Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Crump applied for social security disability benefits based on her long history of numerous mental health impairments, including bipolar disorder and polysubstance abuse disorder. An administrative law judge denied benefits, finding that Crump, despite her severe impairments, could perform work limited to simple and repetitive tasks. The district court affirmed. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The ALJ did not adequately account for Crump’s difficulties with concentration, persistence, or pace in the workplace. An ALJ generally may not rely merely on catch-all terms like “’simple, repetitive tasks’” because there is no basis to conclude that they account for problems of concentration, persistence or pace. In addition, observing that a person can perform simple and repetitive tasks says nothing about whether the individual can do so on a sustained basis. Beyond disregarding the Vocational Expert’s opinion in response to a second hypothetical, the ALJ gave short shrift to the medical opinions of Crump’s treating psychiatrist. View "Crump v. Saul" on Justia Law

RMG sued Harmelech in 2006. Attorney Mac Naughton represented Harmelech in that suit for 10 weeks. The relationship ended in a fee dispute. After he withdrew, the case settled with a consent judgment against Harmelech. Mac Naughton pursued Harmelech by acquiring rights to that judgment. In 2014, Mac Naughton and his company, Casco sued Harmelech to collect the RMG judgment and to set aside a conveyance. In 2015, Judge Holderman disqualified Mac Naughton from attempting to collect the judgment personally and from representing Casco in its collection efforts. Mac Naughton defied that order. In 2018, Judge Feinerman dismissed the 2014 claims predicated on the RMG judgment as a sanction for willful defiance of the Holderman Order. In 2016, Mac Naughton sued third parties to collect for himself money owed to Harmelech. Judge Blakey dismissed that case as a sanction for violating court orders. In 2017, Mac Naughton sued Harmelech to set aside another property conveyance. Judge Durkin dismissed the case on the same grounds. The Seventh Circuit affirmed in the consolidated cases. The Holderman Order disqualified Mac Naughton. It barred him from pursuing his former clients to collect on the RMG judgment. Mac Naughton willfully defied disqualification. The judges were within their discretion in sanctioning Mac Naughton by dismissing the actions he should not have brought. Regardless of whether Mac Naughton agreed with the Holderman Order, he had to follow it until it was undone through proper channels. View "Mac Naughton v. Harmelech" on Justia Law

Officers discovered downloads of child pornography from an IP address associated with Kraemer’s residence. FBI agents executed a search warrant and found an external hard drive containing images of child pornography. Kraemer later admitted that he possessed child pornography, that he searched for child pornography using specific search terms, and that his collection of child pornography totaled about 100,000 files. Kraemer pleaded guilty to one count of possession of child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252(a)(4)(B). At sentencing, the court determined that Kraemer’s prior Wisconsin convictions for first‐degree and second‐degree sexual assault of a child constituted convictions “relating to … abusive sexual conduct involving a minor” that triggered a 10‐year, mandatory minimum sentence, 18 U.S.C. 2252(b)(2), and imposed a sentence of 133 months’ imprisonment, followed by eight years of supervised release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The applicable federal enhancement statute, section 2252(b)(2), requires only that a prior state statute of conviction “relat[e] to,” rather than be fully equivalent to, “aggravated sexual abuse, sexual abuse, or abusive sexual conduct involving a minor or ward.” Kraemer’s first‐degree sexual assault conviction is one “relating to” abusive sexual conduct involving a minor despite a slight difference in the maximum age of the victim under state and federal law. View "United States v. Kraemer" on Justia Law

Cash Depot underpaid employees for their overtime work. Fast filed suit under the Fair Labor Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. 203 (FLSA), on behalf of himself and other Depot employees. Depot hired an accountant to investigate. The accountant tallied Depot’s cumulative underpayments at less than $22,000. Depot issued checks to all underpaid current and former employees covered by the suit and issued checks to Fast for his underpaid wages, for liquidated damages under the FLSA, and for Fast’s disclosed attorney fees to that point. Fast and his attorney never cashed their checks. The district court denied a motion to dismiss because Fast contested whether Depot correctly calculated the amount it owed but granted partial summary judgment for Depot, “to the extent that [it] correctly calculated” what it owed Fast. Eventually, Fast conceded that Depot correctly paid the missing wages and urged that only a dispute over additional attorney fees remained. After Fast’s demand for additional attorney fees went unanswered, he filed a motion for attorney fees. The court determined that because Fast was not a prevailing party for the purposes of the FLSA, he was not entitled to attorney fees, and granted Depot summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Fast never received a favorable judgment. View "Fast v. Cash Depot, Ltd." on Justia Law

In 2016, the Seventh Circuit held that 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(3)(B), which partially defines “crime of violence,” is unconstitutionally vague. In 2017, the court relied on Cardena to vacate Jenkins’s and Jackson’s convictions under section 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). In 2018, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded both decisions for reconsideration in light of its Sessions v. Dimaya decisions. In 2019, the Supreme Court (Davis) found that section 924(c)(3)(B) is unconstitutional. In Davis, the Court held that section 924(c)(3)(B)’s language required the use of the categorical approach and thus that it was unconstitutionally vague. Although a case-specific approach would alleviate the vagueness, the Court concluded that “the statute simply cannot support” the use of that approach. The Seventh Circuit held that Davis vindicates its earlier opinions, and remanded both Jenkins and Jackson for resentencing. View "United States v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Chronis visited the University of Illinois Health Center for an examination that included a pap smear. Chronis alleges the procedure caused her pain and bruising. She claims that the Center did not return her calls or allow her to make a follow‐up appointment. Chronis filed an unsuccessful complaint with the Center’s grievance committee, requesting $332 for expenses that she incurred because of the injury. Chronis then sent a letter to the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, requesting assistance concerning documented ignorance of policy and procedures. Though her letter mentioned her injuries, it focused on the Center’s lack of responsiveness. She included a general statement that she wanted assistance in “receiving the restitution.” Chronis attached roughly 60 pages of documents, one of which mentioned that Chronis had previously sought $332. CMS directed her to the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation to file a formal complaint and invited Chronis to follow up for additional assistance. Six months later, Chronis filed a pro se complaint, alleging malpractice. Because the Center receives funds from the Public Health Service, the United States substituted itself as the defendant and removed the case to proceed under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 42 U.S.C. 233; 28 U.S.C. 1346. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case because Chronis had not exhausted her administrative remedies in that she had failed to first present her claim to the appropriate federal agency. Her letter to CMS did not meet this requirement of making an administrative demand. View "Chronis v. United States" on Justia Law

Two Stateville inmates, struck by buckshot fired by prison guards, sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, asserting that the guards violated their Eighth Amendment rights when they discharged their shotguns over a crowded prison dining hall. The guards claimed that they fired the shots as a necessary warning to two other inmates who were fighting and resisting the efforts of guards on the floor, armed only with pepper spray, who were trying to break up the conflict. The inmates claimed that the shots were fired after the fight had been broken up and that the officers did not aim their shots at a "shot box" intended to prevent ricochets. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit vacated, noting that the force was more than de minimus and that the allegations would support findings of intent to make contact and of malice. Many of the facts are disputed. Construing the facts in favor of the plaintiffs, the force applied was grossly disproportionate to the force that could plausibly have been thought necessary. View "McCottrell v. White" on Justia Law

Hunt worked the overnight shift at a Wal-Mart store. Watson was her supervisor. After Watson made several unprofessional remarks toward Hunt over a four-month period, Watson wrote a disciplinary report on Hunt, who then filed a complaint with human resources. Watson had previously been twice accused of sexual harassment and received written “coaching.” A manager concluded Hunt’s claims could not be substantiated without corroborating witnesses but required Watson to retake the ethics training course. Hunt reported no incidents of harassment following the discipline. Wal-Mart investigated the claims but was unable to substantiate them. Hunt filed suit, alleging Watson sexually harassed her by creating a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At summary judgment, the district court held that Wal-Mart established the Faragher-Ellerth affirmative defense to liability because it reasonably prevented and corrected sexual harassment, and Hunt unreasonably delayed in reporting the harassment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The alleged conduct, while unacceptable, did not amount to constructive discharge. Wal-Mart acted as a reasonable employer. It promulgated a comprehensive sexual harassment policy, trained its employees, maintained an effective reporting system, expeditiously investigated Hunt’s complaint, communicated its zero-tolerance policy, and retrained Watson even though the investigation failed to substantiate the allegations against him. View "Hunt v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

Stepp sued his former employer, Covance, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3, by refusing to hire him permanently in retaliation for his earlier complaints about discrimination. Stepp received positive performance reviews in his first nine months. Two of Stepp’s temporary coworkers were made permanent around their nine-month anniversary. While a temporary worker, Stepp, an African-American male, complained that Casteel, his team leader, treated female and white employees better than male and African-American employees and confronted Casteel directly. A manager investigated Stepp’s complaints but found them baseless. Stepp filed formal charges with the EEOC Casteel complained to Ball, a supervisor, that Stepp often stared at him, shook his head, smirked, and said “uh oh.” Shortly thereafter, with Stepp still in temporary status, Covance froze new hires in his department. Stepp asked Ball if Covance did not give him permanent status before the freeze because Casteel had complained about him; she responded “yes.” Stepp’s one-year term as a temporary worker ended soon after. Grubb, a human resources partner, planned to give a 90-day extension to temporary workers whose terms ended near the December holidays but Covance advised him that a 90-day extension was too long, so he shortened the extensions. The Seventh Circuit vacated a judgment in favor of Covance. A reasonable jury could conclude that Covance refused to promote Stepp to permanent status because of his complaints. View "Stepp v. Covance Central Laboratory Services, Inc." on Justia Law

After fellow moviegoers asked Bonin to stop talking on his phone, Bonin said he was a U.S. Marshal speaking with “the government,” flashed a gun on his belt, and threatened to “take it out in the hall.” Patrons called 911. Bonin is not a U.S. Marshal, but when police arrived, Bonin convinced them that he was, and they allowed him to reenter the theater. As Bonin walked to his seat, he raised his arms, again exposed his gun, and bellowed, “See, I told you I’m a U.S. Marshal.” Moments later, police removed him from the theater. One month later, police observed a car driving with flashing emergency lights activated and pulled over to allow it to pass, then realized it was not an emergency vehicle, but a Ford Bronco adorned with an “AGENT” decal on the windshield and law enforcement insignia on the sides. Bonin was driving. Bonin was convicted under 18 U.S.C. 912, which makes it a crime to impersonate an officer or employee of the United States. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting his claim that section 912 is an unconstitutional restriction on free speech and his challenges to multiple evidentiary rulings and jury instructions. Public safety and protection of the reputation of law enforcement are compelling interests and section 912 is “narrowly drawn to achieve” those interests. View "United States v. Bonin" on Justia Law