Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In March 2020, Illinois Governor Pritzker issued an executive order to reduce transmission of the coronavirus that, among other things, capped at 10 the number of people who could attend religious gatherings. A list of “essential” functions exempt from the 10-person cap included organizations providing food, shelter, and social services, and other necessities of life. Other gatherings, such as concerts, are forbidden, regardless of size.The plaintiffs sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, arguing that the limit effectively foreclosed in-person religious services, even though they were free to hold multiple 10-person services, and that alternatives—online services or services in parking lots while worshipers remain in cars—are inadequate. Before the case was argued, the Governor issued a new order, which permits the resumption of all religious services, with the 10-person cap as a “recommendation.”The Seventh Circuit found that the issue was not moot but declined to grant relief. Illinois has not discriminated against religion and has not violated the First Amendment. While warehouse workers and people who assist the needy may be at the same risk as people who gather for large religious worship, movies and concerts are a better comparison group. By that standard, any discrimination has been in favor of religion. While all theaters and concert halls in Illinois have been closed since mid-March, sanctuaries and houses of worship were open, though to smaller gatherings. View "Elim Romanian Pentecostal Church v. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Illinois inmate Reid sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that a corrections officer used excessive force against him. The district court dismissed the action, concluding that Reid had not exhausted administrative remedies, as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a).The Seventh Circuit vacated. The prison’s communications were so obscure that they made further steps of its administrative process unknowable and, thus, unavailable to Reid. Reid had filed both a “standard grievance” and an emergency grievance, followed by an appeal to the Review Board, which was returned to him. Reid filed a second emergency grievance, which was again denied; the Board returned Reid’s subsequent appeal. The prison’s responses indicated that there was no conceivable next step for Reid. The grievance officer’s memorandum gave him conflicting messages. The Board told him that his appeal was missing specific documents but did not check the box specifying that those documents needed to be provided or that some explanation needed to be given for their absence. When the warden and the Board rejected the second grievance, neither mentioned a pending standard grievance or an ongoing Internal Affairs investigation. As far as Reid could tell, his standard grievance had been either lost in the shuffle or resolved against him. View "Reid v. Balota" on Justia Law

While on supervised release for a drug crime, Shanks was charged in a drug-distribution conspiracy that led to overdoses that resulted in a death and serious bodily injury. At an arraignment, defense counsel reported that Shanks pled not guilty and understood the charges. When the government filed a superseding indictment, Shanks refused to enter a plea; challenged the court’s jurisdiction, denied understanding the charges, and refused to talk with counsel. Shanks did not appear in court again. The judge issued an order for Shanks to appear at trial. Shanks refused to accept service. The judge, counsel, and a court reporter began the trial outside Shanks’s jail cell. Shanks denied understanding whatever was said or refused to answer, despite repeated explanations. The judge found that by “disruptive conduct” Shanks had waived his right to attend. To avoid harm to Shanks or others, the judge did not use force but told Shanks that, if he changed his mind, the marshals would transport him. Outside of the jury’s presence, the judge regularly asked whether Shanks had changed his mind. The judge instructed the jury not to draw any inference from Shanks’s absence.Shanks was sentenced to multiple life terms. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court did not comply with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 43, which (he claimed) requires a defendant’s presence in a courtroom at the start of the trial and that the court clearly erred in finding that he knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to attend. View "United States v. Shanks" on Justia Law

Shaffer sued corrections officials, alleging that an officer attacked him and that others refused to treat his injuries. The court directed Shaffer to notify the court and the defendants if he were released, stating that it would not independently investigate his whereabouts and that failure to notify the court of any address changes could result in a dismissal. Shaffer conducted discovery and flooded the court with filings until he was released on parole 13 months later. The defendants, having had mail returned as undeliverable, moved for an order to show cause why the case should not be dismissed. The case languished for five months. On the deadline for the close of discovery, a defendant filed another motion. A month passed without any response, so the court dismissed Shaffer's case under FRCP 41(b) for failure to prosecute. Shaffer’s parole was revoked. Shaffer filed a notice of his new address, with requests for appointment of counsel and a status hearing 47 days after the entry of judgment. Shaffer asserted that his notices to opposing counsel and the court about his release must have gotten lost in the mail and that prison officials had not forwarded his mail.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Shaffer’s motion. Shaffer’s allegation that he tried to notify the court was self-serving and not credible; it was not plausible that the postal service lost multiple, separate mailings. Shaffer had not established that his failure to update the parties stemmed from mistake or excusable neglect. View "Shaffer v. Lashbrook" on Justia Law

DHS’s Air and Marine Operations Center (AMOC) notified Agent Harrington about an airplane that would be landing at the Litchfield Municipal Airport. Harrington concluded that the plane might be smuggling drugs, and called Lieutenant Jarman for a drug‐detection dog. Lyons landed the Cessna at around 12:05 a.m. Eymann and Lyons loaded its cargo into the airport’s courtesy car and left the airport. Officers followed that car and blocked it in. Eymann admitted that he had a small amount of marijuana in the car. The drug‐dog (Arie) arrived and alerted on luggage, which the officers searched, finding a small amount of marijuana. Harrington frisked Lyons, who had $2,600 in his pocket. Officers arrested the men and returned to the airport. Arie alerted at the Cessna and on bags from inside the plane. Officers found 65 pounds of marijuana and a firearm. The court suppressed the evidence because, although Arie had completed the necessary training, his certification had lapsed weeks earlier. The state dismissed the charges. The two were then charged with federal conspiracy to distribute marijuana and aiding and abetting the possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute,. Lyons was also charged with carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress. The AMOC information established reasonable suspicion. Because the officers used little show‐of‐force, kept their questioning reasonable, and acted consistently with investigatory detention, a reasonable person would not have understood that his freedom was restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest before the handcuffing. Eymann's admission gave the officers probable cause to search the car. Once the marijuana was found, there was probable cause to arrest Eymann. The inevitable‐discovery doctrine then applied. View "United States v. Lyons" on Justia Law

Samantha died from a gunshot wound to the head. The coroner concluded Samantha committed suicide. Samantha’s parents, the Harers' claim Samantha’s boyfriend, Flores—a Crest Hill, Illinois police officer—murdered Samantha during an argument at her home in neighboring Channahon. The Harers sued Flores for wrongful death and other torts and Crest Hill for its alleged unconstitutional practice of concealing officers’ misconduct, which the Harers allege emboldened Flores to kill Samantha. The Harers also sued Channahon and police officers, asserting these defendants denied the Harers their constitutional right of access to court when they engaged in a cover-up to protect Flores. The Channahon defendants moved to dismiss the access claim, arguing they did not prevent the Harers from initiating a wrongful death lawsuit against Flores within the statute of limitations. The court denied the motion, holding that the Channahon defendants still frustrated their judicial access by delaying the Harers’ suit and costing them money; clearly-established law prohibited the officers’ conduct, so qualified immunity did not shield the officers.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The backward-looking access-to-court claim is untenable because the underlying tort claims are timely, facially plausible, and still pending; their access claim is not ripe for review. Post-filing conduct generally cannot serve as a basis for an access-to-court claim. View "Harer v. Casey" on Justia Law

Brasher was part of a narcotics conspiracy, headed by Shelton, centered in Louisville. Shelton typically “fronted” heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine to Brasher and accepted payment from the proceeds of Brasher’s subsequent re-sales of the substances. Brasher became Shelton's “number one customer.” Brasher sometimes supplied kilogram quantities of cocaine to Shelton that he obtained from his own supplier in Texas.Brasher and 14 others were charged with conspiracy to distribute narcotics in and around the Southern District of Indiana, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1). Only Brasher proceeded to trial. He was convicted and sentenced to life in prison. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that there was a material variance between the conspiracy as charged and as proven at trial, that the government’s proof constructively amended the indictment, that the government improperly exercised its peremptory challenges to exclude two African American venire members during jury selection, that the prosecutor made prejudicial remarks in closing argument, that the government made improper use of evidence obtained via court-authorized wiretaps, and that the court erroneously precluded Brasher from challenging a prior narcotics conviction that triggered his mandatory term of life imprisonment. View "United States v. Brasher" on Justia Law

Manyfield pleaded guilty to possessing child pornography; he was sentenced to 120 months in prison. Within a year of his release from prison, Manyfield was twice found in possession of a cell phone with internet connectivity, in violation of his conditions of release. He had created accounts and accessed pornographic websites. He had hard-copy photos of what “appear[ed] to be minor females in sexually provocative poses.” Manyfield had not attended a sex-offender-treatment program; he followed Twitter accounts advertising images of underage girls. The probation officer recommended 18 months’ imprisonment (above the four-10 months’ Guidelines range) plus lifetime supervised release. Manyfield, then 67, did not dispute the allegations but argued that the recommended sentence was excessive under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), emphasizing his medical conditions.The court revoked Manyfield’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months' imprisonment, the maximum allowed under 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), explaining that he was a danger to the community and that his criminal history—including abusing his minor stepdaughter—was “relevant.” The court imposed “lifetime supervised release with the same conditions that were imposed before.” The court neither read the conditions aloud nor asked whether Manyfield waived reading. The written judgment contained conditions that had not been proposed in the revocation petition. Several have been questioned since Manyfield’s original sentencing (prohibitions on “excessive” alcohol use and “frequenting” places where controlled substances are sold). The Seventh Circuit remanded for further consideration of the release conditions; the court properly justified the prison sentence and term of supervised release. View "United States v. Manyfield" on Justia Law

Hughes bought a ticket from Southwest to fly to Chicago. Just before the flight was to board, Southwest canceled it. Hughes, who chose an alternate flight through Omaha, claims that the cancellation was because Southwest ran out of de-icer and that no other airlines had a similar problem. He claims he incurred additional costs for lodging and similar expenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his breach of contract claim. There was no breach; the contract allows the airline to cancel and either reschedule the passenger or refund the fare. There is no implied duty to avoid cancellation. View "Brian Hughes v. Southwest Airlines Co." on Justia Law

Immigrants have historically been eligible for various public benefits and the receipt of those benefits, with limited exceptions did not jeopardize the immigrant’s chances of becoming a lawful permanent resident or citizen. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a new rule, intended to prevent immigrants whom the Executive Branch deems likely to receive any amount of public assistance, from entering the country or adjusting their status. The rule purports to implement the “public charge” provision of 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(4).The Seventh Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against the rule’s enforcement in favor of Cook County, Illinois. The county had standing because the law threatened immediate financial harm because it would cause immigrants to forego preventative health care. The interests of the county are among those protected or regulated by federal law. There is “abundant evidence” supporting the county’s interpretation of the “public charge provision” as being triggered only by long-term primary dependence and that provision does not provide DHS unfettered discretion. The rule is unlikely to survive “arbitrary and capricious” review; it is unclear how immigration officials are to make “public charge” predictions. Cook County lacks legal remedies for the harms imposed by the rule. View "Cook County v. Wolf" on Justia Law