Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court dismissed Nestorovic’s discrimination claims against her employer and the deadline to appeal expired without Nestorovic appealing. The district court granted her motion without making any finding as to whether Nestorovic had made the required showing under 28 U.S.C. 2107(c) that excusable neglect or good cause justified missing the original deadline. The Seventh Circuit dismissed her appeal. Section 2107(c) is an act of Congress, so showing excusable neglect or good cause serves as a prerequisite to appellate jurisdiction. The record below contained no evidence of excusable neglect or good cause for Nestorovic’s tardiness Nestorovic explained only that she was “actively searching for attorneys willing to take the case on contingency” and had been “advised very recently that [prospective] counsel could not file an appeal before reviewing filings to date, which would take several weeks.” View "Nestorovic v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of Greater Chicago" on Justia Law

The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has, on a few occasions, found that “capsule” was “merely descriptive” of cellphone cases, a finding that precludes registration on the Principal Register. The Office has also found otherwise and allowed Uncommon to register “capsule.” Rival case manufacturers still use the term. Uncommon sued Spigen for trademark infringement and unfair competition, 15 U.S.C. 1114, 1125(a). Spigen sought cancellation of the mark. In discovery, Spigen produced a survey to prove that consumers did not associate “capsule” with Uncommon’s cases, and disclosed the person who conducted the survey as a “non-testifying expert,” but without foundational expert testimony to explain the survey’s methodology, it was inadmissible, FRCP 26(a). The district court excused Spigen’s error and granted Spigen summary judgment on the merits. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Spigen’s disclosure was inaccurate but harmless. Spigen carried its burden to defeat Uncommon’s presumption of inherent distinctiveness. Spigen demonstrated that there is no issue of material fact regarding the descriptiveness of the “capsule” mark. With the survey, there was no genuine issue of material fact as to the mark’s invalid registration. Nor was there an issue of fact regarding the unlikelihood of consumer confusion. View "Uncommon, LLC v. Spigen, Inc." on Justia Law

Toure, a citizen of Mali, entered the U.S. on a tourist visa in January 2007. In June 2009, he married Wolfe, a U.S. citizen. Conditional on his marriage, he was granted permanent resident status. In September 2011, Toure and Wolfe filed a joint I‐751 petition to remove the conditions. After an interview, USCIS issued a Notice of Intent to Deny because the marriage seemed to have been motivated by immigration benefits; the two were living apart and could not answer basic questions about each other. USCIS terminated Toure's conditional permanent resident status. In removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(D)(i), Toure conceded removability but said that he and Wolfe were still married and that they intended to proceed with the joint filing. He and Wolfe had actually been separated for several months. The IJ set the merits hearing for more than three years later. In December 2014, Toure and Wolfe divorced. Neither Toure nor his attorney informed the immigration court of this change in status. A month before the long‐scheduled removal hearing, Toure filed a new I‐751 petition, this time requesting a waiver of the joint‐filing requirement. At the hearing, he requested a continuance to allow USCIS time to adjudicate that petition and waiver request. The IJ and BIA rejected his request. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Toure’s hope that USCIS would grant his waiver was speculative at best and he did not diligently pursue his collateral remedy. View "Toure v. Barr" on Justia Law

From 2007-2016, Trujillo worked as a manager of several Ashley Furniture HomeStores in the Chicago area. These stores were owned and operated by Rockledge Furniture LLC, a Wisconsin limited liability company associated with Ashley Furniture Industries, Inc., a Wisconsin corporation. Trujillo was fired and then filed a charge with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission alleging age discrimination and retaliation. In the charge, he listed the name of the Illinois store where he had worked— Ashley Furniture HomeStore, with the address and telephone number of the store. The correct legal name of Trujillo’s employer, however, was Rockledge Furniture LLC. The district court dismissed Trujillo’s claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because he did not name his employer sufficiently and because the EEOC never managed to notify the correct employer of Trujillo’s charge. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Trujillo named his employer sufficiently in his original EEOC charge, and when his lawyer later sent his pay stub with Rockledge’s name and address, he removed any doubt about the employer’s identity. The EEOC’s error in processing his charge does not bar Trujillo from suing his employer. View "Trujillo v. Rockledge Furniture" on Justia Law

Terronez pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. The district court announced a within‐Guidelines sentence of 110 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court committed procedural error by not considering his request for a variance from the Guidelines range given that the base offense level overrepresented the seriousness of his offense. The court noted that Terronez had two Illinois drug trafficking convictions, each of which subjected him to over a year in prison, plus two drug possession convictions, an aggravated assault conviction, and two driving-on-a-suspended-license convictions, and that the firearm had an “obliterated serial number.” Given that the court imposed a within‐Guidelines sentence, its explanation as to why it did not believe the sentence overstated the seriousness of Terronez’s felon‐in‐possession conviction is sufficient. View "United States v. Terronez" on Justia Law

St. Clair pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon. The court notified St. Clair in writing that it proposed to impose six mandatory and 14 discretionary conditions of supervised release. The court later sentenced St. Clair to 33 months in prison and a year of supervised release, including all 20 proposed conditions. St. Clair did not appeal. Within the first month of his supervised release, he started violating the conditions. The government moved to revoke St. Clair’s release, citing 16 violations: using marijuana, failing to submit to drug tests, and not reporting to probation. St. Clair admitted to the violations. The court revoked St. Clair’s supervised release and sentenced him to another year in prison, plus another year-long term of supervision. With no objection from St. Clair, the court included 17 proposed supervised release conditions in the revocation sentence. The Seventh Circuit upheld those conditions, rejecting arguments that the district court failed to justify the discretionary conditions and violated his due process rights by imposing a vague condition based on a superseded version of the Sentencing Guidelines. St. Clair waived his right to challenge his conditions when he acknowledged that he received prior notice of the proposed conditions and discussed them with counsel, and then told the judge that he had no objections or questions. View "United States v. St. Clair" on Justia Law

Spivey was convicted of predatory criminal sexual assault, which required him to register under the Sex Offender Registration Notification Act. In 2014, Spivey pleaded guilty to knowingly failing to register, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). The district court sentenced him to 41 months in prison and five years of supervised release, with a condition that he truthfully answer his probation officer’s inquiries. The court struck that condition and others in an amended judgment issued two weeks later. Spivey began serving supervised release. Probation officers submitted reports reflecting 18 separate violations of Spivey’s conditions. The court conducted multiple "show cause" hearings. Spivey claimed that because he was homeless, he had challenges registering as a sex offender and that he could not fulfill his supervised release conditions due to his work schedule, lack of funds, and illnesses. In March 2018, Spivey failed to appear before the court on three separate occasions. Officers arrested Spivey at his girlfriend’s house, where she lived with her children. The court revoked Spivey’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months in custody. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Spivey’s due process argument that the court relied on a violation of a non-existent supervised release condition when imposing his sentence: that he truthfully answer all inquiries of his probation officer. Nothing indicated that the court considered the nonexistent condition when imposing sentence; the focus was on the fact that Spivey had been living with children, aged 8 and 10. View "United States v. Spivey" on Justia Law

A person “who has been convicted in any court of, a crime punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year” is forbidden to possess a firearm, 18 U.S.C.922(g)(1). Kanter was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, for bilking the Medicare program, and was sentenced to 366 days in prison. After release, he contended that section 922(g)(1) was invalid, as applied to him because fraud is not a violent crime. Reversing the district court, the Seventh Circuit upheld section 922(g)(1), The Supreme Court has specifically upheld “longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons” and fraud is a thought‐out crime that demonstrates disdain for the rights of others and disrespect for the law. Section 922(g)(1) may be applied to a felon convicted of fraud, whose maximum sentence exceeded a year, even if the actual punishment was less. The court noted that it is not possible to separate persons with felony convictions into two categories: dangerous and harmless and rejected an argument that the section was invalid because Congress has declined to fund a statutory (18 U.S.C. 925(c)) program that would permit the Attorney General to lift the prohibition for persons who demonstrate that they would not present a danger to others. View "Hatfield v. Barr" on Justia Law

Simm, a debt collection agency, sent plaintiffs collection letters, stating: CLIENT: PAYPAL CREDIT ORIGINAL CREDITOR: Comenity Capital Bank; giving the balance and origination date; and stating that, upon the debtor’s request, Simm will provide “the name and address of the original creditor, if different from the current creditor.” Plaintiffs filed purported class actions (consolidated on appeal) under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging Simm violated 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(2) by failing to disclose the current creditor or owner of the debt and that the letter was false, deceptive, or misleading. The court granted Simm summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The letter identifies a single “creditor,” as well as the commercial name to which the debtors had been exposed, allowing the debtors to easily recognize the nature of the debt. It is true the letter identifies Comenity as the “original” instead of “current” creditor but the FDCPA does not require the use of any specific terminology to identify the creditor. The letter does not identify any creditor other than Comenity, which might have led to consumer confusion. By informing debtors they could request the name of the original creditor if different from the current creditor, the letter alerts debtors the original and current creditor may be the same. View "Nieto v. Simm Associates, Inc." on Justia Law

Buncich, the Sheriff of Lake County, Indiana, solicited and accepted payments from towing companies. He was convicted of five counts of wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1346, and one count of accepting bribes, 18 U.S.C. 666(a)(1)(B). To establish wire fraud, the government must prove the defendant participated in a scheme to defraud, intended to defraud, and used interstate wires in furtherance of the fraud. An honest services fraud scheme covers only bribery or kickbacks. To prevail, the government must show that the bribe in question “entail[ed] a plan to change how the employee or agent does his job.” The Seventh Circuit vacated as to Counts I‐III, which relied on “Federal Reserve payroll funds transfer[s]” on three dates; the evidence failed to establish the wire transfers that were the basis of those counts. The court affirmed as to Counts IV and V, which relied on JP Morgan Chase wire transfers dated April 8, 2014, and October 21, 2014, and the bribery count. View "United States v. Buncich" on Justia Law