Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Mathews purchased an RV from a dealer which came with a warranty from the manufacturer, REV, which limited both express and implied warranties to one year from the purchase date. The warranty stated that “[i]f the repair or replacement remedy fails to successfully cure a defect after [REV] received a reasonable opportunity to cure the defect[], your sole and exclusive remedy shall be limited to Warrantor paying you the costs of having an independent third party perform repair(s).” The Mathews were told about the warranty when they bought the RV, but they were not initially given a hard copy. The Mathews say that they encountered problems with the RV almost immediately and several times thereafter. Dealerships completed some repairs; REV completed others and issued an extended goodwill warranty. The Mathews did not report all of the problems but eventually asked REV to buy back the RV. REV declined and they filed suit, alleging breaches of express and implied warranties and violations of the Indiana Deceptive Consumer Sales Act and the Magnuson–Moss Warranty Act. They claimed that REV had failed to fix numerous problems,15 U.S.C. 2310(d)(1). The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of REV. Although the Mathews “bought a lemon,” they have not shown that REV failed to honor its warranties or that the warranty provisions were unconscionable, View "Mathews v. REV Recreation Group, Inc." on Justia Law

Wilson, an inmate at Illinois’s Stateville Correctional Center, had an inguinal hernia that was first spotted in the 1990s, but then apparently subsided. In 2011, it reappeared in the identical spot. Wilson says that the recurrence was extremely painful. He claims that the prison’s medical officers refused to listen to him and delayed giving him hernia-repair surgery, instead forcing him repeatedly and fruitlessly to push the herniated tissue back into his abdominal cavity. In September 2014 Wilson received surgery, which was successful. Wilson alleged violation of his Eighth Amendment rights through deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and sought damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court dismissed a defendant, Dr. Carter, on statute of limitations grounds, and excluded several reports and ultimately dismissed the case. The Seventh Circuit reversed with respect to one defendant, Dr. Obaisi too quickly, but otherwise affirmed. Construing the facts in Wilson’s favor, a reasonable jury could believe Wilson’s testimony over Obaisi’s insistence on the completeness of his notes and could conclude that Dr. Obaisi not only learned of the painful hernia in January 2013, but also explicitly refused to hear potentially relevant medical details and was dismissive about Wilson’s pain. View "Wilson v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

For decades, regulated, vertically-integrated utilities dominated the U.S. electricity market, generating, transmitting, distributing, and collecting payments for electricity. In Illinois that utility was ComEd; its rates are set by the Illinois Commerce Commission. Illinois restructured its electricity market by the Electric Service Customer Choice and Rate Relief Law of 1997, which allows alternative retail electric suppliers to compete with ComEd, setting their own rates and not regulated by the Illinois Commerce Commission. ComEd and alternative suppliers now serve as middlemen, purchasing electricity wholesale from PJM, a regional transmission organization that controls the electric grid covering northern Illinois and several other states, and reselling it to customers. Sevugan contracted with Direct Energy, an alternative supplier, in 2011. In 2013, Sevugan neither re-enrolled nor canceled service, which triggered a “Renewal Clause” with a variable price per kWh. Sevugan sued in 2017, alleging Direct deceived him (and others) with its four-page form contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Sevugan’s breach of contract claim, reasoning that Sevugan did not allege facts showing Direct’s rates were not “based on generally prevailing market prices,” or that its “adder,” a discretionary component of the electricity price, was “unreasonable.” View "Sevugan v. Direct Energy Services, LLC" on Justia Law

Corral, a native of Mexico, was admitted to the U.S. as a lawful permanent resident in 1994. In 1999, he applied for naturalization. He became a U.S. citizen in 2000. He was then indicted on seven counts of aggravated criminal sexual abuse. Less than five months after becoming a U.S. citizen, Corral pleaded guilty to Aggravated Criminal Sexual Abuse, under Illinois law, which then stated, “sexual conduct with a victim who was under 18 years of age when the act was committed and the accused was a family member.” In 2017, the government sought to revoke Corral’s citizenship on the grounds that he obtained his citizenship illegally and by willful misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, 8 U.S.C. 1451(a), in that Corral lacked good moral character because he committed a crime involving moral turpitude within the statutory period of five years preceding his application for citizenship. The Seventh Circuit affirmed a ruling in favor of the government, rejecting defenses of “laches” and selective prosecution. Whether Corral made a willful misrepresentation or concealed a material fact is irrelevant because these factors do not relate to the ground for Corral’s denaturalization. View "United States v. Valenzuela" on Justia Law

Lewellen, a Chicago Police Department “dirty cop,” arrested Ruiz-Cortez for possessing cocaine and served as the key witness at his trial Ruiz-Cortez was convicted. Ruiz-Cortez spent a decade in prison before the federal government discovered Lewellen’s crimes, which included drug conspiracy, racketeering, and, according to the government, perjury at Ruiz-Cortez’s trial. The government prosecuted Lewellen and moved to vacate Ruiz-Cortez’s conviction. Ruiz-Cortez sued the city and Lewellen under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for withholding material impeachment evidence of Lewellen’s crimes. The district court dismissed the claim against the city, finding no evidence of municipal liability. A jury later found for Lewellen, despite his refusal to testify based on the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the city but vacated as to Lewellen. Ruiz-Cortez failed to marshal the evidence needed to meet Monell’s high standard. The district court allowed Lewellen to offer innocent explanations for his Fifth Amendment invocation, that “fly in the face of Fifth Amendment law,” and failed to instruct the jury about when a Fifth Amendment invocation is proper. If the jury believed that Lewellen could invoke the Fifth Amendment simply because there was other ongoing litigation, and not because truthful answers may have incriminated him, the jury was almost certainly less likely to penalize Lewellen for his invocation. View "Ruiz-Cortez v. Lewellen" on Justia Law

Hanson, age eight. was killed by shots fired into his grandmother’s Rockford home in 2002. Anderson, Johnson, and Ross were convicted of the murder and each received a 50-year sentence. The men spent more than a decade in prison before an Illinois court ordered a new trial based on the delayed disclosure of Brady material—specifically, the recorded jail calls of the prosecution’s key witness in which he contradicted his trial testimony. Anderson, Johnson, and Ross were retried and acquitted. They sued the city and officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers not only withheld the recorded jail calls and other exculpatory information but also fabricated evidence. The Seventh Circuit reversed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Anderson, Johnson, and Ross have brought forth sufficient evidence to move forward against particular defendants on particular aspects of their alleged due process violations. No physical or forensic evidence linked the plaintiffs to the Hanson murder, so the withheld evidence was material. The court rejected some of the claims of fabricated evidence. View "Anderson v. City of Rockford" on Justia Law

Nelson pleaded guilty to drug crimes and was sentenced to 16 years’ imprisonment and supervised release. After his release, Nelson was arrested for another drug crime. The court revoked Nelson’s release and sentenced him to imprisonment and additional supervised release. During his second term of supervised release, Nelson’s parole officer filed a revocation petition based on allegations that he had committed aggravated battery and drug crimes. At an initial hearing, the judge determined that defense counsel had discussed the petition with Nelson and that Nelson understood it. At the final hearing, the parties agreed to a 41-month sentence (below the guideline range) in exchange for Nelson’s waiver of a contested hearing. The judge informed Nelson that his stipulation could not be conditioned on the court’s acceptance of that sentence. Nelson responded: “Just go on.” After an exchange, Nelson's lawyer and Nelson assured the court that Nelson understood and did not “want to fight .” Nelson entered his stipulation. The judge questioned Nelson about the voluntariness of his stipulation. Nelson responded that he had “no say in nothing” but that he was “okay with stipulating” and that he had violated the conditions “just by being arrested.” The judge accepted the stipulation, stating, “just being arrested isn’t enough” and explained the stipulation. Nelson stated that he understood. The court rejected the recommendation and sentenced Nelson to 60 months, the statutory maximum, explaining that it was unpersuaded that avoiding a hearing justified a reduced sentence and concerns about Nelson’s criminal history. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding Nelson’s waiver knowing and voluntary. View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Krell, a former ironworker, applied for Social Security disability benefits. Krell was notified that a vocational expert would testify at his hearing and that Krell had the right to request a subpoena for documents or testimony “that you reasonably need to present your case.” Krell’s counsel requested a subpoena to require the vocational expert to produce documents upon which the expert may rely in forming opinions, including statistics, reports, surveys, summaries, work product, and a description of the methodologies used by publishers or compilers of the statistics. The ALJ did not respond. At the hearing, the ALJ denied the request, reasoning that it had not specified what the documents would show and why these facts could not be shown without a subpoena and that counsel could challenge the testimony post‐hearing. During cross‐examination, the vocational expert stated that to determine available job numbers, he relied on Wisconsin occupational projections produced by the Department of Workforce Development. Krell made no post‐hearing challenge. The ALJ found that Krell was disabled and entitled to benefits, but only as of 2014, rather than 2011. Based on the expert’s testimony, the ALJ concluded that up to 2014, Krell was able to perform work existing in significant numbers in the economy. The Social Security Appeals Council denied review. The district court concluded that the ALJ had erred in denying Krell’s subpoena request. The Seventh Circuit reversed. While Krell’s case was pending, the Supreme Court held (Biestek) that a vocational expert is not categorically required to produce his supporting data. Krell advanced no reason why it was necessary for the expert to produce his underlying sources. View "Krell v. Saul" on Justia Law

Walker sexually assaulted his four‐ and six‐year‐old nephews. In 1998, he pleaded guilty under a Colorado law that prohibits sexual contact with a child under 15 by anyone who is a least four years older than the child and was sentenced to four years’ probation. His probation was later revoked, and he served a prison term. After his release, Walker had to register under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), which imposes a progressive registration scheme that tracks the severity of the offense, 34 U.S.C. 20915(a). In 2017, Walker was indicted for failing to register as a sex offender after June 2016, 18 U.S.C. 2250(a). Walker argued that his 1998 conviction was only a Tier I SORNA offense so that his obligation to register ended 15 years after his conviction. Walker entered a conditional guilty plea. The Seventh Circuit vacated his conviction, first stating that SORNA’s text compels a hybrid approach—part categorical and part circumstance‐specific—when comparing the defendant’s conviction to the SORNA categories. Because Walker’s Colorado conviction is not a categorical match with “abusive sexual contact (as described in section 2244 of title 18),” he does not qualify for Tier II or Tier III status regardless of the ages of his victims. View "United States v. Walker" on Justia Law

Jackson was charged with throwing boiling oil at his wife, knifing her in front of their children, and later, threatening her from prison. Jackson asked the judge to remove his appointed counsel. The court granted the motion and barred Jackson from communicating with anyone but his attorney of record because of his threatening phone calls. A second appointed lawyer reported that Jackson asked him to withdraw. The court ruled that Jackson’s reasons were inadequate and refused to appoint another lawyer but allowed Jackson to seek a private attorney in compliance with the restrictions on his outside communications. The court denied Jackson’s request to represent himself. Months later, the court returned to Jackson’s request. It stressed the complexity of the case and stated that Jackson “can’t do this.” The court denied Jackson’s request. Jackson pleaded guilty to felony intimidation of a witness, first-degree reckless injury, and aggravated battery and was sentenced to 20 years’ imprisonment. Jackson filed an unsuccessful post-conviction petition in Wisconsin, seeking to withdraw his guilty plea. In his federal habeas action, Jackson argued that, because he was competent to plead guilty, he was competent to represent himself at trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of that petition. Although the Wisconsin appeals court unreasonably applied Supreme Court precedent on the Sixth Amendment right to self-representation at trial, Jackson waived the error by validly pleading guilty. View "Jackson v. Bartow" on Justia Law