Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

At Malagon’s trial for conspiracy with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 846, 841(a)(1), the government introduced cell phone records, audio and video recordings and their transcripts, and witness testimony, including from undercover officers, concerning two meetings involving an informant. The recordings captured conversations about quantity, price, and timing. At the end of the second meeting, surveillance officers moved toward the house’s garage. Hearing them, Malagon tried to hide the cocaine. Officers saw the kilograms against the garage wall and a blue cooler that Malagon had previously been observed carrying. They arrested Malagon, and on one of his cell phones that they seized, they found a photograph of the two kilograms of cocaine. Malagon was convicted. The court imposed a below-Guidelines sentence of 60 months’ imprisonment, the statutory minimum.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Malagon’s arguments that DEA agents were improperly allowed to present expert testimony as to drug trafficking practices and the use of drug code, and to present lay opinion testimony. Malagon failed to demonstrate an error that was not intentionally waived, which was plain and affected his substantial rights, and that the error affected the fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. View "United States v. Malagon" on Justia Law

Indiana-based hemp sellers and wholesalers sought to enjoin the enforcement of Indiana’s “Act 516” criminal prohibition on the manufacture, delivery, or possession of smokable hemp, Ind. Code 35-48-3-10.1, arguing that Indiana’s law is preempted by the Agriculture Improvement Act of 2018. The 2018 Act expanded the definition of industrial hemp to include all parts of the cannabis plant with a low THC concentration and all low-THC cannabis derivatives; excludes industrial hemp from the federal definition of marijuana, removing it from the DEA’s schedule of controlled substances; provides that the states retain the authority to regulate the production of hemp (7 U.S.C. 1639p); and forbids the states from prohibiting the transportation of hemp products through the state. The district court issued the requested injunction. Indiana then enacted Act 335, which clarifies that Indiana’s prohibition on the delivery and possession of smokable hemp does “not apply to the shipment of smokable hemp from a licensed producer in another state in continuous transit through Indiana to a licensed handler in any state.”The Seventh Circuit vacated, finding the injunction overly broad. The part of Act 516 prohibiting the manufacture of smokable hemp does not fall under the 2018 law’s express preemption clause; it is not clear that the express preemption clause, alone, precludes a state from prohibiting the possession and sale of industrial hemp within the state. View "C.Y. Wholesale, Inc. v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Illinois permits voters to place initiatives and referenda on both local and statewide ballots but requires proponents to collect a specific number of signatures during a period of 18 months. That period ended for the state on May 3, 2020, and will end for the city on August 3. Plaintiffs filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, contending that the state’s requirements are unconstitutional, given the social-distancing requirements adopted by Illinois' Governor during the COVID-19 pandemic. A district judge denied relief.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first holding that at least one plaintiff (Morgan) had standing because began his petition campaign before filing suit. During most of the time available to seek signatures, Morgan did nothing. The other plaintiffs did not do anything of substance until the suit was filed. They had plenty of time to gather signatures before the pandemic began and are not entitled to emergency relief. The Governor’s orders did not limit their speech. The orders concern conduct, not what anyone may write or say. Although the orders make it hard to obtain signatures, so would the reluctance of people to approach strangers during a pandemic. The federal Constitution does not require any state or local government to put referenda or initiatives on the ballot; if the Governor’s orders, coupled with the signature requirements, amount to a decision to skip all referenda for the 2020 election cycle, there is no federal problem. View "Morgan v. White" on Justia Law

Running from police officers, Payne threw down a loaded pistol. Payne then attempted to provide a false identity and said he was not a felon. Payne had outstanding warrants for absconding from probation and three prior felony convictions. He had been convicted of child abuse and driving a stolen vehicle and, later, of felony failure to comply with a police officer and misdemeanor battery after holding hostage a domestic partner and her child.Payne pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g), 924(a)(2). The court conducted a colloquy to determine whether Payne’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary, and confirmed that he previously had been convicted of a crime punishable by a term of imprisonment exceeding one year. Payne did not say he knew he was a convicted felon. After hearing about his low educational attainment and mental-health issues, the court sentenced Payne to 41 months’ imprisonment, despite a Guidelines range of 51-63 months. Days later, the Supreme Court, in Rehaif, held that to be convicted of such a status offense, a defendant must have known “he belonged to the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” Payne argued there was a reasonable probability he would not have pleaded guilty had he known about this element. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction, finding it “highly implausible Payne was ignorant of his felon status.” View "United States v. Payne" on Justia Law

Robinson pled guilty to a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine after he was caught in a controlled buy. Robinson claimed on appeal that although the government indicted him for participating in a conspiracy involving 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A), he only pled guilty to a conspiracy involving a lesser or unspecified amount, section 841(b)(1)(B). The Seventh Circuit affirmed Robinson’s 200-month sentence, a downward departure from a guidelines range of 262-327 months. Robinson admitted to the facts implicating him in the greater crime (section 841(b)(1)(A)) in documents filed before the plea hearing, at the plea hearing itself, by admitting to the facts in the presentence investigation report, and at sentencing. He agreed that he had been advised that the minimum sentence provided by the statute was 10 years and the maximum was life and stated that he made no claim of innocence. In exchange for the plea, the government agreed not to seek an increased sentence based on his prior felony convictions. Before either party entered the courtroom, both sides had agreed that Robinson would plead guilty to section 841(b)(1)(A)—a conspiracy involving 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. View "United States v. Robinson" on Justia Law

A nurse accused Indiana prisoner Douglas of threatening her in the infirmary. Based on this accusation, Douglas was convicted of a disciplinary offense. Douglas appealed. The prison’s superintendent overturned the conviction about 18 days later for lack of evidence. In the meantime, Douglas was placed in “segregation” housing, lost his job as a “wheelchair pusher,” and stopped receiving wages. After his successful appeal, Douglas was returned to the normal cell block but not to his original cell. Douglas sought return to his old cell, reinstatement to his old job or a better one, and back pay. Douglas eventually received a new job and back pay but he lodged several more grievances. He filed suit (42 U.S.C. 1983) alleging violations of the First, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments. The district court screened the complaint, 28 U.S.C. 1915A(b), and allowed only the First Amendment claim against his casework manager, Reeves, to proceed. Douglas asserted that Reeves punished him for taking his appeal by refusing to restore his benefits. Later, the court granted summary judgment, rejecting that claim. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. No reasonable jury could conclude that Reeves inflicted deprivations on Douglas likely to deter a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in First Amendment activity. View "Douglas v. Reeves" on Justia Law

Chicago assesses fines for parking and other vehicular offenses against the owner. If the owner filed bankruptcy, keeping the car in the estate meant that the automatic stay prevented the city from using collection devices such as towing or booting. The Seventh Circuit previously held 11 U.S.C. 1327(b), which provides that “confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate in the debtor” precludes debtors from avoiding such fines by keeping the car in the estate except when a court enters a case-specific order, supported by good case-specific reasons. Bankruptcy judges then changed their form confirmation order, adding a checkbox through which debtors could elect a departure from the statutory presumption. The Seventh Circuit then held that vehicular fines are administrative expenses that bankruptcy estates must pay even though not listed on debtors’ 11 U.S.C.507(a)(2) schedules. Whether a car’s title returns to the owner on confirmation of the plan or remains in the estate, vehicular fines must be paid.The Seventh Circuit then reversed confirmation orders that were based only on the debtor’s choice. Immunity from traffic laws is not an outcome plausibly attributed to the Bankruptcy Code. A bankruptcy court must confirm any plan that satisfies 11 U.S.C. 1325(a) and "other applicable provisions of this title”; section 1327(b) is an applicable provision. A bankruptcy court may confirm a plan that holds property in the estate only after finding good case-specific reasons for that action. View "City of Chicago v. Kiera Cherry" on Justia Law

Williams was convicted in Illinois state court in two separate cases for raping two women and received sentences totaling 66 years’ imprisonment. Williams contends that his defense attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not only advising him to reject a 41-year plea offer but also failing to inform him of his maximum sentencing exposure if he proceeded to trial in both cases and lost. An Illinois court rejected these claims, concluding that Williams failed to provide any information pertinent to one of the two cases that gave rise to the 41-year plea offer. Without knowing anything about that case, the Illinois court reasoned, there was no way to assess defense counsel’s performance and no way to conclude that Williams received ineffective assistance.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his federal habeas petition, finding the Illinois court’s conclusion reasonable. The Illinois Appellate Court sensibly concluded that it had too little information to judge the advice Williams received in connection with the 41-year plea offer. Without even a superficial familiarity with one of the cases, a court could not know with confidence that Williams would have accepted a combined 41- year plea. View "Williams v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Wilborn was convicted of first-degree murder for the 2004 murder of a rival gang member in Chicago and was sentenced to 30 years, plus 25 years for personally discharging a firearm. After exhausting state remedies, he sought federal habeas relief. He claimed that trial counsel’s promises during opening arguments amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel. Trial counsel indicated multiple times that Wilborn’s co-defendant, Jenkins, would testify to shooting the victim. During the trial, however, Jenkins changed his proposed testimony and defense counsel determined Jenkins would no longer be credible. Wilborn agreed with this recommendation on the record.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of the petition. Wilborn’s representation did not contain serious errors amounting to a deprivation of a fair trial; unforeseen situations may arise during trial. Counsel’s failure to present Jenkins to the jury or present testimonial evidence does not rise to the level of prejudice under Strickland. Promising the jury it will hear testimony that Wilborn did not participate in the crime does not necessarily create prejudice. View "Wilborn v. Jones" on Justia Law

In 1998, Long, age 16, got into Purkey’s truck. Purkey, 46, threatened her with a knife and drove her across the state line to his home, where he raped her and ultimately killed her. Purkey dismembered Long’s body and burned the pieces. He dumped the remains into a septic lagoon. Later in 1998, he killed 80-year-old Bales. He was caught. While awaiting trial, Purkey contacted Detective Howard about Long and insisted that an FBI agent come along because he thought that if he were convicted on federal charges, he could serve a life sentence in a federal facility. Purkey confessed to killing Long, took them to the crime scene, and gave handwritten confessions. Howard and Tarpley denied that any deal was on the table. After Purkey pleaded guilty to the Bales murder, he was indicted for Long's kidnapping, rape, and murder. Purkey had repeatedly confessed to kidnapping Long; his defense was that he thought she was a prostitute who willingly accompanied him and that he had fabricated the kidnapping claim to be prosecuted in federal court. Defense counsel did not object to the use of his confessions to refute that story. A jury voted for a death sentence. The Eighth Circuit affirmed.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, rejecting claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and several alleged violations of his due process rights--government misconduct during the trial, insufficient evidence to find kidnapping beyond a reasonable doubt, and error in the jury’s failure to address the question of mitigating evidence. View "Purkey v. United States" on Justia Law