Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Vargas began working as a mail carrier in 2005. Mail carriers must be able to carry up to 35 pounds in their shoulder bags. Vargas’s route also required shuttling mail and equipment weighing up to 75 pounds between the post office and a satellite location. Vargas sustained an on-the-job foot injury in 2008. He was diagnosed with plantar fasciitis, received treatment, submitted a successful workers’ compensation claim, and continued working. In 2011, Vargas filed an EEO complaint, raising miscellaneous workplace grievances and alleging race- and disability-related discrimination. He withdrew this complaint. Vargas’s plantar fasciitis subsequently flared up. His doctor placed him on work restrictions, March 1-22, prohibiting him from carrying more than 15 pounds. On March 14, Vargas returned to work from a vacation; he wanted his route restructured to eliminate carrying heavy loads. His superiors did not oblige and he applied for workers’ compensation. He also made daily requests for “light duty” but there was no light duty work available, so he took paid sick leave.Vargas, who is Hispanic, sued, alleging disability-based discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act, with retaliation and racial discrimination claims under Title VII. Vargas still works for the Postal Service. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment rejecting his claims. Vargas could not perform the only job available to him, with or without reasonable accommodation, and there is no evidence he was treated differently because of his race or suffered unlawful workplace retaliation. View "Vargas v. DeJoy" on Justia Law

Makhsous owned three Wisconsin residential care facilities. In 2015, the Wisconsin Department of Health Services (DHS) found that two of Makhsous’s facilities did not comply with Wisconsin law. Daye is the supervisor of the Aging and Disability Resource Center (ADRC) of Marinette County, which makes recommendations to individuals who inquire about residential care facilities. It does not place individuals in care facilities, monitor care facilities, or issue citations or sanctions to care facilities. In 2016, the ADRC began publishing a “facility directory” for potential residents. Under Wisconsin’s ADRC Operational Practice Guidelines, the directory cannot include facilities that have been found in violation of law.Makhsous filed suit, alleging that Daye violated the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses by failing to include Makhsous’s facilities in the ADRC directory and refusing to refer individuals to her facilities. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of Daye. Makhsous did not show that Daye harmed a constitutionally protected property interest or discriminated against her. The ADRC directory did not include Makhsous’s facilities because they were found deficient by DHS and because Makhsous failed to ask the ADRC to include them. Makhsous had no rebuttal evidence showing that Daye failed to include her facilities in the directory because of her race. View "Makhsous v. Daye" on Justia Law

Fields filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law against Chicago, Chicago police officers, and former Cook County prosecutors. Fields alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional rights and state law by fabricating evidence and withholding exculpatory evidence in a criminal investigation that resulted in Fields’s conviction for a 1984 murder. A retrial resulted in an acquittal, 12 years after the original trial. The individual who had implicated Fields in the crimes eventually confessed to committing the murder. Fields sought a certificate of innocence, which was denied.After a third trial, the jury found in favor of Fields against Detectives O’Callaghan and Murphy on one of his section 1983 claims, against Chicago on Fields’s Monell liability claim, and against O’Callaghan on a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress, and found for the defendants on the remaining claims. The jury awarded Fields $22 million in compensatory damages and punitive damages of $30,000 against O’Callaghan and $10,000 against Murphy. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting the detectives’ challenges to evidentiary rulings concerning wiretaps, character evidence, evidence of Fields’s 1972 murder conviction, and evidence concerning prison incidents. The evidence allowed a jury to conclude that the city had failed to take the necessary steps to address an unconstitutional practice of using street files and that there was a “systemic underproduction of exculpatory materials to prosecutors and defense counsel.” View "Fields v. City of Chicago" on Justia Law

Federal judges may release prisoners for compassionate reasons. Previously, that authority required a motion by the Bureau of Prisons. The 2018 First Step Act created a judicial power to grant compassionate release on a prisoner’s own request; the prisoner must first allow the Bureau to review the request and make a recommendation (or let 30 days pass in silence), 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). Gunn’s sentence for drug and firearm offenses runs into 2024. She sought release under section 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that, because of her age (62) and medical condition, she faces extra risks should she contract COVID-19.The district court denied relief, citing the requirement ”that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission." The Sentencing Commission, which lacks a quorum, has not updated its policy statements to implement the Act. The most recent Guidelines Manual refers to a “motion of the Director of the Bureau of Prisons" and covers only prisoners who suffer from certain medical problems.The Seventh Circuit vacated. The Manual lacks an applicable policy statement; any decision is “consistent with” a nonexistent policy. “Consistent with” differs from “authorized by.” While a judge acting on a prisoner’s motion may lack the Director's advice, contemplated by Manual, about whether an “extraordinary and compelling reason” exists, the First Step Act does not muzzle the Director. Until an amended statement is adopted, district judges must operate under the statutory criteria: ”extraordinary and compelling reasons.” View "United States v. Gunn" on Justia Law

Elmer owned and operated multiple healthcare-related companies including Pharmakon, a compounding pharmacy that mixes and distributes drugs—including potent opioids like morphine and fentanyl—to hospitals across the U.S.. Pharmakon conducted its own internal potency testing and contracted with a third party to perform additional testing to evaluate whether its compounded drugs had too little of the active ingredient (under-potent) or too much (over-potent). In 2014-2016, testing showed 134 instances of under- or over-potent drugs being distributed to customers. Elmer knew the drugs were dangerous. Rather than halting manufacturing or recalling past shipments, sales continued and led to the near-death of an infant. Elmer and Pharmakon lied to the FDA.Elmer was charged with conspiracy to defraud the FDA (18 U.S.C. 371); introducing adulterated drugs into interstate commerce (21 U.S.C. 331(a), 333(a)(1) & 351); and adulterating drugs being held for sale in interstate commerce (21 U.S.C. 331(k), 331(a)(1) & 351). Pharmakon employees, FDA inspectors, and Community Health Network medical staff testified that Elmer was aware of and directed the efforts to conceal out-of-specification test results from the FDA. The district court sentenced Elmer to 33 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting challenges to rulings related to the evidence admitted at trial and Elmer’s sentence. The evidence before the jury overwhelmingly proved Elmer’s guilt. The sentence was more than reasonable given the gravity of Elmer’s crimes. View "United States v. Elmer" on Justia Law

Shuhaiber, who is confined to a wheelchair, sued the Illinois Department of Corrections under the Americans with Disabilities Act and Rehabilitation Act. He alleged that the Stateville Center failed to accommodate his disability by confining him to a cell unsuited to the use of a wheelchair and that he was transported to physical therapy in vans that were not ADA-compliant, leaving him to depend on an officer to lift him. The district court dismissed the complaint, determining that Shuhaiber failed to allege that he was deprived of access to facilities or services or that the vans caused him to miss medical appointments.Shuhaiber appealed and sought permission to proceed without prepaying the requisite filing fee. Meanwhile, Shuhaiber, a native of the United Arab Emirates, had been transferred to DHS custody for removal from the United States. Shuhaiber, as a frequent filer of federal lawsuits, had accumulated more than three strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act for filing frivolous lawsuits and would have had to prepay the filing fee to appeal the dismissal of his claims. Doubting that Shuhaiber was still a “prisoner,” the district court granted his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the appellate filing-fee bar does not apply where the appellant is being held by immigration authorities and no longer is a “prisoner” within the meaning of the PLRA. The district court was, nonetheless, right to dismiss his claims. View "Shuhaiber v. Illinois Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Dawson pled guilty to conspiring to transport stolen property in interstate commerce and was sentenced to 18 months of prison followed by three years of supervised release, plus restitution. Less than a year after Dawson was released, Dawson’s probation officer asked the court to revoke his supervised release because Dawson had violated several conditions, including by possession of a firearm. Dawson was charged in state court with weapons violations. He was released to home confinement on electronic monitoring.At the federal revocation hearing, the parties disagreed about proving the firearms violation. The judge opined that state courts “do literally nothing” on firearm violations and continued the hearing. Later, officers testified and the court found by a preponderance of the evidence that Dawson had possessed the firearm. Dawson did not contest the other violations.The advisory Guidelines range was six-12 months in prison. The statutory maximum was 24 months. The court revoked Dawson’s supervised release and sentenced him to 24 months’ imprisonment with no supervised release to follow. The court focused first on Dawson’s electronic-monitoring violation, then on Dawson’s failure to make restitution payments. As for Dawson’s missed drug tests, the court considered them a “technical violation.” The court called the firearm violation, “an affront to the Court,” and “a danger to the community.” The court made its sentence consecutive to any forthcoming sentence in the pending state-court case.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the court chose its sentence to punish Dawson for possessing the firearm but should have focused on his breach of the court’s trust and left any punishment to the state court and that the court disregarded his mitigation arguments and the relevant sentencing factors. View "United States v. Dawson" on Justia Law

The Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act regulates the collection, use, retention, disclosure, and dissemination of biometric identifiers (fingerprints, retina and iris scans, hand scans, and facial geometry). Fox's employer, Dakkota, required employees to clock in and out by scanning their hands on a biometric timekeeping device. Dakkota used third-party software to capture that data, which was stored in a third-party's database. Fox alleges that Dakkota did not obtain her informed written consent before collecting her biometric identifiers, unlawfully disclosed or disseminated her biometric data to third parties without her consent, failed to develop, publicly disclose, and implement a data-retention schedule and guidelines for the permanent destruction of its employees’ biometric identifiers, and failed to permanently destroy her biometric data when she left the company. Fox was represented by a union at Dakkota, The judge dismissed two counts as preempted by the Labor Management Relations Act, but remanded the section 15(a) claim to state court.The Seventh Circuit reversed the remand order. Fox’s section 15(a) claim does not allege a mere procedural failure to publicly disclose a data-retention policy but alleges a concrete and particularized invasion of her privacy interest in her biometric data stemming from Dakkota’s violation of its section 15(a) duties to develop, publicly disclose, and comply with data retention and destruction policies. Her allegations plead an injury in fact for purposes of Article III. The invasion of a legally protected privacy right, though intangible, is personal and real, not general and abstract. View "Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems, LLC" on Justia Law

Daoud came to the FBI’s attention because of online activity that evinced a desire to engage in violent jihad. While communicating and meeting with undercover agents, Daoud sometimes wavered about killing people. Daoud planned a Chicago car bomb attack. Undercover agent, “Mudafar” described the bomb that he would supply and the mass carnage it would cause. Mudafar and Daoud met to implement the attack. Daoud, age 18, was arrested upon pressing the button and was charged with attempting to use a weapon of mass destruction and attempting to destroy a building used in interstate commerce with an explosive. While Daoud was in pretrial custody, he solicited the murder of the FBI agent (Mudafar). Daoud’s cellmate was paid to record conversations and instructed Daoud to make a phone call authorizing the killing, which Daoud did. Daoud was charged with soliciting a crime of violence, murder-for-hire, and obstruction of justice. Two years later, Daoud physically attacked another for drawing a picture of the Prophet Muhammad. Daoud was, again, charged. Daoud spent over 400 days in segregated housing during his pretrial incarceration, and Daoud witnessed his cellmate commit suicide.The cases were consolidated. Daoud was diagnosed with psychiatric disorders. With medication, Daoud’s condition improved; he was found competent to stand trial. Daoud pled guilty while maintaining his innocence. The advisory Guidelines range was life imprisonment; he was sentenced to 16 years' imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated the sentence as substantively unreasonable. The court downplayed the extreme seriousness of Daoud’s offenses in conflict with the undisputed facts; failed to account for the need to protect the public from Daoud’s high risk of reoffending; improperly distinguished the sentences of similar offenders by relying on Daoud’s pretrial confinement; and premised its sentence on mitigating factors that could not bear the weight assigned to them. View "United States v. Daoud" on Justia Law

Johnson, a “sovereign citizen,” participated in a bogus mortgage-elimination scheme. Charged with mail fraud, Johnson represented himself at a month-long jury trial, presenting nonsensical defenses. Johnson was capable of basic trial tasks. The Ninth Circuit affirmed his conviction, stating that Johnson was a “fool,” but not incompetent.While serving his 300-month sentence, Johnson filed false bankruptcy petitions. Charged with bankruptcy fraud, Johnson did not have counsel at his initial appearance and repeatedly insisted that he was not the defendant. The magistrate asked Johnson several questions to confirm his decision to proceed pro se. Johnson stated that his competency to represent himself had “already been established and affirmed on appeal.” The magistrate “strongly urge[d]” him to accept counsel but ultimately found that Johnson had knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. Johnson was again questioned and declined counsel during the final pretrial conference, Before and at trial, Johnson performed the necessary functions. Johnson’s arguments were gibberish, characterized by statements like, “the United States is a figment of our imagination.” Johnson accepted counsel for sentencing. The court applied a downward variance and sentenced Johnson, age 55, to 216 months’ imprisonment, consecutive to his current sentence.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court’s colloquy with Johnson was lacking, but Johnson’s waiver of counsel was valid. Johnson’s history and his separate, more thorough colloquy with the magistrate indicate that Johnson’s decision to forgo counsel was not uninformed. The court also rejected Johnson’s challenge to the sentencing explanation. View "United States v. Johnson" on Justia Law