that harm “may” be imminent; similarly, TSCA does not impose a heightened standard. The parties should have another opportunity to litigate whether a substantial and imminent endangerment to health exists. View "Liebhart v. SPX Corp." on Justia Law

Galloway pleaded guilty to possessing ammunition as a felon. Galloway’s guideline range would have been 130-162 months in prison if it were not capped by a 120-month statutory maximum. The government asked the court to give Galloway the full 120 months. Galloway’s attorney told the court he had determined, after reviewing the Sentencing Guidelines and precedent, that “there was no way to make an objection,” and argued generally for a downward departure. Galloway appealed his 120-month sentence, raising an unpreserved argument that the district court used an incorrect guideline range. The Seventh Circuit dismissed his appeal. In his plea agreement, Galloway waived his appellate rights with respect to the “sentence imposed and the manner in which the sentence was determined” except in the event of a deviation by the district court from a recommendation made by one of the parties. The court acknowledged that the language used in this appellate waiver is unusual, but rejected Galloway’s arguments that his lawyer’s sentencing arguments did not constitute a recommendation because they did not include a specific proposal for a certain length of incarceration. View "United States v. Galloway" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs purchased land near a former GE manufacturing plant that had operated in Morrison, Illinois for 60 years. The plant leached toxic chemicals that seeped into the groundwater. The Illinois Environmental Protection Agency filed suit under state law against GE in 2004 and has been working with the company since then to investigate and develop a plan to address the contamination. In 2013, plaintiffs filed suit under the citizen suit provision of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. 6901, seeking a mandatory injunction ordering GE to conduct additional investigation into the scope of the contamination and ordering the company to remove the contamination. The district court found the company liable for the contamination on summary judgment but denied injunctive relief because, despite the many opportunities, plaintiffs did not offer evidence establishing a need for injunctive relief beyond what the company had already done in the state action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court had the discretion to award injunctive relief under the RCRA but was not required to order relief after a finding of liability. Plaintiffs did not carry their burden to establish mandatory injunctive relief was necessary under the RCRA. View "Conway v. General Electric Co." on Justia Law

In 2006 Trinity borrowed about $2 million from a bank, secured by a mortgage. The bank sold the note and mortgage to ColFin, which relied on Midland to collect the payments. In 2013, Midland recorded a “satisfaction,” stating that the loan had been paid and the mortgage released. The loan was actually still outstanding. Trinity continued paying. In 2015, ColFin realized Midland’s mistake and recorded a document canceling the satisfaction. Trinity stopped paying. ColFin filed a state court foreclosure action. Trinity commenced a bankruptcy proceeding, which stayed the foreclosure, then filed an adversary action against ColFin, contending that the release extinguished the debt and security interest. The bankruptcy court, district court, and Seventh Circuit rejected that argument and an argument that the matter was moot because the property had been sold under the bankruptcy court’s auspices. There is a live controversy about who should get the sale proceeds; 11 U.S.C. 363(m), which protects the validity of the sale, does not address the disposition of the proceeds. Under Illinois law, Trinity did not obtain rights from the 2013 filing, which was unilateral and without consideration; no one (including Trinity) detrimentally relied on the release, so ColFin could rescind it. ColFin caught the problem before Trinity filed its bankruptcy petition, so a hypothetical lien perfected on the date of the bankruptcy would have been junior to ColFin’s interest. View "Trinity 83 Development LLC v. Colfin Midwest Funding LLC" on Justia Law

Pewaukee, Wisconsin law enforcement officers were searching for two African‐American men who, moments before, had committed an armed robbery and had been tracked to the parking lot of a nearby Walmart store. An officer stopped and questioned Street, the only African‐American man in the crowded Walmart. Street was not arrested then, but during the stop, he provided identifying information that helped lead to his later arrest for the robbery. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Street’s conviction, rejecting his argument that the stop violated his Fourth Amendment rights because he was stopped based on just a hunch and his race and sex. The officers stopped Street based on much more information than his race and sex. They did not carry out a dragnet that used racial profiling. Rather, the police had the combination of Street being where he was, when he was there, and one of a handful of African‐American men on the scene, thus fitting the description of the men who had committed an armed robbery just minutes before. That information gave the officers a reasonable suspicion that Street may have just been involved with an armed robbery, authorizing the “Terry” stop. View "United States v. Street" on Justia Law

Based on a 2005 domestic violence incident, Jones was charged with battery. For another incident, he was charged separately with intimidation and being a habitual offender. The court set a joint omnibus date of October 18. Indiana law then allowed prosecutors to make substantive amendments to pending charges only up to 30 days before the omnibus date. Nine days after that date, the state moved to amend the battery information to add criminal confinement. Jones’s attorney did not object; the court granted the motion without a hearing. In January 2006, the state moved to amend the intimidation charge to add language Months later Jones’s new attorney unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the amended intimidation information. On the first day of a consolidated trial, the state moved to amend the criminal-confinement charge (battery) again, to add “and/or extreme pain.” The court allowed the third amendment over Jones’s objection. Convicted, Jones was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment for criminal confinement, enhanced by 25 years for being a habitual offender. Jones sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that his lawyer’s failure to object to the untimely first amendment constituted ineffective assistance. The Seventh Circuit granted relief. Applying the state’s statutes, as interpreted by Indiana’s highest court, a competent lawyer should have recognized that relief for his client was possible and would have pursued it. View "Jones v. Zatecky" on Justia Law

Courtney had a CT scan performed at CDI’ diagnostic imaging facility. The radiologist, Webster, an independent contractor hired by MSC, missed Courtney’s rectal cancer. Courtney's cancer festered for over a year before being diagnosed, having metastasized to her lungs and liver. CDI claimed that it could not be held liable because CDI did not directly employ Webster. The district court rejected this argument and applied Indiana’s apparent agency precedent, which instructs that a medical provider is liable if a patient reasonably relied on its apparent authority over the wrongdoer. The jury returned a $15 million verdict. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first explaining that CDI had not registered under Indiana’s Medical Malpractice Act, which limits liability for registered qualified health care providers and requires the presentation of a proposed complaint to a medical review panel before an action is commenced in court. MSC and Walker had registered as qualified health care providers, so the Websters had filed a complaint against them with the Indiana Department of Insurance. Courtney testified that she had no idea about the contractual relationships among MSC, CDI, and Dr. Walker and she was never provided information that the physician who would be interpreting her CT scan was not subject to CDI’s control or supervision. View "Webster v. CDI Indiana, LLC" on Justia Law