Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hughes bought a ticket from Southwest to fly to Chicago. Just before the flight was to board, Southwest canceled it. Hughes, who chose an alternate flight through Omaha, claims that the cancellation was because Southwest ran out of de-icer and that no other airlines had a similar problem. He claims he incurred additional costs for lodging and similar expenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his breach of contract claim. There was no breach; the contract allows the airline to cancel and either reschedule the passenger or refund the fare. There is no implied duty to avoid cancellation. View "Brian Hughes v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

Immigrants have historically been eligible for various public benefits and the receipt of those benefits, with limited exceptions did not jeopardize the immigrant’s chances of becoming a lawful permanent resident or citizen. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a new rule, intended to prevent immigrants whom the Executive Branch deems likely to receive any amount of public assistance, from entering the country or adjusting their status. The rule purports to implement the “public charge” provision of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4).The Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against the rule’s enforcement in favor of Cook County, Illinois. The county had standing because the law threatened immediate financial harm because it would cause immigrants to forego preventative health care. The interests of the county are among those protected or regulated by federal law. There is “abundant evidence” supporting the county’s interpretation of the “public charge provision” as being triggered only by long-term primary dependence and that provision does not provide DHS unfettered discretion. The rule is unlikely to survive “arbitrary and capricious” review; it is unclear how immigration officials are to make “public charge” predictions. Cook County lacks legal remedies for the harms imposed by the rule. View "Cook County v. Wolf" on Justia Law

O’Neal was convicted of aggravated battery of a police officer after an altercation during a traffic stop. While incarcerated and while his appeal was pending, O’Neal filed a pro se lawsuit that asserted 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the officers. Under "Heck," O’Neal’s section 1983 suit was barred unless his conviction was reversed or expunged. Heck-barred suits are usually stayed or dismissed without prejudice, but after O’Neal failed to comply with briefing deadlines, the court ordered O’Neal to show cause why his case should not be dismissed. O’Neal didn’t respond. The court dismissed his claims with prejudice for failure to prosecute. Months later, O’Neal’s conviction was overturned on appeal. Ten months later, O’Neal returned to court, with counsel, with a “Motion to Reinstate the Case and for Leave to File an Amended Complaint" under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. His motion nowhere mentioned Rule 60(b), the mechanism for obtaining relief from judgment. The defendants' response, maintained that O’Neal was not entitled to Rule 60(b) relief. O’Neal’s reply brief attempted to articulate why Rule 60(b) relief was warranted.The court denied O’Neal’s Rule 15 motion, explaining that he could not file an amended complaint in a terminated case, and held that the Rule 60(b) argument was waived. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. O’Neal waived any argument under Rule 60(b) and, because the case was terminated on the merits, the court was right to deny his Rule 15 motion. View "O'Neal v. Reilly" on Justia Law

Johnson filed a putative class action against ERC, alleging that it sent her a misleading collection letter in violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692‐1692p. The district court certified a class composed of all individuals in Indiana who had received a collection letter like Johnson’s from ERC in 2016-2017. The court later entered summary judgment for ERC.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Johnson failed to present any evidence beyond her own opinion that ERC’s letter was misleading, Johnson focused primarily on the sentence, “This letter serves as notification that your delinquent account may be reported to the national credit bureaus.” According to Johnson, “may be reported” implied future reporting, and by the time she received the letter her debt had already been reported. She also singled out a sentence stating, “Payment of the offered settlement amount will stop collection activity on this matter” as constituting a promise by ERC that if she took advantage of the first settlement offer and paid by May 26, then ERC would not report her debt to the national credit bureaus. Because Johnson chose instead to rely solely on her “speculation” to support her claim, summary judgment for ERC was appropriate. View "Johnson v. Enhanced Recovery Co., LLC" on Justia Law

Burton injured his knee in 2009 while incarcerated. He repeatedly sought medical attention. Burton’s knee was not treated until 13 months later when Dr. Ghosh recommended a consultation with an orthopedic specialist. Burton had surgery more than 18 months after his injury. Burton’s discharge orders and his follow-up visit called for physical therapy and pain medication. Burton did not receive pain medication nor physical therapy for several months despite repeated letters and a formal grievance. Because of these delays, Burton claims, he has significant, permanent damage to his knee. In 2011, Burton filed suit alleging deliberate indifference to serious medical needs and retaliation. After several procedural missteps that resulted in dismissal, recruited counsel filed a new complaint. In 2018, after discovery was complete, and after newly‐recruited lawyers took Burton's case, Burton was allowed to file an amended complaint. The amendments were minor. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, raising the new affirmative defense of res judicata, arguing that the dismissal of Burton’s first suit with prejudice in 2012 precluded the second, that they had become aware of Burton’s earlier dismissed case only days earlier, and that the amended complaint permitted new affirmative defenses. The district court dismissed.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The FRCP 8(c) and 15 standards for amending pleadings govern the raising of new affirmative defenses even when an amended complaint is filed. A district court is not required to allow any and all new defenses in response to any amendment, without regard for the substance of the amendment and its relationship to the new defenses. Here, the late amendment to the complaint was minor and did not authorize a new res judicata defense that had been waived or forfeited years earlier. View "Burton v. Ghosh" on Justia Law

Four months after escaping from a work-release facility, an intoxicated Carter walked into an Illinois bar. He told an employee that a white-supremacist gang was searching for him and then walked out. The employee called the police, who stopped Carter on the street and discovered an active arrest warrant related to his escape. As he was being handcuffed, Carter stated that he was “strapped” and gestured towards his pants. Officers seized a stolen, loaded semiautomatic pistol from Carter’s waistband. Carter pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). The court calculated his Sentencing Guideline range based on a finding that he had previously sustained at least two felony convictions for “crimes of violence,” U.S.S.G. 2K2.1(a)(2), and imposed a sentence of 105 months' imprisonment, at the top of the guideline range.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Carter had at least two prior felony convictions (a California conviction for assault with a deadly weapon and an Iowa conviction for aggravated assault) that qualify as crimes of violence under the categorical approach. The court noted that district judges may and should use their sound discretion to sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) on the basis of reliable information about the defendant’s criminal history even where a strict categorical classification of a prior conviction might produce a different guideline sentencing range. View "United States v. Carter" on Justia Law

After filing a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, Bastani asked the judge to stay a pending state court foreclosure procedure. Bastani’s previous bankruptcy petition had been dismissed less than a year earlier, creating a presumption that the new filing was not in good faith, 11 U.S.C. 362(c)(3)(C)(i), and meaning that the automatic stay would end 30 days after the new proceeding began. The bankruptcy and district courts denied Bastani’s motion.The Seventh Circuit denied relief and also denied Bastani’s motion for leave to file in forma pauperis under 28 U.S.C. 1915. Chapter 13 is designed for people who can pay most of their debts; someone eligible for Chapter 13 relief cannot establish that she cannot pay judicial fees in the absence of extraordinary circumstances. The court further concluded that Bastani’s second bankruptcy petition was filed in actual bad faith; Bastani appeared to be trying to achieve a Chapter 13 benefit (keeping her home) without the detriment of having to pay her debts. View "Bastanipour v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

A medical supply company sent faxes to thousands of medical providers to solicit prescriptions to sell medical equipment to the providers’ patients. One provider received numerous faxes and filed a class action under the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), 47 U.S.C. 227. The supply company failed to appear. A default judgment entered against the company as to liability but not damages. Later the supplier’s CEO was granted summary judgment. Concerned with inconsistency, the district court vacated the default judgment against the company and entered judgment for both the executive and the company.The Seventh Circuit affirmed as to the executive. Because the good cause standard was not applied in vacating the default judgment against the company, and inconsistent judgments between the individual and corporate defendants do not present a problem, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings on the claim against the company. Judgments against these two defendants would not necessarily be inconsistent and the district court mistakenly believed that the plaintiff sought to “essentially” hold the CEO vicariously liable as an officer of the supplier, which would require uniformity in judgments. The plaintiff alleged joint and several liability, which is critically different from vicarious liability. View "Arwa Chiropractic, P.C. v. Med-Care Diabetic & Medical Supplies, Inc." on Justia Law

IMC mailed Peck, regarding a debt that Peck allegedly owed. The envelope's clear pane revealed a barcode containing Peck’s personal information. Peck sued IMC for violating the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act by revealing his personal information on the envelope and by failing to verify that Peck owed the debt after he disputed it. IMC made an offer of judgment of “$1,101, plus costs under Rule 68. Peck accepted. By email, Peck indicated he believed “costs” included damages under the Act. IMC explained that its offer accounted for $1,101 in statutory damages with interest, plus the costs typically recoverable by the prevailing party. The court ultimately entered judgment consistent with the Rule 68 offer and instructed Peck to file a bill of costs, limited to those contemplated by Federal Rule 54(d). Peck demanded $24,137.50 (reimbursement for the hundreds of hours he spent litigating) and $47,425.02 in punitive damages. Citing 28 U.S.C. 1920, the court denied his bill of costs and awarded $1,101.00.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that it lacked jurisdiction because the district court had not sufficiently articulated a rationale. The “costs” recoverable under Rule 54(d) include clerk and marshal fees; printed or electronically recorded transcripts; disbursements for printing and witnesses; fees for exemplification and making copies; docket fees; and compensation of court-appointed experts, interpreters, and for special interpretation services They do not include damages, nor the compensation Peck sought for his time and mailing expenses. View "Peck v. IMC Credit Services" on Justia Law

Quincy’s Prevagen® dietary supplement is sold at stores and online. Quincy registered its Prevagen® trademark in 2007. Ellishbooks, which was not authorized to sell Prevagen®, sold supplements identified as Prevagen® on Amazon.com, including items that were in altered or damaged packaging; lacked the appropriate purchase codes or other markings that identify the authorized retail seller; and contained tags from retail stores. Quincy sued under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114. Ellishbooks did not respond. The court entered default judgment. Ellishbooks identified no circumstances capable of establishing good cause for default. The district court entered a $480,968.13 judgment in favor of Quincy, plus costs, and permanently enjoined Ellishbooks from infringing upon the PREVAGEN® trademark and selling stolen products bearing the PREVAGEN® trademark.The Seventh Circuit affirmed and subsequently awarded Rule 38 sanctions. Ellishbooks’ appellate arguments had virtually no likelihood of success and its conduct during the course of the appeal was marked by several failures to timely respond and significant deficiencies in its filings. These shortcomings cannot be attributed entirely to counsel’s lack of experience in litigating federal appeals. A review of the dockets suggests that Ellishbooks has attempted to draw out the proceedings as long as possible while knowing that it had no viable substantive defense. View "Quincy Bioscience, LLC v. Ellishbooks" on Justia Law