Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sigler totaled his 2001 Dodge Ram and filed a claim with GEICO, his auto insurer, for the loss. GEICO paid him for the value of the car, adjusted for depreciation, minus his deductible. Sigler claims he is entitled to sales tax and title and tag transfer fees for a replacement vehicle, though he did not incur these costs. He filed a proposed class action against GEICO seeking damages for breach of contract. The district court dismissed the suit, holding that neither the GEICO policy nor Illinois insurance law requires payment of these costs when the insured does not incur them.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The premise of Sigler’s suit, that sales tax and title and tag transfer fees are always part of “replacement cost” in a total-loss claim regardless of whether the insured incurs these costs, misreads the policy and Illinois insurance regulations. GEICO’s policy does not promise to pay sales tax or title and tag transfer fees; the Illinois Administrative Code requires a settling auto insurer to pay these costs only if the insured actually incurs and substantiates them with appropriate documentation. View "Sigler v. Geico Casualty Co." on Justia Law

Corner violated the conditions of his supervised release for possessing with intent to distribute 11 grams of cocaine base by using and possessing illegal drugs, failing to comply with drug testing, and lying to his probation officer about his inability to maintain employment. Corner had tested positive for controlled substances more than three times in one year. The court sentenced Corner to 18 months’ imprisonment and 42 months of supervised release.The First Step Act of 2018 subsequently authorized courts to reduce a defendant’s sentence by retroactively applying the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, which modified 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B)(iii), under which Corner was convicted, by reducing the statutory minimum penalties and increasing the amount of crack necessary to trigger those penalties. Corner moved (18 U.S.C. 3582(c)) for a reduction of his revocation sentence and term of supervision. Corner argued that, although his current sentence was for violating his supervised release, he was eligible for a reduction because of his original conviction. The district court denied Corner’s motion, without determining whether he was eligible for relief. Corner began his 42 months of supervision in March 2020.The Seventh Circuit vacated. A district court’s discretionary determination whether to grant a First Step Act motion for a reduced sentence must be informed by whether the Act applies to the defendant's sentence and calculation of the new sentencing parameters. View "United States v. Corner" on Justia Law

Bonk conspired with Kampas and Wood to distribute ice methamphetamine. Charged with conspiracy to possess methamphetamine with intent to distribute and with possession of methamphetamine with intent to distribute, Wood and Kampas pleaded guilty to conspiracy with plea agreements. Bonk, who pleaded guilty without an agreement, had several previous convictions, many of them violent in nature, resulting in a guidelines sentencing range of 292-365 months’ imprisonment. Defense counsel argued that the guidelines' 188-235-month range for methamphetamine mixture should be used instead of the higher range for ice methamphetamine and noted several mitigating factors.The district court sentenced Bonk to 262 months’ imprisonment. Bonk requested access to all sealed documents for Bonk and his codefendants “for the crucial purpose of analyzing, or ruling-out, whether disparity and/or excessiveness of sentencing was committed by the trial court in separately sentencing the three defendants.” The court denied the motion in part. The Seventh Circuit concluded that it did not have jurisdiction to review that denial and rejected a challenge to the reasonableness of Bonk’s sentence. Bonk sought to appeal from an order that was issued after he filed his notice of appeal, and, the order, addressing appellate counsel’s emergency request for access to all documents, is not obviously related to the sentencing order from which he appealed. View "United States v. Bonk" on Justia Law

The accident occurred on I-294 in Illinois. The posted speed limit was 55 miles per hour. It was dark. The weather was cold, snowy, and icy. Perez’s SUV spun out of control. Wharton’s tractor-trailer truck struck the right rear of Perez’s car. Perez claims that his vehicle hit a patch of black ice within its lane, swerved, then returned to the original lane in which Wharton was following Perez. Perez testified he was driving 15-30 miles per hour, while Wharton was driving at or slightly above the posted speed limit. Wharton says that she saw Perez spin out and that his vehicle moved from the right lane all the way to the left side of the highway, so she began slowing down, but Perez unexpectedly cut all the way across the highway again. Wharton testified that she had downshifted to third or fourth gear by the time of impact so that her truck would have been going 10-15 miles per hour. After excluding Perez’s expert witnesses on accidents and truck‐driving, the district court granted summary judgment for Wharton. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Under Illinois law, a reasonable jury could infer that Wharton was driving negligently based on the evidence that she rear‐ended Perez and that she was driving too fast for the weather conditions. View "Perez v. K & B Transportation, Inc." on Justia Law

Cook County, Illinois revised its policies in favor of broader access to pretrial release. The plaintiffs are nine black Chicago residents, arrested and charged with felonies, whom the county trial courts admitted to bail subject to electronic monitoring supervised by the Sheriff. They allege that Cook County Sheriff Dart disagreed with the revised policies, independently reviewed their bail orders, and decided they should not be released on those conditions. They were neither released on monitoring nor left at liberty but remained in jail for about two weeks. Motions for rules to show cause were filed. Two plaintiffs were released in the dead of night, hours before the motion hearings. The district court dismissed most of the plaintiff's civil rights claims.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The plaintiffs’ allegations are sufficient to proceed on federal constitutional claims for wrongful pretrial detention and denial of equal protection, and on state-law claims for contempt of court. A core function of the Fourth Amendment is to put neutral decision-makers between unchecked official discretion and invasions of private liberty by search or seizure. Once the plaintiffs appeared before the court, probable cause ceased to be a justification for the Sheriff’s unilateral seizure. View "Williams v. Dart" on Justia Law

Sommerfield was born in Germany, where some of his family members had died in concentration camps. He emigrated, settled in Chicago, and joined the police department. His supervisor was Sergeant Knasiak. For years, Sommerfield endured vicious anti-Semitic abuse from Knasiak. After Knasiak insulted the Mexican ethnicity of Sommerfield’s girlfriend, Sommerfield filed a formal complaint register (CR). Two days later, Knasiak accused Sommerfield of insubordination for an unrelated incident, recommending suspension. This was the only CR Knasiak had ever issued. Sommerfield’s five-day suspension was unprecedented for the minor infraction of “failure to report location.” Later Sommerfield was denied a promotion, although he was rated “well-qualified.” Sommerfield sued. The court dismissed Knasiak. Sommerfield won a jury verdict of $30,000 against Chicago.Sommerfield again sued Knasiak and the city in 2008, alleging harassment, discrimination on the basis of race, religion, and national origin, and retaliation based on protected activities. The district court dismissed the claims against the city but awarded Sommerfield $540,000 in punitive damages, $8,703.96 in pre-judgment interest, plus another $54,315.24 in economic damages. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the evidence was not “overwhelming,” there was ample evidence from which the jury could conclude that Knasiak filed the CR out of discriminatory animus and that Knasiak was the real decision-maker with respect to the adverse actions taken against Sommerfield. Upholding the award of punitive damages, the court stated that, although Knasiak’s harassment never turned physically violent, his conduct was “extremely reprehensible.” View "Sommerfield v. Knasiak" on Justia Law

Each of the three defendants in these consolidated appeals was convicted of at least one “covered offense” under the First Step Act, 132 Stat. 5194. A “covered offense” is a federal crime (committed before August 3, 2010) for which the statutory penalties were modified by the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010. They each unsuccessfully sought a sentence reduction.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. If a defendant’s aggregate sentence includes both covered and non-covered offenses, a court may reduce the sentence for the non-covered offenses and, if the Fair Sentencing Act did not alter the Guidelines range for a defendant’s covered offense, a court may still reduce the defendant’s sentence for that offense. View "United States v. Speed" on Justia Law

Quincy’s Prevagen® dietary supplement is sold through brick‐and‐mortar stores and online. Ellishbooks, which was not authorized to sell Prevagen® products, sold dietary supplements identified as Prevagen® on Amazon.com, including items that were in altered or damaged packaging; lacked the appropriate markings that identify the authorized retail seller; and contained Identification and security tags from retail stores. Quincy sued under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1114. The court entered a $480,968.13 judgment in favor of Quincy, plus costs, and permanently enjoined Ellishbooks from infringing upon the PREVAGEN® trademark and selling stolen products bearing the PREVAGEN® trademark.The Seventh Circuit affirmed and subsequently awarded $44,329.50 in sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. Ellishbooks’s arguments “had virtually no likelihood of success” on appeal and it appeared that Ellishbooks attempted to draw out the proceedings for as long as possible. View "Quincy Bioscience, LLC v. Ellishbooks" on Justia Law

Wells was sentenced for two drug offenses: two years’ imprisonment for the first and one year for the second, to run consecutively, with credit for pretrial detention: 255 days for the first sentence and 97 days for the second. Wells calculated his term as 734 days: three years (1095 days) less 255 days less 97 days. The Department of Corrections calculated 1095 less 255, disregarding the 97-day credit because it believed that, after his arrest for the second offense (which occurred while he was on bail) Wells had been in custody on both charges simultaneously. Wells filed grievances but was held until the expiration of the 840-day term (less good-time credits). Wells filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations. After a trial to determine whether the prison’s records supervisor (Caudill) acted with the mental state required to violate the Eighth Amendment, the court ruled in Caudill’s favor.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, first rejecting an argument based on Wells’ pro se status. Wells did not seek legal assistance. The district judge did not make a clearly erroneous finding when concluding that Wells had not shown that Caudill acted with the necessary state of mind. The court also noted that Wells received a sentence calculation early in his term. He protested within the prison hierarchy but did not ask a state court to determine the proper release date. View "Wells v. Caudill" on Justia Law

In 2013, LeVan was elected to the office of Milton Township Assessor, displacing his political rival, Earl. Shortly after he took office, LeVan discharged a group of Deputy Assessors who had publicly supported Earl in his run for reelection. The dismissed employees sued LeVan under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Deputy Assessor position is not one for which political affiliation is a valid job requirement, as the position did not authorize the employees to have meaningful input in policy decisions.The district court concluded that LeVan is not entitled to qualified immunity. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Unless political affiliation is an appropriate job requirement, the First Amendment forbids government officials from discharging employees based on their political affiliation. Taking as true the plaintiffs’ well-pleaded allegations about the characteristics of the Deputy Assessor position, a reasonable actor in LeVan’s position would have known that dismissing the deputies based on their political affiliation violated their constitutional rights. View "Hanson v. LeVan" on Justia Law