Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2014, Sanford was convicted of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute and sentenced to 180 months’ imprisonment— 82 months below the bottom of the U.S.S.G. range. Sanford is incarcerated in the Victorville, California federal prison. On April 28, 2020, the Victorville warden received two written requests from Sanford seeking compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A) due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Without waiting for a response from the warden or letting 30 days lapse without a response (as the statute requires), Sanford filed a compassionate-release motion in court on May 1. Appointed counsel stated that Sanford “suffers from several health conditions, including stomach pain, shortness of breath, and anxiety.” No details were provided.On May 14. the warden denied Sanford’s request, explaining that the medically stable 38-year-old did not establish “extraordinary and compelling” reasons and that “extraordinary measures” were being taken to prevent the spread of COVID-19 and explained the process for administrative appeal. Victorville prison did not then have any COVID-19 cases. The district court denied Sanford’s motion, concluding that the “mere presence” of COVID-19 in prison is not an extraordinary and compelling reason for compassionate release. The Seventh Circuit affirmed on alternate grounds. Sanford failed to exhaust administrative remedies within the Bureau of Prisons before filing his motion; section 3582(c)(1)(A) is a mandatory claim-processing rule and must be enforced when properly invoked. View "United States v. Sanford" on Justia Law

In 1999-2016, Wilkinson convinced approximately 30 people to invest $13.5 million in two hedge funds that he created. By 2008, Wilkinson lost the vast majority of their money. Wilkinson told them that the funds’ assets included a $12 million note with an Australian hedge fund, Pengana. The “Pengana Note” did not exist. Wilkinson provided fraudulent K-1 federal income tax forms showing that the investments had interest payments on the Pengana Note. To pay back suspicious investors, Wilkinson solicited about $3 million from new investors using private placement memoranda (PPMs) falsely saying that Wilkinson intended to use their investments “to trade a variety of stock indexes and options, futures, and options on futures on such stock indexes on a variety of national securities and futures exchanges.” In 2016, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission filed a civil enforcement action against Wilkinson, 7 U.S.C. 6p(1).Indicted under 18 U.S.C. 1341, 1343, Wilkinson pleaded guilty to wire fraud, admitting that he sent fraudulent K-1 forms and induced investment of $115,000 using fraudulent PPMs. The court applied a four-level enhancement because the offense “involved … a violation of commodities law and ... the defendant was … a commodity pool operator,” U.S.S.G. 2B1.1(b)(20)(B). Wilkinson argued that he did not qualify as a commodity pool operator because he traded only broad-based indexes like S&P 500 futures, which fit the Commodity Exchange Act’s definition of an “excluded commodity,” “not based … on the value of a narrow group of commodities.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Wilkinson’s plea agreement and PSR established that Wilkinson was a commodity pool operator. View "United States v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Bullock petitioned for Chapter 13 bankruptcy but failed to disclose on his Schedule B list of assets a pending workers’ compensation claim. On his Schedule C list of exemptions, he failed to declare an exemption for the claim. Bullock proposed a 60-month plan of reorganization to pay $148 per month plus possible tax refunds. The bankruptcy court confirmed the plan in October 2014. In 2017, Bullock received a workers’ compensation settlement award for $92,430.84. The trustee moved to compel Bullock to disclose it. Bullock then listed the settlement proceeds as personal property on Schedule B and declared the proceeds exempt on Schedule C under 820 ILCS 305/21; 735 ILCS. 5/12-1001(b). The trustee successfully moved to compel Bullock to file an amended plan under 11 U.S.C. 1329(a) that would provide for the turnover of Bullock’s workers’ compensation award for distributions to general unsecured creditors. Bullock had already spent the award proceeds. The bankruptcy court confirmed Bullock’s amended plan, requiring Bullock to pay a lump-sum of approximately $15,000 before the plan’s expiration. Bullock failed to make the final payment under the plan. An appeal from the dismissal of the bankruptcy case is pending. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the adversary proceeding on mootness grounds. That issue is mooted because he complied with the very order requiring the reorganization plan’s amendment that he now seeks to challenge and because his underlying bankruptcy case was dismissed. View "Bullock v. Simon" on Justia Law

The mobile home park is a one-square-mile residential community of fewer than 100 dwellings, in North Judson, Indiana. In 2004-2013, Thomas was connected to eight fires there. He collected insurance proceeds on properties that he owned or that were owned by relatives: $75,000, $50,000, $60,000, and $426,227. In 2018, he was charged with mail fraud, 18 U.S.C. 1341, because he had used the mail to collect the insurance proceeds. The district court ruled that two “distractor” fires were part of the scheme and did not implicate Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) but that the 2004 fire was too far removed in time to be part of the scheme. The 2004 fire was admissible as modus operandi evidence and to prove identity. A jury convicted Thomas on all counts. He was sentenced to 90 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the fires were not part of a scheme because they were not a chain of continuous and overlapping events, but rather discrete episodes of alleged criminality and that the fires were inadmissible character evidence. Thomas was charged with mail fraud, not arson. The district court properly decided that six of the fires were part of Thomas’s scheme and not “other acts.” View "United States v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Marnocha, a board-certified doctor in pediatrics and neonatal-perinatal medicine, received her license in 1981 and joined St. Vincent’s Hospital in Indianapolis in 1987. In 2017, Dr. Marandi began became the Executive Director of the pediatric service for St. Vincent, which has two locations. Marandi concluded there were too many neonatologists on staff. In formulating his restructuring plan, Marandi reviewed workflows and schedules, before deciding to terminate the neonatologists at one of St. Vincent’s campuses. Standard restructure review required an HR employee, to assess the impact on the entire targeted group, “to make sure that any business decisions [were not] based off of specifics to an individual and that [they are] specific to the organizational needs.” In 2018, Marandi discharged Marnocha and four of her colleagues. Four of the terminated neonatologists interviewed for one open position at the other campus. A 35-year-old (Landis) was chosen; the others were over 50 years old.Marnocha filed suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 621. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of St. Vincent. Marnocha failed to establish that the doctors at the other campus were similarly situated; she did not provide their ages, work history, performance reviews, supervisors, or qualifications. The two work environments are distinct, varying by NICU level, acuity, and pace. The record supports a range of legitimate, non-age-related reasons for hiring Landis over Marnocha. View "Marnocha v. St. Vincent Hospital and Health Care Center, Inc." on Justia Law

Smith sued under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C.1692g(a)(3). GC’s debt-collection letter stated: If you dispute this balance or the validity of this debt, please let us know in writing. If you do not dispute this debt in writing within 30 days after you receive this letter, we will assume this debt is valid. The Act does not say how a consumer may dispute a debt’s validity. Smith argued that the consumer is entitled to choose how to dispute. In an earlier appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that GC had waived any entitlement to arbitrate the dispute. The district court then held that Smith had not established injury and dismissed the suit.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, without addressing whether a debt collector violates section 1692g(a)(3) by telling consumers to put disputes in writing. Smith did not allege injury, because she did not try to show how a dispute would have benefitted her. Smith does not contend that the letter’s supposed lack of clarity led her to take any detrimental step, such as paying money she did not owe. She is no worse off than if the letter had told her that she could dispute the debt orally. The requirement of injury-in-fact is an essential element of standing, regardless of whether the asserted violation is substantive or procedural. View "Smith v. GC Services Limited Partnership" on Justia Law

A jury found Harden guilty of conspiring to distribute heroin and found that Schnettler's death had “resulted from” the use of that heroin. He was sentenced to life in prison under 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(B), which increases the maximum statutory term of imprisonment for a drug offense on a finding that “death or serious bodily injury result[ed] from the use of [the] substance.” After an unsuccessful appeal, Harden moved under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his sentence, asserting that his attorney was ineffective in agreeing to a jury instruction that repeated section 841(b)(1)(B) but did not elaborate that his heroin had to be the “but-for” cause of Schnettler’s death and failing to present expert testimony to rebut evidence that his heroin caused that death. The court denied his motion without an evidentiary hearing.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In this case, the instruction was a correct statement of the law; no evidence would have led the jury to find that heroin was merely a “contributing” cause of death, so competent counsel would not suspect that the instruction might be confusing. Schnettler died from the toxicity of a single drug; the only issue concerned the timing of his use of the heroin and his death. Given the evidence that counsel did consult an expert, the decision not to call that expert “is a paradigmatic example of the type of strategic choice.” View "Harden v. United States" on Justia Law

In 2005-2007, Merchant purchased Michigan hotel properties from NRB and financed the purchases through NRB, using corporate entities as the buyers. Merchant sold interests in those entities to investors. The hotels had been appraised at inflated amounts and sold for about twice their fair values. When the corporate entities defaulted on their loan payments, NRB foreclosed in 2009. Merchant claimed that NRB’s executives colluded with an appraiser to sell overvalued real estate to unsuspecting purchasers, wait for default, foreclose, and then repeat the process.In 2010, an investor sued Merchant, Merchant’s companies, NRB, and 12 others for investor fraud. In 2014 the FDIC took NRB into receivership and substituted for NRB as a defendant. Merchant and his companies brought a cross-complaint, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state laws. A Fifth Amended Cross-Complaint raised 14 counts against 10 defendants, including two law firms that provided NRB’s legal work. The district court dismissed several counts; others remain active.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against the law firms. The counts under state law are untimely under Illinois’s statute of repose. The cross-complaint effectively admits that one firm played no role in NRB’s alleged fraud perpetrated against Merchant in 2005-2007. The cross-complaint failed to allege that either law firm conducted or participated in the activities of a RICO enterprise; neither firm could be liable under 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). View "Muskegan Hotels, LLC v. Patel" on Justia Law

Dr. Khungar, a pediatrician, worked for Access. A year into her employment, in August 2015, she received a “final warning” from the regional medical director based on Khungar’s accessing of a patient’s medical file to obtain a coworker’s phone number, in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Khungar then reported an earlier incident in which the clinic manager referred to Khungar’s Indian ethnicity. in May 2016, complaints about Khungar began rolling into the Human Resources department (HR) from staff and the parents of her minor patients.Chief Medical Officer Mejia recommended Khungar’s termination based on the nature and volume of the complaints. He later testified that he was unaware of Khungar’s race, religion, and national origin. HR ratified Mejia’s recommendation. After she was notified of the decision, Khungar asserted that her past complaints of “cultural insensitivity” had never been addressed. HR repeatedly attempted to meet with Khungar, but Khungar canceled. Khungar filed an EEOC charge. Before leaving, Khungar made statements that were perceived to be threatening, which caused HR to fire Khungar immediately and employ a security guard for several weeks.Khungar filed suit, alleging discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that Khungar “cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination.” Rhe evidence showed nondiscriminatory and nonpretextual reasons for Khungar’s termination. Khungar “failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [her] protected activity caused her termination.” View "Khungar v. Access Community Health Network" on Justia Law

Meraz-Saucedo, a citizen of Mexico, is married to a Mexican citizen with whom he has young U.S.-citizen children. Meraz-Saucedo first attempted to enter the U.S. in 2003 and was returned to Mexico. He re-entered the U.S. without inspection in 2004. In 2013, he was served in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a). The notice did not contain a specific date or time for the initial hearing. On December 4, 2013, Meraz-Saucedo received a Notice of Hearing, informing him of the date and time. Meraz-Saucedo appeared before the IJ with counsel, did not object to the defective notice, conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and informed the IJ that he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, based on his purported fear of persecution and torture if removed to Mexico. He testified about physical abuse and threats his family received from the Sinaloa Cartel.The IJ denied relief. While his appeal was pending, he sought remand to apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Meraz-Saucedo forfeited his arguments concerning the defective notice and failed to present sufficient evidence that he would be tortured at the hands of, or with the acquiescence of, a government official. View "Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen" on Justia Law