Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

An informant sent Harper a photograph of a pistol. Harper offered to trade five grams of crack cocaine. The informant and an undercover agent met Harper in a parking lot. The agent opened a toolbox containing the gun and handed the gun to Harper, who held it. Harper promised the crack cocaine would arrive within an hour; he got into the truck to wait. The agent returned the gun to the locked toolbox and placed the toolbox in Harper’s lap. The police arrived and arrested Harper. After Harper's first lawyer withdrew, his court-appointed lawyer unsuccessfully sought leave to withdraw. Harper entered a plea agreement, calling for 96 months’ incarceration—60 months for possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime and 36 months for possession of a firearm by a felon and possession with intent to distribute. The judge explained the sentence to Harper. Harper said that the sentence was acceptable and confirmed that he had no other questions. The judge reviewed all the admonishments for a change of plea, then accepted his guilty plea. Months later, Harper moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that his lawyer was ineffective. Harper obtained new counsel, who argued that Harper did not “possess” a firearm because he never had “full control of th[e] firearm.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Harper had at least constructive possession of the gun and cannot establish prejudice from any ineffective assistance. View "United States v. Harper" on Justia Law

Debt collector Med-1 attempted to recover unpaid medical bills from Lavallee. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act required Med-1 to disclose certain information to Lavallee, 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a), by including the required information in its “initial communication” with Lavallee or by sending “a written notice containing” the disclosures within five days after that “initial communication.” In March and April, Med-1 sent Lavallee two emails, one for each debt. The emails contained hyperlinks to a Med-1’s web server; a visitor had to click through multiple screens to access and download a .pdf document containing the required disclosures. Lavallee never opened those emails. When the hospital called her to discuss a different medical debt, she learned about the earlier debts and was told that they had been referred to Med-1. She called Med-1, but Med-1 did not provide the required disclosures. Nor did it send a written notice within the next five days. Lavallee sued Med-1. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Lavallee, rejecting Med-1’s contention that its emails were initial communications that contained the required disclosures. The emails do not qualify as “communication” because they did not “convey[] … information regarding a debt” and did not “contain” the mandated disclosures. At most the emails provided a means to access the disclosures via a multistep online process. View "Lavallee v. Med-1 Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

A 2014 hail and wind storm damaged Windridge buildings that were insured by Philadelphia Indemnity. The storm physically damaged the aluminum siding on the buildings’ south and west sides. Philadelphia argued that it is required to replace the siding only on those sides. Windridge argued that replacement siding that matches the undamaged north and east elevations is no longer available, so Philadelphia must replace the siding on all four sides so that all of the siding matches. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Windridge. Each building suffered a direct physical loss, which was caused by or resulted from the storm, so Philadelphia must pay to return the buildings to their pre‐storm status—i.e., with matching siding on all sides. Having mismatched siding on its buildings would not be the same position. The district court’s conclusion that the buildings as a whole were damaged—and that all of the siding must be replaced to ensure matching—is a sensible construction of the policy language as applied to these facts. View "Windridge of Naperville Condominium Association v. Philadelphia Indemnity Insurance Co." on Justia Law

Lavite, a combat veteran, works in the Administration Building of Madison County, Illinois, as superintendent for the County’s Veterans Assistance Commission. In 2015, Madison County officials banned Lavite from the Administration Building indefinitely after learning that Lavite had experienced a PTSD episode during which he threatened a police officer and then kicked out the windows of a squad car. The ban lasted for nearly 20 months. Lavite kept his job but had to work remotely. Lavite had previously resisted efforts to use funds from the Commission’s budget for other county needs. Before the ban was lifted, Lavite filed suit. The district court granted summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Lavite’s right to assemble on government property was not violated because the ban on his presence in the building was viewpoint-neutral and reasonably motivated by legitimate safety concerns. None of the evidence supports a reasonable inference of causation between the ban imposed on Lavite in 2015 and his 2013 objections to the proposals to divert some of his Commission’s budget to other purposes. Lavite, having no alleged liberty or property interest, did not establish any due process violation. View "Lavite v. Dunstan" on Justia Law

Evans, a state prisoner with multiple health issues, alleged that he developed nasal polyps and that the prison medical staff refused to authorize surgery, the only effective remedy. He sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations. The district court dismissed Evans’s case with prejudice as a discovery sanction. Kayira, one of the defendants, attempted to depose Evans. Kayira noticed the deposition by mail on February 16, for February 21. Evans swears that he did not receive that notice until February 22. When, on the 21st, he was taken from his cell to meet with the defendants’ lawyers, he says that he had no idea why they were there and was feeling ill and could not sit for the deposition. Evans refused to be sworn or to answer questions. The Seventh CIrcuit reversed. Although dismissal is sometimes the proper sanction for a discovery violation, it is one of the harshest sanctions a court can impose. Courts must be especially careful before taking that step. If a party appears for his deposition but refuses to cooperate, the proper procedure is to obtain a Rule 37(a) order, directing him to be sworn and testify. The order permitting Evans’s deposition was far from an order compelling Evans to do anything. In addition, Evans was entitled at least to actual notice. View "Evans v. Griffin" on Justia Law

Brown pled guilty to distributing a controlled substance. Thornton pled guilty to bank robbery and an associated firearms charge. The same district court separately imposed terms of imprisonment followed by supervised release on both. The court imposed mandatory conditions under 18 U.S.C. 3583(d) and U.S.S.G. 5D1.3(a) (do not commit another crime, do not possess a controlled substance, submit to drug testing, and submit a DNA sample). There were also special (discretionary) conditions, authorized by 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), 3583(d). The PSRs also contained nine “administrative” run-of-the-mill conditions that often accompany supervised release, including a requirement to report to the probation office following release from prison, a prohibition on possessing firearms, a direction not to leave the judicial district without permission, and a requirement to communicate with the probation office. The PSRs cited no authority for these conditions but stated that the conditions are administrative and applicable whenever supervision is imposed, regardless of the substantive conditions. Brown and Thornton argued that the PSRs suggested the conditions are mandatory, but there is no statutory basis for that proposition, and that the imposition of administrative conditions violated their due process rights. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that neither defendant objected to the conditions in the district court, and so both waived the issue. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

Until 2013, Wozniak had tenure on the University of Illinois faculty. He waged an extended campaign against students who did not give him a teaching award. As he had done before when the University enforced school policies, Wozniak filed suit. Disagreeing with the University’s Committee on Academic Freedom and Tenure, the Board of Trustees terminated Wozniak. After the Committee had issued its report, Wozniak posted the entire document and evidence on his website, revealing the identities of the students involved. Wozniak also filed a state court civil suit seeking damages from the students, planning to get a judicial order requiring the students to sit for depositions. Wozniak sued the University alleging violations of the First Amendment. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wozniak was fired for intentionally causing hurt to students, and refusing to follow the Dean’s instructions, not simply for publicizing the effects of his actions. Wozniak acted in his capacity as a teacher and used his position to inflict the injuries that precipitated his discharge. The First Amendment does not govern how employers respond to speech that is part of a public employee’s job. How faculty members relate to students is part of their jobs. Speech that concerns personal job-related matters is outside the scope of the First Amendment, even if that speech is not among the job’s duties. View "Wozniak v. Adesida" on Justia Law

Mapes was arrested for trespassing after being refused service at a CVS store. He sued the state, CVS, and several individual defendants asserting a long list of grievances under federal and state law. Mapes asserted the need for pro bono representation based on his poor hearing, social anxiety, a speech disorder, and an unidentified mental disability. The district judge denied Mapes’s request to recruit counsel, dismissed Mapes’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim, and suggested several amendments to the complaint. The judge informed Mapes that his amended complaint “should set forth what happened during the incident and the facts that support his belief that CVS refused to serve him because of his disability.” She explained that Mapes should identify the people who harmed him and describe how they did so. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judge’s refusal to recruit counsel. The inquiry into the plaintiff’s capacity to handle his own case is a practical one, made in light of whatever relevant evidence is available on the question. Mapes demonstrated that he was physically able to file a complaint and mentally able to recall the relevant events. The judge was not required to offer legal guidance. View "Mapes v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Nutmeg LLC, formerly managed by Goulding, served as an investment advisor and sole general partner of more than a dozen investment funds, each a limited partnership under Illinois or Minnesota law. Goulding’s management of the Funds ended in 2009, when the SEC brought an enforcement action against him, Nutmeg, and others under the Investment Advisors Act of 1940, alleging that Nutmeg misappropriated client assets and failed to maintain proper records. The district court found that the SEC made the showing necessary to warrant the issuance of a restraining order prohibiting Goulding from managing the Funds and granted the SEC’s unopposed motion to appoint attorney Weiss as receiver for Nutmeg. Unsatisfied with Weiss’s performance, Goulding and limited partners from certain funds managed by Nutmeg filed an individual and derivative action on behalf of the Funds, alleging breach of fiduciary duty and legal malpractice. The court dismissed the federal securities law claim, claims against Nutmeg, all legal malpractice claims against Weiss and her firm, and two breach of fiduciary duty claims. The Seventh Circuit Affirmed, holding that even when viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs, no reasonable jury could find that either Weiss or her firm willfully and deliberately violated any fiduciary duties. View "Goulding v. Weiss" on Justia Law

Donald and Mary Timm sustained serious injuries in a horrific motorcycle accident. A few months later, they received notice that the helmets they were wearing at the time of the accident were recalled. Believing defects with the motorcycle and its rear tire caused the accident—and that their injuries were especially severe because of a defect with their helmets—the Timms brought a products liability action under Indiana law against defendants involved in the sale and manufacture of the motorcycle, its rear tire, and the helmets. Concluding that the Timms failed to present admissible expert testimony to support their claims, the district court entered summary judgment for the defendants. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Timms did not present any expert testimony to show that, because of a defect with their helmets, their injuries were worse than they otherwise would have experienced in such a severe motorcycle crash. The court rejected the Timms’ claims alleging negligent recall and failure to comply with federal safety standards, concluding that the Indiana Products Liability Act permits neither claim. The court properly excluded expert testimony against Harley-Davidson and Goodyear as lacking the reliability required by Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and “Daubert.” View "Timm v. Goodyear Dunlop Tires North America, Ltd." on Justia Law