Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Odei, a Christian pastor in Ghana and a founding member of Spirit of Grace, a U.S. nonprofit religious group, is a Ph.D. candidate in an online educational program sponsored by a Tennessee university. Spirit of Grace invited him to visit the U.S. to participate in religious activities. Odei also planned to speak at churches and youth groups, perform missionary work, and meet his academic advisors. Odei obtained a B-1/B-2 visa from the U.S. Consulate in Ghana. When Odei arrived in Chicago, Customs agents questioned him, determined that his visa was invalid for his intended missionary and academic purposes, found him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(7), and canceled the visa. They did not immediately remove him because he answered “yes” when asked if he feared returning to Ghana. He was held in the McHenry County Jail. A week later Odei dropped his asylum claim. DHS allowed Odei to withdraw his application for admission and return to Ghana. Odei and Spirit sued DHS, citing the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. The judge dismissed, citing 8 U.S.C. 1252(a)(2)(A), which bars judicial review of any “order of removal pursuant to” the expedited removal procedure in 8 U.S.C. 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Although Odei was not subjected to expedited removal, an “order of removal” refers to both an order to remove and an order that an alien is removable. Odei challenged the latter; the jurisdictional bar applies. View "Odei v. United States Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Tracking a fugitive, Deputy Marshal Linder interrogated the fugitive’s father. Another deputy saw Linder punch the father. Linder was indicted for witness tampering and using excessive force and was put on leave. McPherson, the U.S. Marshal for the Northern District of Illinois, instructed other deputies not to communicate with Linder or his lawyers without approval. The indictment was dismissed as a sanction. Linder returned to work. Linder filed a “Bivens action,” against McPherson and a suit against the government under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(b). The district court dismissed all of Linder’s claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed against the government alone. Section 2680(a) provides that the Act does not apply to “[a]ny claim ... based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.” In deciding when federal employees needed permission to talk with Linder or his lawyer, McPherson exercised a discretionary function. The court rejected arguments that the discretionary function exemption does not apply to malicious prosecution suits. “Congress might have chosen to provide financial relief to all persons who are charged with crimes but never convicted. The Federal Tort Claims Act does not do this.” View "Linder v. McPherson" on Justia Law

Chazen was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felony and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), which mandates a minimum 15-year sentence if a defendant unlawfully possesses a firearm and has three prior convictions for a serious drug offense or violent felony, which “has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another” or is “burglary, arson, or extortion.” At the time, the definition included a residual clause, which encompassed any felony that “otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another.” In 2015, the Supreme Court held the residual clause void for vagueness. Chazen has felony convictions under Minnesota law for second-degree assault, second-degree manufacture of a controlled substance, escape from custody, and second-degree burglary. After an unsuccessful appeal and 28 U.S.C. 2255 habeas petition, Chazen sought relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the grant of relief. The government conceded that Chazen’s controlled substances conviction did not qualify as a serious drug offense. Minnesota's burglary statute covers more conduct than generic burglary and does not qualify as an ACCA predicate violent felony. Relief was available under section 2241 because, at the time of Chazen’s 2013 section 2255 petition, precedent foreclosed any contention that his Minnesota burglary convictions did not qualify as violent felony predicates. View "Chazen v. Marske" on Justia Law

Mountain Crest filed suit alleging that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors had conspired to damage Mountain Crest's beer exports in violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act. Mountain Crest also alleged that defendants were enriched unjustly in violation of Wisconsin law. At issue was an agreement in 2000 between two Canadian entities, BRI and LCBO, and another agreement in 2015 between defendants, BRI, LCBO, and the government of Ontario. The district court ruled that the act of state doctrine required dismissal of the federal claims and granted defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).The Seventh Circuit held that the first prong of the act of state doctrine analysis was met because the agreements establishing the six-pack rule were acts of state for the purposes of the doctrine. The court also held that to the extent Mountain Crest attacks the six-pack rule under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, the act of state doctrine was applicable. Furthermore, to the extent Mountain Crest seeks relief under Section 2 of the Sherman Act predicated solely on the six-pack rule, the act of state doctrine clearly precludes the action. However, the Second Amended Complaint also sets out allegations that Anheuser-Busch and Molson Coors, acting through their officers and employees, violated the same provisions of the Sherman Act by conspiring to bring about the Ontario government's approval of the six-pack rule. The court held that these allegations did not implicate the act of state doctrine. The court affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded for the district court to further consider issues it has not addressed. View "Mountain Crest SRL, LLC v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV" on Justia Law

After a creditor in a closed Chapter 7 bankruptcy case tried for a third time to bring a price-fixing claim against BMS, the district court granted BMS's motion to dismiss. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the creditor did not participate in the market for bankruptcy software services in any way that would make it a proper plaintiff to bring an antitrust claim against a firm that provides those services to bankruptcy trustees. Therefore, the creditor's injury was entirely derivative of the estate's injury and merely derivative injuries sustained by creditors of an injured company did not constitute antitrust injury sufficient to confer antitrust standing. View "McGarry & McGarry, LLC v. Bankruptcy Management Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

Khan construed a lawsuit concerning a traffic accident as “senseless provocation”; believed “noise pollution around [his] house” to be “organized persecution,” for which he promised retaliation; and believed Mayor Emanuel “doomed Chicago.” In Facebook posts, Khan threatened to “kill,” “shoot,” “hunt,” “murder,” and “put bullets in” college students, “vulnerable individuals,” people walking dogs, “high net worth individual[s],” and witnesses that “get [in] the way.” He claimed a specific Chicago neighborhood as his “free kill zone,” planned to “purchase a [G]o[P]ro camera, ... record the killings, and upload them.” Khan drove for Uber and posted messages about “dry run[s]” and carrying a loaded gun during shifts for “necessary murders.” He posted photos of himself holding those guns and “sw[ore] to Allah ... that I will ... murder in the next 30 days, which corresponded to Khan's plan to fly to Pakistan.Khan was indicted for making interstate threats to injure others, 18 U.S.C. 875(c). The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, rejecting challenges to the indictment and the sufficiency of the evidence. The district court was not required to instruct the jury that it must find that Khan intended to communicate a threat; that the intended victim received it; and that it caused the victim to feel threatened. The court properly refused to suppress evidence of a gun found in Khan’s car and to suppress other evidence on the theory that the government did not produce evidence of an anonymous tip. View "United States v. Khan" on Justia Law

Johnson suffers from mental ailments, including paranoid schizophrenia, major depressive disorder recurrent, obsessive-compulsive disorder, and borderline personality disorder. Starting in mid-2011, he had been admitted intermittently to Milwaukee County Medical Health Complex (MHC) for treatment. During one stay, on March 18, 2012, Johnson substantially harmed himself, leading to this present suit. Johnson brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that constitutionally inadequate medical care led to his self-mutilation. Johnson included “Monell” claims that the institutional defendants maintained unconstitutional policies, procedures, and customs that caused his injuries and claimed that defendants engaged in a conspiracy to cover up the constitutionally inadequate care. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of all defendants. While Johnson’s medical condition was objectively serious and the doctor knew of his condition, no reasonable fact-finder could find that the doctor’s decision to remove him from observation was outside the bounds of a competent medical professional’s judgment. The fact that one of three nurses may have left scissors in Johnson’s bathroom is not enough to establish individual liability. View "Johnson v. Rimmer" on Justia Law

In 1996, Haynes robbed six stores at gunpoint. Three robberies were in Illinois and three were in Iowa. Haynes was charged with the Illinois robberies under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951. For each robbery, Haynes also was charged with a count under 18 U.S.C. 924(c) for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence. The Iowa robberies were charged under section 1952(a)(2), which makes it a crime to travel in interstate commerce with the intent to commit a crime of violence and then to attempt or carry out a crime of violence. The indictment alleged that Haynes accomplished each 1952 violation “by committing the offense of robbery” under section 1951; each charge had a corresponding 924(c) firearm charge. Convicted on all counts, Haynes was sentenced to life in prison for each robbery based on 18 U.S.C. 3559(c)(1) because he had two prior Illinois burglary convictions that were treated as “serious violent felonies.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed Haynes’ section 924(c) convictions because the indictment and jury instructions, taken together, required jurors to find each element of the Hobbs Act robberies—crimes of violence—at the center of the nested charging scheme with section 1951 inside section 1952(a)(2) inside section 924(c). Haynes unsuccessfully argued that section 1952(a)(2) was not “divisible” and that the jury did not necessarily find him guilty of the underlying Hobbs Act robberies. View "United States v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Cobb, an Indiana prisoner, brought a state-court negligence action against Aramark for failing to clean up a spill in the kitchen at the Pendleton Correctional Facility on December 15, 2014, causing him to slip and fracture his ankle. Cobb claims, and the counselor affirmed, that on December 9, 2016, he handed his notarized complaint to a prison counselor, who delivered this complaint to the mailroom on the same day. The complaint was not actually mailed until December 19. Aramark removed the case to federal court, then asserted that the complaint was untimely under Indiana’s two-year limitations period; the district court agreed. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court misinterpreted Indiana’s prison mailbox rule. The complaint should be deemed “filed” under the prison mailbox rule on the date he handed it to his counselor for mailing. The Indiana Supreme Court has held that a court shall deem a court filing timely if a pro se prisoner litigant submits the filing to prison officials for mailing on or before its due date, and the prisoner “provide[s] reasonable, legitimate, and verifiable documentation supporting a claim that a document was timely submitted to prison officials for mailing.” View "Cobb v. Aramark Correctional Services LLC" on Justia Law

Cook County residents brought a Second Amendment challenge to Cook County’s ban on assault rifles and large-capacity magazines. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, noting that in 2015 it upheld a materially indistinguishable ordinance against a Second Amendment challenge. The court rejected an argument that its precedent was wrongly decided and that this claim should be evaluated under a test that tracks more closely the language that the Supreme Court employed in its 2008 Heller decision. View "Wilson v. Cook County" on Justia Law