Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Wisconsin inmate McCaa, pro se, claimed that prison officials violated Eighth Amendment rights by responding with deliberate indifference to his threats to commit suicide or to harm himself in other ways. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. In 2018, the Seventh Circuit ruled that in denying a fourth motion for recruitment of counsel, the district court had not addressed sufficiently McCaa’s ability to present his case himself in light of McCaa’s transfer to a different prison where he said he could not locate witnesses or obtain other discovery, as well as the effects of his fifth-grade reading level and serious mental illness. On remand, the district court considered the issue and reached the same decision to not attempt to recruit counsel.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting the district judge’s "detailed and persuasive opinion." He complied with the remand mandate and did not abuse his discretion. The court noted that, on remand, McCaa did not renew his own efforts to obtain counsel; he was able to “send and receive correspondence, make copies, write motions and briefs, and perform legal research;” his reply in support of his renewed motion for counsel was impressive; and he had recently obtained a GED and now reads at a ninth-grade level. View "McCaa v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Hildreth, an inmate at an Illinois maximum-security prison, suffers from Parkinson’s disease. He takes a prescription medication, Mirapex, to manage his symptoms. As a specialty prescription, Mirapex was not kept in stock at the prison; it was filled by an outside pharmacy. The prison allows Hildreth to keep a monthly supply of Mirapex in his cell. To refill his prescription, Hildreth must submit a sticker within seven days of the end of the prescription. Hildreth usually receives his refill when he has three to five days of pills left. On three occasions Hildreth received his refill a few days late, causing him to experience withdrawal symptoms. His symptoms also render his handwriting illegible, so Hildreth uses a typewriter to draft documents. He requested to keep that typewriter in his cell, which the prison denied because it was considered contraband. The prison provided Hildreth with an assistant to help him draft documents and increased access to the library where he can use a typewriter. With those accommodations, Hildreth has not missed any court deadlines.Hildreth sued Wexford Health and jail administrators under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12101. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Hildreth has not shown medication delays were a widespread practice or custom at the prison; he received reasonable accommodations for his Parkinson’s disease, . View "Hildreth v. Butler" on Justia Law

Two female Polk County Jail inmates endured repeated sexual assaults by correctional officer Christensen. The County’s written policy prohibited sexual contact between inmates and guards but failed to address the prevention and detection of such conduct. The County did not provide meaningful training on the topic. Near the beginning of the relevant period, the County learned that another guard made predatory sexual advances toward a different female inmate. The County imposed minor discipline on the guard but made no institutional response—no review of its policy, no training, and no communication with inmates on how to report such abuse. In a civil rights suit, the jury returned verdicts for the inmates. A Seventh Circuit panel overturned the verdict against Polk County, determining that the evidence failed to meet the “Monell” standard for municipal liability.On rehearing, en banc, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the verdicts against both Christensen and Polk County. While the standard for municipal liability is demanding, the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict. The evidence did not require the jury to accept as inevitable that Christensen’s conduct was unpreventable, undetectable, and incapable of giving rise to Monell liability. Nor was the jury compelled to conclude that the sexual abuse had only one cause. The law allowed the jury to consider the evidence in its entirety, use its common sense, and draw inferences to decide for itself. View "J.K.J. v. Christensen" on Justia Law

In 2016, the Seventh Circuit held that Chicago is entitled to limit sales on the streets adjacent to Wrigley Field, home of the Chicago Cubs, but remanded a magazine seller’s contention that an ordinance requiring all peddlers to be licensed was invalid because of an exception for newspapers. Before the judge acted on remand, Chicago amended its ordinance to provide: It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in the business of a peddler without first having obtained a street peddler license under this chapter. Provided, however, a street peddler license is not required for selling, … only newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, or other similar written materials on the public way. There is no distinction between newspapers and magazines. Left Field Media withdrew its request for an injunction but sought damages to compensate for injury before the amendment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit for want of a justiciable controversy. Left Field did not show any injury. It did not assert other costs, such as overtime wages or legal fees incurred to attempt to get a license. Because Left Field has not offered details, it would not be possible to conclude that it suffered even a dollar in marginal costs. View "Left Field Media LLC v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Hoglund and Mallot's daughter, A.H., was born in 1998. A.H. twice told her mother her father was molesting her. Mallot went to the police after Hoglund admitted he committed adultery. Detective Holliday interviewed A.H. in 2006. She said her father had her perform oral sex on him. Dr. Butler examined A.H. Hoglund denied the allegations but made strange and incriminating statements. Indiana charged him with child molesting. A.H. met with Counselor Shestak in 2007 and Dr. Mayle in 2009. At trial in 2010, A.H. testified; Butler, Shestak, and Mayle relayed what A.H. told them and essentially said they believed her. A jury found Hoglund guilty.After exhausting state proceedings, Hoglund filed a federal habeas corpus petition, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to object properly to hearsay when the prosecutor asked the experts to say what A.H. said. The prosecutor invoked the medical exception under Indiana Rule of Evidence 803(4); defense counsel failed to assert the lack of a foundation that A.H. thought she was speaking to the experts for diagnosis or treatment. He also claimed the admission of the experts’ vouching violated due process. Indiana precedent at that time allowed limited, indirect vouching. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief. Defense counsel was deficient but did not prejudice Hoglund. Even without the objectionable hearsay, the case against Hoglund was strong. The vouching did not produce a significant likelihood an innocent person was convicted. View "Hoglund v. Neal" on Justia Law

James, a pretrial detainee at the St. Clair County Jail, was assaulted by another inmate and suffered severe facial injuries. James filed a pro se civil-rights lawsuit against Hale, the jail infirmary's administrator, accusing her of inadequately treating his medical needs. He later acquired counsel. Significant discovery followed, including the production of jail infirmary and outside medical records that contradicted allegations in his complaint. James obtained leave to file an amended complaint, but the factual section simply repeated the allegations in the original version. In a subsequent deposition, James contradicted those factual assertions.When Hale moved for summary judgment, James responded by swearing out an affidavit incorporating by reference the allegations in the amended complaint. The magistrate disregarded the affidavit and an affidavit submitted by James’s mother and recommended that the court grant the motion. The district judge excluded the affidavits under the sham-affidavit rule and entered summary judgment for Hale. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. James’s affidavit was a sham and an improper attempt to convert the complaint's allegations into sworn testimony to avert summary judgment. The exclusion of his mother’s affidavit was harmless error because she added nothing of substance. The constitutional claim lacks factual support, so summary judgment in Hale’s favor was proper. View "James v. Hale" on Justia Law

Propst made multiple harassing, obscene, and threatening telephone calls, often while under the influence of methamphetamine, beginning in 1999. In recent years, Propst’s telephone calls while he was working as an over-the-road truck driver resulted in a multiple-jurisdiction investigation. On June 12, 2018, Propst went on a calling spree, during which he claimed he was sexually assaulting children. Propst ultimately pleaded guilty to two counts of making interstate telephone calls in which he threatened personal injury, 18 U.S.C. 875(c) and to threatening or harassing interstate communications, 47 U.S.C. 223(a)(1)(C).The government’s sentencing memorandum counted “41 state and federal” convictions. The Sentencing Guidelines range was 24-30 months' imprisonment. Under the plea agreement, the parties could argue for any sentence between 60-120 months. At sentencing, the court stated that the parties agreed that the Guidelines range understated the seriousness of the offense and was inadequate and did not capture the “calls to a mother and to childcare centers, which were more than just nuisances.” The court reviewed the goals of the sentence, the nature and circumstances of the offenses, and Propst’s history and character. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his sentence to 84 months’ imprisonment. Propst did not show that the district court improperly relied on inaccurate information about his past convictions; the court adequately explained its reasons for the 84-month sentence. View "United States v. Propst" on Justia Law

Fox Crossing police were dispatched after business hours to an office parking lot. Officer Moe saw an occupied Hyundai Sonata and a Mercedes with a flat tire. As Moe approached, a man exited the Hyundai and said that his name was Adam Nelson. Officer Moe ran a check and found that the man had lied. The man backtracked, explaining that he had a suspended driver’s license and that he was Nicholas Nelson. Officer Haag requested an officer with a trained dog. While talking to the Hyundai’s passengers, Haag noticed the smell of alcohol and marijuana and saw what appeared to be small bits of marijuana. Officer Miller arrived with his trained dog, who alerted on the back driver’s side. Officers searched the car. They found some marijuana and a handgun, underneath a sweatshirt, within reach of the driver. Nelson was a convicted felon. The Wisconsin State Crime Laboratory reported a match between Nelson’s DNA profile and DNA found on the gun’s trigger.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Nelson’s conviction as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), upholding the admission of the drug evidence and of the fact that Nelson and one passenger gave false names. The prosecutor’s reference, during closing argument, to the Hyundai as “his [i.e. Nelson’s] car” was immediately corrected by his statement, “I can rephrase. The car that he was driving.” View "United States v. Nelson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs each obtained loans from online payday lenders affiliated with Native American tribes. Each of their lenders reported delinquencies to Trans Union. One plaintiff contacted Trans Union, which investigated and determined that the report was accurate. Plaintiffs claim that Trans Union violated Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA), 15 U.S.C. 1681, provisions requiring that consumer reporting agencies “assure maximum possible accuracy of the information” contained in credit reports and re‐investigate disputed items. They did not claim the reports were factually inaccurate; they took out the reported loans and did not contest the debt amounts or the reported payment histories. They claimed the reports were “legally inaccurate” because they posted “legally invalid debts” that were void ab initio under New Jersey and Florida usury laws and that “reasonable procedures designed to ensure the maximum possible accuracy” would have shown that the loans were void. They claim that Trans Union’s screening procedures showed that the lenders lacked licenses to lend outside of tribal reservations and had histories of charging interest in excess of rates permitted in certain states and that Trans Union ignored government investigations and enforcement actions. The district court granted Trans Union judgment on the pleadings. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. FCRA does not compel consumer reporting agencies to determine the legal validity of disputed debts. View "Denan v. TransUnion LLC" on Justia Law

Fredrickson, in pre-trial federal custody, unsuccessfully sought release under the Bail Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. 3142 asserting that conditions existed to ensure that he would not be a flight risk or a threat to the public. Five months later Fredrickson filed a pro se notice of appeal, which was dismissed as untimely. Fredrickson then sought habeas corpus relief, 28 U.S.C. 2241, alleging that the court wrongly denied him release on bond and that he was denied effective assistance by counsel who allowed his bail hearing to be delayed and then failed to appeal. He also challenged the determination that his notice of appeal was untimely, arguing that the Bail Reform Act permits him to appeal his detention at any time.The district court dismissed the petition. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, noting that in January 2020 Fredrickson was convicted of sexual exploitation of a child. His sentencing hearing is scheduled for June 2020; he faces a minimum of 15 years’ imprisonment. The district court appropriately refused to entertain the request for pretrial release in his section 2241 petition. A federal detainee’s request for release pending trial can be considered under only the Bail Reform Act, which created a comprehensive scheme to control pretrial release or detention decisions. No authority allows a detainee to contest pretrial detention through a section 2241 petition simply because he missed the deadline to appeal. View "Fredrickson v. Terrill" on Justia Law