Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The case revolves around Jack Clayborne, who was convicted for crimes related to an attempted carjacking. Clayborne, along with two other men, attempted to carjack Michael Guster. During the incident, Clayborne fired five shots, one of which hit Guster. Clayborne was charged with attempted motor vehicle robbery, discharge of a firearm during an attempted robbery, and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. He was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to 234 months' imprisonment.Clayborne appealed his sentence, and the case was remanded for resentencing after the government agreed to dismiss his conviction for discharging a firearm during an attempted robbery. Before resentencing, Clayborne submitted a letter expressing regret for his actions. However, the district court found the letter insufficient to warrant a reduction in sentence for acceptance of responsibility. Clayborne was resentenced to 223 months in prison and appealed again.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Clayborne challenged two aspects of his sentence: the district court's decision not to award him an acceptance of responsibility reduction and the district court's comment that his criminal history included "a lot of" robberies when he had no prior robbery convictions. The court found no procedural error in the district court's decision not to award an acceptance of responsibility reduction. It also found no evidence that the district court relied on incorrect information about Clayborne's criminal history when determining his sentence. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Clayborne" on Justia Law

Raynard Jackson, a prisoner at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (WSPF), was placed in a cell without running water for five days. He alleged that Lieutenant Dane Esser, among other WSPF staff, knew that he did not have water and yet failed to turn the water on. After Jackson showed another staff member that he did not have water, the water was promptly turned on; however, he claimed Lt. Esser and other WSPF staff failed to provide him with medical care for his dehydration. Jackson filed grievances pertaining to these issues. After he exhausted his administrative remedies within the WSPF, he sued Lt. Esser and other WSPF staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The district court, only considering the processed grievances, and without holding an evidentiary hearing, found that Jackson had not exhausted his administrative remedies as to certain claims and defendants. Additional defendants, Nurse Beth Edge and Captain Dale Flannery, were dismissed at summary judgment, leaving only the claims against Lt. Esser for trial. The jury found for Lt. Esser on both claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Jackson that the district court should not have disregarded his allegedly unprocessed grievances without holding an evidentiary hearing. However, the court found no error in the district court’s conclusion that Jackson’s processed grievances did not exhaust remedies as to all his claims. The court also found no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nurse Edge or its evidentiary rulings before trial. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a hearing on the allegedly unprocessed grievances. View "Jackson v. Esser" on Justia Law

The defendant, Delon Echols, was convicted of attempting to possess a controlled substance with intent to distribute it. The case revolved around two packages containing illegal drugs that were sent to the home of Renita Burns, where Echols was temporarily residing. Burns testified that she suspected Echols was responsible for the packages. During the trial, the prosecution introduced testimony from a DEA agent about a prior consistent statement made by Burns. The defense objected, arguing that the testimony was merely bolstering Burns' credibility.The district court in Illinois admitted the testimony, citing Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(1)(B), which allows for the admission of prior consistent statements to rebut charges of fabrication. Echols was found guilty and sentenced to 70 months in prison and three years of supervised release. He appealed his conviction, arguing that the district court erred in admitting the prior consistent statement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that the district court erred in admitting the prior consistent statement. The court noted that under Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and Tome v. United States, a prior consistent statement offered to rebut charges of fabrication must have been made before the motive to fabricate arose. In this case, Burns' statement was made after her alleged motive to fabricate had arisen. However, the court found that Echols had not raised this specific objection at trial, thus forfeiting it on appeal.The court concluded that while the admission of the prior statement was an error, it did not seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. Therefore, the court affirmed Echols' conviction. View "United States v. Echols" on Justia Law

The case involves Angela Flowers, who had a car loan with Kia Motors Finance. One morning, Flowers and her son were followed by a truck, which she suspected was an attempt by Kia to repossess her car due to late payments. Flowers sued Kia, alleging unlawful collection practices. However, she was unable to provide any evidence linking Kia to the truck that followed her and her son.Previously, the district court granted Kia summary judgment. Flowers had attempted to include an earlier repossession in her amended complaint, but the court found that she had unduly delayed this attempt. Furthermore, she could not provide any evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to conclude that Kia was involved in the incident with the truck.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Flowers argued that she did not need the district court's approval to file an amended complaint, as Kia had consented in writing to the amendment. However, the court found that Flowers had unduly delayed her attempt to amend the complaint and had not provided a sound excuse for this delay. Therefore, the court denied her motion to amend the complaint.The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Kia. Flowers had failed to present any evidence linking Kia to the unidentified truck and driver. Her theory of liability was based on speculation and conjecture, which are insufficient to defeat a summary judgment motion. Therefore, the court concluded that there was no genuine dispute of material fact and that Kia was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Flowers v. Kia Motors Finance" on Justia Law

Rodney Lass was initially charged with misdemeanor domestic abuse. However, the case ended in a mistrial due to the alleged victim's disregard of a court order. Subsequently, the prosecutors recharged the case, adding multiple felony counts. Lass was found guilty on all but one charge and was sentenced to 40 years' imprisonment. Lass contended that the second set of charges were the product of an unconstitutional vindictive prosecution. He argued that the prosecutors leveled the expanded charges against him in retaliation for his seeking and receiving a mistrial in the misdemeanor case.Lass sought post-conviction relief in Wisconsin state court and later in federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's decision, determining that Lass failed to allege facts that would establish a presumption of vindictiveness or actual vindictiveness. The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined review.Lass's application for relief in federal district court under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 also fell short. The district court found that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not apply a presumption of vindictiveness and that its declining to do so was neither contrary to nor reflected an unreasonable application of clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. The district court also declined to consider Lass's two remaining claims, finding both procedurally defaulted.In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit, Lass's contentions were seen as procedurally defaulted. The court affirmed the district court's disposition of these two claims. The court also found no basis for federal habeas relief under § 2254(d) on Lass's vindictive prosecution claim. The court concluded that no aspect of the Wisconsin Court of Appeals' rationale was contrary to or reflected an unreasonable application of clearly established U.S. Supreme Court precedent. View "Lass v. Wells" on Justia Law

A nurse practitioner, Lisa Hofschulz, and her ex-husband, Robert Hofschulz, were convicted of conspiracy and multiple counts of distributing drugs in an unauthorized manner, including one count resulting in a patient's death. The charges stemmed from their operation of a "pain clinic" that functioned as a front for an opioid mill, dispensing opioid prescriptions for cash-only payments. Robert Hofschulz was also convicted for his role in assisting Lisa Hofschulz in running the opioid mill.The Hofschulzes were initially tried in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. They were found guilty on all counts, with Lisa Hofschulz receiving a minimum 20-year prison term for the count of unlawful distribution resulting in death, and Robert Hofschulz receiving concurrent terms of 36 months in prison on each of his five convictions. The Hofschulzes appealed their convictions on three grounds: they claimed the jury instructions were inconsistent with a Supreme Court decision, that the judge wrongly permitted the government’s medical expert to testify about the standard of care, and that the evidence was insufficient to support their convictions.The case was then reviewed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The court found no instructional error, stating that the district judge had correctly instructed the jury that the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the Hofschulzes intended to distribute controlled substances and intended to do so in an unauthorized manner. The court also found that the judge had correctly permitted the government’s medical expert to testify about the standard of care in the usual course of professional pain management. Lastly, the court dismissed the Hofschulzes' challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, deeming it frivolous. The court affirmed the convictions of the Hofschulzes. View "United States v. Hofschulz" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a dispute between Zimmer Biomet, a medical-device manufacturer, and six of its former sales distributors. The dispute arose from a compensation agreement that guaranteed the distributors a lifetime of long-term commissions on all sales made within their distributorship after retirement. As the company grew and acquired competitors, a disagreement emerged over which product categories fell within the distributorship and were thus subject to the long-term commission agreement.The district court found the agreement ambiguous and sent the case to trial. The jury returned a split verdict, finding that Biomet owed long-term commissions on some products but not others. Biomet appealed the denials of its motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law, and the distributors cross-appealed the dismissal of two counts of their complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decisions. The appellate court agreed that the distributorship agreement was ambiguous regarding the specific categories of products it covered. It also found that the trial record supported the jury’s verdict in favor of the distributors on their Indiana breach-of-contract claim. The court rejected Biomet's argument that the agreement unambiguously limited long-term commissions to reconstructive products, finding that the agreement did not provide clear guidance on which product categories were covered. The court also upheld the dismissal of two counts in the distributors’ complaint, finding that they either lacked a contractual basis or were duplicative of another count. View "Hess v. Biomet, Inc." on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute between Great American Insurance Company (Great American) and State Farm Fire and Casualty Company (State Farm) over who was responsible for paying the defense costs in a lawsuit against board members at the College of DuPage. The lawsuit was filed by Robert Breuder, the former president of the college, who alleged defamation and other claims after his employment was terminated. The board members were insured under a policy issued by the Illinois Community College Risk Management Consortium (Consortium), which was assigned to Great American, and a personal liability umbrella policy issued by State Farm. Great American sued State Farm to recoup losses from defense costs that it claimed State Farm had the duty to provide on behalf of one board member.The district court dismissed Great American's claims, finding that the language of the State Farm insurance contract was unambiguous and that State Farm had no duty to provide defense costs because the primary policy provided by Great American’s assignor covered the underlying loss. Great American appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that the language of the State Farm policy was clear that it would only provide a defense if the loss was not covered by any other insurance policy. Since the Consortium policy covered the loss, State Farm had no duty to provide defense costs. The court rejected Great American's arguments that the language of the State Farm insurance contract was ambiguous and that State Farm's coverage was primary as it related to the board member's liability for conduct committed in her individual capacity. View "Great American Insurance Co. v. State Farm Fire and Casualty Co." on Justia Law

The defendant, Travis Montgomery, pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine. The government presented evidence that Montgomery stored the drugs, cash, and drug trafficking paraphernalia in a storage unit leased by his sister. The district court applied a two-level enhancement under § 2D1.1(b)(12) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, which requires an increase where a defendant “maintained a premises for the purpose of … distributing a controlled substance.” Montgomery objected to this enhancement, arguing that his use of the storage unit did not meet the requirements of the enhancement.The district court, however, found that the storage unit qualified as a “premises” under § 2D1.1(b)(12), and that Montgomery had used it primarily for storing and distributing drugs. This enhancement increased Montgomery’s total offense level, leading to a sentence of 235 months of imprisonment and five years of supervised release.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Montgomery challenged the application of the § 2D1.1(b)(12) enhancement. The court agreed with the district court that the storage unit constituted a “premises” under the enhancement. However, the court was uncertain whether Montgomery sufficiently “maintained” the storage unit for the purposes of § 2D1.1(b)(12), given that he did not lease the unit himself and his use of it was for only a short time. The court also found that the record fell short of indicating that Montgomery was using the storage unit primarily for distributing drugs during the month in question. As a result, the court vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further fact-finding. View "United States v. Montgomery" on Justia Law

Juan Santiago Lopez, a Mexican citizen, sought to overturn an immigration judge's denial of his request for cancellation of removal. Lopez had been in the United States for nearly 20 years, working for the same company and raising four children with his wife. However, he had also accumulated three convictions for driving while intoxicated. The Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings against him after his third conviction. Lopez conceded his removability but applied for cancellation of removal relief, arguing that his family circumstances, particularly the burden his removal would place on his wife, warranted cancellation.The immigration judge denied Lopez's request for cancellation of removal but granted his request for voluntary departure. The judge acknowledged Lopez's positive equities, such as his long-term residence, employment, and family ties in the U.S., but found that his history of drunk driving and disregard for U.S. laws outweighed these factors. The Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the immigration judge's decision.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Lopez challenged the immigration judge's discretionary decision and argued that the missing date and time information in his Notice to Appear required termination of removal proceedings. The court dismissed his petition for lack of jurisdiction, citing the Supreme Court's decision in Wilkinson v. Garland, which clarified that courts lack jurisdiction to review substantive challenges to an immigration judge's discretionary decision denying cancellation of removal. The court also rejected Lopez's argument about the Notice to Appear, noting that objections to such violations can be forfeited if not raised in a timely manner. View "Lopez v. Garland" on Justia Law