Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Lett worked as an investigator for Chicago’s Civilian Office of Police Accountability. In 2016, Lett was investigating police involvement in a particular civilian shooting. The Chief Administrator, Fairley, directed Lett to include in the report a finding that police officers had planted a gun on the shooting victim. Lett refused because he did not believe that the evidence supported that finding. Lett raised his concerns with Fairley’s deputy, who spoke with Fairley. Soon after, Lett was removed from his investigative team, then removed from investigative work, and ultimately assigned to janitorial duties. Fairley opened an internal investigation that concluded that Lett had violated the office’s confidentiality policy. Fairley ordered that Lett be fired. Lett initiated a grievance through his union. The arbitrator ordered the office to reinstate Lett with back pay and to expunge his record. Fairley immediately placed Lett on administrative leave with pay. Lett was assigned on paper to the Police Department’s FOIA office but was not allowed to return to work. Lett sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation for his refusal to write a false report and Monell liability for the city and Fairley in her official capacity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims. Lett spoke pursuant to his official duties and not as a private citizen when he refused to alter the report; the First Amendment does not apply. View "Lett v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The Chicago Police Department (CPD) periodically administered an examination for sergeants seeking promotion to lieutenant. While the CPD retained discretion over whom to promote, those who scored highest on the exam were generally first in line. Word has served with the CPD since 2001. When he took the exam in 2006, he was ranked 150th. The sergeants ranked 1-149 received promotions; Word was the highest-scoring sergeant who did not. In 2015, when Word next took the exam, his ranking fell to 280th. He was passed over. Word alleges that three senior CPD leaders each had “wives or paramours” who were sergeants who took the 2015 exam and then received promotions. Word alleges that one defendant had early access to the exam and provided test content to the wives and paramours. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit, which alleged violations of equal protection and due process under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and breach of contract. While Illinois law prohibits “wilfully or corruptly furnish[ing] to any person any special or secret information,” there is no property interest in any municipal promotional process. Class-of-one equal protection claims are barred in the public employment context. Word’s s theory does not amount to gender discrimination. There was no contract and Word has not plausibly alleged that the city and exam administrator intended to confer legally enforceable rights on the test takers. View "Word v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Barnes works in facilities management at UIC, reporting to Donovan. UIC hired Barnes in 2008 as an operating engineer and later promoted him to assistant chief engineer. In 2015, a chief engineer retired. UIC identified 11 candidates, including Barnes, who received one of the top-three exam scores and met the minimum qualifications. Barnes and another candidate were African-American; nine candidates were white. Donavan interviewed the candidates without looking at personnel files or performance evaluations. Donovan selected Civito. Civito and Barnes both have several decades of education and relevant experience. Donovan had interviewed Barnes for 15-30 minutes. Barnes did not bring anything with him to the interview, nor had he been asked to. Donovan interviewed Civito for about 20 minutes. Civito, unprompted, brought written materials including his résumé, a letter of reference, a proposal to solve problems with a UIC building, and training items he developed. Barnes sued, alleging that UIC had a practice of not promoting African-Americans to the chief engineer level. Barnes learned during discovery that in performance reviews by the same supervisor, he had received a higher score than Civito. Donovan claimed that he selected Civito because he came to his interview fully prepared,, articulated the most thoughtful approach to the position and demonstrated a commitment to professional development. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Barnes lacked sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of discrimination or to allow the inference that the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason offered for hiring Civito was pretextual. View "Barnes v. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois" on Justia Law

Chicago officers Valadez and Reyes, in an unmarked police car patrolling a neighborhood where a gang-related shooting had recently occurred, saw a passenger in Cruz’s Chevy Tahoe fire gunshots at the occupants of another car. Cruz sped away. The officers followed Cruz’s Tahoe, which had dark, tinted windows, but did not activate emergency lights or sirens. Cruz turned and struck a parked car, pushing it forward into a second car, which rolled into a third. Cruz kept driving before crashing into another car and coming to a stop. The officers parked behind Cruz’s Tahoe, believing that it had stalled. Valadez began getting out of the car, announcing that he was a police officer. Cruz put his Tahoe into reverse, striking the police car, then pulled forward into a parking lot. The officers followed on foot, wearing bulletproof vests that displayed the police star. The parking lot was “pretty well lit.” Cruz’s passenger testified that he knew that Valadez was an officer because he could see Valadez’s vest. Cruz did not stop but turned back toward the exit. Cruz’s headlights shone directly at the officers, who opened fire. Cruz died as a result of a gunshot wound. Approximately 90 seconds elapsed from the initial shots until Cruz was shot; roughly 16 seconds elapsed during the encounter in the parking lot. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The officers acted reasonably in using deadly force to protect others in the vicinity by preventing Cruz's escape. View "Ybarra v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Simental-Galarza unlawfully entered the U.S. in 2001. He married a U.S. citizen in 2013; they divorced three years later. Simental-Galarza was charged as removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), for having entered and remained without lawful admission. Simental-Galarza sought cancellation of removal as a battered spouse under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b)(2), alleging that his removal would result in extreme hardship. He offered evidence of physical, verbal, and psychological abuse and that the abuse left him depressed. His sister-in-law confirmed that since the divorce, Simental-Galarza rarely talked, never laughed, and did not trust people. A licensed clinical social worker diagnosed him with anxiety, severe depression, PTSD, and dependent personality disorder and advised that he continue therapy in a stable, supportive environment. His parents are deceased and five siblings live here. He has steady work. His sister-in-law predicted that if Simental-Galarza were removed, he would “shut down” and that Mexico did not have the mental health resources that are available here. The IJ rejected his claim. The BIA dismissed Simental-Galarza’s appeal, finding that he had not shown that he could not obtain work in Mexico and that, although Mexico can be violent, Simental-Galarza had not shown that he would personally face violence or “that he could not obtain treatment for his anxiety and depression.” The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. The IJ and BIA adequately evaluated the relevant factors and evidence. View "Simental-Galarza v. Barr" on Justia Law

Garcia‐Arce, a citizen of Mexico, was removed from the U.S. and illegally re‐entered. She was arrested for driving under the influence; her removal order was reinstated. Garcia‐Arce sought withholding of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1231(b)(3), and the Convention Against Torture (CAT), based on her purported fear of persecution and torture. Garcia‐Arce testified that in her hometown she was sexually assaulted by her uncle and by a gang member to whom her brother “sold her.” An IJ noted that Garcia‐Arce presented a fake birth certificate at the border, made statements that she did not fear returning to Mexico, could avoid persecution by relocating within Mexico, and had not alleged that a Mexican official had acquiesced or would acquiesce in any torture. The BIA affirmed. Garcia‐Arce moved to reopen based on her attorney’s allegedly ineffective assistance in not properly advancing Garcia‐Arce’s claim that she would be persecuted upon return to Mexico as a result of her alleged mental illness and her CAT claim based on Mexican drug cartels and corrupt law enforcement. The BIA concluded that it was reasonable for the attorney to focus on Garcia‐Arce’s past mistreatment rather than on her mental health and that Garcia‐Arce had not shown that she suffered prejudice. The Seventh Circuit denied petitions for review. The denial of Garcia‐Arce’s withholding application was supported by substantial evidence. Garcia‐Arce’s counsel’s assistance was not so deficient that Garcia‐Arce was prevented from reasonably presenting her case. View "Garcia-Arce v. Barr" on Justia Law

Dennis fell behind on his debt to Washington Mutual Bank. LVNV bought the debt and Niagara Credit sent a form collection letter on LVNV’s behalf, stating: “Your account was placed with our collection agency” and that Niagara’s “client” had authorized it to offer a payment plan or a settlement of the debt in full. The letter identifies Washington Mutual as the “original creditor” and LVNV as the “current creditor.” It lists the principal and interest balances of the debt and the last four digits of the account number. Dennis filed a putative class action complaint, claiming violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by “fail[ing] to identify clearly and effectively the name of the creditor to whom the debt was owed,” 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(2). The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of the suit on the pleadings, rejecting an argument that listing two entities as “creditor” then stating that Niagara was authorized to make settlement offers on behalf of an unknown client could likely confuse consumers. The defendants’ letter expressly identifies LVNV as the current creditor and meets the Act’s requirement of a written notice containing “the name of the creditor to whom the debt is owed.” An unsophisticated consumer will understand that his debt has been purchased by the current creditor; the letter is not abusive or unfair. Section 1692(g)(a)(2) does not require a detailed explanation of the transactions leading to the debt collector’s notice. View "Dennis v. Niagara Credit Solutions, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2006, Allgire was charged with multiple drug-related offenses. He pleaded guilty to two charges and served concurrent terms of 233 months and 120 months. Allgire then began serving concurrent supervised release terms but violated the conditions and was sentenced to seven months’ reimprisonment or, alternatively, up to six months in a halfway house, plus another 24 months’ supervised release. A month into his time at a halfway house, Allgire absconded and spent seven months on the run. The guidelines range for his violation was five to 11 months. The district court felt that Allgire had taken advantage of the court’s previous leniency, having been given a 53-month reduction for cooperating with the government in his initial sentence, and time in a halfway house rather than in prison. The court sentenced Allgire to 24 months’ imprisonment for violating the terms of supervised release on one count of his conviction and 17 months’ imprisonment on the other, to run concurrently. The parties agreed that any additional supervised release would be futile. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the 24-month sentence was unreasonable and that the district court lacked authority to impose a concurrent 17-month sentence. The district court “ably explained its decision to vary upward from the guidelines range.” View "United Statesx v. Allgire" on Justia Law

The Drug Enforcement Administration investigated Dr. Ley and his opioid addiction treatment company, DORN, conducted undercover surveillance, and decided Ley did not have a legitimate medical purpose in prescribing Suboxone. Indiana courts issued warrants, culminating in arrests of four physicians and one nurse and seven non-provider DORN employees. Indiana courts dismissed the charges against the non-providers and the nurse. Ley was acquitted; the state dismissed the charges against the remaining providers. DORN’s providers and non-provider employees sued, alleging false arrest, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy. The district court entered summary judgment for the defendants, holding probable cause supported the warrants at issue. The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to every plaintiff except Mackey, a part-time parking lot attendant. One of Ley’s former patients died and that individual’s family expressed concerns about Ley; other doctors voiced concerns, accusing Ley of prescribing Suboxone for pain to avoid the 100-patient limit and bring in more revenue. At least one pharmacy refused to fill DORN prescriptions. Former patients reported that they received their prescriptions without undergoing any physical exam. DORN physicians prescribed an unusually high amount of Suboxone; two expert doctors opined that the DORN physicians were not prescribing Suboxone for a legitimate medical purpose. There was evidence that the non-provider employees knew of DORN’s use of pre-signed prescriptions and sometimes distributed them. There were, however, no facts alleged in the affidavit that Mackey was ever armed, impeded investigations, handled money, or possessed narcotics. View "Vierk v. Whisenand" on Justia Law

Nationwide Credit sent Horia a letter seeking to collect a debt owed to Gottlieb Hospital. By return mail, Horia disputed the claim. The Fair Debt Collection Practices Act requires a debt collector that notifies a credit agency about the debt to reveal whether the claim is disputed, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(8). Horia claims that Nationwide notified Experian about the debt but not about the dispute, injuring his credit rating and causing him mental distress. Horia previously complained about the same type of violation, based on a different letter that Nationwide sent, attempting to collect a different debt to a different creditor. The suit was settled. Days later Horia filed this second suit. Nationwide cited claim preclusion. The district court dismissed, ruling that Horia has split his claims impermissibly. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The doctrine of bar forecloses repeated suits on the same claim, even if a plaintiff advances a new legal theory or a different kind of injury but applies only to “the same claim.” Federal law defines a “claim” by looking for a single transaction, which usually means all losses arising from the same essential factual allegations. Horia has alleged two transactions. The two claimed debts are owed to different creditors. The wrongs differ—Nationwide could have given proper notice for one debt but not the other—and the injury differs. Each failure to notify could have caused additional harm to credit score or peace of mind. View "Horia v. Nationwide Credit & Collection, Inc." on Justia Law