Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2012, Laducer, a truck driver, rear-ended Spinnenweber’s minivan. Spinnenweber refused medical treatment at the scene. He later sought treatment for neck pain, tinnitus, and bouts of short-term memory loss. Spinnenweber sued Laducer and Laducer’s employer, seeking compensatory damages for his physical injuries. He did not seek punitive damages, medical costs, or lost wages, nor did he claim psychological or emotional injuries. Defendants conceded liability. The defendants’ medical expert, Dr. Carney, was the only expert that Spinnenweber relied on. He testified that Spinnenweber “clearly had a whiplash injury” from the crash. “He certainly could’ve had a very mild concussion.” Dr. Carney did not connect the alleged memory loss or the tinnitus to the accident. Spinnenweber’s counsel stated during closing arguments that the purpose of tort law "is to deter bad conduct so it doesn’t repeat.”The jury awarded Spinnenweber $1 million in compensatory damages. The court offered Spinnenweber the choice of accepting $250,000 or a new trial. Spinnenweber declined to accept the remittitur award. His attorney withdrew. After a one-day bench trial, Spinnenweber requested an award of $0 in damages, calling it a “verdict of silence.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The court did not abuse its discretion by finding that Spinnenweber’s evidence showed that he potentially suffered just whiplash and a mild concussion or by finding that the $1 million verdict was so outrageous that it warranted remittitur or a new trial. “Spinnenweber was hoisted with his own petard.” View "Spinnenweber v. Laducer" on Justia Law

Banks was charged with conspiracy and aiding and abetting a robbery of the Gary, Indiana Post Office, where she worked, 18 U.S.C. 371, 2114(a). After a five-day trial and four hours of deliberation, at about 8:45 p.m., the jury returned a verdict of guilty on both counts. At the request of Banks’s counsel, the judge polled the jurors. The first four affirmed the verdict. The fifth did not. When asked whether the guilty verdict was in fact his verdict, Juror 32 responded, “Forced into.” The judge repeated the question. Juror 32 responded that he needed more time. The remaining jurors affirmed the verdict, singling out Juror 32 as the lone dissenter. The judge instructed the jurors to continue deliberating and sent them back to the jury room at 9:06 p.m. Twenty-nine minutes later, the jury again returned a guilty verdict. This time the poll confirmed a unanimous decision.The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded for a new trial. The totality of the circumstances, most notably, Juror 32’s troubling responses to the poll questions, the judge’s decision to complete the poll notwithstanding the juror’s dissent, the lateness of the hour, and the extreme brevity of the jury’s renewed deliberations, were unacceptably coercive. View "United States v. Banks" on Justia Law

Wisconsin grants public-sector employees the right to bargain collectively through the State Employment Labor Relations Act (SELRA) and the Municipal Employment Relations Act (MERA). In 2011, SELRA and MERA were amended by Act 10, which divided Wisconsin state and municipal employees into “[p]ublic safety employee[s],” which includes police officers, firefighters, and deputy sheriffs, and “general municipal employee[s],” i.e., everyone else. A subsequent amendment created a class of “[t]ransit employee[s].” Public safety and transit employees and their unions continue to operate under the pre-Act 10 scheme but for general employees, Act 10 limited the scope of employers’ collective bargaining obligations, prohibiting bargaining over anything except increases to base wages and mandating that general employee unions submit to an annual recertification election. Certification now requires affirmative votes from an absolute majority of all employees in the bargaining unit, not just those voting. Act 10 bars public employers from deducting union dues from the earnings of general employees.The Seventh Circuit has previously rejected two challenges to Act 10’s constitutionality and affirmed the dismissal of this First Amendment suit, filed a public-employee labor union and two of its members, challenging the annual recertification requirement, the limitations on collective bargaining, and the prohibition on payroll deduction of union dues. View "International Union of Operating Engineers v. Daley" on Justia Law

Mexican citizen Hernandez-Alvarez was a permanent U.S. resident when, in 2002, he was convicted of indecent solicitation of a child. DHS initiated removal on the grounds that his conviction constituted an aggravated felony. Hernandez-Alvarez argued that the conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. He was removed before the Board of Immigration Appeals acted on his motion for reconsideration. The Board determined that his removal constituted a withdrawal of that motion. Fifteen years later, Hernandez-Alvarez moved for reconsideration and reopening, citing two Supreme Court decisions: Esquivel-Quintana (2017), and Pereira (2018). He argued that his motion was timely because it merited equitable tolling; alternatively, he requested that the Board invoke its authority to reopen his proceedings sua sponte. The Board concluded that equitable tolling was not warranted because Hernandez-Alvarez failed to show due diligence; it rejected his argument based on Pereira that the IJ did not have jurisdiction over his removal proceedings and declined to exercise its power to reopen the proceedings sua sponte.The Seventh Circuit denied his petition for review. Hernandez-Alvarez failed to exhaust his remedies before the Board for his argument that his 2019 motion is timely because it relates back to his 2004 motion. Hernandez-Alvarez did not diligently pursue his rights in the two years following the Esquivel-Quintana holding that a conviction under a state statute criminalizing consensual sexual intercourse between a 21-year-old and a 17-year-old does not qualify as sexual abuse of a minor under the Immigration and Nationality Act. The Board did not commit legal error in declining to reopen his proceedings. View "Hernandez-Alvarez v. Barr" on Justia Law

The Spuhlers incurred medical debts that State Collection sought to collect on behalf of the medical‐care provider. The collector sent the Spuhlers dunning letters that provided the debts’ sums but lacked a statement that interest would accrue on the debts. The Spuhlers, who sought to represent a class of consumers, filed a complaint under the Fair Debt Collection Practices (FDCPA), arguing that the omission of a statement that the debt amounts would increase from the accrual of interest made the letters’ account of the debts was misleading, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2), 1692f. A magistrate granted the Spuhlers summary judgment and certified a class.The Seventh Circuit vacated. At the summary judgment stage of litigation, to demonstrate Article III standing to sue for an alleged violation of the FDCPA, the plaintiffs must “‘set forth’ by affidavit or other evidence ‘specific facts’” demonstrating that they have suffered a concrete and particularized injury that is both fairly traceable to the challenged conduct and likely redressable by a judicial decision. The plaintiffs here did not carry that burden. View "Spuhler v. State Collection Service, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2009. Zamora, a high-ranking Latin Kings Chicago gang member, pleaded guilty to an extortion and racketeering conspiracy. After successfully challenging his sentence, Zamora was transferred to the Metropolitan Correctional Center (MCC) to await resentencing. At MCC, Zamora took orders from fellow inmates for contraband and directed his sister to obtain the items. She would pass synthetic marijuana, cigarettes, and cell phones to an MCC guard, Lizak, who smuggled the items to Zamora. Over six months, the group smuggled four loads of contraband into the MCC before Lizak withdrew from the scheme. Zamora was charged with conspiracy to commit an offense against the United States, 18 U.S.C. 371, and giving and offering bribes to a federal official, 18 U.S.C. 201(b)(1)(C). He pleaded guilty to bribery; the government dismissed the conspiracy charge.The district court calculated Zamora’s guideline sentencing range using USSG 2C1.1 and added a four-level enhancement because the offense “involved … [a] public official in a high-level decision-making or sensitive position.” The district court overruled Zamora’s objection, explaining that although Lizak “may not have had high-level decision-making authority,” a prison guard qualifies as a “sensitive position.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The Guideline’s commentary, which generally binds courts on issues of interpretation, explains that officials in sensitive positions include those who are situated similarly to a law enforcement officer. View "United States v. Zamora" on Justia Law

Finance sent Bazile a letter seeking to collect medical debts. The dunning letter stated the date (September 19, 2017) and the total balance of the debt ($92.23), without indicating whether that amount may increase with the accrual of interest. Bazile filed suit, alleging that the letter’s exclusion of information concerning the accrual of interest was a violation of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA) because the letter was misleading and did not provide “the amount of the debt,” 15 U.S.C. 1692g(a)(1), 1692e. The district court concluded that Bazile had Article III standing.The Seventh Circuit remanded for findings of fact. The complaint may survive dismissal as a matter of pleading but that’s not enough for the district court to decide the merits of the action. While Bazile’s allegations support an inference that interest was accruing on the debt, the defendant asserted that interest was not accruing and questioned whether the letter’s omission of information about interest affected Bazile’s response to the correspondence or to the debt. Facts necessary for standing have been called into doubt, requiring further inquiry into whether the court has subject‐matter jurisdiction, requiring an evidentiary hearing on the defendant’s motion to dismiss. View "Bazile v. Finance System of Green Bay, Inc." on Justia Law

Convergent sent Brunett a letter demanding repayment of a debt that slightly exceeded $1,000, offering to accept 50% of the balance in satisfaction of the debt. The letter stated that, if the creditor ended up forgiving more than $600, it would be required to report the release of indebtedness to the IRS, because federal law treats as taxable income a loan that is not repaid. Brunett sued, arguing that the statement about the IRS violates the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692e(5), (10), because it threatens action that cannot legally be taken and amounts to a false representation.The Seventh Circuit ordered the dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction after noting that the statement was not false. Brunett conceded that the letter had not injured her. She did not pay anything; the statement did not affect her credit rating or discourage anyone from doing business with her. A plaintiff who lacks a concrete injury cannot sue under the FDCPA. The state of confusion is not itself an injury. “If it were, then everyone would have standing to litigate about everything.” That Brunett’s confusion led her to hire a lawyer and that she felt "intimidated" do not change the evaluation. View "Brunett v. Convergent Outsourcing Inc." on Justia Law

When the Gunn's debt for homeowners' association assessments reached $2,000, the association hired a law firm, which sent the Gunns a letter demanding payment. The letter states: If Creditor has recorded a mechanic’s lien, covenants, mortgage, or security agreement, it may seek to foreclose such mechanic’s lien, covenants, mortgage, or security agreement. The Gunns did not pay. The law firm filed suit in state court, seeking damages for breach of contract rather than foreclosure. The Gunns filed suit under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), which forbids false or misleading statements in dunning letters, 15 U.S.C. 1692e(2), (4), (5) & (10). The Gunns acknowledge that the statement is true but contend that it must be deemed false or misleading because the law firm would have found it too costly to pursue foreclosure to collect a $2,000 debt.The Seventh Circuit ordered the dismissal of the suit for lack of jurisdiction. The contested sentence did not injure the Gunns. They argued that they were annoyed or intimidated but did not contend that the letter was a forbidden invasion of privacy. The association and its law firm were entitled to communicate with them, If annoyance were enough, the very fact that a suit was filed would show the existence of standing. The asserted violation of a substantive FDCPA right does not guarantee standing. There must still be a concrete injury. View "Gunn v. Thrasher, Buschmann & Voelkel, PC" on Justia Law

Two armed men robbed three cash-and-check stores. Jett and McKissick were convicted of conspiracy under the Hobbs Act, 18 U.S.C. 1951(a), and attempted bank robbery “by force and violence, or by intimidation,” section 2113(a). The government alleged four “overt acts” for Count 1: three completed robberies and an attempted fourth robbery The defendants had unsuccessfully moved for a special verdict form requiring the jury to find unanimously that the defendants had committed one specific overt act. The district court sentenced each to 293 months’ imprisonment, based on a Guidelines range of 235-293 months, repeatedly commenting on the strength of the evidence.The Seventh Circuit reversed the attempted-robbery convictions because there was no evidence of force, violence, or intimidation, but otherwise affirmed, stating “Hobbs Act conspiracy does not have an overt-act requirement.” On remand, a probation officer calculated the defendants’ advisory Guidelines ranges as 188-235 months. Although Count 2 was gone, the defendants’ total offense levels were still 33, using a grouping analysis and multiple-count adjustment based on the three robberies and the attempted robbery. The defendants’ criminal history categories were lower because of intervening precedent.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the 230-month sentences imposed on remand. The district court erred by using the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, and not the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard, to decide whether the defendants conspired to commit the “object offenses” of the conspiracy but the error was harmless. The court adequately explained increasing their sentences on the conspiracy count. View "United States v. Jett" on Justia Law