Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Igasaki, a gay, Japanese-American, suffers from gout. From 1994 until his 2015 termination at age 62, Igasaki was an IDFPR staff attorney. In 2011, Forester gave Igasaki a good performance review; in 2012, Forester rated Igasaki poorly, providing specific examples of deficient performance. In 2013, IDFPR placed Igasaki on a corrective action plan. He subsequently received three reprimands. Igasaki made limited progress on seven of 12 plan requirements. The plan listed: failure to meet 50 deadlines; sleeping while at work; problems finding files; and lack of preparation for administrative proceedings. In 2014, the Igasaki was suspended for incompetence. Igasaki’s corrective action plan was again renewed. Igasaki received another suspension for insubordination. In Igasaki’s 2014 review, Forester rated him as needing improvement in all categories. In 2015, Forester noted that he had not progressed on six of the 12 requirements; for the first time, Igasaki formally requested accommodation for his gout. IDFPR granted Igasaki an ergonomic keyboard and authorization for an administrative assistant; Igasaki’s request for flexible deadlines, not supported by a doctor’s note, was denied. IDFPR terminated him weeks later.After filing charges with the Illinois Department of Human Rights and the EEOC, Igasaki sued. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of IDFPR, rejecting claims of race discrimination, sex discrimination, and retaliation (Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2), age discrimination (Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. 623), and disability discrimination (Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12112). View "Igasaki v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation" on Justia Law

Guzman-Cordoba and Alvarado-Santiago participated in an extensive drug trafficking organization operating from Indianapolis and Chicago. Guzman-Cordoba was a drug courier, drug seller, and stash house guard; Alvarado-Santiago laundered the drug proceeds by wiring large sums from the Indianapolis grocery store that he managed to California and Mexico. Nine defendants were indicted. Guzman-Cordoba presented a duress defense, arguing that she had been forced to join the organization through violence and threats of violence to herself and her family. Alvarado-Santiago argued that he did not know that the money he had sent to California and Mexico was drug money. A jury convicted Guzman-Cordoba of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute controlled substances and distribution of methamphetamine and convicted Alvarado-Santiago of conspiracy to launder money.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the district court erred in limiting the evidence Guzman-Cordoba attempted to introduce regarding her duress defense, erred in instructing the jury on that defense, and erred in ordering her to forfeit $10,000 in cash that was found at a stash house. The court rejected Alvarado-Santiago’s argument that the district court erred in only admitting a portion of his post-arrest statement, in admitting a statement by Guzman-Cordoba without limiting the jury’s ability to consider that evidence against him, and in giving the jury an instruction on deliberate avoidance of knowledge, the “ostrich instruction.” View "United States v. Alvarado-Santiago" on Justia Law

In 2020 Union Pacific Railroad announced a change to its employee attendance policy. Several regional branches of the union opposed the change and sought an order under the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. 151a (RLA), requiring Union Pacific to submit the change to collective bargaining. The district court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction; the claim belonged in arbitration before the National Railroad Adjustment Board.The Seventh Circuit affirmed and granted Union Pacific’s motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38 for the frivolous appeal. For the second time in three years, the Brotherhood has pressed a position squarely foreclosed by settled law. The union’s challenge to the revised policy amounted to a “minor dispute” subject to mandatory arbitration under the RLA. Given the parties’ course of dealing over workplace attendance requirements, there was a clear pattern and practice of Union Pacific modifying its policies many times over many years without subjecting changes to collective bargaining, which provided the railroad with a nonfrivolous justification to unilaterally modify its attendance policy. That reality made this dispute a minor one subject to resolution through mandatory arbitration. View "Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers & Trainmen GCA UP v. Union Pacific Railroad Co." on Justia Law

Ashland, Wisconsin police found Strobel passed out in his car beside of the road. A search of Strobel’s vehicle uncovered methamphetamine and resulted in state drug charges. Months later, Ashland police again found Strobel passed out in his car in a parking lot. A search of his car uncovered a firearm, marijuana, and paraphernalia. At the time, Strobel was out on bail. Strobel pleaded guilty to unlawful possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1),. At his sentencing hearing, he raised no objections to the conditions of supervised release proposed in the PSR and waived a full reading of those conditions. The court nevertheless discussed some aspects of the conditions, then imposed explicitly the term of supervised release but neglected to impose explicitly the conditions of supervised release. Later, the court issued its written judgment, which included all the conditions of supervised release recommended by the PSR.Strobel argued that the court’s failure to impose explicitly the conditions of supervised release during the sentencing hearing renders the written judgment inconsistent with the court’s oral pronouncement, requiring the vacation of his sentence and remand for a complete resentencing. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his below-guidelines sentence of one year and one day, to run consecutively with Strobel’s state sentence, finding no impermissible inconsistency between the court’s oral pronouncement and its written judgment. View "United States v. Strobel" on Justia Law

Hickey filed suit under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, alleging that his former employer, Protective Life, had interfered with the exercise of his FMLA rights and had retaliated against him for exercising those rights. Hickey later abandoned his retaliation claim. The district court held that Hickey could not succeed on his interference claim because he was unable to prove that he had suffered any monetary damages as a result of the alleged interference or was otherwise entitled to equitable relief. The court refused to consider a supplemental declaration that, according to the court, contradicted Hickey’s deposition testimony.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court correctly concluded that, without evidence that Hickey suffered harm for which the FMLA provides a remedy, Hickey does not have a cognizable action for FMLA interference, and did not abuse its discretion in refusing to consider Hickey’s supplemental declaration as evidence of damages. When Hickey returned from his FMLA leave, he received the same salary and benefits as he had received before his leave. Under the arrangement given him upon his return, his compensation could have diminished after six months but his employment with Protective terminated approximately three weeks after his return for reasons unrelated to his FMLA leave. View "Hickey v. Protective Life Corp." on Justia Law

Hall filed a 28 U.S.C. 2241 petition in the Southern District of Indiana while incarcerated at a facility operated by the federal Bureau of Prisons in that district. Hall was later transferred to a federal prison in the Middle District of Florida. The Indiana district court concluded that it had lost jurisdiction over the petition, and transferred Hall’s case to Florida.The Seventh Circuit granted Hall a writ of mandamus, directing the Indiana court to rescind the transfer and return the case to Indiana. When the government moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate custodian, the district court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent within its jurisdiction who has the legal authority to effectuate the prisoner’s release. Hall filed in the correct court and named his immediate custodian; there is a respondent within the jurisdiction of the original court that has the authority to comply with any order that may issue. The Bureau of Prisons has been and remains Hall’s ultimate custodian; the Bureau can take any necessary action. Mandamus is the proper vehicle for review of a transfer decision, including transfers of a habeas corpus proceeding. Hall did not need to show prejudice before pursuing his venue challenge. View "Hall v. Hanlon" on Justia Law

In 2016, Nebinger pleaded guilty as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The Probation Office determined that he qualified as an armed career criminal, based on prior convictions for Illinois residential burglary, drug possession with intent to deliver, and aggravated battery, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), which changed his sentencing exposure from a 10-year maximum sentence to a 15-year minimum sentence. The court held that his burglary conviction was an improper ACCA predicate and imposed a 10-year sentence. On remand, in light of a Seventh Circuit holding that the Illinois residential burglary statute corresponds to ACCA generic burglary, the court increased his sentence to 15 years.The Seventh Circuit remanded. While this litigation was pending, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled that Illinois residential burglary is not an ACCA predicate. The Supreme Court’s 2019 "Rehaif" holding that the government must prove that the defendant knew that he fell within one of the categories of people who are not entitled to possess guns does not invalidate Nebinger's guilty plea. The knowledge element requires only that the defendant knew, at the time he possessed the firearm, that he was a felon; he did not also need to know that his status prohibited him from possessing a firearm. Neither Neblinger's indictment nor the government’s proffered factual basis for the conviction mentioned Nebinger’s knowledge of his status but Nebinger cannot establish prejudice. He admitted to six prior felony convictions at his plea colloquy. View "United States v. Nebinger" on Justia Law

In 1990, 18-year-old Perez entered the U.S. from Mexico without inspection. She was apprehended and was personally served with an Order to Show Cause, ordering her to appear for a deportation hearing at a time and place “to be set.” She was released on her own recognizance. A hearing was set for July 1992. The immigration court sent notice of the hearing to the New York address Perez provided upon being released. A second notice was sent by certified mail and a receipt bearing the signature of “Rebeca Perez” arrived at the immigration court. Perez insists that she never received either notice.The IJ found her deportable in her absence and sent Perez the decision. No appeal followed. In 2018, Perez moved to reopen those proceedings. The intervening 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), increased the requirements for the document used to initiate “removal,” mandating a Notice to Appear specifying the time and place of a hearing, 8 U.S.C. 1229(a)(1). IIRIRA also created new discretionary relief, “cancellation of removal,” available to certain non-citizens in active removal proceedings who demonstrate 10 years of continuous physical presence in the U.S. Under the “stop-time rule,” the period of continuous physical presence ends when a non-citizen receives a Notice to Appear. In 2018, the Supreme Court held (Pereira) that a Notice to Appear omitting the time and place of a removal hearing does not trigger the stop-time rule.The immigration judge, the BIA, and the Seventh Circuit denied relief. Pereira did not apply because Perez received an Order to Show Cause; Pereira concerned Notices to Appear. Perez was not in removal proceedings but had faced deportation proceedings. View "Perez-Perez v. Wilkinson" on Justia Law

Williams has been seeking release since he began serving his 2013 18‐year sentence for robbery and brandishing a firearm, contending that his guilty plea was involuntary. In 2020, Williams asked the warden to move for his compassionate release, arguing that the judge’s role in his plea negotiations was an “extraordinary and compelling” reason for relief, 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The warden never responded. Weeks later, Williams moved the district court for compassionate release on the same ground. Court-appointed counsel filed an amended motion, advancing a different ground: the COVID‐19 pandemic and Williams’s risk of exposure stemming from his role as a prison chapel usher. The government opposed the motion on the merits and argued that Williams had not met the statute’s exhaustion requirement. The district court denied the motion on the merits, noting that Williams admitted that he did not suffer from any significant medical conditions that might increase his COVID-19 risk.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, also concluding that Williams failed to exhaust his Bureau of Prisons remedies. Exhaustion is a mandatory, claim‐processing rule and must be enforced when properly invoked. An inmate is required to present the same or similar ground for compassionate release in a request to the Bureau as in a motion to the court; any contrary approach would undermine the purpose of exhaustion—to provide the Bureau with information necessary to move for release on a defendant’s behalf. View "United States v. Williams" on Justia Law

Horne rented a drain rodding machine made by Electric Eel from Home Depot. A Home Depot employee selected the machine, which had been tested before it was shipped. After a previous customer returned the machine, a Home Depot employee had determined that it was defective and replaced the foot pedal. Two friends were with Horne as he used the rodder. The powered reverse did not work, so Horne tried to remove the cable by hand. The cable wrapped around his forearm; he was thrown to the ground. Horne’s right hand was badly injured. The wound became gangrenous, most of his right index finger had to be amputated. Horne sued Home Depot and Electric Eel for negligence and breach of warranty and Electric Eel for strict product liability.The Seventh Circuit vacated, in part, summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court noted conflicting provisions of Home Depot’s rental agreement. Horne assumed the risks of operating a machine in good working condition but did not assume the risks of operating a machine with flaws in its basic functioning. Horne has evidence that three key features of the machine were defective; a jury could infer that those defects caused his injuries. He is entitled to take his case against Home Depot to trial. Horne did not establish that Home Depot's Exculpatory Clause violated public policy. Horne failed to establish the absence of abnormal use or reasonable secondary causes and did not tie Electric Eel to his injuries. View "Horne v. Electric Eel Manufacturing Co., Inc." on Justia Law