Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In December 2014, Arctic hired Graham as its maintenance supervisor. Arctic soon received customer complaints about his attitude and noticed his insubordination and difficulty completing tasks on time. In February 2015, Graham was injured on the job. He did not work until May and received worker’s compensation. Graham returned to work with medical restrictions requiring that he work sitting down. Arctic assigned Graham to skate sharpening. Graham maintains that the task requires standing but did not inform Arctic of his belief that skate sharpening did not meet his restrictions. When Graham transitioned back to full-time work. Arctic assigned him to work evenings because of seasonal need. Graham characterized this as a “demotion.” In October 2015, Graham caused a Zamboni accident. Arctic claimed that Graham created a hazard to its customers and fired Graham, citing his poor attitude about his position; poor attitude toward customers; lack of timeliness; insubordination; and the Zamboni accident, which caused Arctic to lose revenue. Graham sued, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101, by failure to reasonably accommodate his disability and by his termination based on disability. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Arctic. If an employee does not provide sufficient information to determine the necessary accommodations, the employer cannot be held liable for failing to accommodate the disabled employee. Graham did not provide enough evidence to support an inference of bad faith in his termination. View "Graham v. Arctic Zone Iceplex LLC" on Justia Law

Police arrested Williams for selling cocaine, then found a gun in his pocket. After he pleaded guilty to federal firearm and cocaine charges, the government sought a sentencing enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), which applies if the defendant has three prior convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses. The government offered evidence of Williams’ prior convictions for burglary, robbery, and dealing cocaine. For the cocaine conviction, the government established that in 2007, Indiana charged Williams with a Class A Felony for “Dealing Cocaine,” and alleged that Williams knowingly or intentionally delivered cocaine within 1000 feet of a school. Williams pleaded guilty to “the lesser included offense of Dealing Cocaine as a Class B Felony.” The district court applied the ACCA enhancement, finding that Williams’ “Dealing Cocaine” conviction qualified as a predicate “serious drug offense.” Williams did not dispute the presentence report and was subject to a statutory minimum of 15 years in prison. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 210-262 months' imprisonment but found that the range likely overstated the seriousness of Williams’ conduct and sentenced him to 188 months in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the record did not show exactly which statute he was convicted of violating and that Indiana’s statute on dealing cocaine is broader than the ACCA definition of a “serious drug offense.” View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

After pleading guilty to failing to update his sex-offender registration, Hunt began supervised release, with a condition prohibiting him from committing another federal crime. The next year, Hunt pleaded guilty to a bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 2113(a), during which he brandished a firearm, section 924(c). The judge imposed consecutive sentences of 70 months for the robbery, 84 months for the gun charge, and 18 months for the violation of supervised release, followed by three years of supervised release, which included conditions that had been conditions of his original, revoked term of release. Hunt received the presentence report with the proposed conditions but did not object to any proposed conditions. Consistent with his on-the-record acquiescence, Hunt declined the judge's offers to read the conditions aloud for the record and justify the conditions individually. Hunt later challenged conditions prohibiting Hunt from leaving the judicial district in which he is supervised without permission and requiring (as directed by the probation officer) notification to third parties of risks that may be occasioned by Hunt’s criminal record or personal history or characteristics. The Seventh Circuit rejected Hunt’s challenges to the conditions as waived and dismissed an appeal of the revocation of his earlier term of supervised release. View "United States v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Hernandez-Garcia’s husband entered the U.S. illegally in 2001. He sent her money in Guatemala, so she had a higher standard of living than her neighbors. In 2013, her oldest son left for the U.S. She began receiving anonymous notes asking for money and threatening her and her younger children. Hernandez-Garcia went to the police, who ignored her. The family left Guatemala. At the U.S. border, they were served with Notices to Appear. An immigration judge denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Hernandez-Garcia admitted that she told an officer that she did not fear persecution or torture and that she had left Guatemala because of poverty. The judge found the threats not sufficiently imminent or severe to be more than harassment and that Hernandez-Garcia failed to demonstrate a nexus between that harm and a protected ground, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42)(A)). Perceived or actual wealth, alone, does not form the basis of a particular social group. The BIA affirmed, rejecting Hernandez-Garcia’s argument that the proceedings were jurisdictionally barred because of the absence of date-and-place information in the Notice; she received a later notice with that information and appeared at several hearings. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Hernandez-Garcia was not prejudiced by the omission of information in her Notice to Appear. “It is too big a leap from the indifference the police demonstrated ... to a finding that public officials would either torture her or stand by while others did.” View "Hernandez-Garcia v. Barr" on Justia Law

In 2010, Baby Fold, which provides Illinois foster-care services, placed three-year-old Kianna in the care of Lamie, who killed Kianna in 2011 and was convicted of murder. The administrator of Kianna’s estate maintained a state court wrongful death action against Baby Fold, which settled for $4 million. Baby Fold’s insurer, Philadelphia, sought a declaratory judgment that its maximum indemnity is $1 million under a primary policy and $250,000 under an excess policy. Baby Fold and the administrator argued that the excess policy’s limit is $5 million. The district court entered judgment in favor of Philadelphia and dismissed the counterclaims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the policies were ambiguous. The primary policy comprises several “coverage parts,” each of which outlines specific types of losses. One part covers losses arising out of negligent supervision of foster parents who commit physical abuse; this part provides $1 million of coverage. The excess policy then provides additional coverage for physical-abuse claims, but the background limit of $5 million drops to $250,000 for each instance of “abusive conduct”, a term that aggregates multiple acts of abuse by multiple persons. The policies contain anti-stacking provisions to prevent an insured from benefiting from consecutive policies’ limits when injuries or losses span multiple periods. The primary policy accomplishes this by defining “abusive conduct” to aggregate multiple acts of abuse into one unit. View "Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co. v. Chicago Trust Co." on Justia Law

Anstice pleaded guilty to conspiring to distribute methamphetamine and was sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Five conditions of supervised release appeared in the written judgment of conviction but were not announced orally by the district court at sentencing. Three of the challenged conditions are mandated by federal statute, 18 U.S.C. 3583(d), and two are discretionary (requiring Anstice to report to the probation office within 72 hours of his release and prohibiting his possessing a firearm, destructive device, or other dangerous weapons),. All had been categorized as “mandatory” in the Presentence Investigation Report. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part. The three conditions mandated by section 3583(d) were validly part of Anstice’s sentence even though the court failed to announce them orally at sentencing. The court vacated the other two conditions. As commonplace and sensible as the conditions may be across federal sentences, Congress has not mandated their imposition. If a district court does choose to impose them, they must be announced at sentencing; in this case, the oral sentence conflicts with the written sentence. View "United States v. Anstice" on Justia Law

Narkiewicz‐Laine, an artist, rented space from the defendants in 2004. About six years later, the defendants cleared the rental space and discarded most of his property, including his only records of the stored property. Narkiewicz‐Laine filed suit, citing the Visual Artists Rights Act, 17 U.S.C. 106A. For certain visual art, the Act confers upon artists rights to attribution and integrity, including the right to prevent the work’s destruction. Narkiewicz‐Laine added claims for trespass, conversion, and negligence under Illinois law. He sought $11 million for his losses. The defendants presented evidence that Narkiewicz‐Laine had missed multiple rent payments and stopped paying for the property's utilities, and testified that, before emptying the space, they saw nothing resembling art or valuable personal property. The defendants introduced Narkiewicz‐Laine's prior conviction for lying to an FBI agent. The jury awarded $120,000 in damages under the Act plus $300,000 on the state law claims, reflecting the loss of all the belongings stored at the unit. The court reduced the total award to $300,000 to avoid an improper double recovery, reasoning that Narkiewicz‐Laine’s common law claims necessarily included the loss of his artwork. The court concluded did not award Narkiewicz‐Laine attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first upholding the decision to allow Narkiewicz‐Laine’s 2003 conviction into evidence. Narkiewicz‐Laine is not entitled to recover twice for the same property, so the actual damages attributed to specific art must be subtracted from the jury’s award of actual damages for all destroyed property. View "Narkiewicz-Laine v. Doyle" on Justia Law

Bernal bought a monthly pass to Six Flags amusement parks. The contract said that if he fell behind on his payments, he would “be billed for any amounts that are due and owing plus any costs (including reasonable attorney’s fees) incurred by [Six Flags] in attempting to collect amounts due.” After Bernal missed several monthly payments, Six Flags hired AR, a debt collector. Under their contract, AR could charge Six Flags a 5% management fee plus an additional amount based on the number of days the debt was delinquent (in this case, an additional 20%), as is common in the market. AR hired NRA, a subcontractor, which sent Bernal a collection letter asking for the $267.31 he owed, plus $43.28 in costs. Reasoning that it could not have cost $43.28 to mail a single collection letter, Bernal filed a class-action lawsuit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, alleging that NRA charged a fee not “expressly authorized by the agreement creating the debt,” 15 U.S.C. 1692f(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed a judgment for NRA. A debt collector’s fee counts as a collection cost under that language. The contract unambiguously permits Six Flags to recover any cost it incurs in collecting past-due payments, and that includes a standard collection fee. View "Bernal v. NRA Group, LLC" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Donelson was moved to Stateville, where a prison nurse screened him for medical issues. Donelson is asthmatic and stated that he needed a new inhaler. The nurse responded that he could get one from a doctor. Donelson had to wait 16 days to see a doctor but apparently could have gone to the commissary at any time for an inhaler. Donelson received an inhaler 20 days after arriving at Stateville. He sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of the Eighth Amendment (deliberate indifference to his asthma) and the First Amendment (delaying his care to retaliate for prior lawsuits). During discovery, the court encountered several problems: Donelson’s conflict with his recruited lawyer and that lawyer’s withdrawal; Donelson’s false assertion that Wexford refused to respond to his document requests; and Donelson’s obstructive behavior during his deposition. Donelson professed not to understand simple questions, no matter how often rephrased, then refused to answer. Donelson accused opposing counsel of bringing contraband (an inhaler) into Stateville. The judge described Donelson’s responses as “evasive and argumentative,” then ruled that dismissal with prejudice and an award of costs was a proper sanction. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the sanction reasonable. Donelson acted willfully and in bad faith; the dismissal was proportional and appropriate given Donelson’s grossly unacceptable conduct, the need to convey the seriousness of his violations, the obvious insufficiency of any warning, and his inability to pay any meaningful monetary sanction. View "Donelson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner testified at her asylum hearing that she believed that E.G., the father of her son, is a member of the Mexican cartel, La Familia Michoacana. Petitioner ended her relationship with E.G. in July 2012, fearing that opposing cartel members might harm her or her children. She moved to her mother’s house, two hours away, while pregnant with E.G.’s child. Petitioner saw little of E.G. until June 2013, when he started occasionally driving by her home and the restaurant where she worked. When she declined to return to him, E.G. threatened to take her sons away—“the bad way” if necessary. Petitioner moved but continued to see E.G. driving by her apartment late at night. Local police told her there was nothing they could do. She fled to the U.S. with her children. Petitioner has not spoken to E.G. since June 2013 but E.G. sent his relatives to her mother’s house to ask about her whereabouts. Petitioner argued that she was entitled to asylum because she fears persecution as the mother of a cartel member’s child and as a Mexican woman who cannot leave her relationship. The IJ and BIA denied relief. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Petitioner’s testimony did not establish past persecution or a well-founded fear of future persecution and an inability to relocate in Mexico to avoid persecution. Petitioner did not establish membership in either social group she identified. She did leave her relationship; her belief that E.G. was a cartel member was speculative. View "N. Y. C. C. v. Barr" on Justia Law