Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fox Crossing police were dispatched after business hours to an office parking lot. Officer Moe saw an occupied Hyundai Sonata and a Mercedes with a flat tire. As Moe approached, a man exited the Hyundai and said that his name was Adam Nelson. Officer Moe ran a check and found that the man had lied. The man backtracked, explaining that he had a suspended driver’s license and that he was Nicholas Nelson. Officer Haag requested an officer with a trained dog. While talking to the Hyundai’s passengers, Haag noticed the smell of alcohol and marijuana and saw what appeared to be small bits of marijuana. Officer Miller arrived with his trained dog, who alerted on the back driver’s side. Officers searched the car. They found some marijuana and a handgun, underneath a sweatshirt, within reach of the driver. Nelson was a convicted felon. The Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory reported a match between Nelson’s DNA profile and DNA found on the gun’s trigger.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Nelson’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), upholding the admission of the drug evidence and of the fact that Nelson and one passenger gave false names. The prosecutor’s reference, during closing argument, to the Hyundai as “his [i.e. Nelson’s] car” was immediately corrected by his statement, “I can rephrase. The car that he was driving.” View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each obtained loans from online payday lenders affiliated with Native American tribes. Each of their lenders reported delinquencies to Trans Union. One plaintiff contacted Trans Union, which investigated and determined that the report was accurate. Plaintiffs claim that Trans Union violated Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, provisions requiring that consumer reporting agencies “assure maximum possible accuracy of the information” contained in credit reports and re‐investigate disputed items. They did not claim the reports were factually inaccurate; they took out the reported loans and did not contest the debt amounts or the reported payment histories. They claimed the reports were “legally inaccurate” because they posted “legally invalid debts” that were void ab initio under New Jersey and Florida usury laws and that “reasonable procedures designed to ensure the maximum possible accuracy” would have shown that the loans were void. They claim that Trans Union’s screening procedures showed that the lenders lacked licenses to lend outside of tribal reservations and had histories of charging interest in excess of rates permitted in certain states and that Trans Union ignored government investigations and enforcement actions. The district court granted Trans Union judgment on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. FCRA does not compel consumer reporting agencies to determine the legal validity of disputed debts. View "Denan v. TransUnion LLC" on Justia Law

Fredrickson, in pre-trial federal custody, unsuccessfully sought release under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3142 asserting that conditions existed to ensure that he would not be a flight risk or a threat to the public. Five months later Fredrickson filed a pro se notice of appeal, which was dismissed as untimely. Fredrickson then sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, alleging that the court wrongly denied him release on bond and that he was denied effective assistance by counsel who allowed his bail hearing to be delayed and then failed to appeal. He also challenged the determination that his notice of appeal was untimely, arguing that the Bail Reform Act permits him to appeal his detention at any time.The district court dismissed the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that in January 2020 Fredrickson was convicted of sexual exploitation of a child. His sentencing hearing is scheduled for June 2020; he faces a minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. The district court appropriately refused to entertain the request for pretrial release in his section 2241 petition. A federal detainee’s request for release pending trial can be considered under only the Bail Reform Act, which created a comprehensive scheme to control pretrial release or detention decisions. No authority allows a detainee to contest pretrial detention through a section 2241 petition simply because he missed the deadline to appeal. View "Fredrickson v. Terrill" on Justia Law

Officer Garrison encountered Gibson, a suspected drug trafficker, walking with a companion. Although initially a consensual encounter, Garrison questioned Gibson and his companion and briefly detained Gibson. After Gibson and his companion departed, Garrison spotted a methamphetamine pipe under his patrol vehicle. Local law enforcement conducted a traffic stop of Gibson’s vehicle in the curtilage of his driveway. A drug detection dog signaled the presence of a controlled substance in the vehicle, though nothing was found. Earlier that day, Gibson’s wife had met with DEA agents to tell them about methamphetamine inside the home. Police used information Mrs. Gibson had provided to obtain a search warrant. The search of the home uncovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, currency, and AK-47 rifles, which led to Gibson’s arrest. Gibson moved to suppress all evidence seized during the search, alleging he was detained without reasonable suspicion, unlawfully frisked, arrested without probable cause, stopped without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, and the traffic stop exceeded a permissible scope. Upon learning of his wife’s cooperation, Gibson also argued her statement was insufficiently attenuated to justify the search warrant. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. Mrs. Gibson’s voluntary statement with DEA agents was independently sufficient to sustain findings of probable cause and sufficiently attenuated from subsequent events to preclude suppression. View "United States v. Gibson" on Justia Law

Following a 1992 fight that involved Johnson, Herron, and Walker, two shooters shot the three men. Johnson survived. In the hospital, Johnson described a shooter by the street name “Duke,” where Duke lived, and Duke's car. Johnson identified Duke and his accomplice from a photo array. Police pulled over a vehicle matching Johnson’s description and arrested the driver, Kirkman, and the passenger, who matched the general description of the second shooter. Kirkman had a tattoo of Duke on his arm. Police took additional photos and presented a second photo array to Johnson, who identified them as the shooters. At trial, Johnson identified Kirkman and his passenger as the shooters. There was disputed testimony about the cause of the fight. Convicted of murder and aggravated battery with a firearm, Kirkman was sentenced to life in prison.Johnson had a change of heart and submitted an affidavit, identifying Ford and an unknown man as the shooters. At Kirkman’s post-conviction hearing, Johnson testified that he and his family had been threatened. Other testimony was inconsistent with Johnson’s. Illinois courts denied post-conviction relief, finding that Johnson’s recantation lacked credibility. Johnson later pleaded guilty for perjury but failed to specify which statement was false. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Illinois courts found Johnson’s recantation lacked credibility. An evidentiary hearing satisfied Kirkman’s due process rights. The Illinois trial court’s determination defeated Kirkman’s innocence and perjured testimony claims. View "Kirkman v. Thompson" on Justia Law

In 2016-2018, Draheim managed a conspiracy, responsible for at least 38 packages of methamphetamine sent from California to La Crosse, Wisconsin. Draheim supervised at least 11 associates who accepted shipments on her behalf, sent money transfers to California, distributed the meth, rented storage lockers, and collected money owed to her. Draheim provided vehicles. After agents placed a wiretap on her phone and seized several packages of meth en route to Draheim, her California supplier forced Draheim to find a new source. Draheim contacted Lewis, recently out of jail but still involved in the “meth scene.” Lewis agreed to purchase meth from a new supplier. During the planned transaction, agents seized the package, which contained 28.6 grams of nearly pure meth. Police subsequently arrested Draheim after they found her daughter dead at home from an overdose; they took Lewis into custody for violating the terms of his state supervision.Both pleaded guilty to meth distribution offenses, 21 U.S.C. 841, 846. Draheim, facing a mandatory‐minimum 10-year sentence, unsuccessfully argued that she qualified for “safety‐valve relief.” The court reasoned that she was the leader of her enterprise. Lewis unsuccessfully contended that he should be sentenced based only on his conviction, not other “relevant conduct.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed Draheim’s sentence but vacated as to Lewis. The fact that the defendant has engaged in other drug transactions is not, alone, sufficient to justify treating those transactions as relevant conduct for sentencing purposes. View "United States v. Lewis" on Justia Law

In 2014, Cook Medical entered a five-year agreement for Acheron to serve as the distributor of Cook medical devices and products to VA and Department of Defense Medical Centers. Sales to Defense are primarily made through a Distribution and Pricing Agreement (DAPA); sales to the VA require a Federal Supply Schedule (FSS). Cook already had a DAPA, but not an FSS; the agreement required Acheron to obtain an FSS. Cook refused to submit to a required audit of its commercial sales records as required by 48 CFR 515.408(b)(5) to obtain an FSS and refused to deactivate its DAPA, preventing Acheron from selling Cook products to Defense through Acheron’s own DAPA. Cook sent notice that Acheron was in material breach and terminated the agreement 30 days later due to Acheron’s failure to cure. Acheron filed suit.The district court granted Cook summary judgment; Acheron materially breached its obligation to obtain an FSS but owed no damages because the breach was excused by the force majeure clause. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Agreement does not expressly obligate Cook to submit to the VA audit or to deactivate its DAPA. The duty of good faith requires that a party perform its obligations under the contract in good faith but does not require a party to undertake a new, affirmative obligation. Neither party actively sought to sabotage the other party’s performance to escape its own obligations or obtain an unfair advantage. View "Acheron Medical Supply, LLC v. Cook Medical Inc." on Justia Law

H.A.L., in the business of trading securities, set up a brokerage account with Advantage in Chicago. H.A.L.’s trading losses led Advantage to issue margin calls, which H.A.L. failed to meet. Advantage then liquidated H.A.L.’s account, leaving a negative balance of more than $75,000. When H.A.L. failed to pay, Advantage sued. H.A.L. responded with an offer of judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68 for the entire amount, plus attorney fees and costs. Advantage accepted and judgment was entered. H.A.L. did not pay the judgment but instead filed suit against the CEO of Advantage claiming damages of more than $25 million arising from the same transactions. The Advantage CEO invoked the defense of res judicata. The district court agreed and dismissed this case.The Seventh Circuit affirmed and imposed sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38, calling the appeal “an exercise in unacceptable gamesmanship, without a reasonable and good-faith basis.” H.A.L.’s sole argument to the district court—that federal law applied and Rule 68 judgments could not support res judicata—was doomed by unanimous federal precedent. It was built on the flawed premise that state law was irrelevant. Illinois gives consent judgments claim-preclusive effect if preclusion otherwise applies. View "H.A.L. NY Holdings, LLC v. Guinan" on Justia Law

Bryant's Illinois employer had a cafeteria, containing vending machines owned and operated by Compass. The machines did not accept cash; a user had to establish an account using her fingerprint. Fingerprints are “biometric identifiers” under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). In violation of BIPA, Compass never made publicly available a retention schedule and guidelines for permanently destroying the biometric identifiers and information it was collecting; never informed Bryant in writing that her biometric identifier was being collected or stored, of the specific purpose and length of term for which her fingerprint was being collected, stored, and used; nor obtained Bryant’s written release to collect, store, and use her fingerprint.Bryant brought a putative class action in state court; BIPA provides a private right of action to persons “aggrieved” by a violation. Compass removed the action to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, 28 U.S.C. 1332(d), on the basis of diversity of citizenship and an amount in controversy exceeding $5 million. Bryant successfully moved to remand the action, claiming that the district court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because she lacked the concrete injury-in-fact necessary for Article III standing. State law poses no such problem. The district court found that Compass’s alleged violations were bare procedural violations that caused no concrete harm to Bryant. The Seventh Circuit reversed. The failure to follow BIPA leads to an invasion of personal rights that is both concrete and particularized. View "Bryant v. Compass Group U.S.A., Inc." on Justia Law

The Uber ride-sharing service does not own or select its drivers’ vehicles; its app presents riders with options, including sedans, premium cars, or SUVs. Customers restricted to motorized wheelchairs need wheelchair accessible vehicles (WAVs) equipped with ramps and lifts. Uber’s app offers that option. Access Living is a Chicago‐based nonprofit organization that advances the civil rights of people with disabilities; 14 percent of the organization’s staff and 20 percent of its board members are motorized wheelchair users. The district court dismissed claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(F), alleging that Uber, as a travel service/public accommodation, discriminates against people with disabilities by failing to ensure equal access to WAVs because Uber fails to ensure the availability of enough drivers with WAVs, but outsources most requests for wheelchair accessible rides to local taxi companies. As a result, plaintiffs claimed, motorized wheelchair users experience longer wait times and higher prices than other Uber customers.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The alleged harm to the Access Living organization comes only indirectly in the form of increased reimbursement costs. An individual plaintiff has never downloaded Uber’s app, attempted to request a ride, or learned about the response times he would personally experience. View "Access Living of Metropolitan Chicago v. Uber Technologies, Inc." on Justia Law