Justia U.S. 7th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Pennell defaulted on a loan, then sent MobiLoans a letter refusing to pay her debt and requesting that all future debt communications cease. MobiLoans sold Pennell’s debt to Global, which had no knowledge that Pennell refused to pay and that she was represented by counsel. Pennell received a dunning letter from Global. Through counsel, Pennell notified Global that she refused to pay the debt and requested all debt communications stop. Global complied. Pennell sued under 15 U.S.C. 1692c(a)(2), the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, which prohibits a debt collector from directly communicating with a consumer who is represented by counsel with respect to the debt and proscribes a debt collector from directly communicating with a consumer who notifies a debt collector in writing that she refuses to pay or that she wishes the collector to stop communicating with her. Pennell claimed “stress and confusion” as her injuries. The district court granted Global summary judgment on the merits. The Seventh Circuit vacated and ordered dismissal for lack of Article III standing. A party invoking federal jurisdiction must demonstrate that he has suffered an injury in fact that is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct and redressable by a favorable judicial decision. The state of confusion is not itself a “concrete and particularized” injury. Nor does stress, without physical manifestations or a medical diagnosis, amount to concrete harm. Pennell failed to show that receiving the dunning letter led her to change her course of action or put her in harm’s way. View "Pennell v. Global Trust Management, LLC" on Justia Law

Coleman is serving a 45-year sentence for attempting to murder Dye. He was tried twice. The first jury acquitted him of murdering Jackson during the same incident but could not reach a unanimous verdict on the charge of attempted murder. The events were captured by a surveillance camera. By the time Coleman shot Jackson, Dye was on the ground with two bullets in him and Jackson had opened fire at Coleman. Coleman cited the Double Jeopardy Clause, arguing that the first jury must have found that he acted in self-defense when killing Jackson and that this conclusion necessarily applies to Dye. Coleman also argued ineffective assistance at the second trial. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of habeas relief. It does not require any deference to conclude that Coleman’s acquittal on the murder charge does not establish self-defense in Dye's shooting. Coleman shot Dye twice, including once after he was on the ground. Applying the “Strickland” standard, the court concluded that counsel’s overall performance was admirable. Dye testified at both trials. His testimony was subtly different; Coleman’s lawyer did not try to impeach Dye at the second trial. Counsel may have felt that pointing out such modest inconsistencies would have been nitpicky. That judgment call did not result in prejudice, in light of the video. View "Coleman v. Neal" on Justia Law

The School terminated Pack's employment as a teacher after less than a year and published a press release about Pack on its website, allegedly criticizing Pack, which remains available on the School’s website. Pack sued the School. The Elkhart Truth ran an article later that month under the headline: “Fired Northridge teacher, an atheist, sues Middlebury Community Schools for religious discrimination.” Pack and the School settled that case. The School agreed to maintain a level of confidentiality and agreed to tell Pack’s prospective employers only limited information about him. The parties agreed that neither would disparage the other party. The settlement agreement did not mention the 2014 press release. Pack sued Elkhart Truth in state court, alleging defamation. School Superintendent Allen gave an affidavit supporting Truth’s motion to dismiss. Pack later recruited two acquaintances to call the School and pose as prospective employers. During one call, Allen said that Pack’s termination was “a matter of public record.” During another, Allen said Pack was terminated “for cause.”Pack sued for breach of the settlement agreement. The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the School on all claims. The School had no contractual obligation to remove the pre-existing press release from its website, enjoys absolute privilege for the affidavit submitted in the Truth litigation, and did not disclose contractually forbidden information to “prospective employers” because the callers were not “prospective employers.” View "Pack v. Middlebury Community Schools" on Justia Law

In 1997, for his participation (at age 18) in a deadly kidnapping scheme to collect drug debts, Ruiz was convicted of conspiracy to commit racketeering, conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping resulting in death, assaulting a federal officer, four counts of violating the Hostage Act, including one count resulting in death, and three counts of using a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence (18 U.S.C. 924(c)). The indictment listed a different predicate offense for each section 924(c) count: the underlying conspiracy to commit kidnapping, kidnapping, and assault on a federal officer charges. The Seventh Circuit affirmed his seven concurrent life sentences plus a consecutive term of 45 years for using a firearm during the underlying crimes of violence.Ruiz made several unsuccessful attempts to challenge his sentence through 28 U.S.C. 2255 and 2241. After the Supreme Court invalided as unconstitutionally vague the residual clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act, one of the Act’s alternative definitions for a predicate “violent felony,” Ruiz obtained permission (28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3_) to file a new collateral attack, contending that the residual clause of section 924(c)’s definition of “crime of violence” was unconstitutionally vague and that his predicate offenses otherwise did not count as crimes of violence under section 924(c)’s elements clause.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Ruiz’s petition on harmless error grounds; any error in his section 924(c) convictions would have no effect on Ruiz’s seven life sentences. View "Ruiz v. United States" on Justia Law

Informants reported that Slone was selling methamphetamine out of his basement apartment in Dillon's house. In that basement, agents found two guns, 80 grams of meth, and paperwork in Slone’s name. Dillon stated that Slone had recently moved out, leaving his possessions and that Slone sold meth. Agents later found Slone staying with a friend. A search revealed a small amount of meth and a scale in the apartment, and a revolver in the friend’s van, which she said Slone had borrowed. Slone admitted that he had dealt meth, stayed in Dillon’s basement, and had purchased the guns.Slone was charged with possession with intent to distribute the 80 grams of methamphetamine, and illegally possessing firearms as a felon (non-payment of child support), 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). A jury acquitted Slone on the drug charge but convicted him on the firearm charge. The court sentenced him to 41 months’ imprisonment, based on a guidelines range of 41–51 months, adding two offense levels for obstruction of justice, based on perjury, and a four-level enhancement, concluding that Slone possessed the firearms “in connection with” the felony offense of meth trafficking. The court found that the guns potentially facilitated distribution regardless of whether the 80 grams seized were Slone’s and stated that, even if the enhancement did not apply, it would impose the same 41-month sentence based on the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors.The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The government did not need to show that Slone ever carried or brandished the gun during a sale; a gun that is available to protect a drug stash has the potential of facilitating drug trafficking. View "United States v. Slone" on Justia Law

In 2002, Dr. Phillips performed a hysterectomy on Bramlett; she died from complications days later. Bramlett’s family sued Phillips, his clinic, and the hospital. Phillips and his clinic held a $200,000 MedPro professional liability insurance policy. The hospital settled for about $2.3 million. Under Texas law, an insurer who rejects a settlement demand (Stowers demand) within policy limits that a reasonably prudent insurer would accept will later be liable for any amount awarded in excess of the policy limit. MedPro refused two $200,000 Stowers demands. A jury returned a $14 million verdict. In 2009, the Supreme Court of Texas capped Phillips’s liability at $1.6 million. The Bramletts sued MedPro. The parties settled for a confidential amount.MedPro asked its insurer, AISLIC, to cover the settlement. AISLIC refused. The district court rejected MedPro's claims under an exclusion, finding that MedPro’s rejections of the two Stowers demands were Wrongful Acts that MedPro could have reasonably foreseen would lead to a claim.On remand, the district court held that MedPro could invoke coverage without having to prove that it actually committed a “Wrongful Act,” and found that a claim was not first asserted against MedPro for its failure to settle for policy limits before the 2006 AISLIC Policy incepted. A jury found that MedPro did not commit a “Wrongful Act.” The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district court properly held that MedPro was covered by the 2006 Policy before the jury decided the issue of exclusion. The earlier interpretation of the policy did not require a holding that MedPro never committed a “Wrongful Act” necessary to invoke coverage. MedPro can invoke coverage because the claim that it settled was not brought before the policy period began. View "Medical Protective Company of Fort Wayne v. American International Specialty Lines Insurance Co" on Justia Law

Owned by the Indiana Finance Authority, the Indiana Toll Road has been operated since 2006 by a lessee, ITR. What ITR can charge depends on state law. In 2018, ITR paid the state $1 billion in exchange for permission to raise by 35 percent the tolls on heavy trucks. The district court dismissed a suit under the Commerce Clause, reasoning that Indiana, as a market participant, was exempt from rules ordinarily applied under the Commerce Clause.The Seventh Circuit affirmed, stating that the increase is valid even if it discriminates against interstate commerce. The tolls are neutral with respect to the origins, destinations, and ownership of the trucks. The court also reasoned that when a state participates in, rather than just regulates, the market, it may discriminate in favor of its own citizens and declined to find that tollways “are different.” The court noted the history of private ownership of roads. View "Owner-Operator Independent Drivers Association, Inc. v. Holcomb" on Justia Law

Madigan was elected to the Illinois House of Representatives in 1970 and re-elected to 25 additional two-year terms. He became Speaker of the House in 1983 and the state’s Democratic Party Chairman in 1998. In 2021 he withdrew from the race to be reelected as Speaker and resigned his seat in the House and his role as Chairman. Four candidates were on the ballot for the 2016 Democratic primary. Madigan won with 65% of the votes; Gonzales received 27%, Rodriguez 6%, and Barboza 2%. Gonzales sued, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that Rodriguez and Barboza were stooges put on the ballot by Madigan’s allies to divide the Hispanic vote, violating the Equal Protection Clause.The district judge noted that Gonzales had made his suspicions public early in the race and that an editorial in the Chicago Sun-Times agreed with Gonzales. Concluding that the voters were not deceived, the court granted summary judgment against Gonzales. The Seventh Circuit affirmed. The district judge did not penalize Gonzales’s campaign speech. Speech, including in depositions and interrogatories, often affects litigation's outcome; a judge who takes account of speech that proves or refutes a claim does not violate the First Amendment. Gonzales told the voters that he thought Madigan had played a dirty trick. The electorate sided with Madigan. The Constitution does not authorize the judiciary to upset that outcome or to penalize a politician for employing a shady strategy that voters tolerate. View "Gonzales v. Madigan" on Justia Law

The Illinois Public Labor Relations Act allowed public unions to require nonmembers to pay “fair share” or “agency” fees to compensate for the representative services the union provides. In 1977 the Supreme Court concluded that a similar fair-share fees law did not violate nonmembers’ First Amendment rights. In 2018, in “Janus,” the Supreme Court overruled that decision and held that unions compelling the payment of fair share fees from nonmembers offended the First Amendment by compelling nonmembers to subsidize private speech on matters of substantial public concern.”Local 150 represents around 3,300 municipal employees in 133 bargaining units, employing nine staff members at an annual cost of about $5 million. Local 150 remains obligated to represent nonmembers but must now do so without any way of compelling fair share fees. Local 150 filed suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the duty of fair representation in Illinois law without the corresponding ability to collect fair share fees infringes the union’s First Amendment rights of free speech and association.The district court entered summary judgment against the union. The Seventh Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss the union’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The union has not alleged any concrete and particular facts showing that it faces a post-Janus freeriding predicament. The court declined to address the substantial legal question in the abstract. View "Sweeney v. Raoul" on Justia Law

The church holds weekly in-person worship services attended by approximately 80 people. Its pastor suspended these services after he received a March 31, 2020 “Cease and Desist Notice” from the county health department that threatened penalties under Illinois Executive Order 2020-10, issued March 20, 2020, if the church continued to host in-person gatherings of ten or more people. The Plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction, citing the First Amendment and the Illinois Religious Freedom Restoration Act and alleging violations of their due process rights and that the Order exceeded the governor’s powers.On May 29, months before plaintiffs filed their appellate brief, the governor issued Executive Order 2020-38, which removed the mandate. All subsequent pandemic-related executive orders have expressly exempted religious gatherings from mandatory restrictions.The Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction. While intervening Supreme Court decisions offer a greater prospect for success on the merits of the First Amendment claim than previously expected, they have also indicated that equitable considerations weigh against granting a preliminary injunction at this time. The prospect of irreparable injury to the plaintiffs is very low; the public interest weighs substantially against injunctive relief. The federal procedural due process claim was not presented to the district court. The Eleventh Amendment bars relief against the governor; it may also bar relief against the local defendants. All of the state-law claims are poor candidates for a federal court’s exercise of supplemental jurisdiction. View "Cassell v. Snyders" on Justia Law