Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Karl Rabenhorst, a former Navy officer employed by FEMA, alleged that he was subjected to age and sex discrimination, a hostile work environment, and retaliation after being removed from a Puerto Rico disaster relief operation and later suspended without pay. The incidents leading to these adverse actions included reprimands for inappropriate interactions with state officials and insubordination, such as sending unauthorized emails and making disrespectful remarks. During the Puerto Rico deployment, Rabenhorst used derogatory language toward younger female coworkers, which prompted his removal from the operation.After his removal, Rabenhorst filed internal complaints, including a grievance with the DHS Office of Equal Rights, alleging discrimination and retaliation. FEMA investigated and ultimately denied his claims, issuing a final agency decision in 2021. Rabenhorst then brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, asserting violations of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA).The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment for the Secretary of Homeland Security, finding that Rabenhorst failed to establish a prima facie case of discrimination, as he did not meet his employer’s legitimate expectations and could not show that similarly situated employees outside his protected classes were treated more favorably. The court also concluded that Rabenhorst provided no evidence of an objectively hostile work environment or that any adverse conduct was based on his age or sex. Regarding retaliation, the court found no causal link between his protected activity and the suspension decision. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo and affirmed, holding that Rabenhorst did not provide sufficient evidence to support claims of discrimination, hostile work environment, or retaliation. View "Rabenhorst v. Noem" on Justia Law

Ramona Milam, an Illinois homeowner, obtained a mortgage loan in 2005 and later fell behind on her payments. Selene Finance, acting as the loan servicer since 2021, sent Milam a letter warning of possible acceleration and foreclosure if she did not cure her default within 35 days. Milam argued that, due to federal regulations and Selene’s internal practices, Selene would not actually seek foreclosure or acceleration until at least 120 days of delinquency, making the letter’s threat misleading and intended to spur premature payment. After making a payment, Milam sued Selene, alleging violations of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and Illinois law, and claimed negligent misrepresentation.Selene moved to dismiss the complaint in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, arguing that, as the lender’s assignee under the mortgage, it was entitled to notice and an opportunity to cure before being sued. The district court agreed, finding Selene to be an assignee and holding that Milam failed to comply with the mortgage’s notice and cure provision, thus barring her claims. The court also dismissed Milam’s state law claims for lack of pleaded pecuniary loss.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed whether Milam had standing and whether Selene was properly considered an assignee under Illinois law. The court found Milam had standing based on supplemental allegations of monetary harm from accelerated payment. However, the Seventh Circuit held that the pleadings did not establish Selene as an assignee under Illinois law, distinguishing between assignment and delegation of duties. The Seventh Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings to resolve the assignee issue and reconsider the state law claims. View "Milam v Selene Finance" on Justia Law

Alfredo Juarez-Perez, a citizen of Mexico, was arrested in Sun Prairie, Wisconsin, after illegally reentering the United States for the third time. His criminal history spans decades, including multiple state convictions for sexual assault, failure to register as a sex offender, operating while intoxicated, and federal convictions for distributing cocaine and illegal reentry. He has repeatedly used aliases to elude law enforcement and violated conditions of release by failing to appear for legal proceedings. Upon his most recent arrest, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) lodged a detainer against him, and he was indicted for illegal reentry in October 2025.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Western District of Wisconsin initially ordered Juarez-Perez released pending trial, reasoning that the ICE detainer eliminated the risk of flight because he would remain in government custody. The magistrate judge indicated that, absent the detainer, Juarez-Perez would pose a serious risk of flight under the Bail Reform Act. The government appealed this decision, and the district court revoked the release order, finding that Juarez-Perez’s criminal history, likely incentive to consent to deportation, repeated illegal reentries, and use of fraudulent documents presented a serious risk of flight. The district court concluded that no conditions could reasonably assure his appearance in court.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision and affirmed the denial of Juarez-Perez’s motion for release pending trial. The Seventh Circuit held that the presence of an ICE detainer does not preclude pretrial detention under the Bail Reform Act, and that Juarez-Perez’s history demonstrated a serious risk of flight and non-appearance. The court found that no conditions of release would reasonably assure his appearance, and accordingly denied his motion for release. View "USA v Juarez-Perez" on Justia Law

Ryan O’Donnell and Michael Goree each had their vehicles disposed of by the City of Chicago after failing to pay multiple traffic tickets. The City acted under a municipal code provision that allows for immobilization, towing, and eventual disposition of vehicles registered to owners with outstanding violations. O’Donnell’s vehicle was sold to a towing company at scrap value; Goree’s vehicle was relinquished to a lienholder. Neither was compensated or had proceeds offset against their ticket debt.After these events, O’Donnell and Goree filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division. Their complaint alleged that the City’s forfeiture scheme was facially unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause and the Illinois constitution, and included a state-law unjust enrichment claim. They also asserted a Monell claim against the towing company, URT United Road Towing, Inc. The district court dismissed all claims for failure to state a claim, finding that the vehicle forfeiture under the traffic code was not a taking.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the City’s graduated forfeiture scheme is an exercise of its police power to enforce traffic laws rather than a taking for public use. The court reasoned that this type of law enforcement forfeiture does not trigger the Takings Clause of either the federal or Illinois constitutions. The court further found that because there was no constitutional violation, the plaintiffs’ Monell and unjust enrichment claims also failed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of all claims. View "O'Donnell v City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Alvin Beasley was charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm after police responded to gunshots at his ex-girlfriend’s house in Danville, Illinois. Officers saw a car fleeing the scene, found Beasley inside, and recovered a discarded firearm. As Beasley was on parole for a felony conviction, he could not lawfully possess a firearm. After a jury found him guilty, a presentence investigation identified three prior felony convictions: armed robbery in 2004, aggravated battery in 2005, and second-degree murder in 2011. The probation office concluded that Beasley qualified for enhanced sentencing under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois overruled Beasley’s objection that a jury should decide whether his prior convictions occurred on “different occasions,” and sentenced him to 300 months’ imprisonment. The court relied on then-controlling Seventh Circuit precedent, which permitted judges to make this finding. Beasley appealed, arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions (Wooden v. United States and Alleyne v. United States) required that this factual question be determined by a jury.While the appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Erlinger v. United States, holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments require a jury to decide whether prior offenses occurred on different occasions under ACCA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit agreed that the district court erred under Erlinger, but concluded the error was harmless. The appellate court found, beyond a reasonable doubt, that a properly instructed jury would have reached the same result, given the substantial gaps in time and the distinct nature of the offenses. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "United States v. Beasley" on Justia Law

De’Andre Owens was the subject of a controlled drug buy operation in Centralia, Illinois, on March 15, 2022. Law enforcement provided a confidential informant, Charlie Anderson, with money and recording equipment to purchase methamphetamine from Owens. The exchange occurred under police surveillance, but the recording device did not capture the transaction clearly. After the sale, Anderson was followed by Owens, prompting coordinated surveillance by detectives until Anderson safely rejoined them and turned over methamphetamine. While awaiting trial in jail for this offense, Owens attempted to bribe Anderson not to testify, orchestrating a series of calls offering Anderson $10,000 for his silence.In July 2023, Owens was indicted in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois on counts of distributing methamphetamine and witness tampering. At trial, several law enforcement officers and experts testified regarding the procedures used in the controlled buy and the subsequent investigation. The jury found Owens guilty on both counts. The district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment, classifying him as a career offender based in part on a prior state drug conviction. Owens had initially objected to the career offender enhancement but withdrew that objection at sentencing.Owens appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arguing errors related to expert testimony, jury instructions, handling of dual-role witnesses, and the career offender enhancement. The Seventh Circuit held that Owens forfeited or waived each argument. The court found no plain error in the admission of expert testimony, the inclusion of a witness in a jury instruction, or the handling of dual-role testimony, and concluded Owens had waived his objection to the career offender enhancement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Owens" on Justia Law

After serving more than a decade in the Illinois state legislature, the defendant established a lobbying and consulting firm and also sold life insurance for a private company. For several years, she correctly filed her tax returns and reported her income. However, beginning in 2014, she significantly underreported her income on her personal tax returns or failed to file altogether, despite substantial earnings from her business and insurance work. She was later terminated from her insurance position for fraudulent activity. The IRS discovered unreported income and issued a notice of tax liability, prompting her to amend one return and enter a payment plan, which she later abandoned.A grand jury indicted her on six counts, including making false statements on tax returns and willfully failing to file returns for herself and her company. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, made several evidentiary rulings before and during trial, including excluding evidence of her amended tax return and payment plan, and limiting her expert’s testimony. The jury convicted her on four counts. The court denied her motion for judgment of acquittal and later sentenced her to one year of imprisonment and supervised release. She subsequently filed a motion to modify her sentence to make her eligible for good-time credits, which the district court denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed her convictions and the district court’s evidentiary rulings de novo and for abuse of discretion, respectively. The appellate court held that there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to find willfulness, affirmed the exclusion of post-offense remedial evidence as within the district court’s discretion, found her challenge to the impeachment ruling waived since she did not testify, upheld the limitation on her expert’s testimony, and agreed that her motion to correct the sentence was untimely and properly denied. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Federal law enforcement began investigating the defendant after a wiretap of an associate’s phone implicated him in drug trafficking outside Chicago. The investigation revealed that the defendant, a convicted felon, was likely involved in significant drug transactions and was concerned about being targeted for a robbery. He was overheard discussing that he possessed a firearm for protection. Surveillance observed him using countersurveillance driving maneuvers, prompting agents to initiate a stop. During the stop, the defendant failed to comply with commands, resisted a frisk, and was ultimately found to have a handgun in his pocket.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, considered and denied the defendant’s motion to suppress the firearm, finding that the officers had reasonable suspicion for the stop and that their use of force did not convert the encounter into an arrest without probable cause. The case proceeded to trial, where the jury found the defendant guilty of being a felon in possession of a firearm. The district court also denied the defendant’s posttrial motions for acquittal and a new trial. At sentencing, the court declined to enhance the sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), concluding that the defendant’s prior Illinois conviction for voluntary manslaughter was not a qualifying predicate offense.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction, holding that the officers had reasonable suspicion and their conduct was justified under the circumstances. The court also found the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the verdict and that the district judge’s evidentiary rulings did not merit a new trial. However, the Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence, holding that the defendant’s 1982 Illinois voluntary manslaughter conviction qualifies as a violent felony under the ACCA, and remanded for resentencing. View "USA v Edwards" on Justia Law

Two individuals brought a class action against Amazon, alleging that its Virtual Try-On (VTO) feature—used to preview makeup and eyewear products by rendering them on users’ faces via their mobile devices—violated the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (BIPA). The VTO software, developed both in-house and by a third party, captured users’ facial geometry to overlay products for virtual preview. The plaintiffs claimed Amazon collected, stored, and used their facial data and that of many others in Illinois without proper notice, informed consent, or the creation of required data retention and destruction policies as mandated by BIPA.After removal from Illinois state court to the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs moved for class certification under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3). The district court certified a class of all individuals who used Amazon’s VTO feature in Illinois after September 7, 2016. The district court found the class satisfied the requirements of numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy, and that common questions—primarily concerning the VTO’s functionality and Amazon’s use of biometric data—predominated over individual questions such as location and damages. It also found a class action was superior due to the size and cost of potential individual litigation.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed only the class certification decision, focusing on predominance and superiority. The court affirmed the district court’s certification, holding that common questions about Amazon’s alleged statutory violations predominated and that individual questions regarding user location and damages were manageable. The court also agreed that a class action was superior to individual suits, given the complexity and cost of litigation, and affirmed the district court’s discretion. View "Svoboda v Amazon.com Inc." on Justia Law

A defendant was indicted on multiple federal charges, including sex trafficking by force, transporting a victim across state lines with the intent of prostitution, and coercing or enticing a victim to travel interstate for prostitution-related activities. During jury selection, a prospective juror with experience in local law enforcement expressed doubts about her ability to remain impartial, suggesting that cases typically proceed only when there is sufficient evidence. Her comments were made in the presence of other prospective jurors.After this exchange, the defendant moved to strike the entire venire, arguing that the comments had irreparably tainted the panel. The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied the motion but excused the individual juror for cause. The court reasoned that her experience was limited to a police department unrelated to the case and emphasized that it had already instructed the panel multiple times that an indictment is not evidence of guilt. The defendant was ultimately convicted on all counts, and his motion for a new trial—reiterating his concerns about jury prejudice—was denied by the district court, which found no prejudice resulted from the juror’s comments.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether the district court abused its discretion in refusing to question or strike the rest of the venire and in providing the jury with a redacted copy of the indictment during deliberations. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court acted within its discretion in both respects, noting the low probability of prejudice, the adequacy of curative instructions, and the routine nature of providing indictments with proper safeguards. The court also rejected the argument of cumulative error and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA v Thomas" on Justia Law