Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In early 2018, employees represented by the International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150, went on strike at two quarries operated by RiverStone Group, Inc. During the strike, RiverStone disciplined and discharged a union member, required another union member to sign a hiring list to return to work, unilaterally changed a company policy, and removed picket signs. Local 150 filed charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), alleging these actions were unfair labor practices in violation of the National Labor Relations Act.An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled that RiverStone violated the Act as charged. RiverStone appealed to the NLRB, which affirmed the ALJ’s decision in part. The NLRB found that RiverStone violated the Act by denying a union steward's presence at an investigatory interview, requiring a union member to sign a preferential hiring list, removing a picket sign, and unilaterally changing the punch-in policy. However, the NLRB disagreed with the ALJ regarding the discipline and discharge of the union member, concluding that RiverStone acted consistently with its progressive discipline policy and would have disciplined the employee regardless of his union activity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court upheld the NLRB’s findings, concluding that substantial evidence supported the Board’s order. The court denied the petitions for review from both Local 150 and RiverStone and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement. The court also denied Local 150’s motion for sanctions against the NLRB and its counsel, finding that the Board’s waiver argument had a plausible legal and factual basis. View "National Labor Relations Board v. International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150" on Justia Law

Jonathan Smith pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine in federal court. At sentencing, the district court applied two recidivist enhancements based on his 2008 Illinois conviction for aggravated robbery, classifying it as a "crime of violence" and a "serious violent felony." Smith argued that his prior conviction should not qualify as a predicate offense for these enhancements because Illinois law did not require the intentional use of force for an aggravated robbery conviction.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois disagreed with Smith, relying on the Seventh Circuit's previous decision in United States v. Chagoya-Morales, which held that an Illinois aggravated robbery conviction involves the "use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another." The district court followed this precedent and sentenced Smith to 120 months in prison. Smith appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court examined whether the Illinois aggravated robbery statute, under which Smith was convicted, required the use of force directed at another person. The court found that Illinois law necessitated the use of force or the threat of force to deprive someone of property, aligning with the federal definitions of "serious violent felony" and "crime of violence." The court also considered Smith's arguments regarding the applicability of recklessness and the lack of a specific intent requirement but found them unpersuasive. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit held that Smith's 2008 conviction qualified as a predicate offense for the sentence enhancements and affirmed the district court's decision. View "USA v. Smith" on Justia Law

Gary Hicks, a corrections sergeant, was suspended for 10 days by the Illinois Department of Corrections after an internal investigation into his Facebook posts, which were described as "Islamophobic" and "offensive" by a news article. The investigation concluded that Hicks violated Department policies prohibiting conduct unbecoming of a State employee or that may reflect unfavorably on the Department. Hicks admitted to making the posts, which included derogatory comments about various groups and a prayer for a civil war or government overthrow. He sued the Department and officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging First Amendment retaliation and a Fourteenth Amendment challenge to the Department’s policies.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both claims. The court held that Hicks’s suspension did not violate the First Amendment because his posts were not on matters of public concern, and the Department’s interest in maintaining discipline outweighed his interest in speaking. The court also found that the Department’s policies were not impermissibly vague as applied to Hicks’s conduct and granted qualified immunity to the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The court concluded that the Department’s interest in managing its affairs outweighed Hicks’s interest in posting the content, thus he could not sustain a First Amendment retaliation claim. Additionally, the court found that the Department’s code of conduct was not impermissibly vague as applied to Hicks, as a reasonable officer would understand that his posts were unbecoming and could reflect unfavorably on the Department. Therefore, the court affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants on both the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims. View "Hicks v. Illinois Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Alexander Kawleski was convicted of sexually assaulting his then-girlfriend's adolescent daughter and recording the act. He also recorded videos of the girl undressing and showering, which were stored on a flash drive. His new girlfriend, Tracy Brown, discovered the flash drive and turned it over to the police. Kawleski faced state charges and was federally indicted for producing and possessing child pornography. Key evidence included Brown's testimony and the videos found on the flash drive.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin oversaw the trial. The jury found Kawleski guilty on all counts. Kawleski moved for a new trial, citing newly discovered evidence from Brown's ex-boyfriend, who questioned her credibility and suggested she might have transferred the videos to the flash drive. The district judge denied the motion, stating the ex-boyfriend's statements were speculative and would only serve as impeachment evidence, which was unlikely to lead to an acquittal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district judge's decision, agreeing that the new evidence was speculative and insufficient to warrant a new trial. The court also found that the forensic examination of the Apple computer, which found no evidence of child pornography, refuted the ex-boyfriend's theory. The court held that the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying the motion for a new trial and in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. The convictions and sentences were affirmed. View "U.S. v. Kawleski" on Justia Law

Phillip Robbin was removing a tree from a residential lot in the City of Berwyn when he was confronted by Sarah Lopez, a city inspector. Lopez berated Robbin using racial slurs, which led Robbin to demand disciplinary action against her. The Mayor of Berwyn denied Robbin's request for Lopez's termination, leading Robbin to sue the City, the Mayor, and Lopez for violations of his substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois dismissed Robbin’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that he failed to state a federal claim. The court also declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, leading to Robbin's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Robbin failed to allege a violation of a fundamental right and that the conduct described did not "shock the conscience," which are necessary elements for a substantive due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court noted that while Lopez's use of racial slurs was deplorable, it did not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Consequently, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Robbin's complaint. View "Robbin v. City of Berwyn" on Justia Law

Brian Cook entered a bank in Roseville, Illinois, wearing a disguise and armed with what appeared to be a gun, later identified as an air pistol. He threatened two tellers, directing one to retrieve money from the vault and instructing the other to stay put. Cook fled with a bag of cash but was quickly apprehended by law enforcement, who found the stolen money and the air pistol in his vehicle. Cook pleaded guilty to bank robbery under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a).The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois sentenced Cook to 144 months of imprisonment and three years of supervised release. The court applied a four-level enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(D) of the United States Sentencing Guidelines, finding that Cook had "otherwise used" the gun during the robbery. Cook contested this, arguing that he had only "brandished" the gun, which would warrant a lesser, three-level enhancement under § 2B3.1(b)(2)(E). The district court also considered Cook's extensive criminal history and his deliberate targeting of a small-town bank in its sentencing decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The appellate court found no procedural error in the application of the four-level enhancement, agreeing that Cook's actions constituted "otherwise using" the gun. The court also upheld the above-Guidelines sentence, noting that the district court had provided a thorough explanation for its decision, including Cook's extensive criminal history and the need for deterrence and public protection. The appellate court concluded that the sentence was neither procedurally erroneous nor substantively unreasonable. View "USA v. Cook" on Justia Law

Reginald Pittman, a pretrial detainee at the Madison County jail, attempted suicide and suffered a severe brain injury. He claimed that two guards ignored his requests for crisis counseling before his suicide attempt. Pittman sued Madison County and various jail officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment for failing to provide adequate medical care. The case has a lengthy procedural history, including three appeals and three trials.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois initially granted summary judgment for the defendants, but this was reversed in part by the Seventh Circuit in Pittman I. After a first trial, the Seventh Circuit in Pittman II reversed and remanded for a new trial due to the erroneous exclusion of evidence. In Pittman III, the Seventh Circuit found a jury instruction error and remanded for a third trial. In the third trial, the district court instructed the jury in line with Pittman III, requiring proof that the officers were subjectively aware or strongly suspected a high likelihood of self-harm. The jury returned a verdict for the defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and found that the jury instruction was erroneous. The court clarified that Pittman did not need to prove subjective awareness of the risk of harm. Instead, the jury should have been instructed to determine whether the defendants made an intentional decision regarding Pittman’s conditions of confinement and whether they acted objectively unreasonably by failing to mitigate the risk. Despite this error, the court concluded that the erroneous instruction did not prejudice Pittman, as the case was presented as a credibility contest between the testimony of the guards and an inmate. Therefore, the Seventh Circuit affirmed the verdict for the defendants. View "Pittman v. Madison County, Illinois" on Justia Law

Karl Nichols was convicted in a Wisconsin state court of first-degree sexual assault and sentenced to five years of probation. The conviction was based on allegations by a child, M.R.W., who claimed Nichols touched her inappropriately during a sleepover years earlier. M.R.W. participated in two forensic interviews, during which she made notes to correct her initial statements. These notes were lost by the prosecution, leading Nichols to argue that the prosecution failed to preserve exculpatory evidence and that his trial counsel was ineffective for not raising this issue before trial.Initially, Nichols won relief in the state trial court, which found that the prosecution acted in bad faith by not preserving the notes and that the notes contained exculpatory evidence. The court vacated Nichols' conviction and dismissed the case with prejudice. However, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reversed this decision, concluding that Nichols failed to demonstrate the exculpatory value of the missing notes. Nichols' petition for review by the Wisconsin Supreme Court was denied.Nichols then filed a federal habeas corpus petition in the Western District of Wisconsin. The district court denied relief, citing the deferential standard of review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) and procedural default on the ineffective assistance claim. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Seventh Circuit held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals reasonably concluded that the missing notes had no apparent exculpatory value and that the prosecution did not act in bad faith. The court also upheld the procedural default of Nichols' ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "Nichols v. Wiersma" on Justia Law

Jebari Craig, a black employee, worked for Wrought Washer Manufacturing, Inc. from 2010 until his termination in April 2019. Craig, who became the union president in 2018, filed a racial discrimination grievance against Wrought. He alleged that his termination was in retaliation for this grievance. The incident leading to his termination involved a disagreement with a supervisor and subsequent use of his cell phone on the shop floor, which violated company policy. Craig was suspended and later offered a "Last Chance Agreement" to return to work, which he refused to sign, leading to his termination.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin granted summary judgment to Wrought on Craig's claim that his termination was retaliatory. The court found that Craig had not established a prima facie case of retaliation for his written warning and allowed his claim regarding his suspension to proceed. However, it granted summary judgment on the termination claim, crediting Wrought's explanation that the "Last Chance Agreement" did not require Craig to relinquish his discrimination claims, contrary to Craig's later assertions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court affirmed the district court's judgment, agreeing that Schaefer, Wrought's plant manager, was confused during his deposition about the terms of the "Last Chance Agreement" and the severance agreement. The court found that Craig's declaration, which contradicted his earlier statements, did not create a genuine issue of material fact. The court concluded that no reasonable litigant would have withheld the information Craig later provided, supporting the district court's decision to grant summary judgment to Wrought. View "Craig v. Wrought Washer Manufacturing, Inc." on Justia Law

Samuel Boytor, an engineer and businessman, and his wife Carol, defaulted on loans they had personally guaranteed. They entered into a settlement agreement with EFS Bank’s successor, restructuring their debt into three new promissory notes secured by mortgages on their properties. PNC Bank, which eventually held these notes, filed a complaint in 2018 against the Boytors for defaulting on two of the notes. PNC sought foreclosure on the Boytors’ residential property and a money judgment for the nonpayment of a separate note.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois held a bench trial and found in favor of PNC on both counts. The court ordered foreclosure on the Boytors’ residential property and issued a deficiency judgment after the property was sold. The Boytors appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that PNC had established a prima facie case for foreclosure by presenting the mortgage and underlying note. The Boytors’ affirmative defenses, including lack of consideration and payment of the notes, were rejected. The court found that the $203,000 note was supported by consideration and that the Boytors had not paid the note. Additionally, the court determined that the $200,000 note was not paid, and the release of the mortgage did not extinguish the underlying debt. The court also rejected the Boytors’ argument of accord and satisfaction, finding no evidence of a new arrangement to pay less than the outstanding debt. View "PNC Bank, National Association v. Boytor" on Justia Law