Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

When Indiana officials determine that a child is suffering abuse or neglect, they initiate the Child in Need of Services (CHIN) process. Lawyers are automatically appointed for parents but not for children in the CHINS process. The plaintiffs, children in the CHINS process, claimed that they are entitled to counsel. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit, citing “Younger” abstention. While declining to decide that Younger would mandate abstention in all CHINS cases, the court reasoned that principles of comity entitle states to make their own decisions. Because children are not automatically entitled to lawyers, as opposed to the sort of adult assistance that Indiana routinely provides, it would be inappropriate for a federal court to resolve the appointment-of-counsel question in any of the 10 plaintiffs’ state proceedings. A state judge may decide to appoint counsel or may explain why counsel is unnecessary. View "Nicole K. v. Stigdon" on Justia Law

In 2012, Berrios was charged with Hobbs Act robbery in connection with an armed robbery of a Chicago AT&T store. The next day, as Berrios and his associate were preparing to rob a currency exchange, the FBI conducted a traffic stop and arrested Berrios without a warrant. During a search incident to that arrest, the agents recovered a Samsung phone and other items including a BB gun that Berrios’ group had used in a series of robberies. The FBI conducted a warrantless search of the phone, downloading the contacts, call logs, text messages, and photographs. Some photos showed Berrios with his co-defendants. The government later admitted that the phone search was illegal but argued that the law at the time of the search did not prohibit it, so the "Davis" good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. The other evidence at trial included co-defendant testimony, Berrios’s post-arrest statements, a recorded call that Berrios made from jail, surveillance videos, victim testimony, and the other items recovered from the car.A jury convicted Berrios on all counts; he was sentenced to a total term of 360 months. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a motion to suppress and the convictions. Stating that it “was a close call,” the court concluded that although there was no binding precedent that would have exempted this search from the exclusionary rule, the independent-source rule allowed the admission of the limited evidence the government used. View "United States v. Berrios" on Justia Law

Woodson received prenatal treatment from Dr. Ramsey at NorthShore Health Centers. Ramsey informed Woodson that she would likely need to deliver her baby by C-section. Ramsey delivered P.W. vaginally at Anonymous Hospital. Woodson noticed immediately that something was wrong with P.W.’s left arm. P.W.’s arm did not improve.NorthShore is a Federally-qualified health center (FQHC) that receives federal money (42 U.S.C. 1396d(l)(2)(B)); its employees are deemed Public Health Service employees, covered against malpractice claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 42 U.S.C. 233(g). NorthShore appears in the federal government's online public database of federal funding recipients whose employees may be deemed Public Health Service employees. Woodson’s attorney, Sandoval, failed to recognize NorthShore’s status as an FQHC. Sandoval reviewed the Indiana Department of Insurance (IDOI) and Indiana Patient’s Compensation Fund online databases and learned that Ramsey and Anonymous Hospital were “qualified” providers under the Indiana Medical Malpractice Act. The IDOI forwarded Woodson’s complaint to Ramsey and his insurance carrier. Those claims remain pending.On December 16, 2015, NorthShore informed Sandoval that NorthShore was a federally funded health center. Woodson filed administrative tort claims, which were denied. Nearly three years after P.W.’s birth, Woodson filed suit against the government and Anonymous Hospital. The Seventh Circuit affirmed that the claims accrued on December 7, 2013, the day P.W. was born, and were untimely under the FTCA’s two-year statute of limitations. Woodson had enough information shortly after P.W.'s birth to prompt her to inquire whether the manner of delivery caused P.W.’s injury. The FTCA savings provision does not apply because the IDOI never dismissed the claims. Neither Ramsey nor NorthShore had a duty to inform Woodson of their federal status. View "P.W. v. United States" on Justia Law

Women who work at the Cook County Jail or the adjoining courthouse filed a class-action suit against their employers for failing to prevent male inmates from sexually harassing them. The district court certified a class comprising all non‐supervisory female employees who work with male inmates at the jail or courthouse, of whom there are about 2,000.On interlocutory appeal, the Seventh Circuit held that the district court abused its discretion in certifying the class under Rule 23. The court’s primary error was using the peripheral and overbroad concept of “ambient harassment” (i.e., indirect or secondhand harassment) to certify a class of employees who have endured a wide range of direct and indirect harassment. Even without this error, the class cannot stand because it comprises class members with materially different working environments whose claims require separate, individualized analyses. Hostile work environment claims are fact-intensive. They turn on the frequency, severity, character, and effect of the harassment. Here, these are “worker‐specific” inquiries because they depend on a class member’s unique experience—which correlates to where she works. Some class members will have had comparable experiences but the plaintiffs have not proven that for the entire class. View "Howard v. Cook County Sheriff's Office" on Justia Law

Illinois law enforcement agents received a tip from a confidential source claiming that Smith had been dealing methamphetamine in Mattoon. The agents conducted controlled buys between Smith and the source and requested that a patrol officer stop Smith’s vehicle. The officer stopped the vehicle for “extremely dark window tinting,” and learned that Smith’s license was suspended. There was a 10-minute wait for batteries for the device to measure the tint. The officer then searched the vehicle and found marijuana, a marijuana grinder, and a firearm.Represented by court-appointed counsel, Smith pleaded guilty to distributing methamphetamine and possessing a firearm as a felon. He then sought to retract his guilty plea, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The court denied Smith’s motion, rejected his request for an evidentiary hearing, and sentenced him to 214 months’ imprisonment. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Smith cannot establish that he would have succeeded on a motion to suppress the firearm evidence and did not demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s pressure to accept a plea, he would not have pleaded guilty. There is no evidence that appointed counsel made a misrepresentation or that suggests his unfamiliarity with the case. The court correctly applied the career offender enhancement to Smith’s sentence. View "United States v. Smith" on Justia Law

Perry suffers from serious mental illness defined by two suicide attempts, severe depression, paranoid schizophrenia, and auditory hallucinations. He is serving a 70-year sentence for murdering his former wife during a fit of paranoia in 2013. In 2016, while housed in the Wabash Valley Correctional Facility in southern Indiana, Perry’s condition worsened. He refused all medication, stopped eating because he feared someone had poisoned his food, renewed his conspiracy claims against the Wabash medical staff, and threatened to kill himself if left in his cell any longer. A medical review and administrative hearing culminated in a decision to forcibly administer the antipsychotic medication Haldol. Injections continued for about six months.Perry later sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the forcible medication violated the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment and the Due Process Clause. The district court denied Perry’s request to appoint counsel, finding that Perry understood his case and quite ably prosecuted it. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. The defendants attended carefully to Perry’s health and safety. The Facility’s Review Committee had enough evidence to demonstrate that Perry was a danger to himself or others so as to justify the involuntary administration of Haldol. View "Perry v. Sims" on Justia Law

In 2002, GTL, a mutual reserve company that underwrites insurance policies, engaged Platinum to market its insurance products. After a customer sued both parties, GTL terminated the marketing agreement. In 2015, the lawsuit settled. GTL sued Platinum for breaching the marketing agreement. In 2017, in arbitration, GTL and Platinum entered a settlement agreement, resolving all the claims that had and could have been brought in that litigation and providing for “reasonably proportionate” attorneys fees to the prevailing party in any future litigation. Weeks before the parties executed the 2017 settlement, another customer sued GTL in Missouri. After the 2017 settlement agreement took effect, GTL filed a third-party complaint against Platinum in that Missouri lawsuit, claiming that Platinum breached the marketing agreement by failing to ensure its contractors’ compliance with regulations, GTL's guidelines, and requirements for advertising its insurance products, and GTL's Code of Ethical Market Conduct.Platinum sued GTL in federal court, arguing that the Missouri third-party complaint mirrored claims resolved by the 2017 settlement agreement and was therefore barred. The district court granted Platinum summary judgment and awarded $108,445.10 in attorneys fees (150% of the underlying damages award). The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The 2017 agreement bars the third-party complaint and the award of attorneys fees is “reasonably proportionate” to the underlying damages. View "Platinum Supplemental Insurance, Inc. v. Guarantee Trust Life Insurance Co." on Justia Law

The Roque drug trafficking organization moved more than 1,500 kilograms of cocaine and 100 kilograms of heroin from Mexico to Chicago for distribution and sale. The district judge stated that she had never seen “the level of drugs that were pumped into Chicago” by this criminal enterprise.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sentences of seven Roque organization defendants, ranging from 150 to 420 months’ imprisonment. The court rejected arguments that the district court misinterpreted the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities under 18 U.S.C. 3553(a)(6) and failed to adequately consider their arguments on that issue. The court upheld the imposition of enhancements for possession of a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking offense under U.S.S.G. 2D1.1(b)(1), for two defendants. The district court committed no error, properly avoided unwarranted sentencing disparities, correctly applied the Sentencing Guidelines, and appropriately imposed supervised release conditions, with one minor exception relating to a condition concerning the consumption of alcohol. View "United States v. Cervantes" on Justia Law

Police responded to a call that a homeless person was sleeping in a car behind a store and found Reedy wearing a bulletproof vest in the front passenger seat of a Kia. They saw an open knife, crowbar, and walkie-talkie on the car’s floorboard. Reedy said that his friend, Jason, was visiting someone nearby. Telling Reedy to stay put with one officer, another officer looked for Jason and found him in a backyard wearing dress clothes yet claiming to be doing lawn work. Searching Jason’s backpack, officers found methamphetamine, credit cards in others’ names, latex gloves, rocks, knives, bolt cutters, shotgun ammo, and a walkie-talkie tuned to the same channel as Reedy’s. A search of the Kia turned up a shotgun. Reedy faced a federal gun possession charge.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of Reedy’s motion to suppress. Officers had ample authority to direct Reedy to step out of his car and to subject him to further questioning and investigation consistent with Terry; there was no unreasonable delay in the execution of the Terry stop. This same sequence of events supplied the probable cause necessary to arrest Reedy. Once the police returned Jason to the car, the initial Terry stop of Reedy effectively turned into an arrest supported by probable cause for, at minimum, possession of burglarious tools. View "United States v. Reedy" on Justia Law

Smith suffered an injury from a car accident, retained an attorney for a personal injury lawsuit, and authorized her attorney to obtain her healthcare information. The attorney requested Smith’s medical records from MHS, on three occasions. RecordQuest, not MHS, answered those requests and charged Smith’s attorney (who paid on her behalf) a $20.96 handling fee and an $8.26 certification fee each time.Smith brought a class action, alleging these charged fees contravened the permissible fee schedule set out in Wis. Stat. 146.83(3f)(b) for healthcare records requests and resulted in the unjust enrichment of RecordQuest. The district court dismissed both claims, reasoning that the statute imposes a duty upon only healthcare providers.” RecordQuest is not a healthcare provider but is the agent of MHS; “no principle of agency law holds that a principal’s liability is imputed to the agent when the agent performs the act that results in the principal’s liability.” Smith’s unjust enrichment claim failed because any unjust benefit that Smith allegedly conferred to RecordQuest belonged to MHS.The Wisconsin Court of Appeals subsequently expressly disagreed with the district court’s analysis of Smith’s statutory claim. The Seventh Circuit reversed the dismissal of the statutory claim but affirmed as to Smith’s unjust enrichment claim. Under section 146.83(3f)(b), Smith has a remedy at law for any “injustice” that allegedly resulted from excessive payments; the equitable remedy of unjust enrichment is derivative of and predicated upon the statutory claim. View "Smith v. RecordQuest LLC" on Justia Law