Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Ruano’s persecution in Mexico began after he refused to allow the local drug cartel leader to “possess” his wife. The cartel kidnapped, tortured, and threatened to kill Ruano. Ruano’s children were U.S. citizens, having been born while Ruano and his wife were legally living in the U.S. The cartel terrorizes communities throughout Mexico and exercises influence at all levels of the Mexican government. Ruano and his wife tried to continue living in Mexico. Their attempts failed, in brutal ways. On the advice of a Mexican prosecutor, Ruano and his wife and children fled to the U.S. and surrendered themselves at the border. Ruano applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. An immigration judge found that Ruano was credible and that he would likely be tortured if he returned to Mexico and granted relief under the Convention Against Torture but denied his petition for asylum on the ground that Ruano did not show a nexus between his persecution and membership in a “particular social group,” 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(1)(B)(i). The BIA agreed. The Seventh Circuit remanded, stating that the record compels a finding that the torture and persecution Ruano suffered in the past and fears in the future were and would be because of his membership in the “particular social group” of his wife’s family. View "Ruano v. Barr" on Justia Law

Convicted of bank robbery in 2015, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), Bonds was sentenced to 60 months’ imprisonment. The evidence against him included the testimony of an FBI Latent Print Operations Unit fingerprint examiner, Glass, that Bonds’s fingerprints appeared on the demand notes used in the robberies. In 2004 the Unit incorrectly identified Mayfield as a person whose fingerprints suggested involvement in a terrorist bombing in Spain. Bonds wanted to use this episode to illustrate the potential for mistakes in the “analysis, comparison, evaluation, and verification” (ACE-V) method. The district judge permitted Bonds to cross-examine Glass about the reliability of the ACE-V method and to present other evidence suggesting that the approach is more error-prone than jurors might believe. Evidence about one particular error, the judge concluded, would be more distracting and time-consuming than its incremental value could justify. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting a Confrontation Clause argument. Presenting jurors with details of one wrongful imprisonment (especially on a mistaken charge of terrorism) would appeal to emotion rather than to reason. Bonds had ample opportunity to supply the jury with evidence about the reliability of the ACE-V method, including changes made in the last decade. In 2016, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology concluded that changes in ACE-V have bolstered its accuracy. The summary provides the defense bar with paths to cross-examine witnesses who used the ACE-V approach. View "United States v. Bonds" on Justia Law

The Bureau of Prisons (BOP) released Kopp from prison and ordered her to report to a transitional services program. Kopp disregarded that directive. Days later, she was arrested and pleaded guilty to escaping custody, 18 U.S.C. 751(a). Kopp’s Guidelines range was 15-21 months' imprisonment. The court opined that the drivers of Kopp’s criminal activity were childhood trauma and drug addiction. Kopp’s attorney noted that Kopp participated in the BOP’s Residential Drug Abuse Program (RDAP) in 2016, but had not had another opportunity for treatment. The court noted that “she runs away” and that: “We’ve got to get her some more treatment, and I’m going to try again.” Kopp’s attorney told the court that Kopp had contacted a transitional living program, a sponsor through Narcotics Anonymous, and an organization that offers addiction treatment. After Kopp spoke, the court remarked that it was like a “broken record,” and announced: “The sentence ... is 18 months.... does that give Ms. Kopp time to participate in an RDAP?” The probation officer responded: “that’s probably, like, the lowest end.” The court said: "I’m going to make it 20 months.” Kopp interjected: ”RDAP is only nine months.” The court responded: ”You have to get into it. You’ve got to find a spot for it ... I’m going to make it 20 months.” The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court improperly lengthened Kopp’s sentence to promote rehabilitation in violation of the Supreme Court’s 2011 “Tapia” holding and 18 U.S.C. 3582(a). View "United States v. Kopp" on Justia Law

Illinois residents Matlin and Waring (Plaintiffs) co-founded Gray Matter and developed products. In 1999, with the company facing failure, Plaintiffs executed a Withdrawal Agreement, assigning Plaintiffs' intellectual property and patent rights to Gray Matter, but entitling them to royalties on sales. In the following years, Plaintiffs frequently brought Gray Matter to arbitration to enforce their royalty rights. In 2002, Gray Matter filed an assignment of the intellectual property rights with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, allegedly without Plaintiff's knowledge, by forging Waring's signature. Gray Matter then sold assets to Swimways, including patent rights. A 2014 binding arbitration determined that Gray Matter did not assign the Withdrawal Agreement to Swimways and that Plaintiffs were owed no further royalties. In 2016, Spin Master acquired Swimways and its intellectual property rights. Plaintiffs sued. Swimways is a Virginia corporation with its principal place of business in Virginia Beach. The Spin Master defendants are Canadian companies with their principal places of business in Toronto. None of the defendants are registered to conduct business in, have employees in, or have registered agents for service of process in Illinois. In response to defendants’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, Plaintiffs' counsel submitted an online purchase receipt from Swimways’ website and a declaration that he purchased and received a patented product in Illinois. The court dismissed, reasoning that Illinois law governed whether it had personal jurisdiction over the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the defendants had insufficient contacts with Illinois to establish either general or specific personal jurisdiction in that state. View "Matlin v. Spin Master Corp." on Justia Law

Freed was the president and CEO of JFA, a real estate development company, and created and managed several real estate ventures including UGV. In 2002, UGV secured Chicago tax increment financing (TIF) for an Uptown development. The city issued a redevelopment note for $4.3 million and project note for $2.4 million. UGV was required to annually it was not in default on any loans and had not entered into any transactions that would harm its ability to meet its financial obligations. Freed thereafter obtained loans and allowed them to become double-pledged and go into default. He made false statements to obtain loan modifications. In annual requisition forms Freed provided the city under the TIF agreement, Freed claimed none of his entities were in default. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Freed’s convictions for bank fraud (18 U.S.C. 1344); mail fraud (18 U.S.C. 1341); wire fraud (18 U.S.C. 1343); and making false statements to a financial institution (18 U.S.C. 1014), rejecting arguments that two jury instructions, concerning "aiding and abetting" and "wilfully causing" were incorrect and there was insufficient evidence for several of his convictions. View "United States v. Freed" on Justia Law

Smith twice sold cocaine to a confidential informant. A search of his home uncovered 12.83 grams of cocaine base, 111.57 grams of cocaine powder, a rifle, a body‐armor vest, and a digital scale. Charged possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance; two counts of unlawful possession of a firearm; and three counts of distribution of a controlled substance, Smith had a 2004 felony drug conviction for possession with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of cocaine base and a 2009 Indiana conviction for “Dealing in cocaine or narcotic drug.” The career offender sentencing enhancement, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1. applies where the defendant has two prior felony convictions for either a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense. With the enhancement, Smith’s PSR calculated an imprisonment range as 188-235 months. Smith argued that his conviction under Indiana Code 35‐48‐4‐1 was not a “controlled substance offense” The court imposed a sentence of 188 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Arguably, the Indiana statute has the same elements as section 4B1.2(b), so the career‐offender enhancement should apply under the categorical approach; even if the statute is broader than the Guidelines’ definition, it is divisible, so the modified categorical approach would reach the same result. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Carroll and Lizzie Raines purchased their Mundelein home in 1975 as joint tenants. When Raines’ wife died, he became the sole owner until his 2009 death. Raines died intestate with six heirs. In 2007, Raines had filed federal income taxes for tax years 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2004. The IRS assessed taxes, penalties, and interest that remained unpaid. In 2010, the government recorded a notice of a $115,022.42 federal tax lien with the Lake County Recorder of Deeds. The Notice incorrectly identified “Carrol V. Raines” as the debtor, omitting the second “l” from his first name, and failed to include a legal description or permanent index number, but did correctly identify the property address. Raines’ heirs conveyed their interest in the property to Chicago Title Land Trust, which made improvements and capital investments in the property. In 2017, the government instituted proceedings to foreclose the tax lien, naming Chicago Title, other financial institutions, and municipal entities. The district court found that the defendants had adequate notice of the lien, which conformed to 26 U.S.C. 6323, so the government could enforce the lien. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding a determination that the Affidavit of Bond, a title insurance executive who has conducted thousands of title searches and prepared thousands of title reports, commitments, and insurance policies, was inadmissible because it consisted of undeclared expert testimony and improper legal conclusions. The errors did not make the Lien undiscoverable. View "United States v. Z Investment Properties, LLC" on Justia Law

In 2005, Joliet proposed to condemn and raze New West's apartments as a public nuisance. By 2017 the district court held that Joliet is entitled to condemn the buildings, set just compensation at $15 million, and held that New West cannot obtain relief against the city under federal housing discrimination statutes. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The parties then disputed the status of a reserve fund, about $2.8 million, that the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) held for the federally-subsidized apartment complex. New West argued that the money came from rents to which it was entitled by contract with HUD and that, once it no longer had responsibility for the buildings, HUD must write it a check. The district court recognized that the fund was not part of the condemnation or housing-discrimination suits, but nonetheless rejected New West’s claim and concluded that the fund should accompany the buildings. The Seventh Circuit vacated. HUD controls the reserve fund and is the only entity that can use or disburse it; HUD was dismissed as a party in 2013. The court lacked authority to order HUD to do anything. New West needs to file a new action, seeking an order that the federal government pay it a sum of money, in the Court of Federal Claims, under the Tucker Act or in the district court. “In either forum, the judge should start from scratch, disregarding the missteps in the condemnation suit.” View "Joliet v. New West, L.P." on Justia Law

At 3:31 a.m., East St. Louis Police Officer Sherrod received a report of a vehicle playing loud music. Approaching the vehicle, Sherrod saw Cherry looking for something in the grass. Cherry stated that he was looking for the key to his tire rims. Although Cherry seemed intoxicated, Sherrod decided to help him. As he was searching, Sherrod noticed a handgun a few feet from Cherry. Sherrod handcuffed Cherry for officer safety, without arresting him. Cherry tried to run. Sherrod then arrested Cherry and took him the police station where Cherry told Officer Simon that, earlier that night, he had stopped his car to pick a CD and thought that he saw an acquaintance. After rolling down his window, he realized that he did not know the person, who had a gun; Cherry knocked it out of the man’s hands. The stranger then fled. Cherry explained that during the scuffle he lost his cell phone and got out of the car to look for it. He admitted to picking up the gun.Cherry was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1); 924(a)(2) for forfeiture, 18 U.S.C. 924(d)(1). Cherry requested an “innocent possession” instruction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed Cherry’s conviction, declining to recognize an innocent possession defense. Even where the defense is recognized, it applies only where the defendant immediately surrenders the firearm to law enforcement. No reasonable juror could have failed to find a nexus between the gun and Cherry’s conviction, so the court’s failure to ask whether either party wanted the jury to determine forfeitability of the firearm did not affect Cherry’s substantial rights. View "United States v. Cherry" on Justia Law

In 1998, Garcia-Martinez pleaded guilty to assault with a deadly weapon under N.J.S. 2C:12-1(b)(2). According to his plea colloquy, Garcia-Martinez’s role was minor: he stuck out his foot to trip the victim. Once the victim was on the ground, Garcia-Martinez’s friends “jumped on [the victim] and started hitting him” and “some of [Garcia-Martinez’s] friends punched [the victim], kicked him and struck him.” Garcia-Martinez stood by during their assault; he soon left the scene. The Board of Immigration Appeals has found in the past that “assault with a deadly weapon” is a generic crime of moral turpitude that makes a noncitizen ineligible for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I). The Board found that there was no realistic probability that the New Jersey law could be applied to conduct outside the scope of the generic crime and concluded that Garcia-Martinez’s conviction was for a crime involving moral turpitude. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review and remanded. Although the New Jersey statute appears to fit the generic definition of assault with a deadly weapon, only some of the conduct covered by the statute appears to be sufficiently vile, base, immoral, or depraved to deserve the label moral turpitude. The Board speculated about the type of weapon that Garcia-Martinez’s accomplices may have possessed and did not explain why the generic definition of assault with a deadly weapon includes tripping. View "Garcia-Martinez v. Barr" on Justia Law