Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Norwood met a 15‐year‐old girl, a runaway from a state facility, at an Indianapolis gas station. Using drugs, violence, threats, and manipulative affection, he enticed her to have sexual intercourse with him and then prostituted her to countless men. A jury convicted him of attempted transportation of a minor across state lines with the intent that the minor engage in prostitution, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and (e). The district court sentenced him to 330 months’ imprisonment.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Norwood’s efforts to prostitute the victim before attempting to transport her to Wisconsin was sufficient evidence of his intent to continue prostituting her once they crossed state lines. The court upheld the admission of the victim’s medical records; the victim’s statements about what had happened and when were for the primary purpose of medical treatment. They are non-testimonial. The court also upheld the admission of a recorded jail call in which Norwood talked about “pimping” a young “white girl” to whom he had given cocaine. By arguing that the victim had sex with five men per day because that was what Norwood intended, the government simply asked the jury to draw a reasonable inference from the evidence. The court rejected a challenge involving a juror and affirmed the substantive reasonableness of the sentence and the application of the five‐level enhancement under U.S.S.G 4B1.5(b). View "United States v. Norwood" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs received collection letters from Finance System, seeking payment of medical debts. Represented by the same law firm, they filed materially identical class-action claims under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. 1692, alleging the use of false, deceptive, or misleading representations, or otherwise unfair or unconscionable methods to collect a debt. They cited the letters’ statement that: “You want to be worthy of the faith put in you by your creditor …. We are interested in you preserving a good credit rating with the above creditor.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the claims, reasoning that the plaintiffs have not alleged any injury, or even an appreciable risk of harm, from the alleged statutory violations and, therefore, lack standing. View "Sandri v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc." on Justia Law

Wyatt pleaded guilty to conspiring to traffic a minor, 18 U.S.C. 1594(c). The government promised to recommend a below-Guidelines sentence of 10 years’ imprisonment and to notify the court about his post-plea cooperation. Wyatt’s recommended sentencing range was 262-327 months. At sentencing, Wyatt described how he had “turned his life around” and requested a three-year sentence but reiterated that he wanted to stand by his plea agreement. The government recommended a 10-year sentence but it was defense counsel, not the prosecution, that told the court about Wyatt’s cooperation.Wyatt did not object and received the recommended sentence. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. While the government’s silence breached the plea agreement, Wyatt did not show a reasonable probability that the breach had any effect on his sentence. View "United States v. Wyatt" on Justia Law

Knudtson worked for Trempealeau County for over 45 years. She eventually became a paralegal/office manager in the District Attorney’s Office. When his friend, the Jackson County District Attorney, died, McMahon, the Trempealeau County District Attorney, closed his office for a day and encouraged his staff to attend the funeral. Knudtson refused to attend because she wanted to complete work at the office. McMahon offered Knudtson three choices: work from home, attend the funeral, or take a vacation day. The disagreement became a bitter dispute. The County placed Knudtson on paid leave. Knudtson declined another position at the same pay grade. The County had no other available position and terminated her employment.Knudtson filed suit, citing the Establishment Clause because the funeral took place at a church and involved a religious service. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. Knudtson acknowledged that when she stated that she did not want to attend the funeral, she did not know that it would be a religious service; her decision not to attend had nothing to do with its religious nature. Organizing a delegation from a public office to attend a funeral normally raises no implication that the government, or any officials, endorse the deceased person's religion. View "Knudtson v. Trempealeau County" on Justia Law

In its 2018 “Janus” holding, the Supreme Court reversed course on 41 years of jurisprudence sanctioning agreements between state-government agencies and unions authorizing the unions to collect fair-share fees from non-union members to cover costs incurred representing them. Ocol, a math teacher in the Chicago public school system, filed a putative class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. 2201 against the Unions, the Attorney General of Illinois, and members of the Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, seeking recovery of payments he had previously made under protest to the Union. He also challenged the constitutionality of the exclusive representation provisions of Illinois law as they applied to non-union members.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of all of his claims. Acknowledging circuit precedent, Ocol conceded defeat on his Section 1983 claim for a refund of his fair-share payments and his First Amendment challenge to exclusive representation. The court granted Ocol’s request for summary affirmance so that he may seek a petition for certiorari to pursue his arguments in the Supreme Court. View "Ocol v. Chicago Teachers Union" on Justia Law

The Cook County Jail houses primarily people who have not yet been convicted. Under the jail’s “paper triage” policy, a detainee who has dental pain and wants treatment must submit a health service request form (HSRF). Staff review the HSRF and categorize it as “routine,” “priority,” or “urgent.” The detainee is referred to a dentist for treatment in three to 30 days, depending on the categorization. Most detainees do not receive a face-to-face assessment from a nurse or higher-level practitioner before they see a dentist. An assessment could identify bona fide complaints of dental pain or reveal serious medical issues and would allow a nurse to dispense over-the-counter pain medication.McFields, a former detainee, filed a putative class action, alleging that detainees suffered gratuitous pain as a result of the paper triage policy. They alleged that the standard of care for processing a health service request requires a face-to-face assessment within 48 hours and that the jail’s policy is objectively unreasonable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of class certification, noting that each detainee presents a different situation that involved a different type of pain, took place at a different time, and involved different medical professionals and prison staff. McFields failed to satisfy the commonality and typicality requirements of Rule 23. Individual issues predominate over common questions. View "McFields v. Dart" on Justia Law

Williams, a Chicago school social worker, suffers from depression, anxiety, and chronic sinusitis. For the 2013–14 school year, Williams received an evaluation score that placed him in the “developing” category, and was given a Professional Development Plan. Social workers' hours depend on the school they are serving on a particular day. The Board denied Williams's first accommodation request, for consistent work hours. During the 2014–15 school year, Williams was cited for interrupting a teacher, failing to read a student’s individual educational plan before a meeting, speaking inappropriately about his personal life, making personal calls during school hours, and failing to report to work. Williams was twice denied titles that may be awarded to “proficient” social workers. Williams filed a discrimination charge and another accommodation request, seeking a consistent start time, a reduced caseload, and assignment to a single school. The Board denied these requests but assigned him to schools with 7:45 a.m. start times. Williams's third accommodation request sought a private office, dedicated equipment, and exemption from evaluations. The Board supplied Williams with HEPA filters, computer monitors, and access to a private meeting space; it denied his other requests. Williams was not selected for special assessment teams because he did not have the “proficient” rating and was not bilingual. He filed his second charge of discrimination.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act. 42 U.S.C. 12101, and Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, rejecting claims that the Board discriminated against Williams because of his disability and gender, failed to accommodate his disability, and retaliated against him for filing discrimination claims. View "Williams v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago" on Justia Law

The defendants sell shaker tubes in grocery stores across the country, with labels advertising “100% Grated Parmesan Cheese.” The products are not 100 percent cheese but contain four to nine percent added cellulose powder and potassium sorbate, as indicated on the ingredient list on the back of the package. Plaintiffs claim that these ingredient lists show that the prominent “100%” labeling is deceptive under state consumer-protection laws. The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred numerous similar actions to the Northern District of Illinois for consolidated pretrial proceedings. That court ultimately dismissed the plaintiffs’ deceptive labeling claims (100% claims) with prejudice.The Seventh Circuit reversed in part. Plaintiffs have plausibly alleged that the prominent “100%” labeling deceives a substantial portion of reasonable consumers, and their claims are not preempted by federal law. An accurate fine-print list of ingredients does not foreclose as a matter of law a claim that an ambiguous front label deceives reasonable consumers. Many reasonable consumers do not instinctively parse every front label or read every back label before purchasing groceries. For reasons specific to multidistrict litigation, the court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction to review the dismissal of the 100% claims in two complaints because the appeals were filed too late. View "Bell v. Albertson Companies, Inc." on Justia Law

During a 2005 traffic stop, officers searched Hogsett’s vehicle and discovered crack cocaine and a firearm. A jury convicted Hogsett of being a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1), possessing with intent to distribute 0.5 grams of a mixture or substance containing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and possessing a firearm during and in relation to a drug-trafficking crime, 18 U.S.C. 924(c)(1). The court found that Hogsett’s relevant conduct was approximately 21.5 grams of crack cocaine (0.5 grams from the vehicle search and 21 grams from prior, noncharged instances of trafficking) and sentenced him to 355 months’ imprisonment: 295 months on Count 1, 240 months concurrently on Count 2, and 60 months consecutively on Count 3. The Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 subsequently reduced the crack-to-powder penalty disparity from 100:1 to 18:1; Congress made this reduction retroactive in the First Step Act of 2018, permitting district courts to reduce the sentences of defendants convicted of a “covered offense” before August 3, 2010.In 2019, Hogsett sought resentencing. The district court denied his motion. The Seventh Circuit reversed, finding that possession with intent to distribute crack cocaine under 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C) is a covered offense. View "United States v. Hogsett" on Justia Law

Donald has glaucoma and keratoconus, a thinning of the cornea that causes distorted vision. To treat his keratoconus, Donald had left-eye corneal transplant surgery in 2011. A few years later, Donald was convicted of drug crimes. He began his prison sentence at Illinois River Correctional Facility in 2014. His eye problems started flaring up, causing redness and poor vision. He was subsequently seen by Illinois River’s optometrists and at Illinois Eye Center several times. Ultimately, he was diagnosed with a rupture of the globe, an irreversible loss of vision in his left eye. After surgery, pathological tests revealed that the infection that led to the ruptured globe was caused by bacteria that can act very quickly and cause perforation in as few as 72 hours. Donald filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deliberate indifference to a serious medical need.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The undisputed evidence shows that the defendants did not act with deliberate indifference toward an objectively serious medical condition and the district court appropriately exercised supplemental jurisdiction to dispose of the malpractice claim. View "Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc." on Justia Law