Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2005-2007, Merchant purchased Michigan hotel properties from NRB and financed the purchases through NRB, using corporate entities as the buyers. Merchant sold interests in those entities to investors. The hotels had been appraised at inflated amounts and sold for about twice their fair values. When the corporate entities defaulted on their loan payments, NRB foreclosed in 2009. Merchant claimed that NRB’s executives colluded with an appraiser to sell overvalued real estate to unsuspecting purchasers, wait for default, foreclose, and then repeat the process.In 2010, an investor sued Merchant, Merchant’s companies, NRB, and 12 others for investor fraud. In 2014 the FDIC took NRB into receivership and substituted for NRB as a defendant. Merchant and his companies brought a cross-complaint, alleging violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and state laws. A Fifth Amended Cross-Complaint raised 14 counts against 10 defendants, including two law firms that provided NRB’s legal work. The district court dismissed several counts; others remain active.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of claims against the law firms. The counts under state law are untimely under Illinois’s statute of repose. The cross-complaint effectively admits that one firm played no role in NRB’s alleged fraud perpetrated against Merchant in 2005-2007. The cross-complaint failed to allege that either law firm conducted or participated in the activities of a RICO enterprise; neither firm could be liable under 18 U.S.C. 1962(c). View "Muskegan Hotels, LLC v. Patel" on Justia Law

Dr. Khungar, a pediatrician, worked for Access. A year into her employment, in August 2015, she received a “final warning” from the regional medical director based on Khungar’s accessing of a patient’s medical file to obtain a coworker’s phone number, in violation of the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act. Khungar then reported an earlier incident in which the clinic manager referred to Khungar’s Indian ethnicity. in May 2016, complaints about Khungar began rolling into the Human Resources department (HR) from staff and the parents of her minor patients.Chief Medical Officer Mejia recommended Khungar’s termination based on the nature and volume of the complaints. He later testified that he was unaware of Khungar’s race, religion, and national origin. HR ratified Mejia’s recommendation. After she was notified of the decision, Khungar asserted that her past complaints of “cultural insensitivity” had never been addressed. HR repeatedly attempted to meet with Khungar, but Khungar canceled. Khungar filed an EEOC charge. Before leaving, Khungar made statements that were perceived to be threatening, which caused HR to fire Khungar immediately and employ a security guard for several weeks.Khungar filed suit, alleging discrimination and retaliation under Title VII. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that Khungar “cannot make out a prima facie case of discrimination.” Rhe evidence showed nondiscriminatory and nonpretextual reasons for Khungar’s termination. Khungar “failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact as to whether [her] protected activity caused her termination.” View "Khungar v. Access Community Health Network" on Justia Law

Meraz-Saucedo, a citizen of Mexico, is married to a Mexican citizen with whom he has young U.S.-citizen children. Meraz-Saucedo first attempted to enter the U.S. in 2003 and was returned to Mexico. He re-entered the U.S. without inspection in 2004. In 2013, he was served in removal proceedings, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a). The notice did not contain a specific date or time for the initial hearing. On December 4, 2013, Meraz-Saucedo received a Notice of Hearing, informing him of the date and time. Meraz-Saucedo appeared before the IJ with counsel, did not object to the defective notice, conceded removability under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), and informed the IJ that he sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, based on his purported fear of persecution and torture if removed to Mexico. He testified about physical abuse and threats his family received from the Sinaloa Cartel.The IJ denied relief. While his appeal was pending, he sought remand to apply for cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b). The Seventh Circuit denied a petition for review. Meraz-Saucedo forfeited his arguments concerning the defective notice and failed to present sufficient evidence that he would be tortured at the hands of, or with the acquiescence of, a government official. View "Meraz-Saucedo v. Rosen" on Justia Law

Diaz entered the U.S. without inspection in 1995. He was placed in deportation proceedings. The notice of his hearing did not reach him. Zelaya failed to appear. A final order of deportation was entered in his absence. Zelaya later left the U.S. but re-entered before December 30, 1998. In 2014, following a traffic-related arrest, Zelaya successfully moved to reopen his deportation case. At a 2018 hearing, Zelaya moved for administrative closure of his deportation proceeding to allow “repapering,” by which a deportation proceeding that began under pre-1996 law can be converted into a cancellation-of-removal proceeding under 1996 legislation, 8 U.S.C. 1229b(b), to enable Zelaya to seek cancellation of removal, for which he is apparently legally eligible.The BIA ordered voluntary deportation, citing the Attorney General’s 2018 opinion, which sharply restricted the ability of immigration judges and the Board to close cases administratively. The Seventh Circuit granted a petition for review, noting that it has previously held that the Attorney General’s directive was contrary to law; “immigration regulations plainly grant immigration judges broad authority and discretion to take ‘any action … that is appropriate and necessary for the disposition’” of their cases. The BIA did not exercise its discretion according to law, guided by factors enumerated in earlier precedent. View "Diaz v. Rosen" on Justia Law

McGee, Frazier, and Glaspie, were transporting heroin from Chicago to Minneapolis. Police stopped their vehicle for speeding. None of the men had valid driver’s licenses. The vehicle was registered to McGee’s girlfriend. McGee consented to a canine “free air sniff.” The canine alerted to the presence of drugs. Officers found more than 100 grams of heroin and fentanyl inside the vehicle. McGee was charged with possession with intent to distribute, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1). Glaspie told police that McGee asked him to accompany McGee on the trip and that McGee had hidden the drugs. An inmate housed with McGee told investigators that McGee said that the heroin belonged to McGee and that McGee paid Frazier to drive. While in jail, McGee called McMillan, a drug dealer with whom he worked. McMillan scolded McGee for hiding the drugs badly and blamed McGee for failing to instruct Frazier to slow downMcGee pleaded guilty. The district court applied a two-level enhancement for being an “organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor in the criminal activity” under USSG 3B1.1(c), calculated McGee’s Guidelines range as 92-115 months (without the leadership enhancement, 77-96 months), and sentenced McGee to 84 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit vacated. The court erred in imposing the leadership enhancement. The evidence suggests McGee was a “middleman.” The court miscalculated McGee’s criminal history points by erroneously considering a DUI conviction from 2007 View "United States v. McGee" on Justia Law

Officer Wimmersberg detected an IP address requesting child pornography using a peer‐to‐peer file‐sharing network, Freenet. As a member of an FBI Task Force, she was certified to investigate on Freenet and had previously conducted more than 40 similar investigations. Wimmersberg determined that the IP address belonged to Wehrle. Wimmersberg and others executed a search warrant on his residence and found a photo album in Wehrle’s bedroom, The album contained a photograph depicting A.E. lying on a blanket with his penis exposed. The background matched Wehrle’s living room. Officers seized electronic devices and discovered over one million images and videos of child pornography, including additional pornographic images of A.E. Wehrle acknowledged he had downloaded child pornography using Freenet. Wehrle attempted to disqualify Wimmersberg as an expert witness, but the court found her to be "credible" and that her credentials and qualifications did not suggest that the evidence was not properly obtained or any problem with the investigation.The district court found Wehrle guilty and sentenced him to a below‐guidelines term of 40 years’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to qualify Wimmersberg as an expert witness. The admission of trade inscriptions found on the seized devices did not violate the rule against hearsay and the Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause; 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), which criminalizes the production of child pornography, does not violate the Commerce Clause. Wehrle’s sentence was not substantively unreasonable. View "United States v. Wehrle" on Justia Law

Zellweger applied for disability benefits in 2013, claiming a per se disabling spinal condition equivalent to Listing 1.04. His amended onset date was August 28, 2013. His last-insured status expired on September 30, 2013, so the application presented a narrow question: whether he was disabled during the one-month period from August 28 to September 30 (42 U.S.C. 416(i)(3)(B)). The primary medical basis for his application was cervical and lumbar degenerative disc disease.An ALJ denied his claim, concluding that the medical evidence did not meet the criteria for Listing 1.04 and that Zellweger could perform light work. A magistrate reversed, ruling that the ALJ’s discussion was too cursory at step three of the sequential analysis prescribed in the agency regulations: assessing whether the claimant has an impairment that meets or medically equals one of the Listings. Although the ALJ explained his reasoning more thoroughly later in his decision, the magistrate refused to consider that discussion.The Seventh Circuit reversed and remanded. The sequential process is not so rigidly compartmentalized. Nothing prohibits a reviewing court from reading an ALJ’s decision holistically. The ALJ thoroughly analyzed the medical evidence at the step in the sequential analysis that addresses the claimant’s residual functional capacity. That analysis elaborated on the more cursory discussion at step three and was easily adequate to support the ALJ’s rejection of a per se disability under Listing 1.04. View "Zellweger v. Saul" on Justia Law

In 2006 Conners began work as a licensed practical nurse (LPN) at a VA-operated facility near Chicago. Her duties included treating and observing patients, giving immunizations, managing the front desk, teaching classes, and completing paperwork. In 2011 she was hit by a car and suffered severe injuries. Her supervisor initially permitted her to retain her LPN position but radically reduced her responsibilities to only teaching and paperwork. After more than two years in that status, the VA concluded that Conners could not perform the essential duties of an LPN even with reasonable accommodations and unsuccessfully attempted to work with her on an acceptable reassignment. The VA terminated her employment.Conners sued the VA under the Rehabilitation Act for failing to accommodate her disability, retaliating against her, and subjecting her to a hostile work environment based on her disability. The district court rejected the claims on summary judgment. Only the accommodation claim was appealed. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Conners had to prove that when she was fired she was a “qualified individual with a disability,” capable of performing the essential functions of an LPN with or without reasonable accommodation. Conners’s abilities to stand and walk were severely limited, making it impossible for her to treat and observe patients, respond to medical emergencies, give immunizations, or manage the front desk View "Conners v. Wilkie" on Justia Law

Clearview's facial recognition tool takes advantage of public information on the Internet. Clearview uses a proprietary algorithm to “scrape” pictures from social media sites such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, LinkedIn, and Venmo. Clearview’s software harvests from each scraped photograph the biometric facial scan and associated metadata (time and place stamps); that information is put onto its database, which is stored on servers in New York and New Jersey. Clearview offers access to this database for users who wish to find out more about someone in a photograph. Many of its clients are law-enforcement agencies. The New York Times published an article about Clearview.This putative class action asserted violations of Illinois’s Biometric Information Privacy Act, 740 ILCS 14/15. After its removal to federal court, the district court remanded the case to state court, stating that the complaint alleged only a bare statutory violation, not the kind of concrete and particularized harm that would support Article III standing in federal court. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. In alleging a violation of a general rule that prohibits the operation of a market in biometric identifiers and information, the complaint described only a general, regulatory violation, not something that is particularized to the plaintiffs and concrete. It alleged no particularized injury resulting from the commercial transaction. View "Thornley v. Clearview AI, Inc." on Justia Law

On August 17, 2004, Randall opened fire on Copeland’s vehicle while Copeland drove by. Copeland’s car was struck by gunfire. No one was injured. Armfield and Nelson were present. Later that evening, Randall spotted Copeland again. Armfield and Nelson armed themselves. They tracked down Copeland. As Copeland approached an intersection, Randall gave the signal. Armfield and Nelson sprang from their car and fired into Copeland's vehicle, killing him.The state charged the three with first-degree murder. Two separate trials occurred simultaneously before the same judge, with the juries and defendants shuffling in and out depending on the evidence presented. During deliberations, the Armfield/Randall jury requested a transcript of certain witnesses’ testimony. The court, by mistake, tendered a transcript containing the prosecutor’s opening statements from Nelson’s case. The Armfield/Randall jury had not heard this version, in which the prosecutor referenced a videotaped statement from Nelson that purported to implicate all three defendants in the murder. In Armfield's trial, the state leaned primarily on two witnesses. The jury convicted Armfield of first-degree murder. Illinois courts rejected Armfield’s appellate argument that disclosing the reference to Nelson’s confession deprived him of a fair trial and a collateral attack, arguing that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief. Armfield’s Confrontation Clause claim failed because the state’s strong case against him renders any constitutional error harmless. Armfield cannot show trial counsel’s shortcomings resulted in prejudice. View "Armfield v. Nicklaus" on Justia Law