Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Fayez Dahleh purchased a flexible premium universal life insurance policy originally issued to Gilda Perlas. Dahleh had no known prior relationship with Perlas, but acquired the policy as an investment after Perlas designated him as owner in July 2019. The policy allowed the holder to vary premium amounts and payment schedules, and policy charges were assessed monthly. After becoming owner, Dahleh frequently maintained the policy by making payments at the end of grace periods triggered by insufficient account funds. In February 2022, Dahleh failed to make the required payment before the grace period expired, resulting in Minnesota Life cancelling the policy.Dahleh filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, seeking a declaratory judgment that the policy remained in force. He argued that Minnesota Life failed to provide the statutory notice and six-month grace period required by 215 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/234 before cancelling the policy. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Minnesota Life, holding that proper notice was given and no six-month grace period was required.Reviewing the case de novo, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit considered whether the policy’s required monthly charges constituted “premiums” under Section 234 and whether the policy was exempt from statutory notice and grace-period requirements. The appellate court held that the charges were premiums, but that the policy was exempt from the statutory requirements because premiums were payable monthly, fitting the exception in Section 234(2). Therefore, Minnesota Life was not required to provide additional notice or a six-month grace period before termination. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Dahleh v. Minnesota Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

A police officer in Peoria, Illinois, encountered a parked vehicle in a closed, dark parking lot at around 2:45 a.m. Inside the vehicle were Dazmine Erving and a female companion. The officer observed Erving make a sudden movement that appeared to be an attempt to hide something, smelled burnt cannabis, and noticed the woman provided false identification information. The officer determined that Erving was on federal supervised release for a weapons offense, only twelve days into his release. After allowing both individuals to retrieve their belongings, the officer conducted a limited search under the driver’s seat, where he discovered a handgun. Erving admitted ownership of the firearm.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reviewed Erving’s motion to suppress the firearm, arguing the search was not justified under the Fourth Amendment. The district court found the officer’s testimony credible and held that, considering the totality of circumstances—furtive movement, odor of cannabis, Erving’s criminal history, and his companion’s false statements—a protective search was warranted. Erving’s motion to suppress was denied. He then pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm as a felon and admitted to violating supervised release; the court sentenced him to the upper range of the advisory Guidelines and imposed a consecutive sentence for the supervised release violation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court found the protective search justified under the Fourth Amendment, as the officer had reasonable suspicion that Erving was dangerous and could gain immediate access to a weapon. The appellate court also rejected Erving’s arguments regarding procedural and constitutional errors at sentencing, concluding the district court did not rely on impermissible factors or speculation in imposing sentence. The denial of the suppression motion and the sentencing decision were affirmed. View "United States v. Erving" on Justia Law

Illinois Tamale Company, a Chicago-based food manufacturer, brought a trademark infringement suit against LC Trademarks and Little Caesar Enterprises, alleging that Little Caesars’ launch and advertising of its “Crazy Puffs” product infringed Iltaco’s registered trademarks for “Pizza Puff” and “Puff.” Iltaco has sold its “Pizza Puff” product for decades and registered the “Pizza Puff” trademark in 2009 and the “Puff” mark in 2022. Little Caesars, a national pizza chain, began selling “Crazy Puffs” in 2024, marketing them with its established “Crazy” branding and trade dress, and included the phrase “4 Hand-Held Pizza Puffs” in small print as part of its advertising.After receiving a cease-and-desist letter from Iltaco, Little Caesars disputed the claims and continued its use of the contested names. Iltaco filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, asserting Lanham Act and related state law claims and moved for a preliminary injunction to stop Little Caesars from using “Crazy Puffs,” “Pizza Puff,” or “Puff.” The district court denied the injunction for “Crazy Puffs” and “Puff,” finding no sufficient likelihood of success on those claims, but granted the injunction for “Pizza Puff,” ruling that Iltaco was likely to prove infringement with respect to that mark.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court erred in granting the injunction for “Pizza Puff,” finding that Iltaco failed to show a likelihood of success in proving the mark was protectable and in rebutting Little Caesars’ fair use defense. The court affirmed the district court’s decision denying the injunction as to “Crazy Puffs” and “Puff.” Thus, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Illinois Tamale Company, Inc. v. LC Trademarks, Inc." on Justia Law

LJM Partners, Ltd. and Two Roads Shared Trust, both involved in options trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, experienced catastrophic losses on February 5 and 6, 2018, when volatility in the S&P 500 surged unexpectedly; LJM lost approximately 86.5% of its managed assets and the Preservation Fund (managed by Two Roads) lost around 80%. The plaintiffs alleged that eight defendant firms, acting as market makers, manipulated the VIX index by submitting inflated bid-ask quotes for certain SPX Options, which artificially raised volatility and resulted in inflated prices on the plaintiffs' trades, causing over one billion dollars in combined losses.After initially filing complaints against unnamed "John Doe" defendants in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, the plaintiffs pursued extensive discovery to identify the responsible parties. The cases were swept into a multidistrict litigation proceeding (VIX MDL), which delayed discovery. Eventually, after several rounds of amended complaints, the plaintiffs identified and named eight defendant firms. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that LJM lacked Article III standing because it failed to allege an injury in fact, as the losses belonged to its clients, not LJM itself. For Two Roads, the district court held that its claims were time-barred under the Commodity Exchange Act’s two-year statute of limitations, and equitable tolling was denied due to lack of diligence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. It held that LJM’s complaint failed to establish Article III standing, as it did not allege that LJM itself—not just its clients—suffered actual losses. The court further held that Two Roads’s complaint was untimely and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing equitable tolling. Both dismissals were affirmed. View "LJM Partners, Ltd. v. Barclays Capital, Inc." on Justia Law

On February 5, 2018, an abrupt spike in market volatility led to a sharp decline in the S&P 500 and a rapid increase in the VIX index. LJM Partners, Ltd. and Two Roads Shared Trust pursued trading strategies on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange that assumed low volatility and suffered catastrophic losses when volatility soared. They alleged that several market makers manipulated the VIX by quoting inflated bid-ask prices for certain options, which artificially increased volatility and caused losses exceeding one billion dollars in managed assets over two days.Both LJM and Two Roads filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, initially naming “John Doe” defendants. The cases were coordinated into multidistrict litigation, and the plaintiffs sought expedited discovery to identify the defendants. After extensive litigation, they amended their complaints to name eight firms as defendants. The defendants moved to dismiss. The district court found that LJM lacked Article III standing, as its complaint only alleged injuries suffered by its clients, not by LJM itself. The court denied LJM’s request for leave to substitute the real party in interest and dismissed its complaint without prejudice. For Two Roads, the court found that its claims were barred by the Commodity Exchange Act’s two-year statute of limitations, declined to apply equitable tolling, and also dismissed for failure to state a claim.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Seventh Circuit held that LJM did not allege a concrete injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing, as its complaint failed to distinguish between its own losses and those of its clients. The court also held that Two Roads’s complaint was untimely and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying equitable tolling. The court declined to reach the merits of the underlying Commodity Exchange Act claims. View "Two Roads Shared Trust v. Barclays Capital Inc." on Justia Law

Jaryan Gills, an inmate at East Moline Correctional Center, was assaulted by another prisoner, suffering a broken arm that required two surgeries. Following the incident, Gills was placed in medical segregation for a month in a cell lacking a sink or toilet, relying on guards for bathroom access and provided with portable urinals and waste bags. He alleges that prison staff frequently denied him timely bathroom access, resulting in unsanitary conditions. Gills also contends that he received delayed or inadequate medical care for his injuries and other health issues, and that a prison doctor and staff were deliberately indifferent to these needs.The United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment. In its decision, the district court disregarded Gills’s declarations, which largely repeated allegations from his complaint and added details not disclosed in his deposition, and granted summary judgment to the defendants. The court determined that Gills failed to present sufficient evidence to establish genuine disputes of material fact regarding his Eighth Amendment claims for unconstitutional conditions of confinement and inadequate medical care, as well as his conspiracy and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. The Seventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Gills’s declarations under the sham affidavit rule. While the conditions Gills experienced may have been unpleasant, the appellate court found that the evidence did not support a finding of deliberate indifference by prison officials or the medical director. The court also concluded that Gills’s conspiracy claim failed because no underlying constitutional violation was proven and there was no non-speculative evidence of an agreement among defendants. The judgment in favor of the defendants was affirmed. View "Gills v. Hamilton" on Justia Law

Sean Grusd fraudulently persuaded multiple victims over two years that he was a successful investor, convincing them to entrust him with significant sums of money, including life savings and funds intended for their children’s education. He substantiated his misrepresentations with forged documents and ultimately used the money for personal luxury purchases. Grusd pleaded guilty to one count of wire fraud and acknowledged in his plea agreement that he had defrauded his victims of approximately $23,155,000. He agreed that restitution would be ordered in that amount, minus any funds repaid prior to sentencing.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, oversaw Grusd’s sentencing. The Presentencing Investigative Report, consistent with the plea agreement, recommended restitution of $23,155,000. During sentencing, the prosecutor noted that approximately $1.6 million had already been recovered from third parties, a representation to which Grusd’s counsel acquiesced and clarified as voluntary returns connected with civil matters. The prosecutor then confirmed that the updated restitution figure was $21,557,739, which the district judge ordered, with credit for any further payments. Grusd did not object to this calculation or the restitution amount.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Grusd challenged the subtraction of the $1.6 million credit from the agreed-upon total, arguing that the district judge erred by not substantiating the amount. The Seventh Circuit held that Grusd had waived his right to challenge the restitution credit by acquiescing during sentencing and failing to object. The court further held that, even if the claim was merely forfeited, Grusd could not meet the requirements for plain-error review. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "United States v. Grusd" on Justia Law

Farhan Sheikh, a college student and active iFunny user, posted a series of public messages threatening to kill doctors, patients, and visitors at a Chicago abortion clinic, naming the clinic and specifying a date. He repeatedly emphasized in follow-up posts and private messages that his threats were genuine and not satirical, even stating his intent to carry out the actions. After his posts were reported to the FBI, the clinic was warned, canceled appointments, increased security, and an employee took time off in response to the threat. Sheikh was arrested and indicted for transmitting threats in interstate commerce under 18 U.S.C. § 875(c).The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois. Sheikh moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statute was facially unconstitutional and the grand jury had not been properly instructed on the law's requirements regarding true threats and criminal intent. The district court denied his motion and proceeded to trial, where evidence included employee testimony and images of security changes at the clinic. Sheikh testified that he did not intend to carry out the threats, but the jury convicted him. His motion for a new trial was denied.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed Sheikh’s constitutional challenge to § 875(c), his grand jury process objections, and his evidentiary complaints. The Seventh Circuit held that § 875(c) is constitutional when interpreted to criminalize only true threats made with at least reckless intent, consistent with recent Supreme Court and circuit precedent. The court found no reversible error in the grand jury process or the admission of evidence at trial, concluding that any evidentiary mistakes were harmless given the strength of the government’s case. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the conviction. View "United States v. Sheikh" on Justia Law

CLEAResult Consulting, Inc. engaged NEXT Payment Solutions, Inc. to create a customized appointment scheduling software called the FAST Tool. After several years of use, CLEAResult acquired another company with its own scheduling platform, the DSMTracker, and decided to transition away from NEXT’s software. CLEAResult analyzed the FAST Tool’s functionality to enhance the DSMTracker, but was never given access to the FAST Tool’s underlying source code or algorithms. NEXT alleged that CLEAResult had secretly misappropriated trade secrets and brought claims for misappropriation under federal law and unjust enrichment under Illinois law.Reviewing the case, the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois first granted CLEAResult partial summary judgment on the trade secrets claim, finding NEXT had failed to sufficiently identify its alleged secrets. The court narrowed the claim and required NEXT to provide more detail, but NEXT submitted only vague descriptions of software modules. The court then granted summary judgment in full to CLEAResult, concluding NEXT’s descriptions did not specify protectable trade secrets. The court also granted CLEAResult’s motion in limine, precluding NEXT from pursuing an unjust enrichment claim based on a theory of misusing “other proprietary information,” determining this was a new theory not previously pled. NEXT then voluntarily dismissed its remaining claims, and final judgment was entered for CLEAResult.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that NEXT failed to identify trade secrets with sufficient specificity to survive summary judgment under the Defend Trade Secrets Act. The Seventh Circuit also found the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding NEXT’s late-developed unjust enrichment theory, as this constituted an improper new claim. The final judgment in favor of CLEAResult was affirmed. View "NEXT Payment Solutions Inc. v CLEAResult Consulting, Inc." on Justia Law

Matthew Metzler, an undergraduate student at Loyola University Chicago, was expelled in January 2017 after a university hearing board found him responsible for sexual misconduct involving another student, referred to as Jane Roe. The university’s Title IX process began after Roe reported feeling pressured into sexual acts without her consent. Initially, Roe declined to file a formal complaint, but later decided to do so after continuing distress. The university investigated, interviewed both parties, and considered evidence, including text messages and witness names provided by Metzler. The hearing board credited Roe’s account over Metzler’s based on the perceived consistency and credibility of her statements and found him responsible, resulting in expulsion. Metzler’s appeal was unsuccessful.Metzler filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, asserting claims under Title IX for unlawful sex discrimination and breach of contract due to alleged procedural irregularities in the disciplinary process. The district court granted summary judgment for Loyola, finding insufficient evidence that Metzler had been discriminated against based on sex or that contractual standards had been violated in a manner lacking rational basis. The case was briefly remanded for jurisdictional review and to determine anonymity, after which the district court reaffirmed its decision for Loyola.The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that Metzler failed to present sufficient evidence for a reasonable factfinder to conclude that Loyola discriminated against him on the basis of sex under Title IX, even when considering generalized public pressure and procedural errors. The court further found that Metzler’s breach of contract claim failed because Loyola had a rational basis for its disciplinary decision. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "Metzler v Loyola University Chicago" on Justia Law