Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vesey pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g). His PSR had calculated a base offense level of 20 because Vesey had a prior conviction for a crime of violence, Illinois aggravated assault: Vesey swung a shower rod at a correctional officer performing his official duties. After subtracting three levels for acceptance of responsibility, with a criminal history category of VI, his guidelines range was 51-63 months’ imprisonment. Vesey argued that his prior conviction was not a “crime of violence.” The court sentenced him to 72 months’ imprisonment, stating that “even if my legal analysis on determining whether that prior aggravated assault is a crime of violence to raise your base offense level up to the 20 from the 14 and yield the— and result in the 51 to 63 is wrong, I still think based on the 3553(a) factors ... specifically, your personal history and characteristics and your risk to recidivate because you’ve been undeterred by any prior sentences, fully supports at least a range there independent of any of the guideline calculations." The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Applying the categorical approach and finding the Illinois statute divisible, the court concluded that Vesey’s Illinois conviction was for a crime of violence. View "United States v. Vesey" on Justia Law

Hosler responded to a darkweb site post purporting to advertise sex with a young girl. Eau Claire Detective Beardsley had created the advertisement, pretending to be a mother, “Amanda,” offering her 12-year-old daughter, “Gracie,” for sex in exchange for money or in a swap for other young girls. Hosler corresponded with "Amanda," arranged a meeting, then traveled from Texas to Eau Claire. He was arrested at the planned meeting location and was charged with child enticement, 18 U.S.C. 2422(b); interstate travel for the purpose of engaging in illicit sexual activity, section 2423(b); and possession of child pornography, sections 2252(a)(4)(B), (b)(2).The court denied Hosler's motion for a judgment of acquittal on the child enticement charge, found him guilty, sentenced him to concurrent 120-month terms of imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, finding the evidence sufficient to support Hosler’s conviction for attempting to persuade or entice a minor into a sexual relationship. The statute refers to a defendant who “ knowingly persuades, induces, entices, or coerces” the minor to engage in prohibited sexual activity. The court noted Hosler’s extensive communications with “Amanda” about “Gracie’s” preferences and awareness of and reaction to Hosler’s interest. It was not plainly irrational for the judge to interpret Hosler’s messages as trying to win Gracie’s favor. View "United States v. Hosler" on Justia Law

Manuel's disabled cellmate requested a change of rooms and became hostile toward Manuel. Manuel reported this but no action was taken. The cellmate beat Manuel into unconsciousness. Officer Nalley investigated. Manuel submitted a grievance to Counselor Miller. Manuel later filed additional grievances and requested status updates. Miller failed to respond. Manuel filed a civil complaint. Later, an inmate informed prison personnel that Manuel asked him and another inmate to file fraudulent paperwork regarding the attack. The prison filed an incident report and shakedown slip.Two weeks later, Manuel again sought a status update The conversation ended when Miller asked Manuel if he was going to file a grievance against her; he responded “maybe.” Minutes later, Nalley searched Manuel’s cell following the shakedown slip and confiscated a note describing trading and trafficking, forged letters describing the cellmate incident, letters addressed to the court, and a contraband cassette tape. The prison committee found Manuel guilty of forging documents and possessing contraband.The district court rejected, on summary judgment, his 42 U.S.C. 1983 First Amendment retaliation claim against Miller and Nalley. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Manuel needed to furnish evidence that would allow a reasonable jury to find that his protected speech was at least a motivating factor for Nalley’s response. The suspicious timing of the shakedown shortly after the conversation with Miller is not enough to prove that Nalley was motivated by the protected activity and the shakedown was retaliation. View "Manuel v. Nalley" on Justia Law

Tonyan, a Dunham’s store manager, suffered a series of injuries, requiring multiple surgeries and restrictions to her shoulder, arm, and hand movement. After her doctor imposed permanent restrictions, including one preventing her from lifting more than two pounds with her right arm, Dunham’s fired her. Dunham’s claims, because of its lean staffing model, that store managers must perform various forms of physical labor, such as unloading and shelving merchandise, as essential functions of their job duties.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of her claims, alleging disparate treatment and failure to accommodate her disability, 42 U.S.C. 12112(a) and 42 U.S.C. 12112(b)(1)–(7). Physical tasks were essential functions of Tonyan’s job; in light of the severe restrictions on her movement, no reasonable factfinder could determine that Tonyan was capable of performing the essential functions of her position. The court rejected Tonyan’s argument under the FLSA “primary duty” test for overtime exemption; an exempt employee may spend more than 50 percent of his time performing non‐exempt work, such as manual labor. Tools were available throughout Tonyan’s employment and they did not permit Tonyan to perform her duties, which she delegated. Even with tools, a person restricted to lifting no more than two pounds with one of her arms could not lift canoes, for instance, to their proper storage space. View "Tonyan v. Dunham's Athleisure Corp." on Justia Law

Police investigating Vermilion County drug trafficking sent an informant to buy cocaine at Glenn’s home. The transaction was recorded on audio and video. About a month later a state judge put agent Alblinger under oath, took his testimony, and issued a warrant to search Glenn’s home. A search turned up cocaine and guns. Glenn unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The warrant rested on the “controlled buy” plus Alblinger’s testimony that the informant had for more than a decade provided reliable information. Although Alblinger did not reveal whether agents had searched the informant before the transaction, that the informant had a long criminal record and was cooperating to earn lenience, and that the informant’s record of providing accurate information was with the local police rather than with Alblinger personally, the omissions do not negate probable cause. Given the audio and video evidence of the controlled buy, the informant’s reliability and motivations are not material to the existence of probable cause. The passage of time did not render the information stale. In an interview shortly before Alblinger applied for the warrant, Glenn conceded that he sold cocaine from his house, negating any possibility that Alblinger knew that information obtained after the controlled buy implied that Glenn’s house no longer contained cocaine. The delay was intended to prevent Glenn from inferring the informant’s identity. View "United States v. Glenn" on Justia Law

A 2012-2015 collective bargaining agreement (CBA) contained a union security clause that required Maysteel employees either to become union members or to pay a “service fee for representation.” Under a dues check‐off provision, Maysteel, with an employee’s authorization, deducted dues or fees from the employee’s paycheck. A new agreement was to take effect on March 5, 2015, the day after the old agreement expired; the parties agreed to implement it on March 2, with the start of a new pay period. The new agreement was actually signed on March 18. On March 11, Wisconsin’s Act 1, a right-to-work law prohibiting union security clauses, took effect and applied to CBAs “upon renewal, modification, or extension of the agreement occurring on or after” that date.Plaintiffs unsuccessfully demanded that Maysteel stop fee deductions, then filed charges with the NLRB, which negotiated a settlement that did not require reimbursement of the deductions or invalidation of the union security clause. The plaintiffs sued, alleging unfair labor practices under state law. Defendants removed the case to federal court. The judge denied remand and granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The federal question at the heart of the complaint was whether the 2012 CBA was "renewed, modified, [or] extended on or after March 11, 2015.” Wisconsin is not entitled to give an independent answer to this question, different from federal law. The CBA was formed before Act 1 took effect. View "Sarauer v. International Association of Machinists & Aerospace Workers" on Justia Law

Doctors removed Haynes’s gallbladder. She was injured in the process and required additional surgery that led to more than $300,000 in medical expenses. Her father’s medical-benefits plan (the Fund) paid these because Haynes was a “covered dependent.” The plan includes subrogation and repayment clauses: on recovering anything from third parties, a covered person must reimburse the Fund. Haynes settled a tort suit against the hospital and others for $1.5 million. She and her lawyers refused to repay the Fund, which sued to enforce the plan’s terms under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(3). Haynes argued that she did not agree to follow the plan’s rules and was not a participant, only a beneficiary. The district judge granted the Fund summary judgment and enjoined Haynes and her lawyer from dissipating the settlement proceeds. The Fund had named each of them as a defendant.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. ERISA allows fiduciaries to bring actions to obtain “equitable relief … to enforce ... the terms of the plan.” The nature of the remedy sought—enforcement of a right to identifiable assets—is equitable. Having accepted the plan’s benefits, Haynes must accept the obligations The absence of a beneficiary’s signed writing, regardless of the beneficiary's age, does not invalidate any of the plan’s terms. View "Central States, Southeast & Southwest Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Haynes" on Justia Law

Officers executed a search warrant at Ruth’s residence and recovered 2.9 grams of crack cocaine, 5.6 grams of powder cocaine, a counterfeit $100 bill, $2,250 in U.S. currency, and drug paraphernalia. Ruth was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. The government notified Ruth (21 U.S.C. 851) of intent to rely on his 2006 Illinois conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute as a predicate felony drug offense to enhance his statutory maximum sentence from 20 to 30 years’ imprisonment. Ruth eventually pleaded guilty.The probation officer determined that Ruth was a career offender based on prior felony convictions for controlled substance offenses, U.S.S.G. 4B1.1: the 2006 Illinois cocaine conviction and a 2010 Illinois conviction for possession with intent to deliver cannabis. Ruth’s resulting Guidelines range was 188-235 months. Ruth argued that his 2006 conviction was not a “controlled substance offense” under the Guidelines because the Illinois statute is categorically broader than federal law; it prohibits possession of positional isomers of cocaine whereas the federal Controlled Substances Act does not and its definition of cocaine “analog” was categorically broader than the federal definition of a controlled substance analog. Ruth did not object to the section 851 sentencing enhancement.The Seventh Circuit vacated Ruth’s 108-month sentence. Using the categorical approach, the overbreadth of the Illinois statute disqualifies his prior conviction as a predicate felony drug offense. View "United States v. Ruth" on Justia Law

FedEx twice fired Kotaska because she could not lift up to 75 pounds. The first time, she was limited to lifting only 60 pounds after a shoulder injury. Eventually, her condition improved so that she could lift 75 pounds to her waist. A FedEx supervisor rehired her “oě the books.” Within three, FedEx discovered her capabilities above the waist remained severely limited and dismissed her again. Kotaska filed suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101–12213.The district court granted FedEx summary judgment because Kotaska had not shown she was a qualięed individual or that the second dismissal was in retaliation for her complaints about the first. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The parties agree that lifting packages, including above the waist and shoulders, is an essential function (really the essential function) of a handler. Kotaska did not dispute FedEx’s judgment that a handler must be able to lift up to 75 pounds by herself and up to 150 pounds with help. Whatever precise weight a handler might need to lift above the waist or shoulders, no reasonable fact-finder could place that weight within Kotaska’s stringent medical restrictions. View "Kotaska v. Federal Express Corp." on Justia Law

In 1997, Durham received a 35-year sentence for a federal drug offense that was reduced to 20 years after amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines. Durham was released in 2015. In 2018, he violated the terms of his supervised release by domestic battery, unauthorized travel, making false statements to a probation officer, and theft of over $500. Dunham denied having assaulted his ex-girlfriend, despite the testimony of a third party witness.He was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment, about twice the high end of the guidelines range. The district court emphasized the gravity of Durham’s abuse of his ex-girlfriend and stated: “The guideline allows for an upward variance if he received a reduction. He has received two reductions.” Durham’s attorney responded: “That’s a point well-taken, Judge.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting Dunham’s argument that he was being punished for the Guidelines amendments. Read as a whole, the sentencing transcript indicates that the district court selected the 30-month revocation sentence by applying the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and, most especially, considering the “nature and circumstances” of Durham’s supervised release violations, foremost the violent assault of his former girlfriend. The district court could reasonably conclude that Durham “squandered” his early release. View "United States v. Durham" on Justia Law