Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shell began working at Chicago’s Corwith Rail Yard in 1977. By 2010, BSNF owned Corwith Yard; Shell worked for BNSF's contractor. BNSF assumed the railyard’s operations itself, terminating the employment of those who worked for the contractor. BNSF invited those employees to apply for new positions. Shell applied to work as an intermodal equipment operator, a “safety-sensitive” position, which required the employee to climb on railcars to insert and remove locking devices, drive trucks that move trailers, and operate cranes to load and unload containers. BNSF extended a conditional offer of employment, requiring that Shell pass a medical evaluation. Shell had a body-mass index of 47.5. BNSF does not hire applicants for safety-sensitive positions if their BMI is 40 or greater (class III obesity). BNSF believes that someone with class III obesity could unexpectedly experience a debilitating health episode and lose consciousness while operating dangerous equipment. BNSF informed Shell of his disqualification but told him that his application could be reconsidered if he lost at least 10% of his weight and maintained the weight loss for at least six months. Shell sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court denied BNSF’s motion for summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. With only proof that BNSF refused to hire him because of a fear that he would develop an impairment, Shell has not established that BNSF regarded him as having a disability or that he is otherwise disabled. View "Shell v. Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway Co." on Justia Law

Lewis, a Wisconsin prisoner, filed suit, alleging violations of his Eighth Amendment rights. The Seventh Circuit vacated summary judgment, finding that a reasonable jury could find that a nurse and a correctional officer acted with deliberate indifference by delaying medical attention for Lewis’s painful back condition. The court suggested that, on remand, the district court should consider whether to reinstate Lewis’s state-law medical malpractice claim against the nurse. On remand, Lewis went to trial, represented by recruited counsel. The jury found for the defendants. Lewis immediately moved, pro se, to set aside the verdict and for a new trial. The district court, construing Lewis’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(a), denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that there is a rational basis for the jury’s decision and that the district court committed no error warranting further proceedings. The court rejected arguments that Lewis received ineffective assistance of counsel and that the trial was unfair. View "Lewis v. McLean" on Justia Law

Yama Seiki, a California manufacturer of machine tools, sent PMT, a Wisconsin corporation, an exclusive letter of dealership, requiring sales of $1,000,000 or 15 machines in a year and stocking one machine on PMT’s showroom floor. PMT rejected the letter, believing it could not reach the sales requirements. Weeks later, PMT offered to take stock of two machines in exchange for an exclusive-dealer agreement. PMT responded with an application for dealership status and a proposal to negotiate further. Wang, a Yama Seiki manager with whom PMT had negotiated, did not address the offer but responded that he was “not sure if you are aware that you are in ‘exclusive’ status.” PMT never took stock of any machines, but it facilitated sales by soliciting customers, negotiating prices, and connecting customers with Yama Seiki,j who paid Yama Seiki under its usual sales terms. PMT was responsible for installation and warranty work. In 2015-2018, PMT derived 74% of its profits from Yama Seiki sales. More than a year after Wang's “exclusive status” statement, PMT discovered that others were selling Yama Seiki machines in Wisconsin. PMT sued, alleging violations of Wisconsin’s Fair Dealership Law. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Yama Seiki. PMT failed to show that it had any dealership agreement with Yama Seiki, much less an exclusive one. PMT never stocked any of its products, collected money for sales, or made more than de minimis use of Yama Seiki’s logos. View "PMT Machinery Sales, Inc. v. Yama Seiki USA, Inc." on Justia Law

Groves, an accountant, allegedly organized, sold, and promoted abusive tax shelters related to distressed Chinese debts in 2005. The IRS assessed a tax penalty against him ten years later. Groves argued that the catch‐all five-year statute of limitations for civil penalties, 28 U.S.C. 2462, applied. The district court struck Groves’s statute‐of‐limitations defense and denied Groves’s motion for judgment on the pleadings and certified the orders for interlocutory review; 28 U.S.C. 1292(b) also required him to seek permission from the Seventh Circuit within ten days. He attempted to obtain that permission on August 18th, the tenth day after the certification order, by emailing an application to appeal. A paralegal mistyped the email address. The email was not delivered. An automated message noting the failure, sent to the paralegal within minutes, landed in a spam folder. The paralegal discovered that notification on Sunday, August 20th, and emailed the application to the correct address. On August 21st, Groves asked the district court to recertify its orders to restart the ten-day clock. The court entered an identical second order. Groves refiled his application the next day. The Seventh Circuit ultimately dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Recent Supreme Court cases have emphasized that federal courts have no authority to read equitable exceptions into fixed filing deadlines. District courts cannot extend the ten‐day window by simply reentering or recertifying their orders. View "Groves v. United States" on Justia Law

The Union and the NECA Electrical Contractors Association entered into a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) providing health, welfare, and pension benefits for union workers. The Funds operate as trusts for these benefits. Employers, who are members of NECA, self-report the benefits they owe. Veterans Electric participated in NECA, assented to the CBA, and contributed to the Funds for its union employees. The Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(g), governs benefit plans between labor unions and multiemployer associations. The Funds attempted to audit Veterans’ payroll records. Veterans only provided records for union employees, which accounted for about half of the total reported wages. The Funds requested payroll information for non-union employees. Veterans refused, contending that the records were outside the scope of a proper audit under the CBA. The Funds filed suit. During discovery, Veterans provided the additional payroll information. The district court granted Veterans summary judgment, limiting the scope of the trustees’ audit authority. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Under the CBA, the trustees’ authority to audit payroll records includes “all employees regardless of membership or non-membership in the Union.” In light of the ERISA fiduciary duties imposed on union trustees and the authority under the Trust Agreements, the Funds had the right to conduct random audits on employer payroll records. View "Electrical Construction Industry Prefunding Credit Reimbursement Program v. Veterans Electric, LLC" on Justia Law

Atwood pleaded guilty to federal drug crimes. The presentencing report calculated a Guidelines range of 188-235 months. Judge Bruce sentenced Atwood to 210 months’ imprisonment, citing the 3553(a) factors and stating, "if I have made a mistake in the guideline calculations … my sentence would still be the same.” It later became known that while Atwood’s case was pending, Judge Bruce engaged in extensive ex parte communication with the U.S. Attorney’s Office about other cases. Bruce had been a federal prosecutor at that Office before his appointment to the judiciary. A newspaper exposed that communication and published emails. Judge Bruce was removed from cases involving the Office. The ex parte communications never explicitly mentioned Atwood’s case. The Seventh Circuit Judicial Council found no evidence that Bruce’s improper communications actually affected his decision in any case but stated that his actions violated the Code of Conduct. Bruce remained unassigned to any case involving the Office until September 2019. The Seventh Circuit vacated Atwood’s sentence and remanded for resentencing by a different judge. The federal recusal statute, 28 U.S.C. 455(a), requires a judge to recuse himself from any proceeding in which his impartiality may reasonably be questioned. The disclosure of the ex parte correspondence invited doubt about Bruce's impartiality in proceedings involving the Office. Because of the judge’s broad discretion in sentencing, Bruce’s failure to recuse himself was not harmless error. View "United States v. Atwood" on Justia Law

Daza worked for the Indiana Department of Transportation (INDOT) as a geologist for 23 years. In 2011, Daza expressed concerns that another employee was denied promotion because of his political affiliation. In 2013, Daza complained about a commissioner’s misuse of political office. About a month later Daza received his first reprimand, for refusing to answer calls after hours. In 2014, he again complained about the treatment of another employee. A supervisor complained about Daza’s “professionalism.” Daza had multiple disagreements with supervisors and was ultimately terminated “because his behavior consistently defied INDOT culture and expectations.” Daza filed suit, alleging that his firing was unlawful. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, rejecting claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 that alleged violation of Daza’s First Amendment rights by discriminating and retaliating against him for his political activities and affiliation. Daza presented a long string of facts occurring over four years but presented no evidence that his alleged political activities or affiliation motivated his firing. The evidence actually shows that management had taken issue with Daza’s conduct for years, and the decision to fire him was made after his offensive comments during a training session. View "Daza v. Indiana" on Justia Law

Kimbrough dated the mother of daughters, ages five and seven, who eventually revealed Kimbrough had molested them for two years. Kimbrough was convicted and sentenced to 80 years’ imprisonment. The judge considered Kimbrough’s lack of criminal history and Kimbrough’s abuse of a position of trust. Kimbrough's counsel argued the court abused its discretion in imposing that sentence but never challenged his sentence under Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B), which allows the court to revise a sentence that "is inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” A split panel of the Indiana Court of Appeals sua sponte reduced his sentence under Rule 7(B). The Indiana Supreme Court vacated, holding Rule 7(B) should not have been invoked sua sponte. Kimbrough then sought post-conviction relief, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to challenge the sentence under Rule 7(B). The trial court and Indiana Court of Appeals denied relief, stating: “Kimbrough has not established that there is a reasonable probability that, if appellate counsel had made a Rule 7(B) challenge, the result ... would have been different.” Granting Kimbrough’s petition for federal habeas relief, the district court found that because panels of the Indiana Court of Appeals reached opposite conclusions, Kimbrough necessarily had a reasonable probability of success and had satisfied Strickland’s prejudice prong. The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that a federal court considering a 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) habeas petition cannot disagree with a state court’s resolution of a state law issue. View "Kimbrough v. Neal" on Justia Law

States may provide certain home-based services through Medicaid's Home and Community Based Waiver program, 42 U.S.C. 1396n(c). Illinois operates a waiver under which it contracts with non-profit organizations (ISCs) to provide case management services for adults with developmental disabilities receiving home- and community-based services as part of Medicaid. Illinois awarded 17 ISC contracts through a non-competitive, annual renewal process. The plaintiffs had received contracts for at least 25 years. In 2018, the state announced a new competitive bidding process to begin on July 1, 2019. The plaintiffs submitted bids but learned in January that their contracts would not be renewed. They sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violations of Medicaid’s free-choice-of-provider provision, 42 U.S.C. 1396a(a)(23). On June 5, 2019, with new contracts to go into effect in less than 30 days, they sought a preliminary injunction. The district court denied their motion on June 25, reasoning that ISCs were not “qualified providers” under the statute. The plaintiffs appealed that same day. Four days later, they sought emergency injunctive relief pending appeal, which the Seventh Circuit denied. Months later, at oral argument, plaintiffs’ counsel acknowledged that vacating the new contracts would be too disruptive. The Seventh Circuit dismissed the appeal. With the plaintiffs no longer challenging the denial of their preliminary injunction, it is unnecessary to address the meaning of “qualified providers” or determine what kinds of services the plaintiffs provide. The passage of time has rendered the issue moot. View "Western Illinois Service Coordination v. Illinois Department of Human Services" on Justia Law

Haldorson, a fireworks enthusiast and a drug dealer, was arrested on his way to a second controlled buy. Along with drugs, officers found three pipe bombs in his car. He was charged with several counts related to drugs, explosives, and a firearm. Haldorson unsuccessfully moved to suppress evidence and was convicted on four counts of the seven-count indictment: distribution of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession with intent to distribute cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1); possession of MDMA, or ecstasy, and cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 844(a); and possession of an explosive during the commission of a felony, 21 U.S.C. 844(h)(2). The court vacated Count Three because it was a lesser-included offense of Count Two and sentenced Haldorson to 192 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, upholding the denial of the motions to suppress. Probable cause, based on the controlled buy three weeks earlier, supported the arrest and exigent circumstances existed for the warrantless search of his bedroom. There was a legitimate concern that other homemade explosive devices were in Haldorson’s bedroom and were dangerous to others. The jury instructions did not constructively amend the indictment for unlawfully carrying an explosive and permit the jury to convict him on a broader basis than charged. View "United States v. Haldorson" on Justia Law