Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Joll, an accomplished runner and an experienced running coach, had been a middle school teacher for more than 25 years. She applied for a job as the assistant coach of a high school girls’ cross-country team. The school hired a younger man for the job but invited Joll to apply for the same position on the boys’ team. She did so but the school hired a younger man again. She filed suit for sex and age discrimination. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for the school district, concluding that Joll had not offered enough evidence of either form of discrimination to present to a jury.The Seventh Circuit reversed, stating that the district court apparently asked “whether any particular piece of evidence proves the case by itself,” rather than aggregating the evidence “to find an overall likelihood of discrimination.” Joll offered evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that the school district used hiring procedures tilted in favor of the male applicants, applied sex-role stereotypes during the interview process, and manipulated the criteria for hiring in ways that were inconsistent except that they always favored the male applicants. View "Joll v. Valparaiso Community Schools" on Justia Law

Davis's girlfriend, Orkman, a Walmart assistant manager, shared her knowledge of Walmart’s cash handling procedures. Davis robbed the Indianapolis Walmart with Greer. Greer entered the customer service area, pointed a gun, used duct tape to restrain employees, including Orkman, then returned, with bags of cash, to the car where Davis was waiting. Davis photographed the cash and gave Orkman $1,500. Davis planned a second robbery. Orkman wanted out. Davis threatened her. Davis and Williams executed a second robbery. Later that day, Davis paid $8,000 in low-denomination bills for a Land Rover.Indianapolis Police began watching Orkman, who had worked during both robberies although they occurred during different shifts. An officer noticed Davis’s Land Rover near Orkman's home, learned about its purchase, and obtained a court order to place a GPS tracking device. Davis planned his third robbery with Townsell, who later testified. The GPS tracking device allowed the police to locate the Land Rover after an alert about the Kokomo robbery. Officers arrested Davis, Greer, and Townsell. Inside the vehicle, they found a gun and stashes of cash ($23,862, $9,088, $17,020, $8,205, and $1,958). In Davis’s apartment, they found a bag of quarters stamped “Walmart,” ammunition, cash, and a suitcase taken from the Kokomo Walmart.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Davis's and Greer's convictions, rejecting challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence. A rational jury could have found each guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

DePuy manufactures medical instruments. Its Los Angeles area exclusive distributor was OrthoLA. The agreement included an arbitration provision. When that distribution arrangement ended, OrthoLA sued in Los Angeles Superior Court, alleging tort and contract claims. DePuy moved, unsuccessfully, to refer those claims to arbitration. DePuy appealed and filed a demand for arbitration with the American Arbitration Association. Three days later, DePuy filed this suit in the federal district court in Indianapolis, seeking an order compelling arbitration and an injunction against the state court proceedings.The district court stayed the case, pending the resolution of the California action. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The lawsuits are parallel by any definition. Evaluating the “exceptional circumstances,” the court reasoned that the risk of splintering this litigation was great: functionally identical suits in two places creates a high risk of inconsistent results and wasteful duplication. The California courts were the first to take jurisdiction; that litigation is well along the road to resolution. The state courts are co-equal partners with the federal courts in protecting federal rights. The court speculated that “DePuy’s decision to open a second front in its effort to obtain arbitration just three days after it filed its appeal in the California courts was at best opportunistic and at worst manipulative.” View "Depuy Synthes Sales, Inc. v. Orthola, Inc." on Justia Law

Bennett was assigned to Cook County Jail Division 10, which houses detainees who need canes, crutches, or walkers. He filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12131–34, and the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C.794, alleging that Division 10 lacks grab bars and other necessary fixtures. Bennett claims that he fell and was injured. He unsuccessfully sought to represent a class. The court reasoned that the appropriate accommodation of any detainee’s situation depends on personal characteristics, so common questions do not predominate under FRCP 23(b)(3). Bennett proposed an alternative class to avoid person-specific questions, contending that Division 10, which was constructed in 1992, violates 28 C.F.R. 42.522(b)'s requirement that as of “1988 … construction[] or alteration of buildings” must comply with the Uniform Federal Accessibility Standards. The Standards require accessible toilets to have grab bars nearby and accessible showers to have mounted seats. The district court rejected this proposal, reasoning that to determine whether the Structural Standards control, thereby mooting the reasonable accommodation inquiry, would require a ruling on the merits, which would “run[] afoul of the rule against one-way intervention.”The Seventh Circuit vacated. The "view that a class cannot be certified unless the plaintiff has already prevailed on the central legal issue is a formula for one-way intervention rather than a means to avoid it." Bennett proposes a class that will win if the Standards apply and were violated, to detainees’ detriment and otherwise will lose. View "Bennett v. Dart" on Justia Law

Until 2010, Reinaas, now in his mid‐fifties, worked as a machine operator. He injured his spine and tore his rotator cuff on the job, and underwent two neck fusion surgeries. Reinaas planned to return to work but continued to suffer from severe headaches (treated with hydrocodone), shoulder pain, and a decreased range of motion. A neurologist diagnosed him with cervicogenic headaches, and his family doctor diagnosed “long term nuchal headaches” and “[p]ermanent pain syndrome post cervical fusion.” Dr. Bodeau, a Mayo Clinic occupational physician, opined that Reinaas could not return to his factory job and suggested surgical intervention. In 2013, Reinaas had shoulder surgery and attended physical therapy; he took naproxen and Vicodin for pain.Reinaas applied for social security disability benefits. Benefits were denied after state‐retained physicians reviewed his records and concluded that Reinaas’s accounts of his symptoms were not fully credible. Dr. Bodeau opined that Reinaas had “deteriorated significantly” and was “highly unlikely to successfully regain employment at any physical demand level.” The ALJ concluded that Reinaas was not disabled. In determining Reinaas’s residual functional capacity, the ALJ afforded great weight to the opinions of the two non‐examining physicians and gave little weight to Dr. Bodeau’s opinion, explaining that Bodeau lacked knowledge of Social Security disability rules and that his report was based on subjective complaints of questionable credibility.The Seventh Circuit vacated. Substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s decision to discount the treating physician’s opinion and the ALJ did not adequately evaluate Reinaas’s subjective complaints. View "Reinaas v. Saul" on Justia Law

The Hazeltons sought sanctions against the University for collecting an educational debt after their debts were discharged in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The district court reversed a bankruptcy court holding that the debt was nondischargeable and remanded. The Seventh Circuit dismissed an appeal, citing its jurisdiction in bankruptcy cases under 28 U.S.C. 158(d)(1), which is limited to orders that resolve “discrete disputes” within the bankruptcy case. The district court did not resolve the dispute regarding sanctions but decided a subsidiary legal issue. View "Hazelton v. Board of Regents for the University of Wisconsin System" on Justia Law

O’Brien was convicted of mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, and bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1344, based on a 2004-to-2007 scheme in which O’Brien misrepresented her income and liabilities to cause lenders to issue and refinance loans related to two Chicago investment properties O’Brien owned., O’Brien was a licensed attorney with a background and experience in the real estate industry, including as a registered loan originator, mortgage consultant, and licensed real estate broker.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting O’Brien’s arguments that the charges against her were duplicitous and that under a properly pled indictment the statute of limitations would have barred three of the four alleged offenses. She also argued that the district court should not have admitted evidence offered to prove those time-barred offenses and that there was insufficient evidence to support the jury’s guilty verdict. The government appropriately acted within its discretion to allege an overarching scheme to commit both bank fraud and mail fraud affecting a financial institution. Each count included an execution of the fraudulent scheme within the applicable 10-year statute of limitations, and the jury’s guilty verdict rested upon properly admitted and sufficient evidence. View "United States v. O'Brien" on Justia Law

David, Sheila’s husband, raped, sexually abused, and took pornographic photos of their daughter (MF) when she was between the ages of five and eight. Sheila viewed those pictures and found other images of child pornography to share with David. Ultimately, Sheila pleaded guilty to possession of child pornography and was sentenced to 57 months’ imprisonment, and ordered to pay $55,600 in restitution jointly and severally with David.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. U.S.S.G. 2G2.2(c)(1), which applies to various forms of the sexual exploitation of children, starts at a higher base level than section 2G2.2 and advises a two-level increase if the defendant was a parent who “permitt[ed]” her minor child to engage in sexually explicit conduct. There was ample evidence that Sheila “permitted” David to use their daughter for the production of child pornography. The district court exercised appropriate caution in taking the word of an abusive husband against that of his wife and, even without David’s statements, there was enough evidence to support the application of section 2G2.2. One need not “participate” or “assist” in an activity to “permit” it. The court granted Sheila a substantial downward departure as an abuse victim and imposed a sentence at the bottom of the advisory range that would have applied under the guideline that Sheila requested. The court employed the restitution calculation made in David’s sentencing-- the estimated cost of providing counseling and therapy to MF. Sheila could have challenged that calculation. View "United States v. Geary" on Justia Law

Omorhienrhien came to the U.S. as a visitor from Nigeria in 2008 and began a relationship with Harris, a citizen. They married months later. Harris filed Form I-130 to give Omorhienrhien a path to residency based on their marriage. USCIS denied the petition upon discovering that Omorhienrhien had been legally married to another woman in Nigeria when he married Harris, though the Nigerian marriage had since ended. Omorhienrhien and Harris remarried and submitted a new petition. Omorhienrhien received a two-year conditional permanent residency in 2011, 8 U.S.C. 1186a(a)(1). Omorhienrhien and Harris divorced about six months after he obtained that status. Because Harris did not join him in a petition to remove the conditions, Omorhienrhien unsuccessfully sought a hardship waiver. In removal proceedings, an IJ rejected his claim that the marriage was in good faith. The divorce decree stated that the parties were married in December 2008 and had been separated since July 2009; there was a lease indicating that the two lived separately. The IJ noted the lack of any objective evidence that the couple married with the intent to share a life together. The BIA dismissed his appeal. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review, finding no legal errors. The IJ applied the correct standard of proof. View "Omorhienrhien v. Barr" on Justia Law

Lord, an inmate at Wisconsin’s Waupun Correctional Institution, exposed himself to a female guard. After the guard told him that she would write him up and walked away, Lord began yelling that he had a razor blade and intended to kill himself. A short while later, a male guard went to Lord’s cell, ordered him out, and saw he had minor scratches treatable with a gauze bandage. Lord sued four guards for money damages under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they acted with deliberate indifference to a material risk to his life by not responding faster to his suicide threat. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. “Prison suicide is very real and very serious, but any fair reading of this record, even in the light most favorable to Lord, shows that he leveled an insincere threat of suicide to get attention and demonstrated no recoverable injury.” View "Lord v. Beahm" on Justia Law