Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Bethany participated in a conspiracy to distribute crack cocaine. He was sentenced in 2013. That sentence was vacated under 28 U.S.C. 2255, and he was resentenced in 2019, after the enactment of the First Step Act of 2018.The Seventh Circuit ordered a limited remand. Bethany is entitled to the benefit of the First Step Act. When the Act became effective, Bethany was awaiting resentencing. The court considered the possibility that any error in the failure to apply the Act was harmless because the district court made it clear that it did not rely on the mandatory minimum in resentencing Bethany. The record reveals a significant possibility that Bethany would have received the same sentence regardless of whether the Act applied but the district court did refer to the 20-year mandatory minimum and, in a colloquy with the defendant during resentencing, said, “It seems … you’re stuck with the … 20-year mandatory minimum.” Because some ambiguity exists in the resentencing transcript and because of the very significant difference in the mandatory minimum now applicable under the First Step Act, the proper course is a remand. If the district court indicates that it is not inclined to resentence Bethany, the Seventh Circuit will address whether the present sentence is reasonable. View "United States v. Bethany" on Justia Law

Uriarte, a gang member, was convicted of racketeering, drug crimes, and two counts of using a firearm to commit a kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 924(c). A conviction for a single count of using a firearm to commit a crime of violence carries a mandatory minimum penalty of five years’ imprisonment, which is elevated to seven years if the firearm was “brandished” during the crime. Before the First Step Act, a second section 924(c) violation triggered a 25-year mandatory minimum, even if the counts were asserted in a single indictment. Under the First Step Act, only a second violation committed after a prior conviction for the same offense triggers the 25-year minimum. At Uriarte’s 2013 sentencing, the court calculated a mandatory minimum of 42 years’ imprisonment: 10 years from the racketeering and drug charges, seven years for the first firearm offense because it involved brandishing a weapon, and 25 years for the second firearm offense. The court sentenced Uriarte to 50 years, well below the Guidelines recommendation. The Seventh Circuit remanded, citing the Supreme Court’s “Alleyne” decision--brandishing is an element of section 924(c) that must be found by a jury. At the time of the enactment of the First Step Act, Uriarte was convicted, but unsentenced.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his resentencing under the First Step Act, to 20 years’ imprisonment: 10 years for the drug and racketeering offenses, five years for the first firearm offense without the brandishing enhancement, and five years for the second firearm offense. View "United States v. Uriarte" on Justia Law

Peeters sought disability benefits, citing degenerative disc disease in the lumbar spine, degenerative joint disease of the right shoulder, depressive disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, generalized anxiety disorder, and learning disabilities. Peeters has not sustained gainful employment since 2014. After a hearing, an ALJ denied Peeters disability benefits in 2016. On stipulated remand, the Appeals Council instructed the ALJ to reconsider Peeters’ maximum residual functional capacity, obtain evidence and examples of jobs Peeters could perform from a vocational expert, provide a new hearing, and issue a new decision. At the second hearing in 2018, the ALJ issued a 15-page decision denying Peeters disability benefits because he failed to meet the severity requirements of 20 C.F.R. pt. 404 and 20 C.F.R. pt. 416.The district court and Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial as supported by substantial evidence. The court upheld the greater weight given to the opinions of six state agency psychologists who evaluated Peeters; three found Peeters would have moderate limitations completing a normal workday and carrying out detailed instructions, but could handle simple two to three-step instructions, while three found Peeters capable of performing light work. View "Peeters v. Saul" on Justia Law

In 2006, Mlsna was hired by Union Pacific, as a conductor. Union Pacific was aware of Mlsna’s hearing impairment. In 2012 the Federal Railroad Administration implemented regulations to ensure that train conductors possessed hearing acuity, and to confirm that railroads appropriately protected their employees’ hearing, 49 C.F.R. 242.105(c). Union Pacific had Mlsna’s hearing tested several different ways. Mlsna passed the hearing acuity test only when he relied on his hearing aids with no additional hearing protection. Later Mlsna was retested with the same results. Union Pacific decided it could not recertify Mlsna to work as a conductor. When he wore hearing aids and passed the hearing acuity requirement he was in violation of Union Pacific’s hearing conservation policy, which required additional hearing protection; when he complied with that policy by wearing the protection, he could not pass the hearing acuity test. Mlsna proposed he use specific custom‐made hearing protection. Union Pacific rejected his proposal because that device did not have a factory‐issued or laboratory‐tested noise reduction rating, as required by the regulation. Mlsna’s employment was terminated.Mlsna sued, alleging discrimination based on his hearing disability. The district court granted the railroad summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed. Issues of fact exist as to whether wearing hearing protection is an essential function of Mlsna’s work as a conductor, as well as whether reasonable accommodations for the conductor were properly considered. View "Mlsna v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of a taxpayers' suit, challenging Cook County’s pre-2008 property tax assessments. The district court had determined that it lacked jurisdiction under the Tax Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. 1341, because Illinois offered the taxpayers a “plain, speedy and efficient remedy.” The Seventh Circuit held that Illinois’s procedures left these taxpayers no remedy. Mandate issued in April 2020, The case returned to the district court. In June, the defendants sought a stay pending the resolution of a petition for a writ of certiorari that they planned to submit in September. The Seventh Circuit denied their request but the district court granted relief.The Seventh Circuit vacated the district court order. Declining to consider the taxpayers’ argument under 28 U.S.C. 2101(f), which governs cases in which a “final judgment” is subject to Supreme Court review, the court stated that the district court’s stay was in direct opposition to the mandate. When a court of appeals has reversed a final judgment and remanded the case, the district court is required to comply. The Seventh CIrcuit noted that it had already denied the defendants’ request for the same relief. The spirit of the mandate entailed more than changing the status of the case from “closed” to “reopen”; it presupposed that further proceeding would be at an ordinary pace. View "A.F. Moore & Associates, Inc. v. Kocoras" on Justia Law

Patrick was convicted of double murder in 1995 and sentenced to life in prison. The convictions were vacated in 2014. The Cook County Circuit Court issued a certificate of innocence. Patrick filed suit for wrongful conviction against seven Chicago police officers and two prosecutors, alleging several constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state-law claims for malicious prosecution and civil conspiracy. Chicago, also a defendant, stipulated to liability if any of its officers were found responsible for violating Patrick’s rights. A jury exonerated the prosecutors and one officer but found six officers liable and awarded more than $13 million in compensatory damages plus punitive damages.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that the district judge should have dismissed the case as a sanction for Patrick’s acknowledged perjury during discovery. The judge’s ruling was a reasonable exercise of his discretion. Patrick’s lies concerned peripheral matters and were fully exposed during a rigorous attack on his credibility that emphasized his criminal history and gang affiliation. The admission of the certificate of innocence was not unfairly prejudicial, even in combination with closing argument statements by Patrick’s lawyer. The jury instructions, which failed to explain that Patrick had the burden to prove that the fabricated evidence was used against him at his criminal trial and was material, contained a harmless error. View "Patrick v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Cook County Jail detainees filed suit after the Jail reported an outbreak of COVID-19, arguing that the Sheriff violated their due process rights by failing to provide them with reasonably safe living conditions. They sought an injunction requiring the Sheriff to implement procedures related to social distancing, sanitation, diagnostic testing, and personal protective equipment for the duration of the pandemic. The district court granted a temporary restraining order, requiring the Sheriff to provide hand sanitizer and soap to all detainees and face masks to detainees in quarantine, and prohibiting the use of a “bullpen” for new detainees. Dismissing the Sheriff’s contention that he faced feasibility limitations on further social distancing, the court later concluded that the detainees were reasonably likely to succeed on their contention that group housing and double-celling is objectively unreasonable, except in certain situations.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. The district court erred in analyzing the issue of group housing and double-celling by failing to consider the Sheriff’s conduct in its totality, failing to afford proper deference to the Sheriff’s judgment in adopting policies necessary to ensure safety and security, and citing an incorrect legal standard when evaluating the likelihood that the claims will succeed on their merits. Regarding the remaining relief, the court made detailed factual findings, properly considered the Sheriff’s conduct in its totality, and closely tailored the relief to CDC guidelines. View "Mays v. Dart" on Justia Law

Marshall worked at the Indiana Department of Corrections for over 20 years. He received good reviews and promotions. He identified as homosexual. He reached the rank of Internal Affairs Investigator. In 2015, he was arrested for operating a vehicle while intoxicated. Warden Brown issued a written reprimand. In 2016, he attended a law enforcement conference in Indianapolis. A sheriff from another county complained that Marshall became intoxicated at the conference and behaved inappropriately. Marshall denies the allegations. Later that month, Marshall and others confronted Storm—a subordinate directly under Marshall’s supervision—about Storm’s unethical disclosure of confidential investigation materials. The next day, Storm accused Marshall of sexually harassing him twice outside of work. Regional Director Osburn decided to terminate Marshall. At a meeting before the termination, someone said they should be prepared for Marshall to file a complaint with the EEOC. Osburn terminated Marshall and demoted Storm.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the summary judgment rejection of Marshall’s claims of discrimination based on sexual-orientation discrimination and retaliation. Marshall’s case falters for lack of a similarly situated comparator; there were legitimate issues about whether he was meeting expectations. Marshall’s exposure of Storm’s breach of confidentiality is not protected by Title VII; retaliation for the exposure cannot be Title VII retaliation. View "Marshall v. Indiana Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

During the coronavirus pandemic, Illinois Governor Pritzker issued executive orders designed to limit the virus’s opportunities to spread, similar to orders in other states. Executive Order 2020‐43 (EO43, June 26, 2020), imposing a 50-person cap on gatherings, states: This Executive Order does not limit the free exercise of religion. To protect the health and safety of faith leaders, staff, congregants, and visitors, religious organizations and houses of worship are encouraged to consult and follow the recommended practices and guidelines from the Illinois Department of Public Health.... the safest practices ... are to provide services online, in a drive‐in format, or outdoors (and consistent with social distancing requirements and guidance regarding wearing face coverings), and to limit indoor services to 10 people. Religious organizations are encouraged to take steps to ensure social distancing, the use of face coverings, and implementation of other public health measures. Emergency and governmental functions enjoy the same exemption.The Republican Party challenged the “favored” treatment of religion. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. Because the exercise of religion involves more than simple speech, the equivalency urged by the Republicans between political speech and religious exercise is a false one. If there were a problem with the religious exercise carve‐out, the state would be entitled to return to a regime in which even religious gatherings are subject to the mandatory cap. View "Illinois Republican Party v. J. B. Pritzker" on Justia Law

Pulliam was arrested after fleeing from two Chicago police officers. During the chase, both officers saw a gun in Pulliam’s hand. Pulliam had previously been convicted of multiple felonies, making it a federal crime for him to possess a gun. Pulliam was convicted of possessing a firearm as a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). After Pulliam was sentenced, the Supreme Court decided Rehaif (2019), which clarified the elements of section 922(g) convictions; in addition to proving that the defendant knew he possessed a firearm, the government must also prove the defendant knew he belonged to “the relevant category of persons barred from possessing a firearm.” This knowledge-of-status element was not mentioned in the jury instructions at Pulliam’s trial.The Seventh Circuit affirmed his conviction. The jury instructions, missing an essential element, constituted plain error, but the error did not seriously affect “the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings.” The court noted that Pulliam stipulated to his prior felony conviction, has had many convictions, has served prison sentences of more than a year, and ran from police, indicating knowledge of his status. The only potential evidentiary error would be harmless. View "United States v. Pulliam" on Justia Law