Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017, White participated in several Indianapolis commercial armed robberies, primarily as a lookout. He also assisted his coconspirators by selecting and staking out the targeted premises and providing supplies, including (at least once) the gun. Eventually, undercover detectives spotted them attempting to rob a Verizon store. White pleaded guilty to three counts of conspiracy to commit robbery and one count of conspiracy to commit armed bank robbery. Based on a sentencing range of 97-121 months, the judge imposed four concurrent 108-month terms of imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit vacated White’s sentence. The general federal conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. 371, caps any term of imprisonment at 60 months. The judge must impose a new sentence on one count. Though she may restructure the entire sentence, she is not required to do so. The physical restraint enhancement was properly applied to one robbery conspiracy count. During the bank robbery, one of White’s accomplices wielded a handgun, grabbed a bank manager, and led him to the lobby at gunpoint, which is physical restraint under U.S.S.G. 2B3.1(b)(4)(B). The conduct underlying the second application of the enhancement is not physical restraint; during the robbery of a cellphone store, an accomplice wielded a gun and ordered an employee to move to another area. That error was harmless and did not alter the applicable Guidelines range. View "United States v. White" on Justia Law

C.B., a minor, suffers from generalized anxiety disorder, depression, and ADHD. During the 2017-2018 school year, the Brownsburg School Corporation determined that C.B. was eligible for accommodations under the Rehabilitation Act. In 2019, C.B. brought a shotgun shell to school with a device believed capable of discharging the shell. Brownsburg recommended expulsion. Conferences and administrative hearings followed. In April 2020, Brownsburg offered to pay for a new independent education evaluation of C.B. and to revisit C.B.’s eligibility for an individualized education plan under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). C.B.’s parents agreed to various compromises if Brownsburg agreed to pay for all attorney’s fees. In July, Brownsburg indicated willingness to pay part of the fees. C.B.’s parents rejected Brownsburg’s offer and reinstated their initial demands. Brownsburg sought dismissal of the proceedings, citing its concessions and “extreme effort” to resolve this case short of an administrative hearing. The parents requested factual findings regarding attorney’s fees and acknowledgment as the “prevailing party.” The hearing officer ultimately adopted the parties’ concession regarding services for C.B. and dismissed the petitions.C.B.’s parents sued for attorney’s fees under the IDEA’, 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(3)(B)(i)(I). The district court granted Brownsburg summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit reversed, concluding that the parents were the “prevailing party” and could be eligible for fees. Brownsburg's agreement to provide every student-related remedy set out in C.B.’s parents’ due process request was not binding until the hearing officer issued a finding. View "A. B. v. Brownsburg Community School Corp." on Justia Law

When a Chicago jewelry store opened, Diggs and two others exited a Lexus SUV bearing Michigan license plates and entered the store with guns raised. They subdued and handcuffed the security guard and dragged a sales associate to a back room where they handcuffed and pistolwhipped her. One man encountered another sales associate, put a gun to her head, and locked her in the bathroom. A fourth man, McClellan, sat in the Lexus and listened to the robbery on his cell phone before driving the men and more than $400,000 in watches and jewelry away. Diggs and McClellan were tried together and convicted; two men remain at large. Before trial, the court denied the spousal testimonial privilege to Diggs's wife, Adams (his girlfriend at the time of the robbery), finding that Adams fell within the joint-participant exception, The evidence showed that Adams became a co-conspirator on the day of the robbery and only withdrew days later when she told police that Diggs had used her car for the robbery.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. After considering Adams’s testimony in relation to “all else that happened” at trial, an average juror would not find the government’s case significantly less persuasive without it. The admission of purportedly hearsay testimony by a DHS agent was also harmless error. View "United States v. Diggs" on Justia Law

Hirlston worked for several years as a Costco store's Optical Manager. Hirlston has life-long disabilities that make it hard for her to bend, walk, and stand. In 2015, Costco planned to remodel the optical department in a way that would make it more difficult for Hirlston to continue working in that job. The parties discussed accommodations, including work restrictions designated by Hirlston’s doctor. Costco determined that no accommodations would allow Hirlston to continue as Optical Manager and that she had not been carrying out the essential functions of her job before the remodeling. She had been acting contrary to her doctor’s restrictions and delegating tasks that Costco believed were essential for her to carry out. Costco placed Hirlston on involuntary leave and later assigned her to a different job paying less money.Hirlston sued under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), alleging disability discrimination and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. 12111(8), 12112, 12203(a). A jury concluded that she was not qualified to do the Optical Manager job. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The use of a special verdict form was not erroneous. Hirlston forfeited her challenge to jury instructions by failing to make a timely objection. The key instruction included an error but the error did not harm Hirlston’s case so as to require a new trial. The judge did not abuse her discretion by allowing the parties to introduce photographs of the workplace that had not been disclosed in discovery. View "Hirlston v. Costco Wholesale Corp." on Justia Law

Uulu lived with his wife and children in Kyrgyzstan. He joined an opposition party. In 2013, Uulu attended a peaceful protest, during which police fired tear gas at the crowd and attacked protesters. They took Uulu to a police station where they hit him with a filled bottle and placed cellophane over his head, causing him to lose consciousness. Uulu testified that he was detained for several hours with a chemical in the room, making him dizzy. The next morning he was returned to the station. When he returned home, unknown men beat him until he was unconscious. He woke up in the hospital.Two months later, he entered the United States on a tourist visa. Uulu says that the Kyrgyz government subsequently convicted him of “organizing mass riots” and sentenced him in absentia. An asylum officer classified him as removable (8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(B)). In 2018, an immigration court held a hearing at which Uulu testified and presented corroborating documents. The judge ordered Uulu’s voluntary removal, finding that Uulu made shifting statements about key events in his asylum application, interview, and hearing testimony, including about whether police harmed him, how long he was detained, and the attack. Uulu’s corroborating statements were from interested parties who were not available for cross-examination. The BIA affirmed. The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Acknowledging concerns about the review of his corroborating evidence, the court found Uulu’s account included too many inconsistencies to upset the conclusion that he was not credible. View "Uulu v. Garland" on Justia Law

Patrick was working near the home of an on-and-off girlfriend when gang affiliates of the girlfriend’s current boyfriend–Freeman—shot at him. Patrick escaped and drove to his mother’s house. Patrick left the house to secure his equipment. Freeman and another Gangster Disciple opened fire on Patrick. Patrick ran inside, grabbed a gun loaded with pellet bullets, and fired from the doorway. The bullets struck Freeman in the buttocks and behind the ear. The gang members ran away. Chicago police officers arrived and handcuffed Patrick, demanding that Patrick tell them where the gun was or they were going to tear Patrick’s mother’s home apart. They did not have a warrant. Feeling that he had no choice, Patrick stated that there was a gun in a safe. The officers seized ammunition and several guns. Arrested, Patrick was eventually charged with additional crimes, including attempted murder. He was detained for over five years before pleading guilty to aggravated discharge of a weapon. He received a sentence of time served.Patrick’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. alleged that the city and 23 officers violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conspiring to conduct an unlawful arrest, execute a warrantless search, and detain him unlawfully. The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Patrick is not collaterally estopped from pursuing his search and seizure claim based his previous false arrest litigation concerning the attempted murder charge. Because his detention was allotted to a lawful sentence, Patrick has no injury that a favorable decision may redress. View "Patrick v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Russell was convicted of distributing heroin and fentanyl, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and received a below-Guidelines sentence of 96 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years of supervised release. Russell challenged one special condition of his supervised release: that he undergo a sex-offender evaluation to determine whether sex-offender treatment is necessary. In imposing the condition, the district court relied on facts from a police report, summarized in the PSR–that Russell had been convicted in 2010 of an offense that involved the sexual assault of a girl who became his stepdaughter. Russell furnished no evidence to call the PSR into question, stressing only that his “sexual assault case” was only a misdemeanor, not a felony. He expressed concern that imposing the condition could cause problems for him in prison. The court found the facts in the PSR quite detailed for the type of offense and age of the victim and credible. The court explained that if treatment were recommended following the assessment and Russell objected, the court would then decide if treatment was necessary.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The condition does not delegate judicial authority to anyone and vests final decision-making with the judge alone. It was narrowly tailored and promoted the goals of the Sentencing Guidelines. View "United States v. Russell" on Justia Law

The National Police Association (NPA), a non-profit organization, describes its purpose as “educat[ing] supporters of law enforcement in how to help police departments accomplish their goals.” In 2018-2019, some police departments around the country took issue with fundraising mailers the NPA sent residents, characterizing the solicitations as deceptive. The Indianapolis Star and the Associated Press reported on the alerts issued by these police departments in articles that questioned whether the money NPA raised went to police departments. Counsel for the NPA sent a letter to the publisher and AP’s general counsel, providing notice under Indiana Code 34-15-4-2 that the NPA considered the articles defamatory and intended to sue. The letter sought a retraction and removal of public access to online copies of the stories. NPA subsequently sued the publishers, alleging libel. The district court dismissed its case, reasoning that NPA never alleged “actual malice”—that the publishers were aware of an inaccuracy or had serious doubts about the accuracy of the material—when the stories were first published.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting “a novel interpretation of the Restatement (Second) Torts 577(2)” that would create a requirement that internet publishers remove previously published libelous information. The court declined to certify questions to the Indiana Supreme Court to confirm that such a duty exists in Indiana. The alleged duty lacks doctrinal support. View "National Police Association, Inc. v. Gannett Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Scanlon went on leave from his job as a Systems Administrator at McKesson. He requested accommodations to return to work; McKesson temporarily granted some, but not all, of them. Scanlon did not return to work but sought long-term disability insurance benefits under a McKesson group policy underwritten, insured, and administered by LINA. To meet the definition of “disabled” under the policy, an employee must be unable to perform the “material duties” of the employee’s regular occupation and earn 80% or more of the employee’s indexed earnings from working in the employee’s regular occupation. LINA denied Scanlon’s request and denied two administrative appeals after Scanlon supplied VA examination reports and letters and two residual functional capacity evaluations. LINA's medical examiners concluded that Scanlon was not entitled to benefitsIn a suit under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. 1132, the district court found that Scanlon, a veteran, suffered from myriad chronic orthopedic and sleep disorders that cause him pain and impact his daily life but found Scanlon ineligible for benefits, concluding Scanlon did not show that he cannot perform the material duties of his job. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The district court clearly erred when it failed to consider Scanlon’s inability to sit at his desk for eight hours a day as required by his occupation and his inability to perform the cognitive requirements of his job during regular work hours and in its treatment of certain medical records Scanlon provided. View "Scanlon v. Life Insurance Co. of North America" on Justia Law

Brown’s credit-monitoring business used a “negative option feature” on its websites, offering visitors a free credit report but automatically enrolling them in a $29.94 monthly subscription when they applied for that report. Information about the monthly membership was buried . Brown’s contractors created website traffic by posting Craigslist advertisements for fake rental properties and directing applicants to the websites for a “free” credit score. The FTC sued under Federal Trade Commission Act (FTCA) section 13(b), which authorizes restraining orders and permanent injunctions to enjoin conduct that violates its prohibition of unfair or deceptive trade practices. On its face, section 13(b) authorizes only injunctive relief but the Commission long interpreted it to permit restitution awards—an interpretation adopted by the Seventh Circuit and others.The district court entered a permanent injunction and ordered Brown to pay more than $5 million in restitution. The Seventh Circuit overruled its precedent and held that section 13(b) does not authorize restitution awards.The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that section 13(b) does not authorize equitable monetary relief. On remand, the Commission argued that the Court’s decision had significantly changed the law and successfully requested the reimposition of the restitution award under the Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act and FTCA section 19. The Seventh Circuit modified the new judgment. Its direction that any funds remaining after providing consumer redress shall be “deposited to the U.S. Treasury as disgorgement” exceeds the remedial scope of section 19, which is limited to redressing consumer injuries. View "Federal Trade Commission v. Credit Bureau Center, LLC" on Justia Law