Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In December 2012, Chicago Police officers responded to an anonymous call reporting a Hispanic man in a black sweater and black hat, carrying a bag, and climbing under a warehouse fence. They found someone who matched the description. After stopping and frisking him, they determined he was not engaged in any crime. Howell, walking toward the police, was white and wearing a black jacket and dark hat. When an officer approached to speak to him, Howell did not answer, looked panicked, and put his hands in his pockets. The officer patted Howell down and found a gun in his jacket. A federal gun charge followed. Howell unsuccessfully moved to suppress the gun.The Seventh Circuit reversed the denial of his suppression motion and vacated his conviction for possessing that gun. The court noted that the facts in the pretrial record differed significantly from those presented at trial, where the arresting officer testified that he decided to proceed with the pat-down only after Howell ignored a directive to remove his hands from his pockets. Viewing the pretrial record as a whole, the police lacked reasonable suspicion to frisk Howell. The court did not reverse Howell’s conviction on a second gun charge that resulted from the execution of a warrant to search Howell’s apartment three months after the initial stop and the ensuing discovery of more guns and ammunition. View "United States v. Howell" on Justia Law

In 2019, Anheuser-Busch began to advertise that its beer, Bud Light, is made using rice, while Miller Lite and Coors Light use corn syrup as a source of sugar that yeast ferments into alcohol. Molson Coors responded by advertising that its beers taste be]er because of the difference between rice and corn syrup. In a lawsuit, Molson contended that Anheuser-Busch violated section 43 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125, by implying that a product made from corn syrup also contains corn syrup. After a remand, the district court issued an injunction.The Seventh Circuit affirmed to the extent that the order denied Molson’s request for an injunction and reversed to the extent that the Bud Light advertising or packaging was enjoined. To the extent that the injunction prevents Anheuser-Busch from stating that Miller Lite or Coors Light “contain” corn syrup, it was vacated; Anheuser-Busch has never stated this nor said that it wants to do so but only made the true statement that “their beer is made using corn syrup and ours isn’t.” View "Molson Coors Beverage Co. v. Anheuser-Busch Companies, LLC" on Justia Law

Stampley, the owner-operator of a tractor-trailer, provided hauling services for Altom. Altom agreed to pay Stampley 70% of the gross revenues that it collected for each load he hauled and to give Stampley a copy of the “rated freight bill” or a “computer-generated document with the same information” to prove that it had properly paid Stampley. The contract granted Stampley the right to examine any underlying documents used to create a computer-generated document and required him to bring any dispute regarding his pay within 30 days. Years after he hauled his last Altom load, Stampley filed a putative class action, alleging that Altom had shortchanged him and similarly situated drivers. The district court certified a class and held that Altom’s withholdings had violated the contract. Stampley had moved for summary judgment on the 30-day provision before the class received notice. The court subsequently denied Stampley’s motion for summary judgment, decertified the class, granted Altom summary judgment, and held that Stampley’s individual claims were barred.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion in finding Stampley an inadequate class representative and decertifying the class. The court found that the 30-day period began to run as soon as Stampley received any computer-generated document purporting to have the same information as the rated freight bill, necessarily including those that lacked the same information as the rated freight bill. View "Stampley v. Altom Transport, Inc." on Justia Law

Illinois prisoner Tuduj, having received extensive dental treatment, filed a “deliberate indifference” suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against his dentists and prison officials. The court recruited counsel to assist Tuduj in filing an amended complaint that complied with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Counsel defended against two summary judgment motions, one arguing that Tuduj had not exhausted his administrative remedies and another on the meritsWhile the motions were pending, Tuduj moved “for leave to represent himself,” stating that he was “concerned that his counsel has filed a structurally, technically and legally insufficient response doomed to be denied.” He asked to file his own brief, except “in the event this Honorable Court deems counsel’s response … legally sufficient and Grants same[,] Plaintiff would be open to continued effective representation.” A magistrate denied Tuduj’s motion, stating that Tuduj “varie[d] between saying he would like to" represent himself and "indicating that he is happy with counselʹs representation as long as he prevails.” The district judge granted the motions for summary judgment, citing professional judgment and finding “no competent evidence” of any policy that unlawfully influenced dental‐treatment decisions. The Seventh Circuit rejected Tuduj’s argument that the court wrongly denied his “unqualified” right to proceed pro se under 28 U.S.C. 1654, the due process clause, the equal protection clause, and the Seventh Amendment. The district court permissibly denied his equivocal request. View "Tuduj v. Newbold" on Justia Law

In 2011, Illinois prisoner Williams was diagnosed with a left-eye cataract. He became completely blind in that eye and experienced dizziness, acute pain, photophobia, and the feeling that some foreign substance was in his eye. His doctors recommended cataract extraction surgery; without this common operation, they would be unable to detect other vision-threatening conditions. Wexford, which provides prison health services, refused to authorize the surgery, based on its “one good eye” policy. In February 2016, an optometrist diagnosed a right-eye cataract and a possible macular hole and vitreomacular traction. Weeks later, a specialist recommended cataract extraction. Doctors found no vision in Williams’s left eye and cataracts in both eyes. Still, he did not qualify for surgery.In February 2016, Williams filed a grievance form, checking a box indicating an emergency. Pontiac’s warden responded by checking a box: “an emergency is not substantiated. Offender should submit this grievance in the normal manner.” Williams asserts that the Administrative Review Board (ARB). denied his grievance. Williams filed a second grievance in August; the warden denied emergency status. The ARB returned the grievance to Williams without addressing the merits. It checked boxes indicating that Williams had not satisfied the requirements of the standard procedure; he was required to provide responses from his counselor and others. Williams filed a pro se complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court dismissed, stating that Williams “did not file a standard grievance" after the denials of emergency status, thereby failing to exhaust administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a). The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that Williams did enough to satisfy the PLRA. View "Williams v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

Taylor fell behind on his mortgage payments during the 2008 financial crisis and sought help under the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (HAMP), which allowed eligible homeowners to reduce their monthly mortgage payments to avoid foreclosure. The first step toward a permanent loan modification was for qualifying borrowers to enter into a Trial Period Plan (TPP, 12 U.S.C. 5219(a)(1)) with their lenders and make lower payments on a provisional basis. Taylor’s lender, Chase, sent him a proposed TPP agreement to be signed and returned to Chase to start the process. That agreement stated that the trial period would not begin until both parties signed the TPP and Chase returned to Taylor a copy bearing its signature. Taylor signed the proposed agreement, but Chase never did. Taylor’s loan was never modified. Taylor sued Chase.The district court granted Chase judgment on the pleadings. The breach of contract claim failed because Taylor failed to allege that Chase had signed and returned a copy of the TPP. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Chase never pre-committed to sending Taylor a countersigned copy of the TPP; it expressly reserved the right not to The return of the signed copy was a condition precedent to contract formation. Taylor alleged no actions by Chase from which it could be reasonably inferred that Chase intended to proceed with the trial modification absent a countersignature. View "Taylor v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

The Attorney General imposed conditions on the Edward Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant Program (Byrne JAG), 34 U.S.C.10151, which the primary source of federal criminal justice enforcement funding for state and local governments. The district court granted a preliminary injunction as to conditions that required that state or local officials honor requests to provide federal agents advance notice of the scheduled release of aliens in custody and that state or local correctional facilities give federal agents access to aliens in their custody. The Seventh Circuit upheld a nationwide injunction. The district court granted a permanent injunction and invalidated a condition requiring that state or local governments certify their compliance with 8 U.S.C. 1373, which prohibits them from restricting their officials from communicating information regarding the citizenship or immigration status of any individual to the INS, was unconstitutional but stayed the injunction to the extent that it applied beyond Chicago.The Seventh Circuit again held that the Attorney General cannot pursue the executive branch's policy objectives through the power of the purse or the arm of local law enforcement, rejecting the Attorney General’s assertion that Congress itself provided that authority in the language of the statutes. Chicago has determined that effective law enforcement requires the cooperation of its undocumented residents; such cooperation cannot be accomplished if those residents fear immigration consequences should they communicate with the police; and, local law enforcement must remain independent from federal immigration enforcement. The Byrne JAG grant was enacted to support the needs of local law enforcement to help fight crime, but “is being used as a hammer to further a completely different policy of the executive branch.” States do not forfeit all autonomy over their own police power merely by accepting federal grants. There is no reason to stay the application of the injunction. View "City of Chicago v. Barr" on Justia Law

In 2017-2018, FBI Child Exploitation Task Force Office Lynn was investigating the sharing of child pornography through online, peer‐to‐peer networks. His investigation led him to believe child pornography would be found in the college apartment, house, and pickup truck of 40‐year‐old Rees. Seeking warrants, Officer Lynn gave a magistrate a 17‐page probable‐cause affidavit, describing his training and experience, methods for tracking child pornography on peer‐to‐peer networks, and the specific investigation that steered him toward Rees’s residences and vehicle. When officers executed the resulting warrants they found thousands of still images and almost 200 videos of child pornography on Rees’s computer. Charged with receiving and possessing child pornography, 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2)(A), (5)(B), Rees unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The district court accepted Rees’s conditional guilty plea and sentenced Rees to 97 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The warrant‐issuing judge had a substantial basis for concluding that there was a fair probability evidence of child‐pornography crimes would be uncovered in the searches; even if the warrants were invalid, the officers executed them in objective good faith. View "United States v. Rees" on Justia Law

Kenosha Officer Torres, on patrol, received a call requesting assistance apprehending Siler. The dispatcher stated that Siler was wanted on a warrant for strangulation and suffocation, had taken a vehicle without consent, and was known to have violent tendencies. Siler did not actually have a warrant for strangulation and suffocation; he was wanted for violating probation. When Torres spotted Siler, he activated his lights and siren. Siler did not stop, resulting in a three-minute chase. Siler crashed his car and fled on foot. Torres followed him to an auto body shop. Bystanders indicated that Siler was in the back room. Siler again attempted to flee. Torres blocked the exit. Within seconds Torres and Siler were on opposite sides of an SUV and began to move in “cat and mouse” fashion. Torres pointed his service revolver at Siler, ordering him to the ground. Siler responded, “fuck you” and “shoot me.” Siler bent over and, when he stood up, Torres saw a black cylindrical object pressed against Siler’s forearm. Torres yelled “drop it.” Siler responded, “fuck you,” “no,” and “shoot me.” Torres still could not see Siler’s hands. Eventually, Torres fired his gun seven times successively. Siler died from gunshot wounds. In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 by Siler’s estate, the Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Torres, citing qualified immunity. Torres’s action conformed to constitutional standards. View "Siler v. City of Kenosha" on Justia Law

In 2005, a van containing six family members van slipped off the edge of an Illinois roadway. In the ensuing rollover crash, everyone was hurt; one passenger died. The crash occurred in a construction zone; a guardrail had been removed and not replaced. All lines had not been repainted on the repaved road, and pieces of asphalt lay on the shoulder. In a suit against the construction companies, the defense attorney told the plaintiffs that the two companies were operating as a joint venture with a $1 million liability insurance policy. The parties settled for $1 million. Plaintiffs signed a release of all claims that stated the plaintiffs agreed they were not relying on any statements by any parties’ attorneys. Four years later, the plaintiffs discovered that the companies carried separate liability policies.The district court ruled as a matter of law that the failure to identify the individual policies violated FRCP 26; that the undisclosed policies would have covered plaintiffs’ claims; and no joint venture agreement existed under Illinois law, so joint venture exclusions in the individual policies were inapplicable. A jury awarded damages of $8,169,512.84 for negligent misrepresentation. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court erred in allowing plaintiffs to rely on a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure for a duty of care; in deciding, before trial, that plaintiffs reasonably relied on the insurance disclosures; and in excluding the defense’s expert testimony on liability and settlement value. View "Turubchuk v. Southern Illinois Asphalt Co., Inc." on Justia Law