Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lockett has been housed at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility since November 2014. He has a significant medical history, having been diagnosed with sickle cell disease, a chronic condition that causes pain, sometimes acutely. During certain periods called sickle cell crises, the pain becomes so severe that it requires immediate emergency medical treatment. Lockett sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 to recover for alleged violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. He alleged that he received inadequate medical care while incarcerated at WSPF and that two prison medical staff members were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the record would not support a jury determination that the WSPF nurse practitioner was deliberately indifferent to Lockett’s needs in prescribing medication. The decision to prescribe non-narcotic pain medication was within the bounds of professional judgment. Lockett did not exhaust his administrative remedies on his claim against a nurse. View "Lockett v. Bonson" on Justia Law

Green was walking through the parking lot of a Chicago gas station. An unmarked police vehicle turned into the lot. Green began to run as the vehicle approached, arousing the suspicion of the four officers inside. One officer chased him on foot and saw him drop and pick up a handgun. Green fled into a residential neighborhood, where another officer caught up with him in the backyard of a home. The officer claims Green began to raise a gun in his direction; the officer fired five shots, wounding Green in the hand and chest. Green denied that he had a gun at any time on the night in question. Green was on probation for a felony drug conviction. A state judge revoked his probation, finding that Green possessed a gun during this encounter. Green sued the officers and the city under 42 U.S.C. 1983. A Fourth Amendment excessive‐force claim against the officer who shot him was submitted to the jury, which returned a verdict for the officer. Green argued that the district judge improperly instructed the jury that the state court’s gun‐possession finding was conclusive. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Green’s excessive‐force claim was premised on his contention that he was unarmed during this encounter but the state judge found that he had a gun; that finding has preclusive effect. View "Green v. Junious" on Justia Law

The named plaintiffs are Hispanic or Latino individuals who applied for employment as line workers at Ford’s Chicago assembly plant but were not hired. Millender is a black Ford employee and the Chairman of the United Auto Workers union for the plant. The plaintiffs allege a conspiracy between Millender, the Harvey unemployment office, and unknown Ford employees, to ensure that the plant predominantly hired black employees to the exclusion of Hispanic and Latino applicants. Millender allegedly believed black employees would be more likely to support him as a union leader. This resulted in a dearth of Hispanic and Latino workers, despite a sizable minority of Hispanic and Latino people in the surrounding area. The complaint alleges line workers at the plant are hired exclusively through the Harvey unemployment office. The district court dismissed the suit for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, holding the claims were not “like or reasonably related to” claims asserted in their EEOC charges. The Seventh Circuit vacated as to Count II; those claims were properly exhausted before the EEOC. Count II describes conduct that is consistent with the conduct described in the charges, alleging a disparate impact upon Hispanic and Latino applicants caused by the skills test, and implicates the same individuals. Count I’s new claims of pre-test discrimination are not included in the EEOC charges and are incongruent with the allegations in the charges. View "Chaidez v. Ford Motor Co." on Justia Law

Barber and Chipps used a crow‐bar to break into Dutchman Hunting Supplies in Shipshewana, Indiana, and steal 15 handguns. They set off the alarm during the robbery and were easily identified by shop employees because they had scouted out Dutchman earlier that day. In addition, Barber discussed the robbery on Facebook Messenger. Barber was indicted on charges of stealing firearms from a federally licensed firearms dealer, possessing firearms as a felon, and possessing stolen firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(u), (g)(1), and (j). Chipps cooperated with the government and testified at trial against Barber. In addition, the government introduced the Facebook messages and cell‐location data for Barber’s phone, placing him near Dutchman at the time of the robbery. The jury convicted him. The court sentenced him to 210 months’ imprisonment, reflecting a two‐level enhancement in his offense level for obstruction of justice based on a message scratched on a courthouse bench: TELL ANTHONY CHIPPS TO THINK B4 H GET ON THERE N LIE. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the admission of the Facebook records, cell‐location data, and a certificate indicating that Dutchman had a firearms license and the application of the obstruction enhancement. The court rejected a Confrontation Clause challenge and an authentication argument View "United States v. Barber" on Justia Law

Indiana statutes provided a fast and confidential judicial bypass procedure that is supposed to allow a small fraction of pregnant, unemancipated minors seeking abortions to obtain them without the consent of or notice to their parents, guardians, or custodians, Ind. Code 16-34-2-4(b). In 2017, Act 404 added a parental notification requirement: Parents must be given prior notice of the planned abortion unless the judge also finds such notice is not in the minor’s “best interests” unlike the judicial bypass of parental consent, which may be based on either maturity or best interests. The district court issued a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the new notice requirements, finding it likely to “create an undue burden for a sufficiently large fraction of mature, abortion-seeking minors in Indiana.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Indiana’s notice law creates a substantial risk of a practical veto over a mature yet unemancipated minor’s right to an abortion. This practical veto appears likely to impose an undue burden for the unemancipated minors who seek to obtain an abortion without parental involvement via the judicial bypass. Indiana has made no effort to support with evidence its claimed justifications or to undermine with evidence Planned Parenthood’s showing about the likely effects of the law. View "Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Indiana Senate Enrolled Act 442, Indiana Code 3-7- 38.2-5(d)–(e), allowed Indiana immediately to remove a voter based on information received from a third-party database rather than in response to direct contact with the voter. The database aggregates voter data from multiple states to identify potential duplicate voter registrations. Act 442 allows Indiana automatically to remove a voter from the rolls if the voter was identified as a database “match” with a certain level of confidence without provision for contacting the voter or confirming her wish permanently to change domicile and cancel her Indiana registration. Organizations challenged Act 442, asserting that it violates the National Voter Registration Act, 52 U.S.C. §§ 20501–11. . Finding that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and that they would suffer irreparable injury if the law were to take effect immediately, the district court issued preliminary injunctions “prohibiting the Defendants from taking any actions to implement [Act 442]” until the cases are concluded. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the plaintiff organizations adequately demonstrated their standing to bring these actions. Indiana equates double registration with double voting. But the two are quite different. Registering to vote in another state is not the same as a request for removal from Indiana’s voting rolls. View "Common Cause Indiana v. Lawson" on Justia Law

Williams, a Racine County Jail pre-trial detainee, suffers from osteoarthritis, for which he has received Social Security disability insurance since 1982. Although the Jail typically provides inmates with a single mattress to sleep on, when the jail places inmates in disciplinary segregation it does not allow them to keep their mattresses in their cells during the daytime hours. Medical staff provided Williams with double mattresses to sleep on as an accommodation for his osteoarthritis and allowed him to keep a single mattress in his cell during the day. Months later, the medical staff concluded that Williams’s medical condition no longer required a second mattress. During the following months, Williams had several disciplinary issues and served time in segregation without a mattress accommodation. The jail staff conducted hearings to evaluate Williams’s write-ups. Williams refused to participate. The jail’s medical staff continued to address Williams’s medical complaints and Williams continued to correspond with officers concerning his grievances. Williams appealed one of the disciplinary determinations. The district court screened Williams’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint and allowed claims alleging retaliation, harassment, conspiracy to fabricate disciplinary tickets, and medical deliberate indifference to proceed but later granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Williams failed to exhaust his administrative remedies. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Williams never made a timely appeal of his grievances; the defendants did not provide him with objectively unreasonable medical care. View "Williams v. Ortiz" on Justia Law

Driveline filed a breach of contract lawsuit against Arctic Cat over a supply contract for specially manufactured goods. Certain counts were resolved against Driveline by summary judgment. After a trial, the district court found that Arctic Cat was liable for $182,234.05; Driveline was liable for $163,481.04 on the Counterclaim; and Arctic Cat was due $27,700.50 in prevailing party attorney’s fees and costs. The court entered judgment for Arctic Cat and against Driveline in the amount of $8,947. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment on one count, finding genuine dispute as to material facts. The relationship between the parties was governed by a mosaic of agreements. Factual issues remained concerning whether Arctic Cat’s delay in payment was or was not a breach and the circumstances surrounding Driveline’s suspension of shipments. View "Driveline Systems, LLC v. Arctic Cat, Inc." on Justia Law

Refined has owned the contaminated Beech Grove, Indiana lead smelter site since 1980 when it acquired it from NL. After years of litigation, Refined entered into a settlement with the federal Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the Indiana Department of Environmental Management (IDEM) in 1998. The 1998 Decree required Refined to close the site, pay a $210,000 fine, and remedy the contamination. EPA and IDEM agreed not to bring suit against Refined on some of their potential claims, effective immediately upon the entry of the Decree. In 2017, Refined sued NL to recoup some of the cleanup costs. The district court found that Refined’s claim was a “contribution action” under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9613(f)(3)(B), subject to a three-year statute of limitations and dismissed the suit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Refined’s argument that its suit was a “cost-recovery” action under CERCLA section 9607(a), and timely under that subsection’s limitations period. The 1998 Decree qualified under section 9613(f)(3)(B), which creates a right to contribution for a party that has “resolved its liability to the United States or a State for some or all of a response action or for some or all of the costs of such action in an administrative or judicially approved settlement” and triggers the limitations period. View "Refined Metals Corp. v. NL Industries Inc." on Justia Law

Rozumalski started out as a water resources engineer at Baird’s Madison, Wisconsin, office in 2010.Rozumalski was sexually harassed by her direct supervisor, Riedel. When Rozumalski reported the harassment to her employer, Baird, the company responded by swiftly investigating the incident and firing Riedel in 2012. Rozumalski claims that Baird dismissed her in 2014 in retaliation for her role in Riedel’s firing, in retaliation for complaining about her supervisor’s continued friendship with Riedel, or as a result of sex discrimination. The district court rejected her claims on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While it may be possible for workplace harassment to haunt a victim’s ability to succeed long after the incident, the facts that Rozumalski has presented do not support a finding of retaliation or of discrimination. The court noted that Rozumalski conceded that the company found her work deficient and that she had been placed on an improvement plan. View "Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & Associates, Ltd." on Justia Law