Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Anthony Day and Omarr Williams were charged with robbing a bank in Hammond, Indiana. Day was identified as the man who brandished a silver revolver during the robbery. After the robbery, the police tracked Day down using a GPS tracker embedded in the stolen cash. They found him in a wooded area, along with cash, an OGIO bag, parts of the robbers' disguises, and two firearms: a silver Smith & Wesson revolver and an American Tactical assault rifle. The police arrested Day and Williams, and a grand jury charged Day with bank robbery, brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence, and being a felon in possession of a firearm.In the district court, Day moved to exclude reference to the American Tactical assault rifle, arguing that there was no evidence he used it during the robbery. He also requested a unanimity instruction, meaning the jurors would have to agree on which gun he possessed for the charge of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court denied both requests, citing a previous decision by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. The jury found Day guilty on all counts, and he was sentenced to 292 months in prison. Day appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm, challenging the district court's failure to give his requested jury instruction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Day's argument de novo. The court noted that the Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to trial by an impartial jury, which requires jury unanimity for convictions for serious crimes. However, this requirement only applies to the elements of the offense, not the means used to commit an element of the crime. The court explained that the particular firearm possessed is not an element of the crime, but rather the means used to satisfy the element of "any firearm." Therefore, jurors do not need to agree on which weapon the defendant possessed. The court also noted that where a defendant possessed multiple firearms, the government may only bring one charge if the defendant's possession of the firearms was "simultaneous and undifferentiated." The court found that the evidence supported a single course of possession of the firearms, not two distinct instances of possession. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court, concluding that no unanimity instruction was required. View "USA v. Day" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Zebulon Marzette, who was convicted for possessing a firearm as a felon. The incident occurred on September 20, 2019, when a 911 call reported people pounding on a door and waving guns at an apartment complex in South Bend, Indiana. Responding officers encountered a chaotic scene and eventually pulled over a car leaving the area. Marzette, who had walked to the location of the car stop, was handcuffed and placed in a squad car. A gun was found in a purse in the back seat of the stopped car, and subsequent DNA testing revealed Marzette's DNA on the trigger. Marzette was charged with felony possession of a firearm.The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana. Marzette objected to the introduction of the DNA evidence, arguing that each custodian in the gun’s chain of custody needed to testify to prove that the gun and the DNA evidence were authentic and reliable. The district court disagreed and overruled Marzette’s objection, admitting the DNA-related testimony and testing results into evidence. The jury returned a guilty verdict and Marzette was sentenced to 36 months’ imprisonment.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Marzette challenged the district court’s admission of the DNA evidence and the hearsay testimony about the 911 call. The appellate court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the DNA evidence, as the government had provided a substantially complete chain of custody. Regarding the 911 call, the court concluded that even if it was an error to admit the dispatch call, the government could have presented effectively the same case with its exclusion. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Marzette" on Justia Law

The case involves Bernell Brasher, who was convicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The case began when a confidential source informed the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) that Bacaree Oaks had a pound of meth for sale. The source suggested he would sell the meth on credit and pay Oaks and Brasher $5,000 afterward. Instead, the source turned the meth over to law enforcement. The meth was tested and found to be 99% pure methamphetamine. Brasher and Oaks were later arrested. During his arrest, Brasher admitted to owing money to his supplier in Mexico for about 100 pounds of meth he had on the street.Brasher was indicted for conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and pleaded guilty. The presentence investigation report (PSR) concluded that Brasher's relevant conduct included four instances of past drug distribution activity. Brasher objected to the PSR's findings, but his objections are not part of this appeal. The district court sentenced Brasher to 200 months’ imprisonment, which fell within his Guidelines range.On appeal, Brasher argued that his past conduct was too dissimilar from his offense of conviction—and too long before it—to factor into his Guidelines calculation. The court disagreed, finding sufficient similarity between the offense of conviction and the uncharged conduct to satisfy the plain error standard. The court also rejected Brasher's argument that the district court failed to explain why the past conduct was relevant. The court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "United States v. Brasher" on Justia Law

A mortgage company, Approved Mortgage Corporation, initiated two wire transfers, but the instructions for the transactions were altered by a third party. The funds were transferred to Truist Bank, which deposited the funds into an account it had previously flagged as suspicious. The funds were then withdrawn in the form of cashier’s checks. Approved Mortgage sued Truist, seeking damages in the amount of the transfers. The company asserted two claims under the Indiana Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), which governs the rights, duties, and liabilities of banks and their customers with respect to electronic funds transfers, and a common law negligence claim.The district court dismissed the UCC claims due to lack of privity between Approved Mortgage and Truist, and dismissed the negligence claim as preempted by the UCC. The court held that the UCC does not establish an independent remedy and must be read with another section of the UCC, which entitles a sender to a refund only from the bank which received its payment.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the UCC claims, agreeing with the lower court that the UCC does not establish an independent remedy and must be read with another section of the UCC. However, the appellate court reversed the dismissal of the negligence claim, holding that to the extent the negligence claim arises from Truist’s issuance of the cashier’s checks after Truist credited the funds to the suspicious account, the claim is not preempted by the UCC. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "Approved Mortgage Corporation v. Truist Bank" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Huazhi Han, who was convicted on charges of money laundering and related offenses. Han used his electronic goods business to launder drug proceeds for Mexican drug traffickers. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and Chicago Police Department (CPD) began investigating a money laundering organization in Chicago, in which Han played a key role. Han received cash proceeds from a drug trafficker, Rafiq Roman, on multiple occasions. After Roman's arrest, he cooperated with the authorities, leading to Han's arrest. The officers found a loaded firearm, approximately $200,000 in cash, and lookalike currency in Han's car. They also searched Han's home, where they found nearly $1.3 million in cash, a money counter, rubber bands, and firearms.Han was indicted on four charges, including conspiracy to commit money laundering and operating an unlicensed money transmitting business. Before trial, Han moved to suppress the evidence seized from his home, arguing that the officers searched his home without a warrant or consent. The district court denied the motion, finding that Han's wife had voluntarily consented to the search. The case proceeded to a jury trial, where Han was convicted on all counts.On appeal, Han argued that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress, admitting threat evidence, and denying his motion for a mistrial based on the government’s closing argument. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found no error and affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that Han's wife had voluntarily consented to the search of their home, the threat evidence was admissible as it was directly related to Han's crimes, and the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments did not result in an unfair trial. View "United States v. Huazhi Han" on Justia Law

The case revolves around a traffic stop in Wisconsin where police officers used a K-9 unit to sniff a car they suspected was involved in drug trafficking. The dog signaled the presence of drugs, leading to a search of the car and the discovery of almost eleven pounds of methamphetamine. The defendant, Juventino Plancarte, who was in the car during the stop, challenged the district court's denial of his motion to suppress the evidence.The lower courts had indicted Plancarte on two counts related to methamphetamine distribution. He moved to suppress the evidence obtained after the dog's sniff, arguing that the dog could identify both illegal marijuana products and legal products that come from cannabis plants. Therefore, he contended that the sniff violated the Fourth Amendment as it was a warrantless search unsupported by probable cause. However, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations denying Plancarte's suppression motion, leading to his guilty plea to both drug charges.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the dog sniff did not constitute a Fourth Amendment search as it did not disrupt any reasonable expectation of privacy. The court noted that the dog sniff occurred outside the home, in a public area, and during a lawful traffic stop, which generally does not implicate legitimate privacy interests. The court also pointed out that the dog's sniff was not designed to disclose any information other than the presence or absence of narcotics. Therefore, the court concluded that the district court appropriately denied Plancarte's motion to suppress. View "United States v. Plancarte" on Justia Law

Derek Mesenbring, an employee of Industrial Fumigant Company, LLC (IFC), died after inhaling a toxic dose of methyl bromide at work. His widow, Melissa Mesenbring, sued IFC and its parent company, Rollins, Inc., for wrongful death. Rollins, as IFC's parent company, had some authority over IFC's revenue goals and certain expenditures, and also leased IFC's facility. However, IFC managed its own day-to-day operations, including safety and regulatory departments, and trained its employees on the safe use of fumigants like methyl bromide.The case was initially filed in Illinois state court but was moved to federal court under diversity jurisdiction. Mrs. Mesenbring dismissed IFC from the suit due to workers' compensation benefits she was receiving, leaving Rollins as the sole defendant. Rollins moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable for IFC's acts under Illinois law. The district court granted Rollins' motion, ruling that Rollins did not specifically direct an activity that made the accident foreseeable, nor did it control or participate in IFC's use of and training on methyl bromide, thus foreclosing direct participant liability. Mrs. Mesenbring appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court agreed that under Illinois law, a parent company is not liable for the acts of its subsidiary unless it specifically directs an activity where injury is foreseeable. The court found that Rollins did not surpass the level of control typical of a parent-subsidiary relationship and did not specifically direct or authorize IFC's use of or training on methyl bromide. Furthermore, there was no evidence that Rollins foresaw that safety would be compromised as a result of its budgetary restrictions over IFC. Therefore, the court concluded that Rollins could not be held liable for IFC's acts under a theory of direct participant liability. View "Mesenbring v. Rollins, Inc." on Justia Law

Minosa Echols, a civil detainee in an Illinois facility, was seriously injured when another resident attacked him. Echols filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that three security officers present during the assault violated his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause by failing to protect him. The case went to trial, and the jury returned a verdict in favor of the defense. Echols appealed, arguing that the district court committed a legal error in its jury instruction.The district court had instructed the jury that to succeed on a failure-to-protect claim, Echols needed to show that the officer in question was subjectively aware that the other resident presented a risk of harm to Echols. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that the jury instruction was erroneous. The court stated that Echols did not need to prove subjective awareness of the risk of harm to establish liability. Instead, the jury should have been instructed to determine whether a reasonable officer in the defendant’s position would have appreciated that the conditions within the dayroom put Echols at risk of harm, and whether the defendant acted in an objectively unreasonable way in addressing that risk.However, to prevail on appeal, Echols also needed to show that the error prejudiced him. The court found that Echols failed to do so. The court concluded that the attack was so unexpected that no reasonable officer, in the circumstances before them, would have anticipated the surprise attack or taken different measures to protect Echols. Therefore, the court affirmed the lower court's decision. View "Echols v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The case revolves around Jack Clayborne, who was convicted for crimes related to an attempted carjacking. Clayborne, along with two other men, attempted to carjack Michael Guster. During the incident, Clayborne fired five shots, one of which hit Guster. Clayborne was charged with attempted motor vehicle robbery, discharge of a firearm during an attempted robbery, and possession of a firearm and ammunition by a felon. He was found guilty on all counts and sentenced to 234 months' imprisonment.Clayborne appealed his sentence, and the case was remanded for resentencing after the government agreed to dismiss his conviction for discharging a firearm during an attempted robbery. Before resentencing, Clayborne submitted a letter expressing regret for his actions. However, the district court found the letter insufficient to warrant a reduction in sentence for acceptance of responsibility. Clayborne was resentenced to 223 months in prison and appealed again.In the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Clayborne challenged two aspects of his sentence: the district court's decision not to award him an acceptance of responsibility reduction and the district court's comment that his criminal history included "a lot of" robberies when he had no prior robbery convictions. The court found no procedural error in the district court's decision not to award an acceptance of responsibility reduction. It also found no evidence that the district court relied on incorrect information about Clayborne's criminal history when determining his sentence. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Clayborne" on Justia Law

Raynard Jackson, a prisoner at the Wisconsin Secure Program Facility (WSPF), was placed in a cell without running water for five days. He alleged that Lieutenant Dane Esser, among other WSPF staff, knew that he did not have water and yet failed to turn the water on. After Jackson showed another staff member that he did not have water, the water was promptly turned on; however, he claimed Lt. Esser and other WSPF staff failed to provide him with medical care for his dehydration. Jackson filed grievances pertaining to these issues. After he exhausted his administrative remedies within the WSPF, he sued Lt. Esser and other WSPF staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.The district court, only considering the processed grievances, and without holding an evidentiary hearing, found that Jackson had not exhausted his administrative remedies as to certain claims and defendants. Additional defendants, Nurse Beth Edge and Captain Dale Flannery, were dismissed at summary judgment, leaving only the claims against Lt. Esser for trial. The jury found for Lt. Esser on both claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed with Jackson that the district court should not have disregarded his allegedly unprocessed grievances without holding an evidentiary hearing. However, the court found no error in the district court’s conclusion that Jackson’s processed grievances did not exhaust remedies as to all his claims. The court also found no error in the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Nurse Edge or its evidentiary rulings before trial. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for a hearing on the allegedly unprocessed grievances. View "Jackson v. Esser" on Justia Law