Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Seaway Bank sued J&A to collect on loans secured by a mortgage on Chicago property. In 2013, the court entered a judgment of foreclosure. The court approved the sale of the mortgaged property and entered a $116,381 deficiency judgment against the guarantor. In 2017, Illinois regulators closed Seaway. The FDIC was appointed as receiver, set a claims bar date, and published notice. J&A filed no timely claims. Months later, J&A filed a Petition to Quash Service in the 2012 state-court lawsuit. J&A argued that once relief was granted, it was entitled to the property.The FDIC removed the proceeding to federal court and moved to stay the proceedings to allow J&A to exhaust the mandatory claims process under the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act, 12 U.S.C. 1821(d). The court granted the stay; J&A did not submit any claims by the submission deadline. The FDIC moved to dismiss for failure to exhaust the Act's claims process. J&A asserted that the jurisdiction-stripping provision applied only to claims seeking payment from a failed bank and that J&A did not seek payment but only to quash service and vacate void orders; only if the court granted that non-monetary relief could they pursue “possessory relief,” so that the FDIC’s motion was not ripe because they were not yet seeking the return of the property or monetary relief. The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal. The district court lacked jurisdiction over the Petition because J&A failed to exhaust administrative remedies. View "Seaway Bank & Trust Co. v. J&A Series I, LLC, Series C" on Justia Law

In August 2015 Gill launched his fifth congressional campaign. Unlike his past campaigns, Gill ran as an independent. Although Gill needed 10,754 signatures to qualify for the general ballot, he came up 2,000 short, so the Illinois State Officers Electoral Board did not permit him to appear on the general ballot for Illinois’s 13th Congressional District. Gill filed suit, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The district court granted the Illinois State Board of Elections summary judgment.The Seventh Circuit reversed. The district court failed to conduct a fact-based inquiry as mandated by the Supreme Court’s Anderson-Burdick balancing test, which considers the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff seeks to vindicate and identifies and evaluates the precise interests put forward by the state as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule. The court must consider the extent to which those state interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff’s rights. View "Gill v. Scholz" on Justia Law

From 1906 -1970, the companies manufactured industrial materials at an East Chicago, Indiana Superfund Site. In the 1970s, the East Chicago Housing Authority constructed “West Calumet,” a low-income residential building, on that site. In 2017, former West Calumet tenants sued the companies based on the tenants’ exposure to hazardous substances. Defendant Atlantic Richfield removed the case to federal court, asserting a government contractor defense because its predecessor, ISR, operated during World War II. ISR sold lead and zinc to entities who were under contract with the government to produce the goods for the military. ISR itself held five Army contracts. The materials made by ISR were critical wartime commodities that had to be manufactured according to detailed federal specifications. Other regulations effectively prevented ISR from selling to distributors for civilian applications. Defendant DuPont asserted that the government directed it to build a facility for the government and then lease it from the government to produce Freon-12 and hydrochloric acid solely for the government. The district court remanded, finding that most of the Companies’ government business occurred outside the relevant time frame.The Seventh Circuit reversed. Atlantic Richfield worked "hand-in-hand with the federal government to achieve a task that furthers an end of the federal government.” The Companies’ wartime production was a small but significant portion of their relevant conduct; the federal interest in the matter supports removal. Atlantic Richfield set forth sufficient facts regarding its government contractor defense. View "Baker v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co." on Justia Law

Schaul's business, ChildRite, provided incontinence supplies for special-needs individuals. In 2009-2013, Schaul submitted claims for Medicaid reimbursement for four million units; approximately one million of those units did not exist. He obtained $582,844.10 from Medicaid for those nonexistent items. Charged with health care fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1347, Schaul entered into a plea agreement that described a scheme to defraud Medicaid, substantially identical to that described in the indictment. It stated that Schaul’s counsel had “fully explained” the indictment and the charges and that Schaul fully understood the nature and elements of the crimes. The agreement erroneously stated that the government needed to prove that the defendant “knowingly or willfully" executed the scheme.” The statute requires proof that the defendant acted “knowingly and willfully.” At his hearing, Schaul agreed with the government’s factual allegations and stated that he had discussed the charges with counsel; that he understood the charge; that he had no questions; and that he was satisfied with his counsel’s representation.When the prosecutor explained the elements of the offense, he read from the plea agreement, which incorrectly stated the mens rea element. The court imposed a 24-month sentence plus $582,844.10 in restitution. After his attorney moved to withdraw, Schaul filed an unsuccessful motion to delay the date of his reporting to the Bureau of Prisons. Schaul filed a motion to reconsider, stating, for the first time, that he could “prove … there was no intent to commit fraud.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion. The misrepresentation of the elements of the offense constituted plain error but did not affect Schaul’s substantial rights. The record affirmatively demonstrates that he knowingly and willfully violated the law. View "United States v. Schaul" on Justia Law

An Illinois prison dentist extracted one of inmate Murphy’s teeth. Two days later, a Friday, Murphy went to the prison’s healthcare unit, complaining that his cheek had swollen significantly. Rice, a prison nurse, examined Murphy and described the swelling as “softball‐size[d]” and suspected infection. Dr. Shah prescribed penicillin. Murphy received penicillin that morning. The next day, Saturday, Murphy made several trips to the healthcare unit. The nurse was unable by phone to reach Dr. Shah, who, on Monday, examined Murphy for the first time. After additional treatment attempts, Murphy was sent to an emergency room. A CT scan showed signs of an infection and the closing of Murphy’s airway. Aan oral and maxillofacial surgeon diagnosed him with Ludwig’s angina—a disease that involves infections of nearly all the anatomic spaces in the neck and requires urgent surgical treatment. Ultimately, Murphy underwent three surgeries. Murphy sued Shah for deliberate indifference. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the doctor. The record reflects not deliberate indifference but at most a medical disagreement over the course of treatment View "Murphy v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law

At about 2:10 a.m., LeDure reported to a Salem, Illinois rail yard to assemble a train for a trip. While on the exterior walkway of a locomotive in order to tag it, LeDure slipped and fell down its steps. LeDure got up and proceeded to power down and tag the locomotive. He returned to where he fell and, using a flashlight, bent down to identify a “slick” substance. LeDure reported the incident to his supervisor. He gave a written statement. Union Pacific conducted an inspection and reported cleaning a “small amount of oil” on the walkway. LeDure sued Union Pacific for negligence. He alleged violations of the Locomotive Inspection Act and the Federal Employers’ Liability Act, arguing that Union Pacific failed to maintain the walkway free of hazards. The district court dismissed LeDure’s claims with prejudice. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Locomotive Inspection Act is inapplicable since the locomotive was not “in use” during the incident. LeDure’s injuries were not reasonably foreseeable because they resulted from a small “slick spot” unknown to Union Pacific. There is no evidence that an earlier inspection would have cured the hazard. View "LeDure v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Chicago Police Officers testified that Washington, standing with his back to them, turned his head as their unmarked squad approached and walked away. He removed a shiny, polished chrome handgun from his waistband and tossed it over a fence into a yard. The officers questioned Washington and recovered the handgun. Washington was charged with unlawfully possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g).The government moved to introduce a YouTube video posted three months before the arrest, depicting Washington and another displaying a chrome handgun, arguing that the gun in the video was the same gun that was recovered from the yard. The court rejected a Rule 404(b) objection and permitted the government to introduce still photos from the video. At trial, an ATF Agent, who examined the gun recovered from the yard, described its features and told the jury that the gun recovered by police and the pistol in the still photos from the video had many similarities.The Seventh Circuit affirmed Washington's conviction. Evidence of recent past possession of the same gun is admissible for a non-propensity purpose—to show the defendant’s ownership and control of the charged firearm—although evidence of past possession of a different gun would raise Rule 404(b) concerns. The judge minimized its potential for unfair prejudice by limiting the government to still photos. View "United States v. Washington" on Justia Law

Jackson was driving with Freeman as a passenger, Chicago Police Officer Petrus, on patrol with other officers, observed an object hanging from Jackson’s rearview mirror that appeared to be an air freshener. Petrus ran Jackson's license plate through a database, then pulled Jackson over for violating a city ordinance regarding the obstruction of the driver’s clear view. During the traffic stop, the officers discovered a loaded rifle beside the front passenger’s seat and two loaded handguns underneath the driver’s seat. The men were charged as felons in possession of firearms, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At a suppression hearing, Petrus testified that she believed the law to be that a driver “cannot have anything obstructing the driver’s view” and that the air freshener obstructed the driver’s view. She explained that her “verbiage was off” when she first spoke to Jackson and said that “can’t have anything hanging from there [the rearview mirror]” and that she was “trying to gain control of the situation.” The court concluded that “this type of air freshener is enough justification to pull the car over,” finding Petrus “very credible.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. All that is required for a traffic stop is reasonable suspicion; the officer had an articulable and objective basis for suspecting that the air freshener obstructed Jackson’s clear view in violation of the city municipal code, so the stop was lawful. View "United States v. Freeman" on Justia Law

Apple owns Madison, Wisconsin vitamin stores. Knott, a former Apple employee, was fired in 2017. Knott founded his own vitamin shop, Embrace Wellness, in Middleton, Wisconsin. Embrace allegedly shared design features and a similar layout with Apple’s locations and carried comparable products. Apple sued, alleging infringement of its trademark, trade dress, and copyrights. The defendants filed counterclaims for tortious interference and retaliation. Apple sought a preliminary injunction on the trademark and trade dress claims, which the court denied, explaining that Apple had failed to show a likelihood of irreparable harm. Apple then moved to dismiss its own claims without prejudice. Because the defendants had already expended resources litigating an injunction, the court ordered Apple to withdraw its motion or accept dismissal with prejudice, expressing its opinion that no party’s claim was strong. Apple agreed to dismiss its claims with prejudice.The court subsequently denied defendants’ motion for fees; they appealed with respect to the copyright claims. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Apple’s copyright claims were frivolous—common-law copyright was abolished in 1976—but the totality of the circumstances did not warrant fees. There was no evidence that Apple had filed suit with an improper motive, and no need to deter future frivolous filings. The case was primarily about trademark and trade dress. no motions were filed related to copyright. Apple dismissed the copyright claims voluntarily before defendants had to argue against them. View "Timothy B. O'Brien LLC v. Knott" on Justia Law

In 2001, Ferreyra, 13 years old, entered the U.S. under the Visa Waiver Program, 8 U.S.C. 1187, which allows visitors to come to enter for 90 days. Ferreyra's mandatory waiver of the right to contest removal, except based on asylum, was signed by his parents. Ferreyra did not leave. In 2018, he was charged as removable for having overstayed. He declared that he wished to apply for asylum, withholding of removal and relief under the Convention Against Torture. Ferreyra claimed that, if removed to Argentina, he would face persecution based on his membership in a particular social group—his family. Ferreyra related that, when he was a child in Argentina, his uncle had sexually assaulted him, that his uncle still lived there, and that his uncle had warned that he would kill him if he told anyone about the assault.The IJ denied relief, finding that Ferreyra failed to show that his uncle had targeted him based on his family membership or that the government was unable or unwilling to protect him. The IJ denied Ferreyra’s request for cancellation of removal based on family hardship as unavailable in the asylum-only proceedings. The BIA ordered his removal. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Ferreyra did not present a case warranting relief because of a credible fear of persecution or torture. The waiver is valid; Ferreyra, therefore, cannot present a claim for cancellation of removal based on family hardship. View "Ferreyra v. Barr" on Justia Law