Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Sparkman belonged to a gang that was responsible for murders, kidnappings, and robberies. Sparkman was directly involved in at least two kidnappings in which firearms were used to threaten the victims. He was convicted of federal offenses, including racketeering, drug crimes, and two counts of using a firearm to commit a kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). In 2012, Sparkman was sentenced to the mandatory minimum--42 years' imprisonment.Before the First Step Act of 2018, the second violation of section 924(c) triggered a much higher 25‐year mandatory minimum, even if the two counts were asserted in a single indictment. The First Step Act amended section 924(c) so that only a second violation committed after a prior conviction for the same offense will trigger the 25‐year minimum. These amendments apply to an offense committed before enactment “if a sentence for the offense has not been imposed as of such date of enactment.” 18 U.S.C. 924 note). Sparkman’s sentence was pending on appeal on the date of enactment. The Seventh Circuit rejected his First Step Act petition; “a sentence is ‘imposed’ in the district court, regardless of later appeals.” View "United States v. Sparkman" on Justia Law

Dzierzawski was vice-president of Forsyth's vineyard company. When Forsythe declined an opportunity to produce a custom wine for the Meijer grocery chain, Dzierzawski formed Vinifera and began doing business with Meijer, while continuing to work for Forsythe. Forsythe eventually became aware of the scope of Dzierzawski’s operation and filed suit.The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dzierzawski on the corporate opportunity theory. A jury found Dzierzawski liable on the unfair competition contention but rejected unjust enrichment, fiduciary duty, and breach of the duty of good faith theories. The jury left the damages section on the verdict form blank. The court polled the jurors, who unanimously responded that it was their intention to award no damages. Forsyth did not object to the verdict at that time but later moved for a new trial. The court denied that motion but granted Forsyth’s request for disgorgement as alternative relief, and ordered Dzierzawski to pay $285,731, reasoning that “the jury’s verdict is merely advisory on the issue of equitable disgorgement, as it is an equitable remedy to be imposed by the Court.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The evidence does not support that Dzierzawski stole a corporate opportunity from his company and there was no reversible error in the disgorgement order. View "Continental Vineyard LLC v. Dzierzawski" on Justia Law

Officers Cates and Hannah responded to a call by Lemons. While Lemons was alone with Cates in her home, he sexually assaulted her. Lemons was arrested, then taken to a hospital. A nurse documented swelling on Lemons’ neck and her bloodshot eyes, as evidence that she had been choked. She did not show signs of vaginal trauma or injury. Cates initially denied having sex with Lemons but later admitted to having oral and vaginal sex with Lemons, claiming it was consensual. Cates was charged under 18 U.S.C. 242 (deprivation of rights under color of law) and 18 U.S.C. 942(c) (use of a weapon during a crime of violence). The jury found Cates guilty on the first count and not guilty on the firearm count. By special verdict, the jury found Cates committed aggravated sexual abuse but found Lemons did not suffer bodily injury. Cates was sentenced to 24 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit granted habeas relief, holding that the district court had instructed the jury incorrectly on the elements of aggravated sexual abuse by defining “force” to include not just force, but also psychological coercion.Cates was then charged with violation of civil rights under color of law, which again alleged his actions constituted aggravated sexual abuse. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a “double jeopardy” motion to dismiss. Cates failed to show the jury decided he did not use force to cause Lemons to engage in sexual acts. A rational jury could conclude that Cates forcibly grabbed Lemons’ neck and continued to squeeze it during the assault without causing her bodily injury, consistent with the jury’s findings. View "United States v. Cates" on Justia Law

Demkovich was hired in 2012 as the music director at St. Andrew the Apostle Catholic Church. Demkovich is gay, overweight, and suffers from diabetes and metabolic syndrome. Demkovich claims Reverend Dada subjected him to a hostile work environment based on his sexual orientation and his disabilities. After Demkovich married his partner, Reverend Dada demanded Demkovich’s resignation because his marriage violated Church teachings. Demkovich refused. Reverend Dada fired him. Demkovich filed hostile environment claims under Title VII and the Americans with Disabilities Act.The Seventh Circuit declined to extend the constitutional "ministerial" exemption to categorically bar all hostile environment discrimination claims by ministerial employees where there is no challenge to tangible employment actions like hiring and firing. The court reasoned that the First Amendment does not bar those same ministerial employees from bringing contract and tort claims against their employers and supervisors, nor does it bar enforcement of criminal laws arising from the mistreatment of those same employees. Religious employers’ control over tangible employment actions—hiring, firing, promoting, deciding compensation, job assignments, and the like—provides ample protection for the free exercise of religion. The First Amendment does not require complete immunity from the sometimes horrific abuse that a bright-line rule would protect. View "Demkovich v. St. Andrew the Apostle Parish" on Justia Law

The Hobos street gang operated in Chicago, 2004-2013. Ten gang members were charged and convicted for violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act, 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, among other crimes. The underlying crimes included drug trafficking, murder, attempted murder, and robbery. Three gang members pleaded guilty.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences, remanding only the sentence imposed on the gang’s leader, Chester. The court rejected challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence, to evidentiary rulings concerning recorded conversations and tool mark analysis of firearms, to in-court identifications, and to sentencing contentions; View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law

Carnell pled guilty to a conspiracy to distribute a mixture containing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 846.. The Sentencing Guidelines distinguish between mixtures involving run-of-the-mill methamphetamine and methamphetamine that is at least 80% pure. U.S.S.G. 2D1.1, note C (ice). Ice sentences are substantially higher than those for non-ice methamphetamine. Carnell claims that the government failed to meet its burden of proving that the substance in which he dealt was ice methamphetamine.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Ice, unlike other drugs, is subject to lab tests and precise definitions, which eliminates the value of any evidence in the nomenclature category, such as “everyone referred to the drugs as ice.” In this case, the two methamphetamine samples that were tested by DEA laboratories and found to be 100% pure had no connection to the Carnell conspiracy. Courts cannot rely on the expertise of a drug user, dealer, or law enforcement officer alone to determine that methamphetamine is more than 80% pure as opposed to 79% pure. The court declined to address the question of whether all of the methamphetamine attributable to a defendant must be tested, and if not, what would constitute a reliably representative sample. In this case, none of the ice attributable to the conspiracy was tested. View "United States v. Carnell" on Justia Law

Bell employees participated in a benefit plan, completely funded by contributions from the members of about 69 unions. The plan is administered by a Board of Trustees, governed by Trust Indenture documents that provide that plan members must contribute a fixed amount unless a member’s union has set a different contribution amount. In 2008, Bell’s union voted to increase its members’ contributions from 6% to 8% of their weekly wages. In 2014, the Trustees revealed that the plan’s financial health was deteriorating. Bell employees unsuccessfully petitioned the union to reduce their compelled-contribution rate. In 2016, Bell's collective-bargaining contract expired. During negotiations, the employees again unsuccessfully requested that the union reduce their required contribution rate. Other members of the union, working for a different employer, were either contributing at lower rates or not contributing; they were originally part of a different union that did not participate in the plan. Contract re-negotiations were unsuccessful. The employees lost certain benefits that are available only to active contributors to the plan.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of a suit under 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(D). The Trustees’ action, interpretation of the Trust Indenture, was not a breach of fiduciary duty. The Indenture can be reasonably interpreted as permitting different segments within a union to contribute to the plan at different levels. Even if the Union controlled the amount of revenue coming into the plan, it did not act as fiduciary but as a settlor. View "Bator v. District Council 4, Graphic Communications Conference" on Justia Law

TDH’s contract to provide HVAC services at a Chicago construction site contained provisions agreeing to indemnify Rockwell, the owner. TDH provided a Certificate of Liability Insurance, identifying Columbia as the commercial general liability insurer, TDH as the insured, and Rockwell and Prairie (the manager) as additional insureds. While working at the site, TDH’s employee Guzman fell 22 feet through an unguarded opening in the second floor, sustaining serious injuries.Guzman sued Rockwell, Prairie, and others. Guzman did not sue TDH. Several defendants filed third-party complaints against TDH for contribution. Scottsdale insured Rockwell and has defended Rockwell and Prairie. Scottsdale filed suit, wanting Columbia to take over their defense.The district court declared that Columbia owes a duty to defend Prairie and Rockwell, ordered Columbia to pay Scottsdale $50,000 for defense costs through August 2019, and left the issue of indemnity for another day. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Columbia policy limitation that another organization would only be an additional insured with respect to liability arising out of TDH’s ongoing operations performed for that other organization does not eliminate Columbia’s duty to defend. Prairie’s and Rockwell’s liability for the fall potentially arises in part out of TDH’s then-ongoing operations performed for Prairie and Rockwell. It does not matter that the underlying suit does not name TDH. The underlying allegations do not preclude the possibility of coverage. View "Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Columbia Insurance Group, Inc" on Justia Law

Johnson, a student at North Central, reported that she had been raped at an apartment complex by two classmates, Froschauer and Risley. North Central Principal Kirk was aware of a previous rape allegation against Froschauer, made by one of Johnson’s friends. Pending investigations by the Department of Child Services and the sheriff’s department, Principal Kirk issued a no‐contact order between Johnson and Froschauer. The school’s lawyers advised Principal Kirk not to “negatively impact [Froschauer’s] track to graduate on time based on unsubstantiated allegations.” Johnson’s physician and Hawker had requested that Johnson be placed in homebound schooling. Principal Kirk placed Johnson in homebound schooling so that she could avoid her morning classes with Froschauer. She still went to school in the afternoons. The prosecutor did not file criminal charges against Froschauer. The sheriff’s department would not release details of the investigation to the school. Her family refused to allow the school to interview Johnson for a Title IX investigation. Johnson subsequently alleged some bullying at school and obtained a protective order against Froschauer. Johnson alleged additional harassment and eventually withdrew from North Central.In her suit under Title IX, 20 U.S.C. 1681(a), the district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Johnson waived any arguments regarding the district court’s evidentiary rulings. The school was not deliberately indifferent to Johnson’s claims of sexual harassment, View "Johnson v. Northeast School Corp." on Justia Law

In 2013, Siddique applied for a temporary student-government position at the University of Wisconsin–Madison. His application was said to have been rejected because he did not meet a minimum-enrollment requirement crafted for the position. Siddique argued that his application was rejected not because of the enrollment criteria but because of his critical stances against members of the University administration who worked with the student government and who were involved with the application process.Siddique sued University officials in their individual capacities, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging violation of his First Amendment right to be free from governmental retaliation. The district court determined that qualified immunity prevented Siddique’s claim from proceeding. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Federal law does not clearly establish that enforcing an enrollment requirement for a student-government position violates the First Amendment. The right to public employment free from retaliation is not at issue and any violation of state law is irrelevant. View "Siddique v. Laliberte" on Justia Law