Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2009. Zamora, a high-ranking Latin Kings Chicago gang member, pleaded guilty to an extortion and racketeering conspiracy. After successfully challenging his sentence, Zamora was transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) to await resentencing. At MCC, Zamora took orders from fellow inmates for contraband and directed his sister to obtain the items. She would pass synthetic marijuana, cigarettes, and cell phones to an MCC guard, Lizak, who smuggled the items to Zamora. Over six months, the group smuggled four loads of contraband into the MCC before Lizak withdrew from the scheme. Zamora was charged with conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371, and giving and offering bribes to a federal official, 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(1)(C). He pleaded guilty to bribery; the government dismissed the conspiracy charge.The district court calculated Zamora’s guideline sentencing range using USSG 2C1.1 and added a four-level enhancement because the offense “involved … [a] public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” The district court overruled Zamora’s objection, explaining that although Lizak “may not have had high-level decision-making authority,” a prison guard qualifies as a “sensitive position.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Guideline’s commentary, which generally binds courts on issues of interpretation, explains that officials in sensitive positions include those who are situated similarly to a law enforcement officer. View "United States v. Zamora" on Justia Law

Finance sent Bazile a letter seeking to collect medical debts. The dunning letter stated the date (September 19, 2017) and the total balance of the debt ($92.23), without indicating whether that amount may increase with the accrual of interest. Bazile filed suit, alleging that the letter’s exclusion of information concerning the accrual of interest was a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) because the letter was misleading and did not provide “the amount of the debt,” 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(1), 1692e. The district court concluded that Bazile had Article III standing.The Seventh Circuit remanded for findings of fact. The complaint may survive dismissal as a matter of pleading but that’s not enough for the district court to decide the merits of the action. While Bazile’s allegations support an inference that interest was accruing on the debt, the defendant asserted that interest was not accruing and questioned whether the letter’s omission of information about interest affected Bazile’s response to the correspondence or to the debt. Facts necessary for standing have been called into doubt, requiring further inquiry into whether the court has subject‐matter jurisdiction, requiring an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. View "Bazile v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc." on Justia Law

Convergent sent Brunett a letter demanding repayment of a debt that slightly exceeded $1,000, offering to accept 50% of the balance in satisfaction of the debt. The letter stated that, if the creditor ended up forgiving more than $600, it would be required to report the release of indebtedness to the IRS, because federal law treats as taxable income a loan that is not repaid. Brunett sued, arguing that the statement about the IRS violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e(5), (10), because it threatens action that cannot legally be taken and amounts to a false representation.The Seventh Circuit ordered the dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction after noting that the statement was not false. Brunett conceded that the letter had not injured her. She did not pay anything; the statement did not affect her credit rating or discourage anyone from doing business with her. A plaintiff who lacks a concrete injury cannot sue under the FDCPA. The state of confusion is not itself an injury. “If it were, then everyone would have standing to litigate about everything.” That Brunett’s confusion led her to hire a lawyer and that she felt "intimidated" do not change the evaluation. View "Brunett v. Convergent Outsourcing Inc." on Justia Law

When the Gunn's debt for homeowners' association assessments reached $2,000, the association hired a law firm, which sent the Gunns a letter demanding payment. The letter states: If Creditor has recorded a mechanic’s lien, covenants, mortgage, or security agreement, it may seek to foreclose such mechanic’s lien, covenants, mortgage, or security agreement. The Gunns did not pay. The law firm filed suit in state court, seeking damages for breach of contract rather than foreclosure. The Gunns filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), which forbids false or misleading statements in dunning letters, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2), (4), (5) & (10). The Gunns acknowledge that the statement is true but contend that it must be deemed false or misleading because the law firm would have found it too costly to pursue foreclosure to collect a $2,000 debt.The Seventh Circuit ordered the dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The contested sentence did not injure the Gunns. They argued that they were annoyed or intimidated but did not contend that the letter was a forbidden invasion of privacy. The association and its law firm were entitled to communicate with them, If annoyance were enough, the very fact that a suit was filed would show the existence of standing. The asserted violation of a substantive FDCPA right does not guarantee standing. There must still be a concrete injury. View "Gunn v. Thrasher, Buschmann & Voelkel, PC" on Justia Law

Two armed men robbed three cash-and-check stores. Jett and McKissick were convicted of conspiracy under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and attempted bank robbery “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” section 2113(a). The government alleged four “overt acts” for Count 1: three completed robberies and an attempted fourth robbery The defendants had unsuccessfully moved for a special verdict form requiring the jury to find unanimously that the defendants had committed one specific overt act. The district court sentenced each to 293 months’ imprisonment, based on a Guidelines range of 235-293 months, repeatedly commenting on the strength of the evidence.The Seventh Circuit reversed the attempted-robbery convictions because there was no evidence of force, violence, or intimidation, but otherwise affirmed, stating “Hobbs Act conspiracy does not have an overt-act requirement.” On remand, a probation officer calculated the defendants’ advisory Guidelines ranges as 188-235 months. Although Count 2 was gone, the defendants’ total offense levels were still 33, using a grouping analysis and multiple-count adjustment based on the three robberies and the attempted robbery. The defendants’ criminal history categories were lower because of intervening precedent.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 230-month sentences imposed on remand. The district court erred by using the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, and not the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, to decide whether the defendants conspired to commit the “object offenses” of the conspiracy but the error was harmless. The court adequately explained increasing their sentences on the conspiracy count. View "United States v. Jett" on Justia Law

Norwood met a 15‐year‐old girl, a runaway from a state facility, at an Indianapolis gas station. Using drugs, violence, threats, and manipulative affection, he enticed her to have sexual intercourse with him and then prostituted her to countless men. A jury convicted him of attempted transportation of a minor across state lines with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and (e). The district court sentenced him to 330 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Norwood’s efforts to prostitute the victim before attempting to transport her to Wisconsin was sufficient evidence of his intent to continue prostituting her once they crossed state lines. The court upheld the admission of the victim’s medical records; the victim’s statements about what had happened and when were for the primary purpose of medical treatment. They are non-testimonial. The court also upheld the admission of a recorded jail call in which Norwood talked about “pimping” a young “white girl” to whom he had given cocaine. By arguing that the victim had sex with five men per day because that was what Norwood intended, the government simply asked the jury to draw a reasonable inference from the evidence. The court rejected a challenge involving a juror and affirmed the substantive reasonableness of the sentence and the application of the five‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G 4B1.5(b). View "United States v. Norwood" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs received collection letters from Finance System, seeking payment of medical debts. Represented by the same law firm, they filed materially identical class-action claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, alleging the use of false, deceptive, or misleading representations, or otherwise unfair or unconscionable methods to collect a debt. They cited the letters’ statement that: “You want to be worthy of the faith put in you by your creditor …. We are interested in you preserving a good credit rating with the above creditor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims, reasoning that the plaintiffs have not alleged any injury, or even an appreciable risk of harm, from the alleged statutory violations and, therefore, lack standing. View "Sandri v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc." on Justia Law

Wyatt pleaded guilty to conspiring to traffic a minor, 18 U.S.C. 1594(c). The government promised to recommend a below-Guidelines sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and to notify the court about his post-plea cooperation. Wyatt’s recommended sentencing range was 262-327 months. At sentencing, Wyatt described how he had “turned his life around” and requested a three-year sentence but reiterated that he wanted to stand by his plea agreement. The government recommended a 10-year sentence but it was defense counsel, not the prosecution, that told the court about Wyatt’s cooperation.Wyatt did not object and received the recommended sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the government’s silence breached the plea agreement, Wyatt did not show a reasonable probability that the breach had any effect on his sentence. View "United States v. Wyatt" on Justia Law

Knudtson worked for Trempealeau County for over 45 years. She eventually became a paralegal/office manager in the District Attorney’s Office. When his friend, the Jackson County District Attorney, died, McMahon, the Trempealeau County District Attorney, closed his office for a day and encouraged his staff to attend the funeral. Knudtson refused to attend because she wanted to complete work at the office. McMahon offered Knudtson three choices: work from home, attend the funeral, or take a vacation day. The disagreement became a bitter dispute. The County placed Knudtson on paid leave. Knudtson declined another position at the same pay grade. The County had no other available position and terminated her employment.Knudtson filed suit, citing the Establishment Clause because the funeral took place at a church and involved a religious service. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Knudtson acknowledged that when she stated that she did not want to attend the funeral, she did not know that it would be a religious service; her decision not to attend had nothing to do with its religious nature. Organizing a delegation from a public office to attend a funeral normally raises no implication that the government, or any officials, endorse the deceased person's religion. View "Knudtson v. Trempealeau County" on Justia Law

In its 2018 “Janus” holding, the Supreme Court reversed course on 41 years of jurisprudence sanctioning agreements between state-government agencies and unions authorizing the unions to collect fair-share fees from non-union members to cover costs incurred representing them. Ocol, a math teacher in the Chicago public school system, filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 2201 against the Unions, the Attorney General of Illinois, and members of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, seeking recovery of payments he had previously made under protest to the Union. He also challenged the constitutionality of the exclusive representation provisions of Illinois law as they applied to non-union members.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of all of his claims. Acknowledging circuit precedent, Ocol conceded defeat on his Section 1983 claim for a refund of his fair-share payments and his First Amendment challenge to exclusive representation. The court granted Ocol’s request for summary affirmance so that he may seek a petition for certiorari to pursue his arguments in the Supreme Court. View "Ocol v. Chicago Teachers Union" on Justia Law