Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Gurkirat Singh, a citizen of India and a member of the Sikh ethnoreligious group, fled to the United States after being beaten and threatened by members of the Congress Party due to his political activities with the Mann Party. Singh applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his requests, finding that Singh could reasonably relocate within India to avoid persecution. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision.The IJ found Singh's testimony credible but concluded that he had not suffered persecution, would not face a substantial risk of torture if deported, and could safely relocate within India. The IJ noted that Singh, a healthy 25-year-old male, had successfully relocated to the United States and maintained a livelihood. The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, finding no clear error in the IJ's relocation or past persecution findings.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Singh's petition. Singh argued that the BIA improperly deferred to the IJ, erred in finding he could reasonably relocate within India, and erred in finding he had not suffered past persecution. The court found that the BIA did not defer to the IJ but conducted an independent review of the record. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the IJ and BIA's conclusion that Singh could reasonably relocate within India, given his health, resilience, and adaptability. Consequently, the court denied Singh's petition for review, affirming that he is ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, or protection under the CAT. View "Singh v Bondi" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Eric Holmes, an Indiana state prisoner, filed a lawsuit against the Marion County Sheriff’s Office under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging unlawful imprisonment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Holmes sought to proceed in forma pauperis, but the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) restricts this ability for prisoners who have had three prior civil actions or appeals dismissed as frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Indiana found that Holmes had incurred three strikes under the PLRA. The court determined that a previous case dismissed for failure to state a claim because it was barred by Heck v. Humphrey counted as Holmes’s third strike. Holmes did not contest the validity of his first two strikes. He filed a notice of appeal and moved to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal, but a motions panel of the Seventh Circuit denied his motion, identifying a different case dismissed due to judicial immunity as his third strike.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether dismissals based on affirmative defenses, such as those barred by Heck or due to judicial immunity, count as strikes under the PLRA. The court held that a case dismissed for failure to state a claim because it was barred by Heck counts as a strike if the Heck bar is clear from the face of the complaint. Similarly, a case dismissed on judicial immunity grounds incurs a strike if the immunity defense is clear from the face of the complaint. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Holmes’s current suit, concluding that both the Heck dismissal and the judicial immunity dismissal counted as strikes. View "Holmes v Marion County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

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Carl and Roberta Culp filed a lawsuit alleging federal and state law claims against various defendants, including Fort Wayne and Allen County police officers. The claims included excessive force under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, assault and battery, criminal mischief, and violations of the Rehabilitation Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The incident in question occurred on August 20, 2018, when Carl Culp, a double amputee, expressed suicidal intentions during a psychiatric appointment, leading to police intervention.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Indiana granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants on most claims, leaving only Carl Culp’s § 1983 excessive force claim and state law claims against Officers Woods and Schulien for trial. A jury found in favor of the defendants on all claims except for Roberta Culp’s state law battery claim against Officer Woods, awarding her nominal damages of $1. The Culps appealed the summary judgment decision, and Woods and Schulien cross-appealed the denial of costs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to the defendants, as the defendants’ brief complied with the local rules. The court also found that the Culps failed to present evidence of discrimination or failure to accommodate under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act. The court assumed, without deciding, that these laws applied to law enforcement actions but concluded that the evidence did not support the Culps' claims.Regarding the cross-appeal, the Seventh Circuit upheld the district court’s decision to deny costs to both parties, recognizing the mixed outcome of the case. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment in its entirety. View "Culp v. Caudill" on Justia Law

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Jacqueline Sterling failed to pay $500 in gym membership fees to Southlake Nautilus Health and Racquet Club, leading to a default judgment against her in the Superior Court of Lake County, Indiana. Despite a bankruptcy court discharging her debt, Southlake continued to enforce the judgment. Sterling did not notify the Lake County court of her bankruptcy or appear at a hearing, resulting in a bench warrant for her arrest. A year later, she was arrested during a traffic stop and spent a weekend in jail, missing work and suffering emotional distress.The bankruptcy court found Southlake in civil contempt for violating the discharge order and contributing to Sterling's arrest and resulting damages. The court also found Sterling partially at fault for not notifying the Lake County court of her bankruptcy. Applying comparative fault principles, the court allocated half the liability for Sterling's lost wages, emotional distress, and attorney’s fees to each party. Sterling was awarded $9,724.50 in compensatory damages and $99,355 in attorney’s fees.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that while compensatory damages in civil contempt proceedings must be awarded if the complainant proves the defendant's actions caused the injury, the court has broad discretion in awarding attorney’s fees. The bankruptcy court erred by not recognizing this distinction and improperly applied comparative fault principles to reduce the attorney’s fees award. The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment in part and remanded the case to the bankruptcy court to reassess the attorney’s fees in light of its broad discretion. The court also clarified that costs should be allowed and directed the bankruptcy court to set a deadline for Sterling to file a bill of costs. View "Sterling v Southlake Nautilus Health & Racquett Club, Inc." on Justia Law

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The defendant, Rolando Joel De Leon De Paz, pleaded guilty to illegally reentering the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. De Leon had been removed from the U.S. five times previously, with his first removal in 2002 following a conviction for the sale and delivery of methamphetamine. Subsequent removals occurred in 2008, 2013, 2016, and 2022, each following separate convictions for illegal reentry. Despite escalating sentences for each conviction, De Leon reentered the U.S. again and was arrested in January 2023. He was indicted for illegal reentry and pleaded guilty after the district court denied his motion to dismiss the indictment on equal protection grounds.The United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin calculated a sentencing Guidelines range of 21 to 27 months but imposed an above-Guidelines sentence of 48 months. The court justified the sentence by emphasizing De Leon's repeated illegal reentries and the failure of previous escalating punishments to deter him. The court also noted De Leon's struggle with alcohol, which contributed to his criminal behavior, although this was not the main reason for the above-Guidelines sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court acted within its discretion in imposing the 48-month sentence, finding that the justifications provided were consistent with the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The court noted that De Leon's repeated offenses and the ineffectiveness of prior sentences warranted the above-Guidelines sentence. Additionally, the appellate court rejected De Leon's argument that the district court improperly relied on his alcohol dependence and found no abuse of discretion in the sentencing decision. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of De Leon's motion to dismiss the indictment, citing recent precedent. View "United States v De Leon De Paz" on Justia Law

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Brian J. Murphy, a former employee of Caterpillar Inc., alleged that he was constructively discharged due to age discrimination and retaliation for previous legal actions against the company. Murphy, who began working for Caterpillar in 1979, had a long history of positive performance reviews and promotions. In 2000, he was placed on a performance action plan and subsequently fired after complaining about age discrimination. He sued Caterpillar, won a retaliation claim, and was reinstated in 2005. In 2018, after successfully leading a significant project, Murphy was placed on another performance action plan that he argued was designed for him to fail.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Caterpillar on all claims. The court found that Murphy did not provide sufficient evidence to support his claims of age discrimination and retaliation. Murphy appealed the decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that Murphy presented enough evidence to support a reasonable inference of pretext and unlawful intent regarding his age discrimination claim. The court noted that the performance action plan was flawed, as it included a deadline that had already passed and was signed off as failed before Murphy had a chance to comply. This, along with Murphy's consistent positive performance reviews, suggested that the plan was a pretext for discrimination. However, the court affirmed the summary judgment on Murphy's retaliation claim, citing the long gap between his previous lawsuit and the adverse action, and the lack of evidence of retaliatory animus.The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court's decision on the age discrimination claim, allowing it to proceed to trial, but affirmed the decision on the retaliation claim. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "Murphy v Caterpillar Inc." on Justia Law

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Gary Matthews and Monte Brannan collaborated on a project to redevelop a landmark hotel in Peoria, Illinois. Instead of fulfilling their financial obligations to lenders, they diverted project revenue for personal gain. This led to federal charges of mail fraud and money laundering, resulting in guilty verdicts by a jury.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois oversaw the initial trial. Matthews and Brannan were convicted of mail fraud, money laundering, and, in Brannan’s case, conspiracy to commit money laundering. They appealed their convictions, raising multiple issues.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found the evidence against Matthews and Brannan overwhelming, affirming their convictions. The court noted that Matthews and Brannan failed to comply with Circuit Rule 30(b)(1) by not including necessary district court rulings in their appendices, which hindered the appellate review process. Despite this, the court ensured a fair review by independently locating the relevant rulings. The court ordered Matthews’s and Brannan’s counsel to show cause why they should not be sanctioned for their violations of Circuit Rule 30. The court affirmed the district court’s judgment, ensuring that Matthews and Brannan received fair consideration of their appeals. View "USA v Brannan" on Justia Law

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Curtis Walker, who was 17 years old when he committed murder, was sentenced to life in prison with a parole eligibility date set for 2071, effectively making it a life-without-parole sentence. After serving nearly 30 years, Walker sought postconviction relief, arguing that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment based on a series of Supreme Court decisions regarding juvenile offenders sentenced to life without parole. Walker's request for a "meaningful opportunity" to demonstrate his rehabilitation was denied by the Wisconsin state courts, prompting him to file a federal habeas corpus petition.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals denied Walker's postconviction motion, holding that his sentence did not violate the Eighth Amendment because the sentencing judge had considered his youth and its attendant circumstances. The Wisconsin Supreme Court denied review. Walker then filed a federal habeas petition, which the district court dismissed as untimely and without merit, concluding that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply federal law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent, particularly in light of the decisions in Miller v. Alabama, Montgomery v. Louisiana, and Jones v. Mississippi. The Seventh Circuit concluded that the state court's decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, as the Supreme Court's precedents did not clearly establish a categorical prohibition against sentencing corrigible juvenile offenders to life without parole. View "Walker v Cromwell" on Justia Law

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Michael Williams was convicted by a Wisconsin jury of reckless homicide and possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. He appealed his convictions to the Wisconsin Court of Appeals, arguing that a jury instruction unconstitutionally lowered the government's burden of proof and that the prosecutor's closing arguments improperly shifted the burden of proof to him. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, and the Wisconsin Supreme Court denied his petition for review.Williams then filed a petition for habeas corpus in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin. The district court held that the state appellate court reasonably applied Supreme Court precedent in concluding that it was not reasonably likely the jury applied the instruction in an unconstitutional manner. The court also held that Williams had not demonstrated that the prosecutor's remarks violated clearly established Supreme Court precedent.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Williams raised the same two arguments. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Wisconsin Court of Appeals did not unreasonably apply Supreme Court precedent regarding the jury instruction on reasonable doubt. The court also found that the prosecutor's comments during closing arguments did not shift the burden of proof to the defense in a manner that violated due process, especially considering the trial court's curative instructions. The Seventh Circuit concluded that Williams had not shown that the state court's rulings were so lacking in justification as to constitute an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Williams v Meisner" on Justia Law

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Verizon Wireless sought permits from the City of Milwaukee to install small cells and matching utility poles in a downtown plaza next to a major arena. The City denied most of the permits, initially citing aesthetic concerns and proximity to existing poles. Later, it claimed it lacked authority to grant the permits because the plaza was leased to Deer District LLC. Verizon sued the City, arguing the denials violated the Telecommunications Act (TCA) and Wisconsin state law. The district court ruled in favor of Verizon, finding the City's justifications insufficient and ordered the City to issue the permits. Verizon installed the poles, and the City accepted the ruling.The district court found that the City's initial reasons for denial were not supported by substantial evidence and violated the TCA. It also found the City's later rationale, based on the lease with Deer District, untimely and unconvincing. The court held that the City violated Wisconsin state law as well, and ordered the City to issue the permits. The City complied and did not appeal the decision. Deer District, an intervening defendant, appealed, challenging the district court's interpretation of the lease and state law, but not the TCA holding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court dismissed Deer District's appeal for lack of Article III standing, as Deer District could not demonstrate that its injury would be redressed by a favorable decision. The court noted that the City did not join the appeal and that the injunction ran exclusively against the City. Therefore, even if the court ruled in Deer District's favor, it would not change the City's obligations under the district court's order. The appeal was dismissed for want of jurisdiction. View "Cellco Partnership v Deer District LLC" on Justia Law