Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Dancel sued, alleging Groupon had used her photograph to promote a restaurant voucher. Groupon had collected the photograph from Dancel’s public Instagram account based on data linking it to the restaurant’s location. She sought damages under the Illinois Right of Publicity Act (IRPA) on behalf of a class of Illinois residents whose Instagram photographs have appeared on a Groupon offer. The parties litigated in state court until Dancel moved to certify a class of “[a]ll persons who maintained an Instagram Account and whose photograph ... was ... acquired and used on a groupon.com webpage for an Illinois business.” The class was not defined by its members’ residency. Groupon filed a notice of removal under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1453. The district court denied remand and denied class certification. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of class certification. IRPA requires more with respect to the plaintiff’s identity than an Instagram username It demands that an attribute, even a name, serve to identify the individual whose identity is being appropriated. This individualized evidentiary burden prevents identity from being a predominating common question under Rule 23(b)(3). View "Dancel v. Groupon, Inc." on Justia Law

A group of students who worked part-time for the University of Chicago Libraries wanted to collectively bargain with their university employer. The University believed the student group was ineligible for collective bargaining under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 157, and wanted to introduce evidence to support this argument at a hearing before the National Labor Relations Board. The evidence was intended to support its claim that the students are temporary employees who do not manifest an interest in their employment terms and conditions that is sufficient to warrant collective-bargaining representation. The Board determined that the University’s proposed evidence would not sustain the University’s position that the students were ineligible for collective bargaining and did not admit the University’s evidence. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition for enforcement of the Board’s order requiring the University to bargain with the group. The Board’s refusal to admit the University’s evidence was not an abuse of discretion and did not violate the University’s due process rights. Under prevailing Board law, short-term student employees may collectively bargain; the Board was not obliged to receive evidence to support a position that is unsustainable under prevailing Board law. View "University of Chicago v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

Johnson showed up drunk for an appointment at a rehab clinic and threatened a therapist and the security guard. Police officers arrested and handcuffed Johnson behind his back. He told them that he would run away; they sat him on the pavement next to a patrol car. Subsequent events were captured on video. Johnson managed to stand. The officers walked him backward and sat him on the grass. They returned to their cars to do paperwork. In about a minute Johnson got to his knees and stood again. He started to move away, shouting threats and racial taunts. Officer Rogers pulled Johnson backward by his cuffed hands. When that did not return him to the ground, Rogers claims he used a leg sweep. Johnson contends that his fall and compound leg fracture resulted from a kick designed to punish him rather than to return him to a sitting position. The grainy video does not enable a viewer to distinguish these possibilities. The district court rejected his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Rogers is entitled to qualified immunity. Johnson, who had told the officers that he wanted to run away, was not under control. That an attempt to regain control caused injury, perhaps because poorly executed, does not lead to liability. The excessive-force inquiry is objective. If the force used was objectively allowable, the officer’s state of mind cannot make it unconstitutional. View "Johnson v. Rogers" on Justia Law

Under the Illinois Election Code, individuals may contribute up to $5,000 to a political campaign; corporations, unions, and associations may donate up to $10,000; and political action committees may provide up to $50,000. Illinois lifts its contribution limits if a candidate’s self-funding exceeds $250,000 in a race for statewide office or $100,000 in any other race, or if spending by an independent expenditure committee or individual exceeds either of these limits, 10 ILCS 5/9-8.5(h). Independent expenditures are any payment, gift, donation, or expenditure of funds, used for the purpose of making electioneering communications or for advocating in support of or against a candidate, and not made in coordination with a campaign. Before making political expenditures exceeding $3,000 in a 12-month period, the Code requires any entity (not an individual) to register; a registered independent expenditure committee may accept unlimited contributions from any source, provided the committee does not make contributions to any candidate, political party committee, or PAC. Independent expenditure committees may never contribute to candidates, even when contribution limits are lifted. An independent expenditure committee challenged the ban only with respect to when unlimited contributions and unlimited coordinated expenditures are allowed for others. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, rejecting claims of violations of the First Amendment rights of free speech and free association and the right of equal protection. The ban is closely drawn to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption. View "Proft v. Raoul" on Justia Law

Burciaga lost his job and filed for bankruptcy a week later. On the date the bankruptcy proceeding began, Burciaga’s former employer owed him approximately $24,000 for unused vacation time. Illinois treats vacation pay as a form of wages. Exemptions for debtors in Illinois rest on state law, 11 U.S.C. 522(b)(2). Burciaga asked the district court to treat 85% of the vacation pay as exempt from creditors’ claims. Illinois permits creditors to reach 15% of unpaid wages but forbids debt collection from the rest. The Chapter 7 Trustee, objected. The bankruptcy judge and district court sided with the Trustee. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding nothing ambiguous about Illinois law or section 522(b)(2) and (3)(A); 85% of unpaid wages are exempt from creditors’ claims in Illinois, and vacation pay is a form of wages. View "Burciaga v. Moglia" on Justia Law

Years of heavy industrial use at Wisconsin's Badger Army Ammunition Plant contaminated the soil and groundwater with asbestos, lead paint, PCBs, and oil. Operations ceased in 1975. Remediation has yielded thousands of acres suitable for recreational use. The National Park Service donated 3,000 acres to the Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources. An environmental group sued to halt three activities at the Sauk Prairie Recreation Area: dog training for hunting, off-road motorcycle riding, and helicopter drills by the Wisconsin National Guard citing the Property and Administrative Services Act, which controls deeds issued through the Federal Land to Parks Program, 40 U.S.C. 550. The Act requires the government to enforce the terms of its deeds and that the land be used for recreational purposes. The relevant deeds require that Wisconsin use the park for its originally intended purposes. Dog training and motorcycle riding were not mentioned in Wisconsin’s initial application. The group also argued that the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321, required an environmental impact statement.The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment. Dog training and off-road motorcycle riding were not mentioned in the application, but are recreational uses. While helicopter training is not recreational, the Service included an explicit deed provision reserving the right to continue the flights, as authorized by the Property Act. The Service reasonably concluded that its approval of dog training and motorcycle riding fell within a NEPA categorical exclusion for minor amendments to an existing plan. The Service was not required to prepare an environmental impact statement for helicopter training because it had no authority to discontinue the flights. View "Sauk Prairie Conservation Alliance v. United States Department of the Interior" on Justia Law

Trumpf, the U.S. subsidiary of an international business, hired Lynch to handle Trumpf’s appearance at a Chicago trade show. Lynch subcontracted with CSI for some of the services. CSI claims that it told Trumpf that it was unsure of Lynch’s reliability and that Trumpf agreed to pay CSI directly or guarantee the payment. There was no written agreement between Trumpf and CSI. Lynch did not pay CSI, which claimed $530,000 in Lynch’s ensuing bankruptcy. CSI also sued Trumpf, asserting promissory estoppel and unjust enrichment. The district court dismissed, reasoning that CSI was estopped, as a result of its bankruptcy claim, from suing Trumpf. The Seventh Circuit reversed, reasoning that Lynch has not prevailed on that claim and that the claim is not inconsistent with Trumpf guaranteeing payment. Filing a claim in bankruptcy does not foreclose claims against non-bankrupt obligors, 11 U.S.C. 524(e). View "CSI Worldwide, LLC v. Trumpf, Inc." on Justia Law

Two non-competing Midwestern companies operated by brothers used marks containing the family name, Fabick. The owner of the registered mark (FI), a small manufacturer of sealants, sued JFTCO, a larger distributor of Caterpillar equipment, for trademark infringement. A jury found that JFTCO had violated the Lanham Act but had not committed common law infringement. The district court entered limited injunctive relief requiring that JFTCO issue, for five years, disclaimers clarifying that it is not associated with FI. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting FI’s claim that it was entitled to a broad permanent injunction and should have been allowed to recover JFTCO’s profits, lacking evidence that the defendants were unjustly enriched by consumers assuming that Fabick’s sealants and coatings business is the same or related to JFTCO’s business. The court also rejected JFTCO’s challenged to a jury instruction: “[D]efendant JFTCO used the FABICK mark in a manner that is likely to cause confusion as to the source or origin of plaintiff’s product or that plaintiff has somehow become connected to JFTCO.” When read in context, the language regarding whether “plaintiff has somehow become connected to JFTCO” clearly refers to the parties’ products and/or services, and is not impermissibly vague. View "Fabick, Inc. v. JFTCO, Inc." on Justia Law

Each plaintiff purchased an opaque, seven-ounce box of Fannie May chocolates for $9.99 plus tax. Although the boxes accurately disclosed the weight of the chocolate within and the number of pieces, the boxes were emptier than each had expected. A box of Mint Meltaways contained approximately 33% empty space, and a box of Pixies contained approximately 38% empty space. The plaintiffs filed a putative class action, alleging violations of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act and asserting claims for unjust enrichment and breach of implied contract. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the case. The court rejected the district court’s reasoning that the claims were preempted by the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C 301–399, but reasoned that the Illinois Act requires proof of actual damage. The plaintiffs never said that the chocolates they received were worth less than the $9.99 they paid for them, or that they could have obtained a better price elsewhere. That is fatal to their effort to show a pecuniary loss. The receipts embody the contract between the parties. State law does not recognize an implied contract in this situation View "Benson v. Fannie May Confections Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

Edwards pleaded guilty to failing to register as a sex offender under the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act, 18 U.S.C. 2250 (SORNA). It was his fourth conviction for a failure to register a change of address as required by state and federal statutes. The district court ordered him to serve a prison term of 27 months and imposed three conditions on his supervised release: a requirement that, as required by his probation officer, he inform employers, neighbors and family members with children, and others of his criminal record, his obligation to register as a sex offender, and other SORNA requirements; a ban on meeting, spending time with, or communicating with any minor absent the express permission of the minor’s parent or guardian and the probation officer; and a bar on working in any job or participating any volunteer activity in which he would have access to minors, absent prior approval of his probation officer. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conditions. Although Edwards has never committed a “hands‐on” sexual offense against a child, the district court expressly considered that point and articulated a reasonable basis to believe that such restrictions were warranted. Edwards has possessed and distributed child pornography, including pornography depicting adults having sex with minors. The court noted his enduring sexual interest in children and his pattern of deception and non‐compliance with the conditions of his release. View "United States v. Edwards" on Justia Law